Video: Hartford Courant interviews of the Secretary of the State candidates

We appreciate the Courant and CT-N for making these interviews available to the public, providing an additional unique opportunity for voters to learn about the candidates positions and personalities. However, we note several criticisms of the interviews.

We appreciate the Courant and CT-N for making these interviews available to the public, providing an additional unique opportunity for voters to learn about the candidates positions and personalities. We recommend listening to both interviews to gain a perspective beyond the few quotes we include below.

However, we note several criticisms of the interviews:

  • The questions are limited to those areas of interest to the Editorial Board and are shaped by their ideas for change. We note the absence of any questions about voting integrity, voting systems for those with disabilities, supporting military and overseas voters, ballot initiatives, or our relationship to vendors responsible for servicing our election equipment and programming our elections. Although the candidates did touch just a little bit on election integrity and the security of mail and internet voting.
  • The Board asked Farrell but not Merrill, how he differed from his opponent.
  • The Board asked Farrell but not Merrill, if he would have chosen the same equipment as Secretary Bysiewicz.
  • The Board asked Farrell but not Merrill, if he was going to keep any lists of people he would be doing business with.
  • The Board asked Farrell but not Merrill, if he would keep a list of people who called the office to ask for help.
  • The Board asked Merrill but not Farrell, about the law providing for three registrars if a third-party registrar is elected.
  • The Courant Editorial Board seems, at this time, to find it amusing that there are “Voting Integrity Activists In Connecticut” and that they have met some such activists (see the Farrell interview). For the record, to my knowledge, I have never met a member of the Courant Editorial Board. However, not so long ago, the Courant thanked voting integrity activists, including me, in one of their editorials for “willingness to shoulder civic responsibility and to apply their expertise and vigilance to the cause has helped to protect and strengthen voting in Connecticut”.

Denise Merrill <view>

A few quotes of interest to CTVotersCount readers:

“[More participation] is the core mission of this job”
“We should do everything we can to make voting easy”
“I want want really very much to have the no-excuse absentee ballot”
“[election day registration] not until we have a really good statewide voter file…not an efficient system yet”
“I’d like to focus on more consistent procedures for everyone”
Should the hurdles for third-party candidates be lowered: “I don’t think so. The system as it is is pretty fair”
“People still by and large trust the system”
100% Mail-in voting, like Colorado, with permanent absentee status?
“They invested a lot in their voting systems…something we ought to consider…maybe something like same day registration would increase participation more with less risk”

Jerry Farrell: <view>

A few quotes of interest to CTVotersCount readers:

“Three roles as I would see it: First voting…secondly…business registrar…thirdly…custodian of state records which I would capitalize on”
“[More Participation] If we were to go different route on how we conduct elections, there could be financial repercussions to the towns and cities…I am for amending the law…to get rid of the provision that calls for an excuse to be given to get the absentee ballot”
“I would be very careful about same day registration…there is no way as it is presently configured for the polling official to find out if that person is registered elsewhere…you would need some type of electronic hook-up…that has a cost to it”
“At the end of the day…voting must have the greatest amount of integrity to it”
“Voting integrity activists…have absolutely impressed on me…the fact that absolute paper trail is such a necessity.”
“It would be very hard for me to be out there running [without public financing]…I am a very firm advocate of it…we cannot have a system [where the] third parties [have an] absolutely impossible impediment”

Denise Merrill: 2nd Campaign Commercial

Here is her 2nd commercial <view> Previously, Merrill had been ran the same commercial used before the primary.  And Jerry Farrell has run two since the primary. Update 10/29.2010: Radio ad <listen>

Here is her 2nd commercial <view>

Previously, Merrill had been ran the same commercial used before the primary.  And Jerry Farrell has run two since the primary.

Update 10/29.2010: Radio ad <listen>

Post-Election Audit Report: Incremental Improvement – New Integrity Concern

Citizen observation and analysis shows some improvements along with a newly uncovered problem with the random selection process…We conclude that August post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of:

  • failure in the integrity of the random district selection process,
  • lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies,
  • weaknesses in the ballot chain of custody, and
  • lack of, consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

the list of polling districts for the random audit drawing was missing some districts and is otherwise inaccurate and ambiguous. The integrity of the audit requires an accurate list of districts that is verifiable by the public. We have extended our recommendations to the Legislature to include an efficient fix to this problem.

Full Report, Press Release etc.<Audit Coalition Post>

Summary, from the Press Release and Report:

Coalition Finds Small Improvements and New Problem in
Connecticut Post-Election Audits

Citizen observation and analysis shows some improvements along with a newly uncovered problem with the random selection process

This is the sixth major post-election audit observation report by the Coalition since the adoption of optical scanners and paper ballots statewide.

Coalition Executive Director, Luther Weeks noted, “Unfortunately, we discovered that the list of polling districts for the random audit drawing was missing some districts and is otherwise inaccurate and ambiguous.  The integrity of the audit requires an accurate list of districts that is verifiable by the public. We have extended our recommendations to the Legislature to include an efficient fix to this problem.”

League of Women Voters of Connecticut President, Cheryl Dunson said: “Compared to previous audits, the Coalition noted continuing incremental improvements in the attention to detail, following procedures, and in the chain-of-custody by election officials. We caution that the primary audit is simpler and shorter than those for November elections which may account much more accurate counting this time.”

We conclude that August post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of:

  • failure in the integrity of the random district selection process,
  • lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies,
  • weaknesses in the ballot chain of custody, and
  • lack of, consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

Each of these items individually could impact the integrity of the statewide post-election audit and calls into question the credibility of the entire post-election audit.

Although most of our general observations and concerns remain, we observed improvements in following audit procedures, in the accuracy of the counting, and in the completion of forms.

Connecticut Citizen Action Group Executive Director, Tom Swan said, “The integrity of the entire audit is dependent the ballot chain-of-custody and on every step of the audit being accurately accomplished in a consistent, transparent, and professional manner. We continue to support our past recommendations to the Secretary of the State and the Legislature for improvement in the post-election audit laws, counting procedures, and chain-of-custody.”

Weeks added, “We look forward to the post-election audit of the November election. We hope to see significant improvement in following procedures along with more accurate counting, demonstrated in the November post-election audit which will involve more extensive, complex counting. ”

Observers came from the membership ranks of the coalition partners — The League of Women Voters of Connecticut, The Connecticut Citizen Action Group, Common Cause Connecticut, and Connecticut Voters Count. Without volunteer observers, nobody but a small number of local election officials would know what happens in post-election audits.

New Overall Audit Integrity Concern

A new concern surfacing this year is the inaccurate list of districts used in the random selection process which is required by law to be based on all of the districts used in the election. This directly impacts the integrity and credibility of the entire post-election audit.

Issues In Three Towns

Several districts in one town were selected, but in one case in the municipality, the ballot bag contained only blank ballots.  In subsequent discussions with the registrar, she reported that a novice moderator in a multiple district polling place had sealed all voted ballots in one bag and all unused ballots in another bag.  [As far as we know, this district was never counted as was not included in Audit Reports from the Secretary of the State.]

In the one district: The official Audit Report indicates 1703 machine counted ballots but only 688 manually counted ballots counted in the audit. In that same audit report 188 ballots are listed for one party with a total of 254 votes in the race audited for that party. The huge difference may represent poor counting procedures and lack of understanding of the audit procedures, however, we have no way of determining the accuracy of the audit nor of the official reporting of results.  Our observer’s comments:

They never counted the ballots first…One team referenced the Tally Sheet from Election night. They recounted their votes until the figures agreed… Checking was done to the Tally Sheet off the Moderator’s report not the machine tape… I did not observe a machine tape, only the Moderator’s return with the Tally Sheet.   When I asked if they had a machine tape, I was told no by one of the Registrars.    When I asked if there was a tape in the ballot bag, I was told no… I have concern about the number entered on the “LT Gov”

These results may represent incompetence. However, incompetence uninvestigated transparently leaves an opening to cover-up fraud and error. The Secretary of the State’s Office had reviewed district results, yet apparently did not notice these large differences until it was pointed out by the coalition.

In one of the last district reports provided to the Secretary of the State’s Office: In one district in one municipality which audited three districts there was a significant difference between the machine counts in one race and the hand count reported.  For two candidates the machine counted 262 and 154 votes while the hand counts were 132 and 78 votes for those same candidates.

Full Report, Press Release etc.<Audit Coalition Post>

Update from CTNewsJunkie: Questions Raised As State Finishes Post-Primary Audit <read>

NewCanaan: Patch Voter Guide to Secretary of the State candidates

How would you use technology to increase access to public information and make it easier to vote? Would you implement online voting? Why or why not?

Covering candidate statements, qualifications and several questions, including one question on voting: <read>

How would you use technology to increase access to public information and make it easier to vote? Would you implement online voting? Why or why not?

Farrell: As the Commissioner of Consumer Protection, I have used technology — electronic forms, online licensing — to make state government more efficient and less costly.  I have saved the taxpayers millions of dollars, in that way, and would implement all of those plans again at the Secretary of the State’s office.  Note that, while my opponent may talk of doing similar things, I am the only one who actually has experience doing so and can immediately start implementing technology, to increase access to public information, lower costs, and make interacting with government more convenient. Unfortunately, there are a variety of roadblocks that prevent voting online. Because elections must be free of the possibility of fraud, every method of voting must have a “paper trail”, where, even if initially tabulated by a computer, there is still an actual paper ballot to examine if there is a question of fraud. I believe that the next Secretary should work to ensure that the current voting machines continue to function and that we find ways to 1) assist the disabled in voting (an issue where we are not in full compliance with the law) and 2) ensure that the ballots cast by our military overseas are counted.

Merrill: One of my top priorities will be making it easier to vote. I believe that our voting system must keep pace with the mobility of the society and the technological advances in information systems.  Although we have made strides over the past 10 years in creating a statewide voter database, it could be greatly enhanced and made more accessible to the public.  We must increase the use of electronic voter registration by making it easier to register online, using fillable forms that could readily be placed into the statewide file.  Online voting might be possible in time, however, there are significant issues with privacy and security that would have to be overcome.  Paramount is the integrity of the ballot.  I would alternatively support streamlining the absentee ballot process, as other states such as Oregon have, with “no excuse” absentee balloting and possibly a system of “early voting” as in Florida, both of which have been shown to increase voter participation. Both would probably require a constitutional amendment.   I would also consider same-day registration to vote provided we have an effective statewide voter file.

We are pleased that both candidates recognize the risks of associated with online voting. Like most fast food, expanded mail-in voting and internet voting are appealing, yet not so good for us.

Connecticut follows MOVE Act, avoids flaws – Others follow the money

We offer our complements to Secretary Bysiewicz, the Town Clerks, Legislators who supported the MOVE Act, Connecticut, the many other states and officials who are implementing the MOVE Act with integrity. But there is big money and momentum behind efforts in other states to exploit flaws in the Act.

Press Release from Secretary of the State, 10/13/2010: <read>

BYSIEWICZ: CONNECTICUT SUCCESSFULLY
IMPLEMENTING FEDERAL MOVE ACT TO
IMPROVE ABSENTEE BALLOTING FOR
OVERSEAS MILITARY VOTERS
SECRETARY OF THE STATE, CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION CONGRATULATE
CONNECTICUT TOWN CLERKS FOR IMPLEMENTING NEW FEDERAL DEADLINE
TO SEND GENERAL ELECTION ABSENTEE BALLOTS ELECTRONICALLY

HARTFORD: Secretary of State Susan Bysiewicz and several members of Connecticut’s
Congressional delegation reported today that all of Connecticut’s cities and towns have
implemented the requirements of the federal Military Overseas Voter Empowerment
(MOVE) Act and have provided absentee ballots by mail or electronically to members of
the military serving overseas, depending on their stated preference. The office of
Secretary of the State Bysiewicz surveyed municipal clerks in all 169 Connecticut cities
and towns to ensure proper implementation of the new law. This survey was conducted
following the federally mandated deadline of September 18th to send ballots by mail, fax
or email to all registered voters currently overseas or in military who applied for them.

We particularly appreciate the statement from the President of the Town Clerks Association, we expect no less from all officials:

Joseph Camposeo, Town Clerk of Manchester and President of the Connecticut Town
Clerks Association, said, “The Town Clerks of Connecticut are committed to working at
the highest level of integrity for their customers and citizens. The record clearly shows
that this commitment applies to the military absentee ballot process as well. I am proud
of our effort made by the Connecticut town clerks and trust that this manner of
compliance and efficiency will continue.”

We offer our complements to Secretary Bysiewicz, the Town Clerks, and Legislators who supported the MOVE Act, along with the many other states and officials who are implementing the MOVE Act with integrity.

We support most of the MOVE Act, yet have been constant critics of one part of the Act which provides for pilot projects for Internet voting for Military and Overseas voters. However, we have been a supporter of Connecticut’s implementation and decision to avoid the Internet voting bandwagon. We have suggested ways in which Connecticut could easily follow the lead of other states and do even better for our military and overseas voters.

We also complement Representative Rush Holt, a MOVE Act and voting integrity advocate, who  supported the Act without realizing it had the dangerous Internet voting provisions, listened to our criticism, offered corrective legislation, and pointed out the risks of Internet voting to the New York Times.

Big money and momentum behind efforts in other states to exploit flaws in the Act:

Hopefully, Internet Voting Will be banned before it costs an election. The recent Washington D.C. public test clearly demonstrated that the years of warnings by computer scientists, security experts, and advocates were fully justified. A new article from TruthOut is a very readable summary of the concerns and the continuing tendency to ignore those concerns by some election officials:  Computer Scientists, Election Integrity Advocates Question Feasibility of “Digital Democracy”. It is also the first article we have seen that effectively covers the money interests behind Internet voting. <read>

Despite the recent hack during public testing of DC’s Internet voting pilot and the rash of other security problems that have plagued the short history of online voting systems, elections entrepreneurs, along with some state officials and voter advocates, continue to make headway as they push for the adoption of i-voting technology. The practice – and the private voting systems industry that appears poised for more widespread adoption – has found an inroad via military and overseas voters…

The argument for technology as a tool to boost participation has already proven successful in paving the way for scandal-ridden DREs (direct-recording electronic voting machines), which were billed as the key to accessibility for voters with blindness and other disabilities. After the 2000 election, “The whole discussion really got hijacked by folks who wanted to go with e-voting for whatever reason and they basically used blind people to do it,” said journalist and blogger Brad Friedman…

Some advocates for military and overseas voters share Friedman’s skepticism. “Money and fame are real drivers, even in the election world,” wrote Overseas Vote Foundation (OVF) President and CEO Susan Dzieduszycka-Suinat in an email to Truthout from her base in Munich. “There are vendors who will make a lot of money, or potentially hope to make a lot of money and become celebrated in their circle, by pushing this right now.”

The Department of Defense (DoD) declined to release the dollar amounts of the contract awards granted to the six vendors – Scytl, Everyone Counts, Konnech, Aquiline, Vexcel Corporation and Credence Management Solutions – citing two exceptions to federal acquisition regulations, one of which applies as long as a single contract is not expected to exceed $100,000. The DoD awarded 20 contracts for the project…

We recommend reading the entire article.

Update: Time Magazine covers the story in a bit less depth, yet misses the money issue: Will Online Voting Turn Into an Election Day Debacle? <read>

Common Sense: Paper Ballots are Insufficient for Voting Integrity

Reminder: Myth #9 – If there is ever a concern we can always count the paper.

Note: This is the third post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <next> <previous>

Last time our post ended with, “Voter Verified Paper Ballots alone provide the opportunity for voting integrity, a necessary prerequisite for democracy. ‘Opportunity’ is insufficient.”

Introduction

Voter Verified Paper Ballots (VVPBs) are a necessary condition for voting integrity, yet as they say “a chain is only as strong as its weakest link”.  VVPBs are only one link in a long chain that provides voting integrity, we might construct different chains with different links, but in the end, the entire chain must be complete and strong enough to provide voting integrity.

Three major segments of the chain of voting integrity:

  1. Democratic voting access and participation: This would include areas critical to an effective democratic process beyond counting votes accurately such as fair rights to vote, accurate voter registration, lack of voter suppression, ballot design, candidate access to the ballot, campaign financing mechanisms, along with voter access to candidate information, complete news, and sufficient education.
  2. A reliable and credible ballot chain of custody: Just like evidence in court, if we cannot trust the chain of custody of ballots then they can only provide a false confidence.
  3. Exploiting ballots to create voting integrity and credibility: Ballots never used, seldom used, or incorrectly used are as helpful as seat belts used improperly, or not at all. Ballots provide election integrity when used for timely and effective audits and recounts coupled with effective action.

In this post, we discuss item #3:

Exploiting ballots to create voting integrity and credibility

Ballots must actually be used for election integrity. This seems so simple it may seem unnecessary to point out, except that many voters and officials seem to believe merely employing optical scanners is sufficient – the cure for voting integrity concerns.  In our The Myths In the Nutmeg State, this is Myth #9:

Myth #9 – If there is ever a concern we can always count the paper.

Reality

The law limits when the paper can be counted.

  • Audits can protect against error or fraud only if enough of the paper is counted and discrepancies in the vote are investigated and acted upon in time to impact the outcome of the election.  See myths #1 and #2.
  • An automatic recount (called a recanvass in CT) occurs when the winning vote margin is within 0.5%. The polling place moderator or the Secretary of the State can call for a recanvass, but even candidates must convince a court that there is sufficient reason for a recount.
  • Recanvass by hand is not required by law.  In early 2008 the Secretary of the State reversed her policy of hand recanvasses.  We now recanvass by optical scanner.

Unlike Connecticut, some jurisdictions with paper ballots do not perform post-election audits or automatic recounts in any form.

To fully exploit paper ballots would require they be used in several ways in addition to the original election count (by hand or by optical scanner):

  • A thorough, complete, adversarial, manual hand recount on close elections. By thorough we mean checking each ballot to correctly classify it by voter’s intent and checking both sides the ballot for distinguishing marks which would disqualify the vote. By complete we mean reviewing absentee ballot and provisional ballot materials to make sure that appropriate ballots are counted and appropriate ballots are rejected. By manual hand count we mean that all counting is performed by human counters using counting and tallying methods that assure accuracy. By adversarial we mean one where all competing interests are represented in closely observing the classification and counting, have a right to object to the classification or procedures employed, and there are far means for resolving objections. By close election we mean one where there is more than a very small probability that errors in classifying votes, counting votes, qualifying ballots, or tallying errors could have caused a result different than the voters’ intentions in the original count.
  • Comprehensive, statistically meaningful, effective post-election audits. Audits approaching the standards in the Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits and The League of Women Voters Report on Election Auditing. By Comprehensive we mean auditing all ballots cast including those originally counted by hand or by machine, and with all contests at least subject to selection for audit. We advocate for optical scanning followed by audits, those who advocate for counting exclusively by hand, should not trust that original hand count and should also insist on post-election audits. (We also point out that beyond the paper ballots, comprehensive election auditing should include auditing the whole voting process). By statistically meaningful we mean auditing enough paper and analyzing results such that strong statistical confidence in the result can be determined. By effective we mean the results of audits are used consistently for improving the election process, determining what levels to set for automatic close election recounts, and lead to full recounts when the audit cannot guarantee a high confidence in the original reported result.
  • Candidate and public directed audits. Candidates and the public (at least in the case of ballot questions) should be given the right to select ballots for audit or recount either as part of post-elections audits or by paying the cost of such audits. Given such rights, questioned results in specific districts could be selected for audit or recount to satisfy the concerns of candidates and the public.
  • Public access to the ballots. Several states provide for public review of ballots under freedom of information laws and other means. Such access has been used to instill public confidence in the process and also to confirm suspicions based on statically irregular results. When possible ballots should be posted to the web, rather than requiring access that is expensive and time consuming for officials, candidates and the public.

This is our list, let us know if we have missed another valuable use for ballots. Paper ballots are necessary but insufficient for election integrity. Using the ballots as we have described is also necessary for voting integrity. Yet, we must insure that the ballots audited, recounted, or accessed by the public are actually the ones cast by voters. Sometime soon we will discuss the chain of custody!

Video-Cure for Internet voting – WARNING: Viewing may cause severe, permanent eInSecurity

For better and for worse the seriousness of the vulnerability goes well beyond what was reported two days ago; goes well beyond Internet voting in D.C; serious issues going well beyond voting.

Testimony earlier today by Prof. Alex Haldeman to Washington D.C. Council.  As reported two days ago Alex and his team hacked, changed votes, and played the U. Michigan Fight Song on public test of D.C.’s proposed Internet voting system.  Without their testing, the system might well have been used and possibly abused in the actual November election.

For better and for worse (*) the seriousness of the vulnerability goes well beyond what was reported two days ago; goes well beyond Internet voting in D.C; serious issues going well beyond voting.

I highly recommend taking the time to watch the video at least Alex’s testimony. which is the 1st 20min or so of the hearing.  It it is also worth taking the time to listen to the questions and answers by the other experts testifying as well. WARNING: Viewing will likely raise severe, permanent distrust in any Internet system. <Video, courtesy Joe Hall>

I challenge any election official, legislator, or any voter, to listen to the entire video, then to support Internet voting and explain why these experts are wrong.

You can also read Joe Hall’s summary of the “new key insights” <here>.  However, I strongly recommend taking them time for the video.

Update: Brad Friedman interviews Dr. David Jefferson <about 14 min in 1st hour>

Update: CNN demos and interview of Alex Haldeman <view>

Update: Washington Post editorial:  Flaws in D.C.’s online voting system should serve as a warning to all states <read>

(*) Better because there was much more demonstrated than the hacking of a single voting system. The large, apparently common risks of many government and private networks. Worse because it demonstrates really serious vulnerabilities to the infrastructure we trust for  much more than voting.

Internet Voting Faces The Music: Hats off to D.C. and Michigan

Testers submitting votes complained of the annoying music playing on their computer after votng. In short order the music was identified, leaving testers wondering why D.C. picked the Michigan Fight Song. Now all has been revealed and the problems went well beyond the music.

Will this clear demonstration of vulnerabilities cause states and Congress to sing a different Internet voting tune? We hope so, yet we doubt it.

The District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics has been gearing up for a Pilot Test of Digital Votes by Mail. They agreed to have the public test the value and security of there Internet voting system originally scheduled to be pilot(*) tested for the November election.

D.C. should be applauded by agreeing to this public test prior to the pilot. Some pointed out prior to the test that the testing time was too short and the notice too short – in the real world hackers would have a much longer opportunity to succeed. I point out that the test also does not show the most vulnerable part of the system – the opportunity for insiders, election officials, software vendors, hardware vendors, communications vendors, and support staff to change votes – the vulnerability where the fewest people could change the most votes.

Testers submitting votes complained of the annoying music playing on their computer after voting. In short order the music was identified, leaving testers wondering why D.C. picked the Michigan Fight Song. Now all has been revealed and the problems went well beyond the music.

Despite the time limitations, Alex Haldeman and his team from Michigan completely compromised the system <read>

We found a vulnerability in the way the system processes uploaded ballots. We confirmed the problem using our own test installation of the web application, and found that we could gain the same access privileges as the server application program itself, including read and write access to the encrypted ballots and database…

D.C. launched the public testbed server on Tuesday, September 28. On Wednesday afternoon, we began to exploit the problem we found to demonstrate a number of attacks:

  • We collected crucial secret data stored on the server, including the database username and password as well as the public key used to encrypt the ballots.
  • We modified all the ballots that had already been cast to contain write-in votes for candidates we selected. (Although the system encrypts voted ballots, we simply discarded the encrypted files and replaced them with different ones that we encrypted using the same key.) We also rigged the system to replace future votes in the same way.
  • We installed a back door that let us view any ballots that voters cast after our attack. This modification recorded the votes, in unencrypted form, together with the names of the voters who cast them, violating ballot secrecy.
  • To show that we had control of the server, we left a “calling card” on the system’s confirmation screen, which voters see after voting. After 15 seconds, the page plays the University of Michigan fight song. Here’s a demonstration…

The specific vulnerability that we exploited is simple to fix, but it will be vastly more difficult to make the system secure. We’ve found a number of other problems in the system, and everything we’ve seen suggests that the design is brittle: one small mistake can completely compromise its security. I described above how a small error in file-extension handling left the system open to exploitation. If this particular problem had not existed, I’m confident that we would have found another way to attack the system.

One more complement to D.C.: Their primary election was September 14th.  On September 27th they released the results of their post-election audit and a likely unique random forensic audit of their voting equipment. They found some incorrect firmware versions! <read>

I wonder if any banks out there would dare offer a similar public test opportunity? Power utilities? Transportation?

There are several states planning Internet voting pilots under the MOVE Act. We and others have warned of the theoretical risks of Internet voting and specifically the pilot provisions of the otherwise valuable MOVE Act. Will this clear demonstration of vulnerabilities cause states and Congress to sing a different Internet voting tune? We hope so, yet we doubt it.

Update: Comments by David Jefferson at VerifiedVoting <read>

Computer security and election experts have been saying for over 10 years that the transmission of voted ballots over the Internet cannot be made safe with any currently envisioned technology. We have been arguing mostly in vain that:

1) Attacks can be remote: Internet voting systems can be attacked remotely by any government, any criminal syndicate, or any self aggrandizing individual in the world.

2) Effective defense virtually impossible: There are innumerable modes of attack, from very easy to very sophisticated, and if anyone competent seriously tried to attack an Internet election the election officials would have essentially no chance at successfully defending. The election would be compromised

3) Attackers may change votes arbitrarily: An attack need not just prevent people from voting (bad as that would be), but could actually change large numbers of votes, allowing the attackers to determine the winner.

4) Attacks may be undetected: An attack might go completely undetected. The wrong people could be elected and no one would ever know.

Prof. Halderman demonstrated all of these points

Update: Unfortunately amid our appreciation for the D.C. testing and auditing, they seem to demonstrate what I call a Miraculous Blind Faith In Science in their response: <read>

With all due respect to Mr. Jefferson, the lesson learned is not to be more timid, but more aggressive about solving the problem in exactly the way that we have chosen. Our task is to continue pursuing a robust, secure digital means for overseas voters to cast their ballot rather than resorting to e-mail or fax. As Thomas Edison famously said, “Nearly every man who develops an idea works at it up to the point where it looks impossible, and then gets discouraged. That’s not the place to become discouraged.”

The burden of proof will always rest with the election officials to ensure integrity and transparency of all voting systems, but the computer science community has a heavy burden as well. The computer science community needs to understand that this toothpaste is already out of the tube and no volume of warnings can put it back. Voters are currently casting ballots by e-mail and fax. We need to work together to find a better alternative.

Even more, voters expect that there will be a day when online voting will be as simple as paying bills or paying taxes. While there will always be citizens who choose to file their taxes on paper and there will always be voters who wish to visit their local polling place on Election Day, election officials know that voters expect, one day, to cast their ballot from their laptop.

With all due respect, science and technology have their limitations. We have yet to cure the common cold, make Reagan ‘s Star Wars vision a reality, or produce gold from sea water.  As we have pointed out before: Damn the science; Damn the integrity; If it feels good do it!

Update: Discussion D.C. Official vs. Pam Smith of Verified Voting <video>

*) Do not confuse Pilot testing with other for forms of testing such as demonstrations or prototype tests. Pilot testing implies using a system for actual use, but on a limited basis. An election pilot test would involve real ballots, real voters, in an actual election, counting those votes to determine the declared winner of the election and the course of democracy. We note D.C. seems also to be using the phrase testing of the Pilot for its public test, hopefully not to be confused with the Pilot itself, originally scheduled for November.

Will The World’s Largest Democracy beat the U.S. to full VVPR?

Scientists and Whistleblower(s) made their point. Now, India heading toward all voter verifiable paper records.

In late August we covered the arrest of voting integrity advocate Hari Prasad for receiving a voting machine used in India for testing. Researchers with the help of Whistleblower(s) obtained the voting machine and demonstrated its vulnerabilities.

Now, encouraging news from India, via Rop Gonggri. <read>

Yesterday there was a meeting of all the national political parties in India, and it appears the ECI has finally given in: they are now looking at alternatives where the voter sees his/her vote on a piece of paper which can be counted by hand. Here, they also did that, which was just a first step to having the machines scrapped. It’s going to be interesting to see whether the Indian government thinks they can drag on the existing solution until something new is ready. (They tried that here, didn’t work.)

Too early to cry victory, but certainly another big step forward. Now the charges against Hari Prasad, the man who spent time in jail for daring to notice that the emperor had no clothes on, need to be dropped (TODAY GENTLEMEN!) and Hari needs to be fully rehabilitated. Then a strict deadline for scrapping black-box voting needs to be imposed. Then the details of any new voting system need to be worked out. There is already talk of allowing a hand-count only if a judge permits it, which is of course far too restrictive.

Currently the U.S. is a mixture of paper ballots, optical scan paper ballots, DREs (Touch Screen) with Voter Verifiable Paper Records (VVPR(*)), and DREs with no paper voter verifiable record. India is all a simple electronic machine with no paper record.

I would not go quite as far as Rop.  He would have paper ballots with all hand counting. I believe we are better off with paper ballots and optical scanning giving the record of occasional official shenanigans and the spotty record in manual counting by Connecticut officials.

(*) VVPR, Voter Verifiable Paper Records include those produced by DREs and Paper Ballots – paper ballots are much preferred, since they must be filled out by voters.  The paper records produced by DREs are inconvenient to verify and are often not actually verified by voters.

Video: The Real Story: Jerry Farrell, SOTS Candidate

“Two key things the next Secretary must solve”:

  • Voting for the disabled
  • Military Voting – getting the ballot back in time

Secretary of the State candidate Jerry Farrell was interviewed on Fox News, The Real Story <video>

For a while I thought we would never get to elections, but the interviewer did bring them up near the end. Overall a good introduction to Jerry and his qualifications. All open-ended, softball questions. Hopefully other candidates will be given the same opportunity to showcase their qualificatons.

“Two key things the next Secretary must solve”:

  • Voting for the disabled
  • Military Voting – getting the ballot back in time