CT IRONY #4: Machine Errors Result In Recounting By Machine

What happens when an post-election audit discovers a large discrepancy in a race that could reverse the election result? A recanvass, defined as a modified optical scanner recount. Possibly some machine problems might be mitigated by such a recanvass, yet if there were an error in memory card programming or an error in the software it is quite likely the same discrepancy would be repeated.

In reviewing Connecticut’s post-election audit law, we discovered another irony, perhaps one of those unintended consequences. What happens when an audit discovers a large discrepancy in a race that could reverse the election result if that same error were present in other optical scanners?

(f) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9-311, the Secretary of the State shall order a discrepancy recanvass of the returns of an election or primary for any office if a discrepancy, as defined in subsection (o) of this section, exists where the margin of victory in the race for such office is less than the amount of the discrepancy multiplied by the total number of voting districts where such race appeared on the ballot, provided in a year in which the Secretary of the State is a candidate for an office on the ballot and that office is subject to an audit as provided by this section, the State Elections Enforcement Commission shall order a discrepancy recanvass if a discrepancy, as defined by subsection (o) of this section, has occurred that could affect the outcome of the election or primary for such office.

For those not familiar with Connecticut law, a recanvass is our substitute for an automatic recount when election contests are close. It make sense to recount an entire race if an audit discovers errors in some districts and if those errors were common across the districts might change the election results. How does our recanvass work?

It is a modified machine recount:

(e) The new memory card shall be installed in the tabulator, the tabulator shall be installed on an empty ballot box, the pre-election testing procedures should be followed to prepare the new tabulator for use and a record shall be made. The test ballots shall be removed and packaged.

(f) After the tabulator is properly tested and those present agree that the tabulator is properly set, the tabulator shall be set in election mode. When the machine prints the election zero report, check that it identifies the town or voting district and the office and candidates being recanvassed. The report shall be signed by the moderator and registrars and left attached to the tape in the machine…

(l) The recanvass officials of opposing political parties shall remove all other ballots in the ballot transfer case (except any ballots marked “spoiled ballots” from a polling place in which the marksense machine was used for polling place voting). They shall examine all these ballots which were machine counted on election day to determine whether the markings for the office being recanvassed are sufficiently clear to be read by the machine. (See examples of properly and improperly marked ballots in this handbook as a guide) Also, if a stickered race is being recanvassed, make sure that early absentee ballots issued without the corrected name are not machine counted. If any such error or defect is found, the ballot should be set aside for hand counting of the races involved in the recanvass. If two recanvass officials of opposing political parties agree that such ballots are sufficiently clear to be read by the machine, such ballots shall be processed through the machine

Possibly some machine problems might be mitigated by such a recanvass, yet if there were an error in memory card programming or an error in the software it is quite likely the same discrepancy would be repeated.

It was not always this way. The recanvass procedures written in the fall of 2007 just after Connecticut purchased optical scanners statewide called for complete manual count for racanvasses. <Oct 2007 Recanvass Manual>

§ (e) The new memory card shall be installed in the tabulator, the tabulator shall be installed on an empty ballot box, the pre-election testing procedures should be followed to prepare the new tabulator for use and a record shall be made. The test ballots shall be removed and packaged.

§ (f) After the tabulator is properly tested and those present agree that the tabulator is properly set, the tabulator shall be set in election mode. When the machine prints the election zero report, check that it identifies the town or voting district and the office and candidates being recanvassed. The report shall be signed by the moderator and registrars and left attached to the tape in the machine.

President Appoints Cyber Czar

Our concern is with the disconnect that has otherwise intelligent people concerned with cyber security based on strong evidence, coupled with the almost simultaneous support for voting by Internet, email, and fax.

Several stories covering the President’s appointment of a Cyber Czar, officially a Cyber-Security Coordinator <read>

After months of delay, President Obama on Tuesday named a cyber-security coordinator to oversee the vast task of protecting the nation’s computer systems in the public and private sectors…

But the selection process ran into division and disarray that, critics said, affect the government’s cyber-security efforts. The administration has sparred with business interests over cyber-security policy and has grappled with bureaucratic infighting among the law enforcement and intelligence agencies involved…

In praising Tuesday’s appointment, the chairman of the Senate’s Homeland Security and Government Affairs committee called on the administration to move faster to safeguard cyber-networks nationwide. Experts have cited threats posed by international organized crime as well as hackers connected to the security forces and spy agencies of China and other nations. China denies it is trying to hack U.S. systems.

We have previously covered the President’s concerns. Our concern is with the disconnect that has otherwise intelligent people concerned with cyber security based on strong evidence, coupled with the almost simultaneous support for voting by Internet, email, and fax.

Reference:

Technologists’ Statement On Internet Voting

CIA Agent: Electronic Voting Risky

Overseas And Military Voting Reform Approved By Senate – With Risky Provision

Washington State Secretary of the State proposes Militairy Internet voting

Voters, Voter Action: Win In Pennsylvania Supreme Court

voters have a right under the Pennsylvania Constitution to reliable and secure voting systems and can challenge the use of electronic voting machines “that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized” through voter verification or independent audit.

Voter Action Press Release <read>

PENNSYLVANIA STATE SUPREME COURT ALLOWS VOTING RIGHTS CASE TO PROCEED

Dec 18 2008 | State’s Highest Court Denies Pennsylvania Secretary of State Permission to Appeal Lower Court Ruling in Voters’ Favor Case Challenging the Use of Electronic Voting Machines Now Moves Toward Trial PHILADELPHIA, PA – Pennsylvania voters challenging the continued use of unverifiable electronic voting machines in their state won another major round on Tuesday when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a ruling allowing their case to proceed toward trial. The state’s highest court, in a one-sentence order, denied the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s petition seeking permission to appeal a lower court ruling decided in the voters’ favor. In April 2007, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania had ruled that voters have a right under the Pennsylvania Constitution to reliable and secure voting systems and can challenge the use of electronic voting machines “that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized” through voter verification or independent audit…

“Across the country, states are realizing that electronic voting systems cannot be trusted,” says Michael Churchill, senior counsel with the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia and another lawyer for the voters in this case. “Like voters in other states, Pennsylvania voters have a right to a voting system which will properly count their votes.

I am not a lawyer ,but to me, this is an important decision and precident. If this decision holds, it would presumably mean that Pennsylvaina voters are entitled to a lot more than reviewing the source code of DRE voting systems. Voting systems include the entire process of voting, not just the electronic systems. If systems “that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized” are unacceptable, then systems with inadequate audits with no way for citizens to verify their paper ballots were counted accurtely would also seem to be inadequate. Of course this would only apply to Pennsylvania, and be most valuable as a precedent to citizens of other states depending on the language in their constitutions vs. Pennsylvania’s.

Next week it will be Seven – Or more?

“Majority Leader Denise Merrill of Mansfield said Friday that she will be officially announcing her candidacy for Secretary of the State next week.”

Update: “Wild West” election year on top of “Wild West” election management?

According to CTNewsJunkie: Majority Leader Will Run For Statewide Office <read>

Majority Leader Denise Merrill of Mansfield said Friday that she will be officially announcing her candidacy for Secretary of the State next week.

“I’m not exploring, I’m running,” Merrill said Friday.

Merrill, who has served in the House of Representatives since 1994, entered politics through a League of Women Voters law and citizenship program, so running for Secretary of State is “going back to my roots,” she said.

Merrill also was once the vice chairwoman of the legislature’s General Administration and Elections Committee. She has also served as chairwoman of the legislature’s powerful Appropriations Committee.

We see multiple reasons why several Representatives and Senators are considering the office: 1) It is the only open constitutional office in addition to Governor. 2) It is a traditional stepping stone to higher office. 3) Perhaps some are tiring of the legislature. AND 4) A genuine interest in making a difference in the responsibilities and possibilities of the office.

See our last post for a list of references, current candidates, and those with exploratory committees.

Update: Chris Keating’s blog at the Courant: House Majority Leader Denise Merrill, Sen. Jonathan Harris Running For Secretary Of The State; To Replace Bysiewicz <read>

“Right now, it’s a game-changing time for the state of Connecticut,” Harris said in an interview. “We have our backs against the wall, and I don’t think we’re going to get a second chance. … It’s going to be a tough year for election – a volatile year. It’s a wide-open, Wild West kind of year.”

Merrill, a lawmaker since 1993, focused early in her career on many of the issues associated with the Secretary of the State’s office and served as vice chairwoman under Bysiewicz on the legislative committee that oversees campaign financing and elections.

Where have we head a reference to the Wild West before? It was from Rep Chris Caruso describing the election system as conducted by the registrars of voters. Iin a public hearing about two years ago in Danbury:

Representative Caruso again mentioned consistency. He mentioned previous testimony that registrars say they have violated the law. He said the “wild west approach” needs to end.

Majority Leader Will Run For Statewide Office

And now there are six

Another Candidate for Secretary of the State: Sen Jonathan Harris

Update: 12/29/2009: Interview with Senator Harris <video>

It’s about jobs and democracy

Another Candidate for Secretary of the State: Sen Jonathan Harris. CTNewsJunkie has the story <read>

Harris, who currently co-chairs the legislature’s Public Health Committee, said in a phone interview Wednesday that he wants to be in the mix during this “game changing moment” and do for the entire state what he was able to accomplish for his constituents in Bloomfield, Farmington, Burlington, and West Hartford…

“I want to be part of the team that will rebuild a strong economy, create good jobs and change the way we’re doing business,” Harris…

Harris, who is in his legislative office five to six days a week, said he hasn’t decided yet whether he will give up his senate seat. At the moment, “I’m just exploring other opportunities,” and will make a decision about the senate seat in the future.

This brings our list up to six candidates and exploratory committees:

Candidate: Richard Abbate (R)
Candidate: Corey Brinson (R)
Candidate: Gerry Garcia (D)

Exploratory: Jonathan Harris (D)
Exploratory: Kevin Roldan (D)
Exploratory: James Spallone (D)

State Elections Enforcement Commission list of candidates and committees.
Our draft list of questions we would ask candidates for Secretary of the State.
For all coverage of the 2010 race for Secretary of the State, click “2010” on our menu.

Miles Rapoport: Demos Leader and former CT Secretary of the State

A longtime friend profiles Miles Rapoport, former Connecticut Secretary of the State, and Demos.

A longtime friend profiles Miles Rapoport and Demos at the Huffington Post: Demos Promotes Participatory Democracy <read>

Coming of age in the sixties, Miles applied his smarts and competitive energy to community organizing and then electoral politics. He became a successful grassroots organizer in Connecticut, then served in the state legislature and as secretary of the state. But in 2001, he may have found his true calling when he was named president of Demos, a Manhattan-based non-partisan research and advocacy organization gearing up to oppose the myriad right-wing think tanks then dominating Washington.

Demos has done pioneering work on a wide variety of issues. One of its principal efforts has been expanding democratic participation, especially among people often left out of the process. The organization has championed Same Day Registration, which has increased voter turnout by 7 to 10 percent in the ten states that have it. And Demos has vigorously pressed states to implement largely ignored provisions of the 1993 National Voter Registration Act that require them to register people to vote when they receive social services.

Like the author, I consider Miles a friend, we were not schoolmates but we met when our sons were schoolmates. I suspect despite the following story, the President is also a friend:

With all the amazing work Demos is doing, it’s still comforting to know that Miles isn’t perfect. Early in his tenure, he had lunch with a Demos board member he felt needed to be more active. When it became clear the member just couldn’t devote the necessary time, they agreed it was probably a good idea that he leave the board. And with that, Barack Obama was a Demos board member no more. Holding a mock gun to his head, Rapoport explains, “as Hillary Clinton once said, ‘Based on the information I had at the time, it seemed like a good decision.'”

Demos Promotes Participatory Democracy

Secretary of the State Candidate Criticizes Exploratory Committees

In our view exploratory committees represent a loophole in the current public financing law. Candidates can collect and spend huge sums in the name of exploring runs for office. On the other hand, unilateral disarmament can be risky.

New Haven Register: ‘Unofficial’ candidates criticized <read>

Gerry Garcia, Democratic candidate for secretary of the state, said candidates who use exploratory committees, rather than candidate committees, are “gaming” the system by getting around contribution limits.

Garcia is among a handful of candidates who have officially declared interest in a specific statewide office. For governor, that group includes Democrat former House Speaker James A. Amann, and Republicans Lt. Gov. Michael Fedele, Scott Merrell and Tom Foley.

Democrats with exploratory committees looking at the gubernatorial race include Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz, former Stamford Mayor Dannel P. Malloy, state Sen. Gary LeBeau of East Hartford, Ridgefield First Selectman Rudy Marconi and Ned Lamont, the 2006 Democratic U.S. Senate candidate, while House Minority Leader Lawrence Cafero is also weighing his options.

Garcia, in a statement, asked that his fellow Democrats officially commit to the public financing system and declare their candidacies. An official candidate for governor who wants to qualify for public financing has to raise $250,000 in $100 increments.

Those in exploratory committees can accept individual contributions up to $375.

In our view exploratory committees represent a loophole in the current public financing law. Candidates can collect and spend huge sums in the name of exploring runs for office. We can see the need for a couple thousand for exploring a run for the legislature or perhaps a low six figure number in exploring a run for Governor, but in our understanding an almost unlimited amount can be spent “exploring”.

On the other hand, unilateral disarmament can be risky. At least on the Democratic side, the leading candidates or Governor are all doing it. Would Bysiewicz, Malloy, or Lamont be handicapped by individually choosing to end their exploratory committees? Or would they gain votes.

West Hartford: Mayor Supports Audits – Would Like State To Pay

“The audit is being done for the best of reasons to protect..to make sure democracy is being done accurately.”

Local Online News Video report on West Hartford post-election audit counting <video>

Featured in the video is West Hartford Mayor, Scott Slifka.

The audit is being done for the best of reasons to protect..to make sure democracy is being done accurately.

Like CTVotersCount, the Mayor believes that the State should pay for the audits:

Disappointing that we have been asked to pay for it. We have requested of the Secretary of the State that here office pay for it.

We believe that the 10% of districts chosen to be counted are checking the system for the whole State, not just their local community. The audits are a small investment to pay to provide confidence and deterrence to the voters that our system is protected from errors and fraud. The audits cost about 10% of the cost of the paper ballots printed for each election. Last year’s Presidential post-election audit cost about $72,000 state wide. West Hartford audited three districts out of the sixty chosen statewide for $2,300.

Of course, even thought the Secretary of the State supports the audits, they are mandiated by the legislature.

Update: Looking at West Hartford’s 2010 budget, the entire budget for the Registrar of Voters is $259,662 and for the town, 212,571,688.

More On Chain-Of-Custody

Last month we commented on reports of chain-of-custody problems in Haddam and on a Courant Editorial on the need for two people of opposing parties whenever ballots are accessed. The problem goes deeper. We sent the following letter to the Courant in the interest of using the breach in Haddam as an educational opportunity. I will post it here, since the time has passed for its potential publication (and the Courant will not publish letters previously published elsewhere) :

To the Editor,

The voters of Connecticut should be concerned with the chain-of-custody of ballots as stated in your editorial, “Only One Party Observed Haddam Vote Count” (Nov 23, 2009). Ballots are required to precisely determine the outcome of close elections and to provide credibility to post-election audits. This particular case is unique in that the breach became public and that it may be a violation of the law.

The law requires that ballots be sealed for fourteen days after an election. Ironically, the post-election audits cannot begin until the fifteenth day after an election. Audit observers have regularly reported violations of chain-of-custody procedures. In Connecticut, election regulations and procedures cannot be enforced.

For voters to have confidence there must be no opportunity for compromise; it is critical that ballots be protected from clandestine access. Ballots are usually sealed in bags or containers, however, more protection is needed. Los Alamos scientists have reported that such a seal can be defeated and replaced with a counterfeit in a median of 43 seconds. In Connecticut, ballots are often held in a room with single key access, with the key available to either registrar, frequently to any official in the Registrars’ Office. The storage is often a room in town hall, the Registrars’ Office, or a hallway cabinet. In other states, ballots are held in vaults, with video surveillance, and uniformed guards

Clearly stronger chain-of-custody protections for our ballots are required.

Luther Weeks

References:

Coalition Citizen Election Audit Coalition reports showing chain-of-custody lapses:
http://www.CTElectionAudit.orgIn particular: http://www.ctelectionaudit.org/?page_id=74

Los Alamos scientists’ report: https://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/TamperIndSeals.mht

NY-23: Richard Hayes Phillips Corrects The Record

The author has since learned that only the cumulative results for each contest, not the results for each election district, are actually certified to the State. Thus it is not strictly correct that these negative numbers appeared in the certified results. But they did appear in the district (precinct) totals from which the certified cumulative results were derived.

Last week Richard Hayes Phillips reported in an article in the Governeur Times “Impossible Numbers Certified in NY-23” as we carried here.

This week in a letter to the editor, he corrects the record based on further information: Letter to the Editor on NY-23 Results <read>

It was reported last week that the St. Lawrence County Board of Elections had certified impossible numbers for the special election in New York’s 23^rd Congressional District. Just hours before certification, I received from the Board, in a .pdf file, by e-mail, their results for each election district (precinct). These contained, for six election districts (four in Canton, one in Massena, and one in Oswegatchie), more votes counted for the candidates than the reported number of ballots cast and, therefore, negative numbers for “blank ballots” or “undervotes.” These negative numbers actually appear, in a computer printout, in the .pdf file

The author has since learned that only the cumulative results for each contest, not the results for each election district, are actually certified to the State. Thus it is not strictly correct that these negative numbers appeared in the certified results. But they did appear in the district (precinct) totals from which the certified cumulative results were derived.

In response to the article, the Board of Elections, as always, has provided the data needed to analyze the situation. Only the numbers for “total” ballots cast and for “blank” ballots have changed for the six districts in question; the vote totals for the candidates remain the same. For comparative analysis, the Board has provided a breakdown of how many voters in each district voted in which manner (machine, absentee, affidavit, or special federal).

A comparison of these data confirms that there were enough “machine” voters (actual voters at the polls) to account for the vote counts for the individual candidates in these six districts. This is what my audit of the poll books had shown, as reported in the original article…

Thus, neither the “whole number” of ballots cast, nor the negative numbers for “blank votes” or undervotes, e-mailed to me by the Board of Elections just hours before certification, can possibly be explained in five of six cases. No vote counting system should ever produce negative numbers. If negative numbers for “blank” votes are allowed by the computer program, “phantom votes” can be entered into the count, and this is a grievous flaw in the system.