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How Anonymous Are Paper Ballots?

A new research report brings into question the degree of anonymity in paper ballots. The finding raises potential concerns for states and election jurisdictions considering the merits of either making ballots available for public review or releasing them under freedom of information requests. We find reasons for concern with ballot anonymity and reasons for skepticism that the result will hold under additional research.

A new research report brings into question the degree of anonymity in paper ballots: New Research Result: Bubble Forms Not So Anonymous <read overview> <report>

From the overview:

Today, Joe Calandrino, Ed Felten and I are releasing a new result regarding the anonymity of fill-in-the-bubble forms. These forms, popular for their use with standardized tests, require respondents to select answer choices by filling in a corresponding bubble. Contradicting a widespread implicit assumption, we show that individuals create distinctive marks on these forms, allowing use of the marks as a biometric. Using a sample of 92 surveys, we show that an individual’s markings enable unique re-identification within the sample set more than half of the time. The potential impact of this work is as diverse as use of the forms themselves, ranging from cheating detection on standardized tests to identifying the individuals behind “anonymous” surveys or election ballots.

The data is based on a sample of 92 ballots filled out at the same time, on the same form, using the same writing instrument:

To test the limits of our analysis approach, we obtained a set of 92 surveys and extracted 20 bubbles from each of those surveys. We set aside 8 bubbles per survey to test our identification accuracy and trained our model on the remaining 12 bubbles per survey…

Additional testing—particularly using forms completed at different times—is necessary to assess the real-world impact of this work. Nevertheless, the strength of these preliminary results suggests both positive and negative implications depending on the application. For standardized tests, the potential impact is largely positive. Imagine that a student takes a standardized test, performs poorly, and pays someone to repeat the test on his behalf. Comparing the bubble marks on both answer sheets could provide evidence of such cheating. A similar approach could detect third-party modification of certain answers on a single test.

The possible impact on elections using optical scan ballots is more mixed. One positive use is to detect ballot box stuffing—our methods could help identify whether someone replaced a subset of the legitimate ballots with a set of fraudulent ballots completed by herself. On the other hand, our approach could help an adversary with access to the physical ballots or scans of them to undermine ballot secrecy. Suppose an unscrupulous employer uses a bubble form employment application. That employer could test the markings against ballots from an employee’s jurisdiction to locate the employee’s ballot. This threat is more realistic in jurisdictions that release scans of ballots.

The finding raises potential concerns for states and election jurisdictions considering the merits of either making ballots available for public review or releasing them under freedom of information requests. We find reasons for concern with ballot anonymity and reasons for skepticism that the result will hold under additional research. Before concluding a number of serious implications, it is critical to do longitudinal studies, as recommended in the report, and to study several other challenging dimensions. Considerations and directions include:

On a small sample, a 51% chance of the most likely individual being correctly identified may not be all that useful, not knowing which 51% are the correct identifications.
How does the probability of the detection of correct correspondent vary with the number of voters? 100, 200, 400, 800 etc.
Are there classes of voters that clump and are hard to distinguish and others that are fairly unique? Is this similar to blood type classifications, with more types, but much less distinct classes? Or is it similar to DNA with many variations, but again nowhere near as distinct?
From looking at a lot of ballots in audits and recanvasses it is clear to me that people do make consistent marks in bubbles on a single ballot, with a single instrument, on a single day, however:
- Do voters make the same marks over time and in different contexts?
- To what extent do single voters or collective groups of voters fill in bubbles the same way from election to election? I suspect it varies from person to person as well,. For me I suspect I am very inconsistent from election to election, except that I do tend to fill in complete bubbles – which would place me in a large class of voters difficult to distinguish individually.
- Filling out an SAT or survey can be quite different than voting. In an SAT we think more and in different ways, under much more stress. In a survey we may hardly think or care at all.
In Connecticut we use felt tip pens in polling places. To what extent does such a thicker instrument make the classification more or less accurate? I would suspect the thicker the instrument the more difficult the classification in general.
In longitudinal studies (using forms filled out on different occasions, days, weeks, months, or years apart): How much more difficult is identification when the instrument varies? e.g. Felt tip pens can be drier or wetter, vary in thickness based on use. Pencils can vary by sharpness, vary by manufacturer. Pens and pencil marks may vary in the way the instrument is be able to be gripped or is gripped on a particular occasion.
What good are past examples from one type of test/ballot type to another? I suspect difficulties based on bubble size, bubble shape, rectangles, or connecting lines – even shape of ballot/test form, layout, lighting, sitting vs. standing etc.
For example, let us say an employer, union, government entity, criminal enterprise, or church wanted to use this method to test votes of individual employees/members, without their knowledge. What accuracy/confidence could they expect with samples from presumably a small subset of voters in a precinct when attempting to identify their ballots in a sea of ballots filled out by other voters?

More research is necessary before we can conclude the degree to which bubble analysis can be used to identify voters. Even so there would be trade-offs between public the positive value and risks of public availability of ballots for review. There are mechanisms of election transparency short of public disclosure of complete paper ballots – methods which could reduce risks but at some risks to credibility and transparency. Of course we could eliminate paper ballots all together and take the greater risks of errors, skulduggery, and lack of confidence of electronic voting like we have seen in recently in New Jersey, last year in Kentucky and several years ago in Sarasota.

Flip-Flopping has its place, but not in voting

Reading and listening to the media we are led to believe that flip-flopping is the worst possible political sin. Wrong. Much of the time we spend writing, voice-mailing, or speaking with legislators is working to convince them to understand a more complete picture; to change their positions on issues.

Brad Friedman covers the case of a voting machine flip-flopping in Los Vegas and the history of flip-flopping and completely missing votes: Las Vegas Mayoral Candidate Sees Own Vote Flipped to Opponent on Touch-screen Voting Machine <read>

It took two tries, but Carolyn Goodman, candidate for Mayor of Las Vegas, and wife of current Mayor Oscar Goodman, was finally able to vote for herself today on Nevada’s illegally-certified, 100% unverifiable Sequoia AVC Edge touch-screen voting machines. At least she thinks she did. Whether her vote will actually be counted for her is something that nobody can ever know…

The failure that Goodman had, and noticed, is just the latest in a string of celebs and candidates who have had similar problems with 100% unverifiable voting machines — as still used by some 20 to 30% of voters in the U.S. — either flipping their vote, or not allowing them to vote at all…
[Randy] Wooten was running for mayor in the rural Poinsett County town with a population of just 80 people that year, when he learned, after the close of polls on Election Night, that he had received a grand total of ZERO votes, as reported by the county’s ES&S iVotronic touch-screen voting systems.

As AP noted at the time Wooten said, “I had at least eight or nine people who said they voted for me, so something is wrong with this picture.” Among those people who Wooten believed had voted for him: himself and his wife.

In Praise Of Flip-Flopping

In 2005, Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, publicly tested and was about to choose unverifiable touch screen (DRE) voting machines similar to those in Los Vegas – then she looked at the evidence, considered additional information from vocal advocates, and flip-flopped. That is why we have voter verifiable paper ballots and optical scanners in Connecticut, with a side benefit of saving about half the cost of DREs.

Senate passes risky, expensive online voting bill – Now on consent calendar

Despite opposition by the Secretary of the State and promises to the contrary, the Senate passed S.B.939 with online voting, placing it on the Senate consent calendar.

Despite opposition by the Secretary of the State and promises to the contrary, the Senate passed S.B.939 with online voting, placing it on the Senate consent calendar. Now Section 59 rather than Section 60:

Sec. 59. (Effective from passage) The Secretary of the State shall, within available appropriations, recommend a method to allow for on-line voting by military personnel stationed out of state. The Secretary shall 1830 look at what other states have done to reduce any potential for fraud in on-line voting and determine whether any such state’s on-line voting system could be appropriate for adapted use by this state. Not later than January 1, 2012, the secretary shall, in accordance with the provisions of section 11-4a of the general statutes, report any progress made toward recommending such a method to the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to elections.

For more information see < post on bill status> and <Op-Ed on online voting>.

Update: It has been pointed out to me that the word “recommend” in the amended bill replaces “establish” in the previous version.

Update: It is the law now. Passed by House with debate, but none about the Online voting provision. Only Representative Tim O’Brien voted against.

Welcome to Post-Confidence Elections

Laws and procedures which are not enforced for elections in the name of “trust us” and “it would be too much work”, are no more real than the laws and Constitutional provisions ignored in the name of national security. “It is time to learn from this recount, fix the problems it uncovered and ensure that future elections are different.”

Monday, Tom Englehardt wrote a post: Welcome to Post-Legal America, subtitled: Dumb Question of the Twenty-first Century: Is It Legal? Post-Legal America and the National Security Complex <read>

Is the Libyan war legal? Was Bin Laden’s killing legal? Is it legal for the president of the United States to target an American citizen for assassination? Were those “enhanced interrogation techniques” legal? These are all questions raised in recent weeks. Each seems to call out for debate, for answers. Or does it?…

My answer is this: they are irrelevant. Think of them as twentieth-century questions that don’t begin to come to grips with twenty-first century American realities. In fact, think of them, and the very idea of a nation based on the rule of law, as a reflection of nostalgia for, or sentimentality about, a long-lost republic. At least in terms of what used to be called “foreign policy,” and more recently “national security,” the United States is now a post-legal society…

It’s easy enough to explain what I mean. If, in a country theoretically organized under the rule of law, wrongdoers are never brought to justice and nobody is held accountable for possibly serious crimes, then you don’t have to be a constitutional law professor to know that its citizens actually exist in a post-legal state. If so, “Is it legal?” is the wrong question to be asking, even if we have yet to discover the right one.

Then today, news that the “apparent” loser in the Wisconsin Supreme Court recount decided concede and not to pursue legal challenges. <Brad Blog overview and details> Sadly we agree with the candidate’s logic. From her statement:

Wis. Stat. §5.01(1) provides that the state election laws “shall be construed so as to give effect to the will of the electors, if that can be ascertained, notwithstanding informality or failure to comply with some of its provisions.” It is questionable whether even the statewide extent of noncompliance uncovered by this recount would cross the bar raised by this statutory language. Moreover, Wisconsin courts have held that absent connivance, fraud or undue influence, substantial compliance with the statutory voting procedures is sufficient.

Which brings me to Waukesha and the question of whether– or if — there was manipulation of some ballots, given the fact that so many bags were unsealed to the point of being wide open. Here again, evidence of opportunity to manipulate or alter ballots is not enough. There would have to be compelling proof that the integrity of the ballots has been compromised. The numerous glaring anomalies in Waukesha certainly warrant further, independent investigation. However, the defects or irregularities in the sealing and securing of the ballot bags, as documented in the recount minutes, would not be sufficient to meet the threshold set by law.

As an attorney, as an officer of the court and as someone who understands both the power and the limits of the law, it is my obligation to evaluate and recognize the legal grounds on which I can and cannot act. I have reviewed the record, the evidence and the law. It would serve no purpose to bring a suit with insufficient legal basis. That is not the kind of lawyer I am.

I suppose it depends on what “substantial” means in “substantial compliance”.

Reading the story of the recount and the election itself, leaves us with little reason to have confidence that elections run like this one in Wisconsin, with fallible accounting and the lack of ballot security result in the winner actually chosen by the people. We have no reason to believe this election is atypical for Wisconsin – just that initial numbers were close enough to require a recount, so critical to receive national attention. Like the candidate, JoAnn Kloppenburg, we cannot say that the result is incorrect, only that elections run this way provide no confidence in the system and could be incorrect by error or won by skulduggery.

Wisconsin is not alone. The chain of custody and security of ballots in Connecticut is no more reliable than in Wisconsin. Until election administration and security is fixed in every jurisdiction in the Nation, we are now knowingly in the era of post-confidence elections. Kloppenburg has asked that the system be improved:

We did the right thing in asking for a recount in this very, very close election. The recount shed light on significant and widespread issues with elections in Wisconsin. The magnitude of those issues surprised clerks, election volunteers, and observers from both campaigns. The problems and gaps ought to be addressed as quickly as possible. And they ought to be fixed.

That is why my campaign is submitting a letter to the Government Accountability Board which summarizes the anomalies, irregularities and in some cases the unexplained mysteries uncovered in this recount. I call on the GAB to take action, along with local clerks, to improve the security, accountability and transparency of the election process in Wisconsin, and to ensure that every vote counts and is counted accurately. The GAB must improve compliance with basic election procedures.

We are also doing the right thing by declining to pursue legal action. Based on the record established in this recount and based on Wisconsin law, the will of the electors has been determined. It is time to learn from this recount, fix the problems it uncovered and ensure that future elections are different.

A good start would be appropriate penalties for officials at all levels responsible for breaking security and the law, followed by sufficient improved election procedures which are enforceable and actually enforced. Penalties should fit the consequences of the loss of public confidence in the system and the consequences of the potential for incorrect or fraudulent election results.

Report: What Hath HAVA Wrought?

Charles Stewart III, presented a fascinating report earlier this spring. It is forty-two pages, double spaced, yet engaging throughout. In addition to describing HAVA and its implications, the report covers the political process which resulted in a useful, yet insufficient response to the issues raised in 2000.

Charles Stewart III, presented a fascinating report earlier this spring at a conference, Bush v Gore, 10 Years Later: Election Administration in the United States.. .The report, in draft form, as presented: What Hath HAVA Wrought? Consequences, Intended and Not, of the Post-Bush v. Gore Reforms <read>

It is forty-two pages, double spaced, yet engaging throughout. In addition to describing HAVA and its implications, the report covers the political process which resulted in a useful, yet insufficient response to the issues raised in 2000. We are left with several thoughts generated by reading the report. (These are our thoughts based on our interpretation of the fascinating details in the report. In general they are consistent with the report, yet our conclusions and interpretations go beyond those in the report.):

Like the Patriot Act rushed through after 911, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was passed in a crisis window of opportunity to fix exposed problems and also to enact longstanding wish lists for reform. Little has happened to election reform efforts at a national level since HAVA and it seems that actual state election integrity improvement legislation and activity has similarly tapered off, except in the wake of a state crisis now and then.
We can expect the same in the aftermath of last November in Bridgeport. The current reforms viewed as less than ideal by the Coalition and the Secretary of the State are likely all we will see from that incident.
The report reminds us how strong the calls for machines to allow the independent voting for voters with disabilities were five years ago. And how little we hear from that community to fix Connecticut’s inadequate IVS system. The report identifies that the real issue for voters with disabilities seems to be physical access to the polling place rather than accommodating machines.
It seems there never was much attention paid to electoral accounting and recounting which were at the core of Gore v Bush decision. (See our testimony on the NPV earlier this year especially page 6) Even in election integrity circles presidential electoral accounting continues to be largely unknown.
The report confirms our concerns with disenfranchisement represented by increased mail-in and unlimited absentee balloting.
Generally, election officials have pushed for unlimited absentee voting because they claim it saves money, while in Connecticut town clerks opposed increased absentee voting based on estimated higher costs. It is an interesting open issue less critical than the risks vs. turnout implications of mail voting.
The report highlights the continuing neglect of voting administration, especially when compared to other government functions. Would the public stand for birth records, drivers licenses, or criminal records with the errors pervasive in voter registration lists? Would they accept Federal Reserve, weapons, or virus research security as weak as ballot security? Why do we accept such weak security and integrity in voting?
We are struck with be lack of balance between election integrity, the promise of counting every vote, vs. the rush to have results and move on quickly after every election. This effects accuracy, overseas voting, and presidential accounting.
Not covered in the report is any discussion of the role of vendors in HAVA. We recall tales of much vendor involvement with Congress. Following the money, it seems to us that the reforms that were enacted were those that result in spending: for new voting machines, for special machines for disabled voters, and centralized voter registration systems. Reforms improving the lot of or requiring more work on the part of officials seem to be neglected unless they were a consequence of the large vendor expenditures.
Three Billion for HAVA seems like real money. But it is a few days at war or a day or so of deficit which might depend on which person is elected President or Senator. It is equal to the deficit we are dealing with in Connecticut, the solution to which is dependent on who is Governor.

This report is recommended reading. It also suggest that we should read and report on some of the other papers delivered at the same conference.

Podcast: Talk of the Nation: Voter fraud, voter ID, and absentee voting fraud.

The main arguments are presented from both sides. We believe that the case for significant individual voter fraud has not been made. Yet, it is appropriate that the debate continue, with more details than can be covered in a half-hour segment. Everyone agreed that absentee ballot fraud is significant and frequent, much more extensive than individual voter fraud. That is the primary reason we oppose any form of increased mail-in voting, including no-excuse absentee voting.

Talk of the Nation held a discussion yesterday by proponents and opponents of voter ID laws, now passed and proposed in several states, Voter ID Debate Ramping Up Again For 2012 <listen>

Most of the hour is devoted to a discussion/debate on the merits of voter ID. The main arguments are presented from both sides. We oppose voter ID. We believe that the case for significant individual voter fraud has not been made, (was not successfully made on this show), that in fact there is little individual voter fraud, and that many would be disenfranchised by voter ID. Yet, it is appropriate that the debate continue, with more details than can be covered in a half-hour segment.

In the last minutes of the debate, everyone agreed that absentee ballot fraud is significant and frequent, much more extensive than individual voter fraud. That is the primary reason we oppose any form of increased mail-in voting, including no-excuse absentee voting. Absentee voting risks also deserve an extended debate.

Brad Friedman questions value of “Faith Based ‘Recount'” – we agree.

What’s the point of having a “recount”, or of using security procedures and physical seals for the ballots after the election, if violations of those procedures and seals are of little concern to the state’s top election agency?

Brad Friedman at BradBlog provides updates on the lack of integrity in the Wisconsin Recount: Tale of the Tapes: Wisconsin’s ‘Dog-and-Pony Show’ Faith-Based Supreme Court Election ‘Recount’ <read>

What’s the point of having a “recount”, or of using security procedures and physical seals for the ballots after the election, if violations of those procedures and seals are of little concern to the state’s top election agency?

Worse, if the results printed on the poll tapes are the ultimate proof of the accuracy of results, what happens when — as discovered among poll tapes from the City of Pewaukee in Waukesha County late last week — the “recount” uncovers “Official Results Report” poll tapes dated a full seven days before the actual election was held?

Or, worse still, what happens when poll tapes failed to print at all on Election Day, as has been seen in a number of towns across the state?…

Faith-Based ‘Recounts’

“Even if the container or [ballot] bag is somehow opened later, or if the chain of custody is broken,” the G.A.B. wrote on their website in response to the concerns late last week, “election officials have the original print-out tape from the machine, as well as the electronic memory device from the machine. This enables election officials to determine the election night vote count.”

Setting aside that the “recount” process in WI does not include examination of “the electronic memory device from the machine[s]” at all, the print-out tapes from the systems may enable election officials to know what the tabulation machines reported — either accurately or inaccurately — as the “election night vote count”, but do those digital elements actually tell us what the intent of voters was? If they do, then why bother to have a “recount” at all?

“If the ballots had been tampered with between the election and the recount, there would be a break in the chain of custody and an unexplained difference in the results [of the ‘recount’],” says the G.A.B., suggesting that they seem to have little or no idea how election fraud may be carried out under their very own noses…

As if the opened ballot bags, missing and scratched-out serial numbers, and mis-dated poll tapes aren’t enough, the minutes from the “recounts” in three different cities in two different counties have revealed that the so-called “Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails” on touch-screen voting machines didn’t actually print at all, because the paper rolls were inserted backwards.

Most disturbingly, no one noticed or bothered to complain about it during the election! What does that tell us about the validity of the so-called “paper trails” printed out with touch-screen voting machines in Wisconsin, and the many other states which use the exact same unverifiable voting systems?

We are always told we can “trust” the results of 100% unverifiable touch-screen voting machines because voters review the “paper record” before they hit the “Cast Vote!” button. Unfortunately, as we’ve been explaining for years, no, they don’t — and here, once again, is more evidence…

And if these new photos of duct taped ballot bags from the Village of Menomonee Falls in, you guessed it, Waukesha County (as taken by an observer who has asked not to be identified) doesn’t “invoke confidence”, we don’t know what will…

Sadly there is no reason to believe that a full statewide recanvass in Connecticut would generate more confidence than the recount in Wisconsin. Our observations of recanvasses reveals huge variations in the process from municipality to municipality, especially in the quality of the review of ballots for marks that might not have been read correctly by the machines. Also the Coalition observations of post-election audits continue to demonstrate concerns with ballot chain of custody.

Op-Ed, Denise Merrill: “Bill Ends Ballot Shortages, Protects Voters”

We agree with Secretary Merrill in strongly supporting passage of the bill. Yet it is insufficient. More is required to recover from similar problems in the future such that all votes are counted initially, followed by time for a full statewide recanvass, when based on corrections to initial results, the tallies become close. We continue to recommend the stronger measures in the Coalition Bridgeport Recount Report.

Update 4/19: Denise Merrill explains the bill on CT-N (about four and a half minutes in <view>
In the interview, she also discusses the primary date change and the National Popular Vote Compact, which we oppose based on serious voting integrity concerns. While there may be no evidence of fraud in the one state that has gone to all absentee balloting, there is plenty of evidence and instances of absentee ballot fraud in several states and it does not increase turnout. Not so long ago our legislature changed the way of delivering absentee ballot applications after several instances of skulduggery right here in Connecticut.
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The following Op-Ed by Denise Merrill in the Hartford Courant today:

Bill Ends Ballot Shortages, Protects Voters

By DENISE MERRILL

The Hartford Courant

May 17, 2011

In the early afternoon of Nov. 2, 2010, the unthinkable happened at the secretary of the state’s office in Hartford. A trickle — then a flood — of reports started arriving claiming that a number of polling precincts in Connecticut’s largest city had run out of ballots and long lines of Bridgeport voters were being turned away while officials scrambled to photocopy paper ballots or print new ballots.As the ensuing crisis surrounding one of the closest races for governor in Connecticut’s history played itself out in the national media for the next few days, this disturbing episode also exposed serious weaknesses in our election laws. If we are to fulfill our promise that what happened in Bridgeport must never happen again, these problems need to be fixed.

Connecticut lawmakers have in front of them a bill I proposed in February that, if enacted, will go a long way toward that goal. Last week, the state Senate rose above partisanship and took the courageous step of unanimously passing this bill, “An Act Concerning the Integrity of Elections.” It is in that spirit of cooperation that I now ask my former colleagues in the House to do the same before the end of the legislative session.

When we looked at what happened in Bridgeport, we found that several communities in Connecticut also ran out of ballots that day, but other towns were prepared. They took decisive, appropriate action: photocopying ballots and promptly distributing them to precincts so voting could continue without interruption. The election integrity bill requires all towns to have an emergency plan for Election Day to cover ballot shortages and other contingencies.

One of the more vexing things I found when I took office as secretary of the state was that this office was unaware of how many ballots had been purchased in each of our 169 cities and towns for Election Day. Under our current law, municipalities are not required to inform the secretary of the state of their pre-election preparations. Our election integrity bill gives municipalities a choice: Either tell us how many ballots they have purchased for the upcoming election, or order enough ballots to cover a 100 percent turnout of registered voters on Election Day.

If, after careful review, our office finds that the number of ballots purchased for Election Day is insufficient or does not take into account factors that could augment turnout (such as a visit by the president of the United States), under this legislation, we would have the authority to direct towns to order more ballots.

I am not proposing to dismantle our election system and start from scratch, nor do I favor a wholesale state takeover of elections. Elections have been run at the local level in Connecticut for more than 200 years, and for the most part our registrars of voters have handled the task well.

Post 2010, we and our partners who administer elections at the local level must prepare and communicate better, and we must all be accountable. If the secretary of the state’s office is truly the chief elections office and everyone looks to us for answers on Election Day, that has to mean something. We need to know how many ballots each town purchases and the factors on which that number is based. It is far better to head off a crisis than to watch helplessly as it unfolds.

The bottom line: No registered voter who wants to cast a ballot on Election Day should ever be turned away from the polls. This is not a political issue — our elections integrity bill has received broad bipartisan support because everyone understands that reliable and secure elections are the essence of our American democracy. That freedom to choose our government is what our military is fighting for overseas.

Let’s not let this historic opportunity to ensure the integrity of our elections slip away.

Denise Merrill is Connecticut’s secretary of the state.

In addition to head moderators, the Secretary of the State should have the power to order discrepancy recanvasses.

Allow more time for the initial reporting of results, investigation of minor discrepancies, and for the accomplishment of recanvasses and the certification of results . There should a timeframe for discrepancy recanvasses, followed by a timeframe for subsequent close vote recanvasses. The current post-election and certification schedule in Connecticut should not be viewed as unchangeable. For example there could be a seven business day window for Discrepancy Recanvasses and their reporting and an additional five business day window for Close Vote Recanvasses to allow for changes in the initial reports resulting from Discrepancy Recanvasses.

Enforceable laws, regulations, and procedures for the accounting for and public verification of the reporting of election results from counting teams, polling place officials, and head moderators, to the Secretary of the State’s Office. Currently district data is transcribed from scanner tapes to district Moderators’ Returns, then in towns with more than one polling place, transcribed and added to the Head Moderator’s Return which is submitted to the Secretary of the State for transcription and summarization on the Secretary’s web site. This is an error prone, difficult to verify process.

Video: If you still have faith in Internet/online voting

We are not surprised that some do not trust us. What is surprising is that many still trust their intuition over the testimony of experts. For those who still have faith in the Internet we present a panel earlier this year at the Overseas Vote Foundation.

We have said it simply in an op-ed, we have pointed to a statement by technologists and presented lists of cyber attacks, but people still think Internet voting is a good idea and that technologist should be able to figure it out. We are not surprised that many still do not trust us. What is surprising is that some trust their intuition over the testimony of experts. For those who still have faith in the Internet we present a panel earlier this year at the Overseas Vote Foundation, UOCAVA Summit.<view> (the 1st first video is the introduction, which automatically links to the panelists in order)

The moderator Assoc. Prof. Candice Hoke, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, introduces the panel and explains why taking prescription drugs is safer than internet voting.

Joe Jarzombek, Department of Homeland Security, explains the risks of purchased software and what questions elections officials need to ask vendors.

Prof. David Jefferson, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, describes the vulnerabilities of email, fax, and web voting and why its false to assume that since I can bank online, why can’t we vote online?

Asst. Prof. J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan, describes his experiences creating a voting machine virus, testing Indian voting machines, and his recent attack on the Washington D.C. online voting system

Dr. Josh Benaloh, Microsoft Security, demonstrates that the central issues are verifiability and vulnerability, not limited to electronic voting. He outlines advanced methods for verifying elections, which leave most vulnerabilities in place.

Stay tuned for the Q&A at the end. It ended with a question from West Virginia officials incompletely answered. Let me provide my response:

With online delivery of ballots and absentee ballot applications, the soldier in the example could vote anytime after the ballots were available as long as he had access to an online computer with a printer. This would solve the problem for the soldier without the risk and expense of online voting (which would also require an online computer).
There is an incorrect assumption in the question. It is true that we could allow a person to accept the risk that their vote would be compromised by online voting, but that is insufficient, since everyone’s vote is at risk if some votes can be compromised.

Three districts selected for May post-election audit

This morning, Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill randomly selected three districts for post-election audit from the the districts using optical scanners in the May municipal elections. Exempted from the audits were districts from two towns with post-election close vote racanvasses and two who used ballots, but not optical scanners.

This morning, Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill randomly selected three districts for post-election audit from the twenty-four districts using optical scanners in the May municipal elections. Two alternates were also selected. Exempted from the audits were districts from two towns with post-election close-vote racanvasses and two that used ballots, but not optical scanners.

This is a good time to recall our stand that the audit law should be amended to included all ballots and districts in the audit, with no exemptions. The three major exemptions are districts with recanvasses, centrally counted absentee ballots, and all hand counted ballots. We know from experience that manual counting can be performed with great accuracy, yet also with significant errors. Any exemption from the post-election audit is an opening for errors to be hidden and a formula for skulduggery.

For example, the November Bridgeport election and citizen recount demonstrated about 25% of originally hand counted ballots being incorrectly counted or reported in the (still) official results. Since audits do not include hand counted ballots we do not have a way of judging how accurately other towns in Connecticut count ballots on election night. We speculate that sometimes some are quite accurate, but that sometimes some are also significantly inaccurate.

The districts selected were:

Groton – West Side Middle School Dist. 2
Groton – William Seely School Dist. 4
Stonington – Stonington Fire House

Alternates selected:

Griswold – Griswold Town Hall
Woodbridge -Center School