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The Times: They are a Antitrust’n, but it is not enough

“The Justice Department’s work should not end with blocking this one sale. It also needs to keep a close eye on widespread reports of anticompetitive behavior by Election Systems and Software and other vendors.”

NY Times Editorial: Antitrust and Your Vote <read>

The good news:

When the nation’s largest voting machine manufacturer, Election Systems and Software, acquired the voting machine business of Diebold, the nation’s second-largest manufacturer, it set off alarms for anyone who cares about election integrity. The combination meant that 70 percent of the nation’s voting machines would be provided by just one company.

The Justice Department has now announced that it intends to block certain parts of the deal on antitrust grounds. That is a very welcome step, but the department and Congress need to do more to protect the vote.

The Justice Department is right to try to block the deal between the voting machine makers. It was a clear violation of antitrust law and a clear threat to the public interest. Less competition would mean less choice for states and localities looking to buy and service voting machines — and even less incentive for industry to produce first-rate products. We hope a federal court approves the Justice Department’s decision and that Election Systems and Software quickly finds a buyer.

But it is not enough:

The Justice Department’s work should not end with blocking this one sale. It also needs to keep a close eye on widespread reports of anticompetitive behavior by Election Systems and Software and other vendors. It should look in particular at how Election Systems handles sales of service contracts for voting machines, which are a big revenue generator, that make it hard for other companies to compete.

Congress also should hold hearings to investigate that and other reports of anticompetitive behavior in the industry. It also should set strong standards for voting machines, including a federal requirement for paper trails and audits. The security of the vote is too important to leave those decisions up to local governments or an industry with a less-than-stellar track record.

We agree.

Canada May Join Internet Voting Race To The Bottom

“Democracy depends upon a fair, accurate and transparent electoral process with outcomes that can be independently verified. Conventional voting accomplishes many of these goals – private polling stations enable citizens to cast their votes anonymously, election-day scrutineers offer independent oversight and paper-based ballots provide a verifiable outcome that can be re-counted if necessary.”

Article in The Star by Michael Geist: Hackers, viruses threaten online voting validity <read> Michael Geist holds the Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law.

New trials would require the approval of a legislative committee, but the province’s Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged that online voting may be coming, noting “online voting is something that’s on the forefront of people’s minds … people say, ‘I can do my banking online, but I can’t do my voting online.’ ”

The enthusiasm for Internet voting is understandable. At first blush, there is a certain allure associated with the convenience of Internet voting, given the prospect of increased turnout, reduced costs and quicker reporting of results. Moreover, since other security sensitive activities such as banking and health care have gravitated online, supporters argue that elections can’t be far behind.

Yet before rushing into Internet voting trials, the dangers should not be overlooked.

Democracy depends upon a fair, accurate and transparent electoral process with outcomes that can be independently verified. Conventional voting accomplishes many of these goals – private polling stations enable citizens to cast their votes anonymously, election-day scrutineers offer independent oversight and paper-based ballots provide a verifiable outcome that can be re-counted if necessary.

Geist gives an educational overview of problems:

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the organization that administers the domain name system, ran an online board of directors election in 2000. The experience was fraught with technical difficulties, leading a reviewer to conclude “the technical weakness in the registration system made it virtually impossible to assess the integrity of the voters’ list, the security of the PINs, and secrecy of vote.”

More recently, the Netherlands used Internet voting as part of its 2006 parliamentary elections. The online option was an alternative for Dutch citizens working or living abroad. Nearly 20,000 valid Internet votes were received at a cost of approximately 90 euros per Internet voter. Two years later, the country implemented a ban on Internet voting…

Caution on Internet voting appears prudent, since experts have identified a long and costly list of necessary precautions, including random spot checks and post-vote verification programs to preserve anonymity. Given the security risks, opening the door to provincial or federal Internet voting seems premature. In the zeal to increase voter turnout, the reliance on Internet voting could inadvertently place the validity of the election process at risk.

As CTVotersCount readers know we have long opposed internet voting, unless and until a viable mechanism is reviewed and approved by the majority of Computer Scientists, Security Experts and Advocates. <reference> <reference>

Michael Geist holds the Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law

Insider Fraud In Kentucky

The scheme involved duping people to walk away from the voting computer before they had finished their elections, then changing their choices…White said she also went into the booth with people who had sold their vote to make sure they cast ballots for the candidates who had paid.

We have blogged in the past about the fuzzy line between retail and wholesale vote fraud. A story from Kentucky describes alleged, long-standing, fraud by officials. In this case the fraud may have been limited in scope, but so were the elections which might well have been decided by skulduggery. <read>

Wanda White testified that Clerk Freddy Thompson — the county’s chief election officer — helped show her how to manipulate voting machines along with Charles Wayne Jones, the Democratic election commissioner.

The scheme involved duping people to walk away from the voting computer before they had finished their elections, then changing their choices, said White, the Democratic judge in a precinct in Manchester.

White said she stole more than 100 votes that election.

“It was easy done,” she said.

White said she also went into the booth with people who had sold their vote to make sure they cast ballots for the candidates who had paid.

White testified Friday in the continuing trial of eight Clay County residents who allegedly took part in a scheme to rig elections over several years…

The machines had a “Vote” button that people could push to review their choices, then a second button they had to push to record the choices and finish voting.

At Maricle’s direction, she went to Stivers, who taught her about distracting voters so they would leave the machine after pushing the review button, but before they’d recorded their choices, White said.

Thompson and Jones used a voting machine to show her and Charles “Dobber” Weaver how to change votes, White said.

White said they did that at the clerk’s office after legitimate training for all election workers. She and Weaver stayed late to learn how to manipulate the machines, White said.

Weaver, then the Manchester fire chief, was the Republican judge in the precinct where White was the Democratic judge in May 2006.

Let us point out that it is questionable to call this electronic voting fraud. It is two schemes, one made possible by confusing touch screen machines. That scheme would work even if the touch screen had a “voter verified” paper record. However, the other scheme, watching people vote to verify they did what they were paid to do, would work just as well with voter verified paper ballots, no matter how they are counted.

ES&S Diebold Purchase: Groups Endorse Remedies for Unlawful Concentration of Market Power

We are deeply concerned about the public impact of ES&S’s purchase of Diebold’s Premier Election Solutions, Inc… Fortunately, the Federal Government has expedited its research into purchaser ES&S’s accelerated absorption of PESI assets into ES&S and the business goliath’s concerted attempt to achieve a de facto dissolution of PESI before the DOJ can act.

Groups endorse and recommend remedies to the merger of ES&S and Dieblod/Premier <read>

RE: ES&S Purchase of Diebold/Premier: Remedies for Unlawful Concentration of Market Power and Other Public Injuries Within DOJ Jurisdiction

Dear Attorney General Holder, Assistant Attorney General Varney, and Assistant Attorney General Perez:

The undersigned organizations and individuals possess nationally recognized expertise in voting systems technologies, local and State election administration, and in removal of barriers to voting participation. We have cooperated in the preparation of this letter thatseeks to address appropriate remedies for ES&S’s anticompetitive disruption of the relevantmarkets and the threats thereby posed to American election integrity.

We are deeply concerned about the public impact of ES&S’s purchase of Diebold’s Premier Election Solutions, Inc. (“PESI”), referenced here as the “merger.” Fortunately, the Federal Government has expedited its research into purchaser ES&S’s accelerated absorption of PESI assets into ES&S and the business goliath’s concerted attempt to achieve a de facto dissolution of PESI before the DOJ can act.

This purchase represents a dangerous concentration of election equipment, maintenance, and management in one company. To understand the extent to which companies can control elections and hold election officials and government hostage, we recommend the VotersUnite report and our comments on the risks to Connecticut.

We are very much impacted by this purchase. It seems that it is now highly unlikely that there will ever be significant software upgrades to our Diebold AccVote-OS optical scanners, and even less chance that there will be a hardware upgrade to fix their(our?) ancient failure prone memory cards.

We have only one other company supplying ballots in Connecticut in addition to Diebold. Only one company programming all the memory cards in five New England states, including Connecticut.

ES&S has a track record that adds to our concerns. From the letter:

C. History of ES&S Anticompetitive Market Conduct:

Buyer ES&S’s record of anticompetitive market conduct includes:

1. Legally proscribed tying arrangements to achieve vertical integration and marketdominance;

2. Predatory pricing of goods and services; and

3. Threatened breaches of contracts on the eve of elections, unless the election jurisdiction agreed to ES&S’s unilaterally determined price increases for essential goods (e.g. ballots) and services (e.g., technical maintenance and testing of voting equipment) that had been previously negotiated and approved for local or State fiscal planning.

D. ES&S Conduct Post-Merger Designed to Obstruct DOJ Remedial Options

ES&S engaged in conduct which appears to have been deliberately designed to vitiate the Antitrust Division’s (AD) scope of available remedies, and specifically the Government’s ability to unwind the sale as by a divestiture of PESI. Given the market share of theresulting corporate entity and other factors that justify DOJ review, buyer ES&S should reasonably have known that DOJ-AD would examine the merger. ES&S conduct that soughtto obstruct DOJ’s vindication of the antitrust laws and larger public interest includes:

1. Taking physical possession and control of all PESI intellectual property and business records within a few days of the sale/merger;

2. Rapidly renegotiating contracts with local election jurisdictions, to transfer them to ES&S products and services at steep discounts if the contracts were executed quickly, thus eviscerating the PESI business relationships;

3. Discharging PESI employees, so that virtually no qualified workforce would remain to manage and execute PESI’s business if DOJ required ES&S to divest PESI; and,

4. Undertaking an arguably deceptive sales effort to excise some low-value PESI assets in order to unilaterally and superficially restructure the voting products and services markets, with the objective of superficially restoring competitive market conditions while also not actually reducing or endangering the ES&S dominant market share.

In sum, ES&S’s restrictive contractual provisions intensify the dependence of local and State governments on one privately held firm for their mission-critical election operations. ES&S’s vertically integrated business model and standard terms greatly reduce the opportunities for smaller vendors to offer goods and services to governmental units. The terms also augment the opportunities for ES&S vendor intimidation of governmental customers in ways that threaten the integrity of elections. ES&S’s oligopolistic control over the market (an estimated 70% share) and the injuries inflicted by this degree of market power will likely escalate unless DOJ-AD redresses ES&S’s problematic contractual provisions as part of the remedies ordered.

With the discharge of employees etc. the purchase cannot be undone to leave Diebold/Premier viable. Yet there are remedies that can mitigate and reverse the damage. From the letter (read the full letter for the details):

A. Prohibit ES&S From Conducting Business Under Contractual Provisions that Undermine Competitive Market Conditions and Unfairly Perpetuate Oligopolistic Market Share

B. Require Continuation of PESI’s Efforts to Achieve Increased Electoral Transparency

C. Require ES&S to Continue PESI’s Effort to Serve Voters With Disabilities By Identifying Alternatives to the AutoMark Voting Machine

D. Require Buyers of PESI Assets to be Qualified to Compete in Jurisdictions that Mandate Paper Ballots

F. To mitigate the increased threat to national security generated by this merger, require ES&S to divest sufficient assets, reduce its contractual control over election jurisdictions, and take other appropriate actions.

We are pleased to join the other signatories in urging strong action.

Update: 2/18/2010: From Bo Lipari’s blog: Dominion [Voting Systems] Sues to Stop New York City Contract with ES&S <read>

A current example of the hardball we may face with possible questionable/illegal tactics by a single company driving further to monopolize election equipment and maintenance:

In court papers, Dominion argues that the New York City Board of Elections failed to comply with New York State and New York City Procurement Laws, Rules and Regulations, and awarded the contract on the basis of illegal criteria. Further, the lawsuit argues that the New York City Board of Elections:

1) Did not conduct a lawful bidding and procurement process;

2) Did not disclose the method and criteria used in evaluating bidders;

3) Did not award the contract to the lowest responsible bidder.

The city used a point system to evaluate the two companies. In the final evaluation, ES&S received 3,417 points, while Dominion received 3,395, a difference of only 22 points. Dominion claims that the slightly higher overall score for ES&S in the city’s evaluation is due to extra points given to the ES&S DS200 scanners for an option called “Easy Startup”. This option is said to include electronic machines pre-programmed in the warehouse prior to delivery to poll sites, and the ability for poll workers to open the machines without a password (such a configuration is not only an obvious security risk, but disallowed under New York election law). The lawsuit claims that the State Board of Elections explicitly ruled that the DS200 Easy Startup option does not comply with state law, and informed the New York City Board that it would reject any contracts that included it.

Bo also points to an article on a lobbiest for ES&S <read>

While a Republican lawyer was under federal investigation in a Yonkers corruption case, he was paid nearly $50,000 last year to help a Nebraska company win a contract to provide New York City with new voting machines.

Anthony Mangone was indicted this month with Yonkers Councilwoman Sandy Annabi and former city GOP Chairman Zehy Jereis on extortion, bribery and other federal charges related to payments made to Annabi for her to change votes on city projects.

Coincidentally that same day, the New York City Board of Elections voted to buy thousands of new electronic voting machines — a contract expected to be worth more than $40 million — from Mangone’s client, Election Systems & Software

Is this what Connecticut look forward to, totally dependent with most other jurisdictions on one company?

In Washburn’s World: Election Records Would Be Public

“I believe there cannot be effective oversight of an election (by an election official or by the public) if any of the election records are a secret.’

Blog post: The GAB: The Johnny Yoo of Election Administration <read>

I believe there cannot be effective oversight of an election (by an election official or by the public) if any of the election records are a secret.

We agree.

GAB provides legal cover to clerks so that the clerks may destroy election records which the clerks deem too inconvenient to preserve and retain.

In order to set the context for the last two years on this matter I will show my fundamentalist, Christian roots and begin with a creedal statement:

I believe there cannot be effective oversight of an election (by an election official or by the public) if any election records are secret.

I believe ballots are not secret, but anonymous.

I believe the content of a removable memory card used by a voting machine during an election is an election record as that term is used in state and federal law.

I believe that ALL of the content of a removable memory card is an election record.

I believe the contents of a removable memory card contain an admixture of some or all of the following:

programming,

ballot “images”¹,

audit logs,

event logs,

vote totals at various levels of aggregation,

“ballot definition files”²,

audio files,

screen text,

page/screen layout,

whole, mountable file systems.

I believe the above list is likely incomplete because the exact contents of a removable memory card are secret and vigorously protected as trade secrets.

I believe election records should not be secret.

I believe election records are records that should have an “absolute right of access“. Under current law some election records in whole or in part are not even open records, much less records with an “absolute right of access“.

I believe the contents of a removable memory card used to aid in the administration of an election should be preserved and retained by jurisdictions for the same length of time as the jurisdiction is required to preserve and retain the poll registration lists used to administer the same election.

I believe state law, WI Stats. 7.23(1)(g), requires the contents of a removable memory card used by a voting machine in the administration of an election be preserved and retained for 22 months

I believe federal law, Title 42, Chapter 20, Subchapter II, § 1974, for federal elections, requires the same; preservation and retention for 22 months

I believe state law, WI Stats. 7.24, requires the backups made of the contents of a removable memory card pursuant to WI Stats. 7.23(1)(g) remain in the custody and control of the election official for the entire retention period.

I believe the contents of a removable memory card used in a voting machine is MORE important than the voter poll lists used in the same election. This is because the contents of the memory card actively and directly determine how the election is administered, where the poll books do not. If nothing else (and there is more), the contents of the removable memory card control how or if marks on the paper ballot or touches on the touch screen will be recognized and to whom votes will accrue based on those marks or touches. These are the election officials’ duties under WI Stats. 7.50 even if those duties have been delegated to an inscrutable black box.

The Government Accountability Board (GAB), its staff, and the clerks who head the Wisconsin Towns Association, Wisconsin County Clerks Association, and the Wisconsin Municipal Clerks Association do not agree with most, if any, of the above credos.

I object to the notion that there can be such things as secret election records.

NY Times: States put Military votes at risk

“Internet voting is in its infancy, and still far too unreliable, but states are starting to allow it and the trend is accelerating because of a new federal law that requires greater efforts to help military and other overseas voters cast ballots. Men and women in uniform must have a fair opportunity to vote, but allowing online voting in its current state could open elections up to vote theft and other mischief.”

New York Times Editorial: Internet Voting, Still in Beta <read>

Internet voting is in its infancy, and still far too unreliable, but states are starting to allow it and the trend is accelerating because of a new federal law that requires greater efforts to help military and other overseas voters cast ballots. Men and women in uniform must have a fair opportunity to vote, but allowing online voting in its current state could open elections up to vote theft and other mischief…

But the value of removing roadblocks is undermined when votes are put at risk, which can happen when ballots are returned by e-mail or are actually cast on a Web site. Massachusetts recently enacted a law allowing service members to vote by e-mail overseas. According to Verified Voting, a group that works to ensure reliable elections, 16 states allow some form of Internet voting, and more than a dozen — including Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois and Washington — are considering it.

E-mail can be intercepted, and voting Web sites can be hacked or taken down by malicious attacks. There are not even agreed-upon standards for what safety measures are necessary.

In many cases, it is not possible to ensure a secret ballot when votes are cast online or by e-mail. That is a particular concern for military voting, where soldiers could come under pressure from commanding officers about their choice of a candidate.

As is often the case, the Times gets it right when it comes to voting Integrity. We would add that if some votes are at risk, our entire democracy of and by the people is a risk.

Many ask “Why not let the Military and even all citizens vote over the Internet like American Idol?”. The question is not the problem, but the public and election officials should direct the question to computer scientists and security experts and listen carefully to their answers.

FVAP Director: MOVE Act requirement “Unfortunate”, “Unfair”

“But just because we have that one unfortunate provision in the MOVE Act, overall, the Act was a huge improvement for military and overseas voters.

The reason this change in the law is unfortunate is not only that military and overseas voters have to reapply every calendar year, but also because in the off-year, if a military or overseas voter doesn’t apply at the beginning of the year, it is unlikely that they will hear of any special elections in time to apply and receive a ballot because they are announced usually within 60 days of their being held. That’s unfair to these voters.”

We welcome the comment of Bob Carey, Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)<read>

The FVAP comments on our criticism of the Military and Overseas Voters (MOVE) Act.

A couple of things to which FVAP feels it should respond:

– The MOVE Act is, overall, a HUGE improvement for military and overseas voting rights: requiring States to send ballots out at least 45 days prior, to transmit blank ballots electronically, and to accept the Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot for all federal elections will significantly improve voting rights for this population.

– As for the requirement to register again, that is unfortunate, and so that is why FVAP is reaching out as aggressively as it is to make sure all military and overseas voters know to reregister and resubmit their absentee ballot application this year. The reason the law was changed is, as “rjs” said, the belief by most election officials that the previous federal legal requirement that States automatically send ballots resulted in many being returned as undeliverable. However, nation-wide, less than 2.5% of these automatically transmitted ballots were returned as undeliverable. In 2008, Connecticut reported to the Election Assistance Commission that NONE of these ballots were returned as undeliverable.

But just because we have that one unfortunate provision in the MOVE Act, overall, the Act was a huge improvement for military and overseas voters.

The reason this change in the law is unfortunate is not only that military and overseas voters have to reapply every calendar year, but also because in the off-year, if a military or overseas voter doesn’t apply at the beginning of the year, it is unlikely that they will hear of any special elections in time to apply and receive a ballot because they are announced usually within 60 days of their being held. That’s unfair to these voters.

Contact FVAP if you have any further questions. Vote@fvap.ncr.gov.

Bob Carey
Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program

We appreciate all reasonable comments on our blog, especially from officials. We also appreciate that the FVAP agrees that the re-registration provision is “unfortunate”. Our opinion remains that it is a significant flaw counter to the purpose of the well-intended act. In addition, the provision in the MOVE Act for Internet voting pilots is more than a significant flaw, it is dangerous. Without these provisions we would wholeheartedly support the Act.

See the video: Colbert, McCain, Feingold, and the people THEN add your support

NOW HEREBY BE IT RESOLVED THAT WE THE UNDERSIGNED VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CALL UPON THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS TO PASS AND SEND TO THE STATES FOR RATIFICATION A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO RESTORE THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FAIR ELECTIONS TO THE PEOPLE.

FreeSpeechForPeople <video>

Background: Supreme Court rules corporations are people: <read>

Resolution:

WHEREAS the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was designed to protect the free speech rights of people, not corporations;

WHEREAS, for the past three decades, a divided United States Supreme Court has transformed the First Amendment into a powerful tool for corporations seeking to evade and invalidate democratically-enacted reforms;

WHEREAS, this corporate takeover of the First Amendment has reached its extreme conclusion in the United States Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Citizens United v. FEC;

WHEREAS, the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. FEC overturned longstanding precedent prohibiting corporations from spending their general treasury funds in our elections;

WHEREAS, the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. FEC will now unleash a torrent of corporate money in our political process unmatched by any campaign expenditure totals in United States history;

WHEREAS, the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. FEC presents a serious and direct threat to our democracy;

WHEREAS, the people of the United States have previously used the constitutional amendment process to correct those egregiously wrong decisions of the United States Supreme Court that go to the heart of our democracy and self-government;

NOW HEREBY BE IT RESOLVED THAT WE THE UNDERSIGNED VOTERS OF THE UNITED STATES CALL UPON THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS TO PASS AND SEND TO THE STATES FOR RATIFICATION A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO RESTORE THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND FAIR ELECTIONS TO THE PEOPLE.

Read and add your support.

Activist Court OK With Foreign Intervention In U.S. Elections

“Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.”

Article by David Corn covering John Paul Stevens accusation of “Activist Court” and reasons for dissent: <read>

By ruling today that corporations and unions can independently spend as much money as they want to back or trash congressional and presidential candidates, the conservative Supreme Court justices are throwing out over a century of jurisprudence that backed the regulation of corporate involvement in elections. Yet will the right denounce the five-to-four decision as an act of judicial overreach? That’s not likely. But Justice John Paul Stevens, in a stinging dissent written for the minority, argues that the right wing of the court has engaged in a brazen act of activism–and has done so to award corporations more legal rights than they have previously been afforded.

http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/01/stevens-accuses-supreme-court-conservatives-judicial-activism

Justice Stevens makes some good arguments, the most surprising given the conservatives concerns when the Court makes decisions on foreign precedents:

Although they make enormous contributions to our society, corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters.

Statement from people for the American Way<read>

NPR Coverage <read>

The ruling could unleash a new flood of corporate cash into the political realm just as the nation enters the pivotal 2010 midterm congressional primaries and election season.

By a 5-4 vote, the court ruled that corporations may spend freely to support or oppose candidates for president and Congress, overturning a 20-year-old decision that barred such contributions.

“We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the majority. “The court has recognized that First Amendment protection extends to corporations.”

The new ruling blurs the lines between corporate and individual contributions in political campaigns. It also strikes down part of the 2002 McCain-Feingold campaign finance law that banned unions and corporations from paying for political ads in the waning days of campaigns…

For example, the decision removes limits on independent expenditures by corporations that are not coordinated with candidates’ campaigns.

“As long as they do it independently, they can spend whatever they want,” notes NPR’s Nina Totenberg. “It will undoubtedly help Republican candidates since corporations have generally supported Republican candidates more.”

Integrity and Credibility in Massachusetts

Stories from the Detroit< FreePress and BradBlog about the possibility of the election in Massachusetts being stolen by Democrats or Republicans <BradBlog> <FreePress>

From BradBlog:

The near-entirety of the state will vote next Tuesday on paper ballots to be counted by Diebold op-scan systems. The same ones used dubiously in the New Hampshire Primary in 2008, and the same ones notoriously hacked — resulting in a flipped mock election — in HBO’s Emmy-nominated Hacking Democracy.

And to make matters even worse, the notorious LHS Associates — the private company with the criminal background that has admitted to illegally tampering with memory cards during elections, and which has a Director of Sales and Marketing who embarrassed himself with obscene comments here at The BRAD BLOG some years ago, resulting in his being barred from CT by their Sec. of State — sells and services almost all of MA’s voting machines along with those in the rest of New England.

From the FreePress:

In Massachusetts, a recount only occurs if the final results are less than half of one percent, and as election reform activist John Bonifaz points out, Massachusetts does not require random audits of the computerized vote counting machines to compare the computer results to the optical scan ballots marked by the voters. Bonifaz notes that in the Al Franken-Norm Coleman Minnesota Senate race in 2008, “everything was ultimately hand-counted.” The problem in Massachusetts hinges on whether the race is close enough to trigger a recount, which candidates can peition for within thirty days…

Given the Democratic party’s astonishing lack of leadership on so many issues, it is entirely possible that Scott Brown could legitimately beat Martha Coakley in this election.

But it is also possible that the outcome could be manipulated by the companies in control of the registration rolls and vote counts. It will be up to citizen election protection activists to make sure that doesn’t happen yet again.

Perhaps the election will be close, less than 0.5% with a very careful recount or a runaway for one side or the other. But otherwise the 1st casualty will be credibility. No matter who wins there are likely to be unsatisfactorily answered questions. Massachusetts, like all states, needs effective, credible post-election audits along with a strong, transparent chain-of-custody. Ironically Massachusetts has paper ballots and was used as proof of the reliability of Diebold equipment and LHS service, because no problems had been discovered after years of use – but without post-election audits how would problems be recognized?