Product Liability: It is not just for consumers

The opportunity is for Secretaries of State and Attorneys General in states harmed by poor products to take advantages of documented defects like those uncovered by UConn, learn of those defects based on studying submissions required by California’s law, and aggressively following Ohio’s example of redress.

Consumers can study product quality by reading Consumer Reports. When products do no perform as advertised we can recover damages under tort law, class action suits, or occasionally rely on actions by consumer protection agencies or state attorney’s general. Similar actions options are open to election officials when voting equipment proves problematic or fails to perform intended functions.

Two years ago in the Outsourced State, we discussed the Voters Unite report, Vendors are Undermining the Structure of U.S. Elections. Two recent developments in Ohio and California show the way aggressive election officials could obtain redress for  election equipment inadequacies like those recently documented by the University of Connecticut (UConn).

Product Defect Example
Recall that memory card failures have plagued our Diebold/ES&S/Dominion AccuVote-OS optical scanners for several years. Depending on the study somewhere between 5% and over 10% of memory cards are completely unreadable when subject to pre-election testing. After years of problems reported in Florida and Connecticut (Presumably occurring but not reported in other states that also use the AccuVote-OS, such as other New England states), UConn recently released a report that a major component of the problem is a product design flaw: The battery test is not able to detect those with low power remaining. Thus when memory cards are tested before each election, the test fails to detect many cards that cannot make it through the election.

An Aggressive Secretary of State Shows The Way
Led by Secretary of State, Jennifer Brenner, Ohio recently won a settlement with Diebold over a software error that caused problems in the 2008 election. <read>

The settlement (PDF) is the result of contract claims made in a lawsuit filed by Secretary Brunner in 2008 regarding problems some counties had encountered with their Premier voting systems. It comes after months of negotiations that involved the Secretary of State’s office, 47 counties that use Premier equipment, and Premier Election Solutions, Diebold, Inc., and Data Information Management Systems, Inc. (a separate company that markets and services voter registration systems to various Ohio counties.)

Among the highlights of the settlement for counties who decide to participate:

  • A total $470,424 of one-time payments to the 47 counties using Premier voting equipment.
  • At the option of each county using Premier voting equipment, up to $2.4 million worth of free software licensing for the voting machines for two years.
  • Each Premier county is eligible to receive free, new AccuVote TSX DRE voting machines equal to up to 15 percent of the number of machines the county already has – which adds up to a potential 2,909 free voting machines for the counties.
  • A 50 percent discount in maintenance fees if a county chooses continuing voting system maintenance from Premier.
  • A 50 percent discount for new generation precinct-based optical scan voting machines, if a county chooses to switch from an electronic touch screen voting system to a paper ballot optical scan voting system.
  • County boards of elections are not bound by the settlement to select Premier as their vendor for services, and they retain the right to negotiate with other vendors who offer certified voting equipment in Ohio, even if they accept the county’s one-time payment from Premier.

New California Law Destined To Help
Led by Secretary of State Debra Bowen, California recently passed a law that is destined to discourage vendors from hiding defects in their systems and to publicize such defects to other states <read>

“Reliable voting systems are critical to a successful democracy, but also to people’s confidence in the electoral process,” said Secretary Bowen, who sponsored similar legislation that the Governor vetoed last year. “Companies that make cars, toys and thousands of other products have to report product flaws and even issue recalls of seriously troubled items. There is no reason that the same philosophy of transparency should not apply to the voting equipment on which millions of Californians rely to record and tally their votes.”…

Beginning January 1, voting system vendors and ballot manufacturers will be required to notify the California Secretary of State, in writing, of every known problem in their respective systems. In turn, the Secretary of State is required to submit a report of all disclosed problems to the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC), making it possible for voters and elections officials in all states to benefit from California’s transparency. Companies may be liable for civil penalties of up to $50,000 per violation for failing to disclose known product flaws…

In recent years, undisclosed defects with voting or ballot systems came to light only after incidents in Humboldt, San Francisco, Sutter, Calaveras and Yolo Counties. Errors were caught by government officials or election observers, and no election results were compromised. “Voters have to put their faith in a voting system every time they cast ballots,” added Bowen. “This new law helps ensure that faith need not be blind.”

The Brennan Center for Justice recently recommended a similar solution national database, Voting System Failures: A Database Solution, as discussed on NPR. Perhaps California’s law will accomplish most of the same objectives, starting sooner.

The opportunity is for Secretaries of State and Attorneys General in states harmed by poor products to take advantages of documented defects like those uncovered by UConn, learn of those defects based on studying submissions required by California’s law, and aggressively following Ohio’s example of redress.

A Tale In Three Ballots

Now that Connecticut voters are used to optical scan ballots, perhaps it is time to revisit ballot design in the “land of steady habits”. Perhaps one of those habits could be continuous improvement! We hear a lot about increasing participation in elections. Creating a better ballot can increase the number of voters willing to vote, and their satisfaction with the process.

Bo Lipari published his testimony on the recent New York Primary <read>

It is all interesting reading. I find two points of particular interest.  Bo’s comments on how excessive problems were attributed to the optical scanners and on the limitations of New York’s full face ballot requirement, that is not all that different from Connecticut’s:

media reports too often implied that all problems were machine problems, but in fact while some voting machines certainly did fail to perform as expected, these reports were in the minority. By far the largest number of problem reports were administrative and legislative issue…

Hard to Read Ballots – The single most common complaint was ballots that were difficult to read. Let me be perfectly clear – ballot problem reports are not a machine problem, they are a political problem. New York Election Law requires the full face ballot, a grid layout where all candidates in all races are traditionally presented on a single page. Further, all candidates from the same party must appear in a single row or column. These and other requirements, like the confusing but obligatory party icon displayed in each box (which is all too easy to confuse with the fill-in oval), leave no choice but to use lettering far too small to be legible for far too many voters.

In the past, New York’s Legislature has not been inclined to eliminate the full face ballot despite calls to do so from civic groups. Truth be told, the full face ballot layout reinforces straight party line voting-it’s easy and natural to go straight down or across the party line filling in boxes, and so political parties tend to favor it. The full face ballot is a holdover from the days of lever machines and like those machines, it’s time has passed. New York’s current ballot design is a usability nightmare for voters. The grid layout is unclear and confusing; the small boxes are filled with unnecessary symbols; the typeface is far too small to be readable. Far better ballot designs are not just possible, they are necessary. I call on the Legislature to change New York State Election law and abolish the full face ballot requirement at the start of the new session.

The recent primary clearly demonstrated that New York voters desperately need a new, usable ballot design. Senators, you are the ones with the power, and the responsibility, to accomplish it.

I have been meaning to bring up ballot design for a while.  This is a good time with Bo’s excellent introduction to the subject.

Look at a sample Connecticut ballot it is in a grid just like a lever machine, one line per party and boxes for each candidate.  To most Connecticut voters this has been the way it has always been – the only way it can be. Most of us are clueless to other designs except for a vague understanding that in Florida in 2000 there was something worse called a “butterfly ballot” and something we nutmeggers understand how to read, not at all, the “punchcard ballot.”

What could possibly be better or worse than our familiar ballot?

Lets start with worse. New York’s ballots are similar to ours, but they require a complete full face ballot, with all the questions, offices, and candidates on one side of one page. In Connecticut we can use multiple sides and multiple pages for complex elections.  It gets worse, New York City requires candidate names in four languages and a party symbol in each box, take a look at a sample NY City Ballot courtesy of the NY League Of Women Voters. Part of which is below:

Now lets explore better. Another way of creating a ballot in other states is the so called, not partisan ballot, with each race getting a separate box on the ballot and the candidates listed with their party but without a party line.  Voters have to work a bit harder if they want to vote strictly along party lines and hopefully think a bit more about individual candidates and races. Here is an example from Minnesota.

Now that Connecticut voters are used to optical scan ballots, perhaps it is time to revisit ballot design in the “land of steady habits”. Perhaps one of those habits could be continuous improvement! We hear a lot about increasing participation in elections. Creating a better ballot might well increase the number of voters willing to vote, and their satisfaction with the process.

There is more to it than simply changing laws, and moving names and boxes around. The Brennan Center for Justice has a report, Better Ballots, discussing extensive ballot design considerations including usability testing – actually testing to see how well voters understand the ballot! Take a look at page 23 of their report to see a before and after example of a ballot similar to Minnesota’s. <Brennan Center Report>

Podcast: What’s the matter in Tennessee?

Allegations of massive election fraud, voter suppression, intimidation, and election manipulation in Shelby County, Tennessee. 10 candidates have filed a lawsuit.

Note to Connecticut voters: Instead of our check-off lists, many states require voter signed poll books. They can help resolve questions like those raised in Tennessee.

Allegations of massive election fraud, voter suppression, intimidation, and election manipulation in Shelby County, Tennessee. 10 candidates have filed a lawsuit.

  • Wrong database used which said voters had already voted – official explanation proves false
  • Over 5000 voters illegally turned away
  • 100% unverifiable voting, 100% unverifiable poll books.
  • 3221 more votes than voters recorded in poll books
  • White Republican candidates win in 70% black, democratic areas
  • Signed poll tapes found in trash
  • A month and a half after the election, the certified election results have not been released

Interview of Bev Harris by Brad Friedman. Bev says she has never heard so much lying by election officials and Bev has heard it all!

The interview starts about half way into the show. In the first half Brad defends Acorn and attacks the idea of massive voter fraud vs. election fraud <post with podcast>

All we can say is that where there is smoke [screens] there is often fire. And without transparency and credibility there will always be doubt.

Note to Connecticut voters: Instead of our check-off lists, many states require voter signed poll books. They can help resolve questions like those raised in Tennessee. In the podcast, Bev points out that the electronic poll books do not contain any voter signatures and are totally unverifiable. In Connecticut we use paper check-off lists. In many states voters must each sign paper poll books or lists, but in Connecticut it is a poll worker checking off names on the list. So we pretty much always have had the paper equivalent of the unverifiable system in use in Tennessee – there is no guarantee that a poll worker might by mistake check off the wrong name causing concern if you come in and your name is already checked off, or fraud could be created by checking off some extras and adding some corresponding ballots. An electronic system would be easier to manipulate on a large scale than a paper one. Yet a paper list with voter signatures can be verified to a much greater extent, can reduce the chance of the wrong voter being checked off or signed, and provide evidence to distinguish between a voter trying to vote twice and attempted fraud.

LWVCT: Voters Guide to Secretary of the State Candidates

Would you support legislation and funding to require post-election audits to be conducted by others than the same local officials who conducted the local election?

The League of Women Voters have published a guide to the Secretary of the State Candidates, listing their qualifications and their responses to two questions <read>

Jerry Farrell, Jr.
The Secretary of the State and local registrars of voters are responsible for both running our elections and conducting post-election audits of our voting machines. Would you support legislation and funding to require post-election audits to be conducted by others than the same local officials who conducted the local election? Please explain.

I do believe that there are improvements that can be made in the post-election audits that would enhance the credibility of the election process. It will be my responsibility to ensure that our elections are open and fair. I support having “outside auditors” as part of the post-election audit, as it would add to the transparency and legitimacy of both the audit and the election itself. I do believe that we need to approach the idea in a way that does not add to the financial burdens and mandates that municipal and state governments are facing.

Denise Wright Merrill
The Secretary of the State and local registrars of voters are responsible for both running our elections and conducting post-election audits of our voting machines. Would you support legislation and funding to require post-election audits to be conducted by others than the same local officials who conducted the local election? Please explain.

There is no greater mandate than to ensure elections are fair, open and accountable. The Secretary of the State randomly selects precincts to be audited and audits are open to the public. This provides accountability.

I believe that post-election audits should include third party review. I would work with the coalition that proposed these solutions to determine whether this could be achieved in a cost-effective manner. I would also review other recommendations made by the coalition such as requiring best practices and consistent procedures for post-election audits and propose legislation to conform our laws to those practices.

No responses were received from other candidates on the ballot.

Common Sense: The Indispensable Role Of Voter Verified Paper Ballots

Paper ballots filled out by voters are inherently “Voter Verified”. They provide the ultimate record of voters’ intent. They alone provide the opportunity for determining the exact result in close elections and the opportunity to verify the correct result in all elections. They alone provide the opportunity for public transparency necessary for real trust and confidence. Voter Verified Paper Ballots alone provide the opportunity for voting integrity, a necessary prerequisite for democracy.

Note: This is the second post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <previous> <next>

Among the heroes of our Democracy, George Washington has been called The Indispensable Man. When it comes to voting integrity, voter verified paper ballots play The Indispensable Role.

Perhaps there is an alternative. I’ll grant that paper might not be the only possible media. Voter verified stone tablets/ballots might work but are hardly realistic. Beyond a different permanent media, so far, no safe alternative has been proposed which has withstood scrutiny.

The alternatives that fail to pass scrutiny, so far:

  • Basic Touch Screen Electronic Voting (DREs)
  • DREs with “Voter Verified” Paper Trails
  • Internet Voting (including: Websites, Email, or Kiosk based)

Any form of voting that relies solely on computers for integrity is subject to fraud and error:

A hardware error could occur changing a program, or causing a touch screen or scanner to function improperly and unexpected, undetectably, to dramatically change a result – either on an individual voting machine or in transmitting or accumulating results.

An unscrupulous insider could change a program or function of a computer in a variety of ways that could be difficult or impossible to detect.

A voting machine could be programmed incorrectly to begin with, running correctly for years and then suddenly produce the wrong result on a particular set of ballots or based on the placement or spelling of a particular candidate’s name.

(It is not common sense that the spelling of a candidate’s name could change the result. It is common sense for experienced computer programmers. Programmers all have stories of mysterious problems. Believe it or not! I cannot send emails with my cell number including imbeded dashes ‘-‘, I can use periods ‘.” and other marks, I can use other phone numbers but not my particular cell number with dashes – the sent emails just plain disappear. I was using the cell number on my email signature.  It took months of lost emails, lost communications, interpersonal misunderstandings, changing software and email providers to no avail. until I stumbled onto this hard to believe fact. I still find it hard to believe, but it was repeatedly, rigorously tested to my amazed/dismayed satisfaction. As far as I can tell it is either a Microsoft or Apache bug which I have not pursued.)

No amount of testing or security can be sufficient to prevent such errors and fraud:

Based on Alan Turing’s Halting Problem it is impossible to determine, in general, that a computer program will do what it is expected to do in all possible circumstances. We could test many sequences of ballots and prove they are counted correctly, but in different circumstances the computer might function differently: A different set of ballots, a different sequence of their submission, submission at a different time, or with different time delays between ballots etc. could yield different results. In reality, it would be almost impossible to test each voting machine with a reasonable number of typical sets of ballots to provide reasonable levels of confidence, let alone test each machine before each election.

Beyond these basic, insurmountable obstacles, voting has unique challenges:

  • Resources are limited. Election officials, in general have limited computer and security expertise. Jurisdictions cannot afford the expertise to plan reasonably effective testing and security measures. They cannot perform extensive testing of single voting machines, let alone each machine before each election.
  • Election computers are programmed anew for each election. Past results do not imply that current programming is reliable or that new errors or fraud have not been induced.
  • Scanners or touch screens can go out of alignment or develop blind/weak spots and errors.
  • Security measures to prevent insider tampering with programming and computer chips would be prohibitively extensive, costly, and sophisticated.

Each of the current alternatives have their own limitations:

Touch screen (DRE) voting machines without paper trails do not have transparent records which can be verified by the voter or election officials after elections. There is no way for anyone to determine if a vote cast by a voter increased the vote for the correct candidates; no way for the public or officials to determine if the counters or electronic records of votes accurately reflect the voters’ actual choices.

Internet voting methods are subject to all the risks of the public and “private secure” Internets.  Sophisticated Government agencies and corporations are regularly subject to hacking (e.g. Google and the U.S. Defense Department). It is wildly optimistic and delusional  to expect voting jurisdictions or voting vendors to do as well, let alone better. Kiosks mitigate a few, but hardly all of these risks. Banks lose billions in ATM electronic fraud each year – once again, they are more sophisticated and can afford more to avoid costly fraud. And bankers have an advantage with double entry bookkeeping and customer receipts which provide means to detect fraud – means by definition unavailable to electronic voting. The recent extensive Wikileaks disclosure of government documents is an example of what a lone or very limited number of insiders can do in compromising the security of a system.

Paper trail DREs provide an inadequate substitute for voter verified paper ballots. The current paper trails are difficult to read for voters and officials and are frequently lost to jams oeundetected “out of paper” conditions.  A small percentage of voters actually verify their vote – fraud or error can misclassify a significant percentage of votes, with the smaller percentage verified chalked up to “I/you must have pushed the wrong button”.  Beyond this DREs are much more costly to purchase, operate, and audit than optical scanners.

The Bottom Line

It is theoretically impossible to develop a computer only voting solution that is not subject error and fraud. Beyond theory, common sense shows that proposed electronic voting systems are subject to error and insider fraud, with all but impossible testing and security requirements, well beyond the capabilities and resources available to election officials.

Paper ballots filled out by voters are inherently “Voter Verified”. They provide the ultimate record of voters’ intent. They alone provide the opportunity for determining the exact result in close elections and the opportunity to verify the correct result in all elections. They alone provide the opportunity for public transparency necessary for real trust and confidence. Voter Verified Paper Ballots alone provide the opportunity for voting integrity, a necessary prerequisite for democracy.

We will have much more to say.  “Opportunity” is insufficient.

Hartford Courant joins in fighting last [election] war

Clearly we got one thing right last month, when we said June primaries are a “Sure media winner”. If the primaries are moved to June we will reference this post when complaints are made that the campaign season is too long or to have the Legislature pay more attention to business in the 1st quarter of an election year.

In an editorial today, the Hartford Courant joins Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, in moving primary elections to June, unlimited absentee voting, and election day registration: How To Turn Up Voter Turnout – An Earlier Primary . . . . . . And two other reforms should boost interest in elections <read>

Ms. Bysiewicz is right. The Aug. 10 turnout — even with some competitive contests between strong candidates — was sickly. Fewer than one in four Democrats reported to the polls, and fewer than one in three Republicans voted.

She suggests the election calendar be changed to make the primary in June, “while children are still in school and parents are more tuned in to news and public affairs before we all go into summer vacation mode.” A June primary makes sense as long as the party conventions — whose main business is to endorse candidates — are moved back in the calendar as well — to, say, March. Keeping the conventions in late May and moving the primary elections to the first half of June would give party-endorsed candidates an even greater advantage than they now have.

The secretary of the state’s other two ideas are so-called “no-excuse” absentee balloting and Election Day registration. Both of those have resulted in increased voter turnout in states that have adopted them.

No-excuse absentee balloting is a form of early voting. It should work in Connecticut so long as political operatives are prohibited from distributing absentee ballot applications and strong-arming vulnerable residents — the elderly or incapacitated, for example — into voting for the operatives’ choices.

As CTVotersCount readers know we conditionally support Election Day Registration (EDR) – conditioned on an implementation that supports voting integrity along with voter convenience – providing election day registration in each polling place followed by the same voting methods used by other voters, as is the case in all but one of the apparently successful EDR states.

We are opposed to the expansion of all forms of mail-in voting, including no-excuse absentee voting. Abuses of absentee voting have occurred in Connecticut and occur on a larger scale in other states with significant levels of absentee voting – it is not worth the risk.  Even the Courant Editorial recognizes the risks adds conditions to its endorsement. We remain opposed given the track record here and elsewhere <ref> <ref>.  According to the Courant:

Absentee balloting has been used by unscrupulous politicians as an illegal vote-grabbing racket for years, especially in Hartford. Safeguards would have to be built into the system if it is expanded.

As we said last month when Secretary Bysiewicz proposed a June Primary:

This is not a voting integrity issue, yet we place it in the category of “Fighting the last [election] war” (i.e. Changes/reforms that look good when attempting to correct a recent, assumed election problem, without looking at all the consequences. ) We say “Be careful what you ask for”:

Starting in June would move the whole campaign season forward by two months:  Earlier primary, earlier state conventions, earlier pre-convention announcements, gaining support, election committees etc.

  • Many voters complain already that campaigns are too long
  • Many officials complain they are always campaigning
  • Would the Legislature’s “Short Session” be two months shorter, or would they pay less attention to state business?
  • Would candidates want/need more money for longer campaigns (A sure media winner)
  • Would challenging primary candidates find it harder to start earlier.

Finally, its unlikely that lower turnout is due to more travel in 2010 than in 2006 – more likely, its less interest in the differences between candidates and more turnoff by campaign tactics.

Clearly we got one thing right last month, when we said June primaries are a “Sure media winner”.  If the primaries are moved to June we will reference this post when complaints are made that the campaign season is too long or to have the Legislature pay more attention to business in the 1st quarter of an election year.

Do You Know A Military or Overseas Voter? Act Now!!!

Tell them they can express their voted ballots back to the U.S. from 94 countries, at a huge discount.

We recommend that all Military and Overseas voters review the information on voting at the Overseas Vote Foundation.  If you know an Overseas or Military voter (or a citizen overseas or in the military that may want to vote) please extend this recommendation to them.

Also the Overseas Vote Foundation has set up a steep discount for expressing back voted ballots:

We know you’ve been waiting for it. So we’re thrilled to announce that we have teamed up again this year with FedEx Express to offer Express Your Vote in 94 countries. (Fourteen more than in 2008!)

The one-of-its-kind Express Your Vote program provides highly discounted rates for express delivery of voted ballots back to local election offices in the United States.

See their site for <Countries, Deadlines and Rates>

Common Sense Election Integrity

One of the benefits of using optical scanners for voting is the requirement for voter marked paper ballots. They are much more reliable and useful than the paper records produced by some DRE (touch screen) voting machines. However, obtaining these benefits depends on the details surrounding the use of optical scanners and paper ballots. To provide true election integrity, Connecticut, like most states, needs to do much better in every dimension.

Note: This is the first post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <next>

One of the benefits of using optical scanners for voting is the requirement for voter marked paper ballots. They are much more reliable and useful than the paper records produced by some DRE (touch screen) voting machines:

  • Marked by voters, paper ballots, should accurately reflect the voters’ intent. Voter verifiable paper records (produced by DREs) are actually reviewed in detail by very few voters, providing an opportunity for fraud and for significant errors to go undetected.
  • Compared with curly, poorly printed, closely spaced DRE records (usually similar to store receipts), paper ballots are relatively easily preserved, organized, and recounted. They can be carefully reviewed for voters’ intent in the case of very close elections.
  • Properly tuned and programmed optical scanners can quickly and accurately count large numbers of ballots with many contests.

However, obtaining these benefits depends on the details surrounding the use of optical scanners and paper ballots. At a high level the requirements are:

  • The integrity of the paper ballots must be guaranteed by a trusted, reliable chain-of-custody.
  • There must be a trusted, reliable reporting process for accumulating results from multiple polling places and jurisdictions.
  • There must be a trusted, reliable post-election audit process that will detect and correct errors or fraud in ballot accounting, optical scanning, manual counting, and reporting process
  • In very close elections there must be a thorough, transparent, and adversarial recount.
  • The entire process must be effective, followed uniformly, enforceable, and enforced, along with a maximum opportunity for public transparency and meaningful observation.
  • The risks of error and opportunity for fraud should be minimized by: non-partisan and opposing party election management/oversight; security, testing, and controls over optical scanner programming and chain-of-custody; and extensive training and certification of election officials.

To provide true election integrity, Connecticut, like most states, needs to do much better in every one of these dimensions.

Warning: New link to check your CT Voter Registration – Not Always Accurate

It has come to our attention that the voter information provided by the Secretary of the State’s new web tool is inaccurate in some cases.

We learned this in the course of discovering a loophole in the integrity of the post-election audit random drawing process.

It has come to our attention that the voter information provided by the Secretary of the State’s new web tool is inaccurate in some cases.

We learned this in the course of discovering a loophole in the integrity of the post-election audit random drawing process:

This spring we realized that there was no way for us to verify the  accuracy of the  list of polling districts subject to se4lection in the 10% random drawing for post-election audits. Each time we had attended the drawing we checked a list of districts supplied by the Secretary of the State’s office against the slips placed in the barrel and occasionally founds some differences to correct. This spring, it occurred to us that we did not have a way to verify the list of districts we were given. In subsequent discussions with the Secretary of the State’s Office, we learned that municipalities are not obligated to send lists of polling places to the Secretary of the State. Municipalities are requested to do that, most do, but are not required to. The Secretary of the State’s Office has proposed legislation to mandate that information be sent, but like many bills it was never passed by the Legislature.

Subsequently we proposed that the list of districts be determined by extracting them from the Secretary of the State’s web feature for voter polling place look up.  Unfortunately, we learned that was also an unreliable source of a list of polling places, and must therefor be supplying incorrect information to some voters. The point was brought home to us when we called on of the towns selected for audit in the most recent random drawing: The district chosen in the town for audit did not currently exist.  The non-existent district was replaced by an alternate in another town, yet without a good lists of districts required an audit loophole is created since existing districts not included in the drawing could be known in advance and therefor guaranteed not to be audited.

Reviewing the Secretary of the State’s press release sent on August 5th, we see that another potential cause of inaccuracy was initially disclosed:  <read>

The website will also provide the location of the individual’s polling place. Users must be aware that occasional special conditions can force changes in
polling places. For the most up to date location, voters should check with their town offices and local registrar of voters.

However, we caution that we can find no similar caution of disclaimer on the website itself associated with the lookup feature. The only mention is in the posted press release.

Update: 9/4/2010

I observed a post-election audit yesterday.  Both districts selected in the random drawing were incorrectly identified by district numbers. Fortunately, the locations were correct and each polling place had only one district. Perhaps the problem is pervasive.

************Original Post 8/5/2010

Link to the Secretary of the State’s website to check that you are registered to vote:<click>  More voting information: <click>

While we applaud the Secretary and her staff for making this available, we have one suggestion: Include the party affiliation in the results. We find that many voters do not recall their affiliation, if any. Having that available would reduce much confusion and unnecessary work for voters and registrars.