CT: Bysiewicz, Slossberg, Spallone Call For Special Senate Elections

From the StamfordPlus <read>

Bysiewicz and legislative leaders call for special election to fill future U.S. Senate vacancies in Connecticut
By Secretary of the State
Dec 17, 2008 – 3:36 PM

Secretary of the State Points to Senate Vacancies in Illinois, New York as Evidence of the Need for Long Overdue Election Reform

Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz today joined the incoming House Chair of the Government, Administration and Elections Committee, State Representative James Spallone (D-Essex) in calling for the adoption of a law designating a special election to fill any future vacancies in Connecticut’s U.S. Senate seats. In the case of a Senate vacancy, current law provides for the governor to appoint a successor to fill out the remainder of a term or until a special election can be called on the date of the next even-numbered general election…

Working together with GAE committee co-chairs, Senator Gayle Slossberg (D-Milford) and Representative James Spallone(D-Essex), Secretary Bysiewicz is vowing to bring a similar Senate vacancy bill before the Connecticut General Assembly in the 2009 legislative session.

What does this have to do with Voting Integrity and CTVotersCount?

Continue reading “CT: Bysiewicz, Slossberg, Spallone Call For Special Senate Elections”

Another Audit – Another Diebold Error

Ohio is conducting its first post-election audits. Like the recent audits in Humboldt, CA, and CT, the Ohio audit has uncovered discrepancies in the machine and manual counts. Here is one of the stories, by Kim Zetter at Wired <read> Montgomery County officials discovered that although the five votes were recorded to a memory card … Continue reading “Another Audit – Another Diebold Error”

Ohio is conducting its first post-election audits. Like the recent audits in Humboldt, CA, and CT, the Ohio audit has uncovered discrepancies in the machine and manual counts. Here is one of the stories, by Kim Zetter at Wired <read>

Montgomery County officials discovered that although the five votes were recorded to a memory card inside the voting machine, the votes weren’t counted by the tabulation software when the memory card was uploaded to the tabulation server. Premier’s Global Election Management System (or GEMS) is the tabulation software that counts votes from memory cards.

We also note the excellent comments of John Gideon of VotersUnite <read>

What does Diebold/Premier have to say? “We have not seen this particular condition anywhere else in Ohio or anywhere else in the country,” according to spokesman Chris Riggall. Clearly Riggall is joking. Of course they haven’t seen this condition in Ohio because Ohio has not done these audits in the past and the lack of audits across most of the rest of the country would ensure that no problems would have been found in the past. Where there are audits that may have found this condition, the condition is ignored or just shrugged-off. What they ignore is that there is federal law that dictates accuracy of voting systems and even the loss of these 5 ballots in a county that saw over 280,000 ballots cast is a violation of that law


What does this Diebold error mean for Connecticut?

Continue reading “Another Audit – Another Diebold Error”

Minnesota Recount vs. Connecticut Recanvass

The Minnesota recount which started on November 19th goes on and will probably continue for several additional days, perhaps weeks. You can read about some of the details of the ongoing Minnesota senate recount at the blog of the Citizens for Voting Integrity MN <blog> We ask: Would this happen here, in Connecticut? Should this … Continue reading “Minnesota Recount vs. Connecticut Recanvass”

The Minnesota recount which started on November 19th goes on and will probably continue for several additional days, perhaps weeks. You can read about some of the details of the ongoing Minnesota senate recount at the blog of the Citizens for Voting Integrity MN <blog>

We ask:

  • Would this happen here, in Connecticut?
  • Should this happen here, in Connecticut?

Continue reading “Minnesota Recount vs. Connecticut Recanvass”

Election “Audit” Discovers Diebold-Known Error

Eureka CA, Diebold error resulted in 179 uncounted ballots. The Times-Standard reports the story of the “Humboldt Election Transparency Project”, similar to a post-election audit <read>

Premier Elections Solutions (formerly known as Diebold Election Systems, Inc.), seems to have known about the glitch at least since 2004.

The Transparency Project is not an ordinary audit, it is partially accomplished by the public:
Continue reading “Election “Audit” Discovers Diebold-Known Error”

Recount won’t actually count ballots

Update: Roanoke Times agrees <read> Letter to the editor in Washington Post <read>, well said. Yes Virginia, nutmeg state recounts don’t involve much actual counting either. Not Quite a Full Recount in Virginia Sunday, November 30, 2008; Virginians will have a recount in the 5th Congressional District race [Metro, Nov. 25] — or will they? … Continue reading “Recount won’t actually count ballots”

Update: Roanoke Times agrees <read>

Letter to the editor in Washington Post <read>, well said. Yes Virginia, nutmeg state recounts don’t involve much actual counting either.

Not Quite a Full Recount in Virginia

Sunday, November 30, 2008;

Virginians will have a recount in the 5th Congressional District race [Metro, Nov. 25] — or will they?

As the article noted, optical-scan ballots will be run through the voting machine again. For direct-recording electronic voting (most commonly touch-screen) machines, officials will recalculate the results from the totals printed out on Election Day. Only hand-marked paper ballots will be physically recounted.

Voters should be surprised and disappointed that a recount won’t actually count ballots, especially since nationwide evidence shows that the direct-recording electronic voting machines are inaccurate and insecure. For instance, the computer systems that run the lottery are subject to tighter controls for accuracy than are electronic voting machines.

Also, unlike most states, Virginia doesn’t do any sort of audit of the machines to make sure they’re counting correctly. In fact, in most cases it’s illegal to conduct an audit. This isn’t the fault of the local elections board or registrars, but rather of the General Assembly, which has failed to pass needed reforms of Virginia’s archaic election laws.

JEREMY EPSTEIN
Co-Founder
Verifiable Voting Coalition of Virginia

Recent examples highlighting the risks of machine recounting <read>

CT: UConn Memory Card Reports: More Info, More “Junk” Data

Results also indicate continuing extensive problems with procedures not being followed by election officials. The UConn VoTeR Center recently released two more reports in its series of memory card audits <Aug Primary Post-Election> <November Pre-Election> We applaud UConn for carrying out these tests and the Secretary of the State’s Office for commissioning these tests. We … Continue reading “CT: UConn Memory Card Reports: More Info, More “Junk” Data”

Results also indicate continuing extensive problems with procedures not being followed by election officials.

The UConn VoTeR Center recently released two more reports in its series of memory card audits <Aug Primary Post-Election> <November Pre-Election>

We applaud UConn for carrying out these tests and the Secretary of the State’s Office for commissioning these tests. We appreciate the valuable addition of analysis of the Audit Logs.

From the Presidential Pre-Election Report:

The UConn VoTeR Center performed a pre-election audit of the memory cards for the Accu-Vote Optical Scan tabulators that are to be used in the November 2008 Elections in Connecticut. The cards are programmed by LHS Associates of Methuen, Massachusetts, and shipped to Connecticut districts for use in the elections. For the pre-election audit the VoTeR Center received and examined 620 memory cards as of November 3, 2008. These cards correspond to 620 distinct districts in Connecticut. About 2/3 of these memory cards were randomly chosen by the VoTeR Center personnel during the visits to LHS and before the cards were packed and shipped to the towns. Another 1/3 of the memory cards came from the towns directly, where the cards were randomly chosen for pre- election audit (this procedure applied to the town for which the cards were not selected at LHS). The towns that shipped the cards to be audited were not asked to perform the local pre-election testing before shipping, thus the majority of the cards received from the towns did not contain the pre-election testing events in their audit logs.

This document reports on the findings obtained during the audit. Among the 620 cards received and tested as of this writing, 564 cards (91%) were found to have been properly programmed for election. These cards contained valid ballot data and the executable code on these cards was the expected code, with no extraneous data or code.

One of the ongoing areas of concern is the quality of memory cards and the quality control of our vendor LHS Associates, which supplies the Diebold memory cards and programs them for each election. Past tests at UConn, in other states, and surveys by the audit Coalition indicate significant problems.

The source of the problems remain in question: Are the cards bad from the beginning? Do they leave LHS working correctly, to be harmed by transport or by testing by election officials? These latest reports may get us closer to some of the answers. Looking at the results and the reports conclusions, we conclude:

  1. The quality control is getting worse: The pre-election test showed 3.8% of the cards were programmed correctly but contained additional random data, apparently a new issue.
  2. Election officials continue to violate procedures: 16 of 297 post-election cards sent by registrars were from the wrong election. 23 cards were duplicated which is prohibited by the Secretary of the State’s procedures.
  3. The cards are bad when they leave LHS: 8.9% of the cards tested post-election contained “Junk” data, when 2/3 of the cards tested were directly from LHS. UConn noted no significant difference in card failure rates between those collected at LHS and those shipped by Election Officials

We might conclude, perhaps erroneously that:

  • The problems are getting worse: The August Post-Election report showed 15.4% of cards with “Junk Data”, while previous post-election reports have shown 5% and 8% junk data.

However, the memory cards shipped by election officials are not selected at random and do not represent all the districts in the election. The results may reflect a tendency for election officials to send in the “Junk” data cards or for districts with problems not to send cards – we have no way of knowing.

The results show serious problems with the hardware and the election system: Memory cards should not fail at these rates. In the unlikely event the memory card problems are shipping and handling, then LHS should specify exactly how the shipping and handling should be improved. Election officials should be expected to follow procedures. How can the public have confidence in our elections when procedures are not followed?

We note from the pre-election report:

The current SOTS procedure is not to duplicate cards, but this is now being reconsidered, with one possibility being to allow duplication at the districts and to document and report all such occurrences.

We have reservations about making this change and question the added vulnerability associated with the duplication of cards. We have concerns that election officials will follow any such procedure given that they have clearly failed to follow the current procedure for memory cards and a similar procedure associated with the post-election audit requiring them to call the Secretary of the State’s Office when incorrectly sealed ballots are discovered. Procedures are insufficient when they are difficult to follow, they are regularly violated, they cannot be effectively monitored, are not enforced, and are not enforceable.


Were You A Poll Worker Nov 4th?

Take this survey. The Verified Voting Foundation and the UC Berkeley Election Administration Research Center have created an online survey of election workers for the November 4th election. If you worked the polls, please consider spending 15-20 minutes taking the survey

Take this survey

The Verified Voting Foundation and the UC Berkeley Election Administration Research Center have created an online survey of election workers for the November 4th election. If you worked the polls, please consider spending 15-20 minutes taking the survey: <survey link>

CT: Secretary Of The State, Town Clerks Open To Explore Early Voting

Update: Photo of Secretary Bysiewicz and caption indicating she will look into early voting <view>
*****

Westport News: A Concept Worth Exploring <read>

Many viewed the long lines as a success for democracy. Well, the record turnout — most notably among younger Americans — sure was. But the lines, no way. In our fast-paced society, where time is money, some voters may have been discouraged by the lines and decided it was not worth the wait. We certainly hope this wasn’t the case and would like to extend our support to a concept that could be the remedy in Connecticut — early voting.

Fortunately, we believe, Connecticut was spared those long lines, as were most states with optical scan voting. If we did have long lines anywhere they could easily be cured by more space and more election officials at those polling places – a much simpler solution than early voting.

We do recognize the value of encouraging more citizens to vote by making it more convenient.

There are two ways early voting can take place: opening polls for a specified period prior to an election and permitting no-excuse absentee ballots.

Without a detailed analysis we can say that we are conditionally against early voting for Connecticut at this time(*). In simpler terms, we would want to see a very detailed plan and have an opportunity for it to be reviewed by nationally respected voting experts, computer scientists, and security experts. Until we see a detailed proposal and it is positively reviewed by experts our position would be against.

“No-excuse absentee ballots” is another name and form of mail-in voting. Like touch-screen voting it is attractive to the public and some election officials and, unfortunately, that ease may be accompanied by an unwarranted confidence that votes will be counted.  For more on concerns with mail-in voting, see <novbm>

“The secretary of the state is open to any and all suggestions that improve access to voters so it’s easier to cast a ballot,” said Adam Joseph, deputy communications director for the Office of the Secretary of the State.

In regard to early voting, Joseph said, “It is definitely going to be on our agenda for consideration in the upcoming legislative session.”

Continue reading “CT: Secretary Of The State, Town Clerks Open To Explore Early Voting”

CT: Republican Chair Concerned With Election Integrity

Christine Stuart, CTNewsJunkie <read> Republican Party Chairman Chris Healy sent this letter to Secretary of State Susan Bysiewicz Friday afternoon asking her to delay the certification of Tuesday’s vote because he fears the results in some close races may not be accurate. Especially in races where candidates were cross-endorsed by other party’s like the Working … Continue reading “CT: Republican Chair Concerned With Election Integrity”

Christine Stuart, CTNewsJunkie <read>

Republican Party Chairman Chris Healy sent this letter to Secretary of State Susan Bysiewicz Friday afternoon asking her to delay the certification of Tuesday’s vote because he fears the results in some close races may not be accurate.

Especially in races where candidates were cross-endorsed by other party’s like the Working Families party.

Using an example from the 62nd District were 18 year incumbent Rep. Richard Ferrari, R-East Granby, was ousted by political newcomer Annie Hornish, Healy said he is concerned about “how easy it is to incorrectly double count votes for cross-endorsed candidates.”

Hornish ran as a Democrat but was also endorsed by the Working Families Party, so her name appeared twice on the ballot. In East Granby the moderator mistakenly counted the votes from the working Families Party twice. “Fortunately, this error was caught in time for the moderator to amend his return,” Healy said.

As Healy said in his letter:

The instructions on the moderator’s return state in relevant part: “1. Enter total votes in the boxes directly below each candidate’s name.” Initially in East Granby, the moderator entered the total votes received by the Democrat candidate in the box under the Democrat candidate’s name. The Working Party votes were included in this total, but the Working Party votes were also entered in the box under the Working Party candidate’s name.

Since the candidate was cross-endorsed, this error had the effect of double counting the
Working Party votes.

We agree that it is very easy to make this error and several others in accounting for votes. There are several problems and contributing factors:

  • Misunderstanding the instructions.
  • Transcription errors – polling place officials transcribe numbers from machine tapes and hand-count totals to the Moderator’s Return – the Head Moderator in each municipality transcribes results to combine totals for the town – the Secretary of the State’s Office transcribes totals to be added to determine results for races that cross municipal boundaries.
  • Moderators do their work late at night after a seventeen or eighteen hour day.

A component of a solution we recommend would be that copies of all polling place Moderator’s Returns and tabulator tapes be faxed to the Secretary of the State’s office with their images posted on the Secretary of the State’s web. This would provide the opportunity for Mr. Healy, candidates, and concerned citizens to review results free of most transcription.

Another component of a solution we recommend would be stronger, more comprehensive post-election audits – including auditing all votes no matter how cast, no matter how counted: Machine counted, hand-counted, including absentee, military, provisional ballots etc.

We share another concern expressed by Mr. Healy in his letter:

My second concern has to do with how the “unknown” votes are assigned to a party (as opposed to a candidate). “Unknown” votes are votes that the tabulator assigns to a cross-endorsed candidate when the voter voted both for the candidate as a Democrat and, as in this case, for the candidate as a Working Families candidate. There is no direction or guidance regarding how these votes are assigned, so the moderator has the discretion to assign them to either the Democrat candidate, or the Working Families candidate. I understand that in most – if not all – cases, these votes are being assigned to the Working Families candidate. This of course has the effect of inflating the vote for the Working Families party and may mean the difference between the party being included or not included on future ballots.

While this practice has no effect on the outcome of these races, it has profound implications for future ballots. It is a practice that is simply unacceptable.

We add these concerns:

  • Assignment of such votes should be decided by the legislature, not the Secretary of the State, and not by local election officials.
  • If credit for votes is effectively taken away from a candidate’s party, the effect of a cross-endorsement could hurt the candidate’s party and serve as an incentive for candidates to not accept cross endorsements.
  • Similarly what if a popular third party candidate was cross endorsed by a major party, would the votes then go to the major party at the expense of the third party?
  • What happens if a candidate is cross endorsed by more than two parties?
  • What happens if a candidate is cross endorsed by two major parties? Could this be a strategy to take credit from the other party?

CT: City Hall scene of election day dispute

West Haven News: City Hall scene of election day dispute <read>

By Abbe Smith , Special to the News

WEST HAVEN – A heated dispute erupted at City Hall early Tuesday when Democratic Registrar of Voters candidate Michelle Hufcut – running unopposed – showed up at the designated polling station in apparent disregard of a state law that prohibits candidates from being near polls.
Police were eventually called to the scene to separate Hufcut and current Democratic Registrar Charles Marino in an effort to keep the confrontation between the two from escalating.
Hufcut defeated Marino in an August primary, but doesn’t take control of the office until January. She said she came to City Hall Tuesday with the intention of shadowing Republican Registrar of Voters JoAnn Callegari during the busy presidential election.
Although she ran unopposed in Tuesday’s municipal election, Hufcut’s name was on the ballot, making her a candidate.
“The law stipulates that 75 feet from any polling station, candidates must stay away,” Marino argued.
When Marino found Hufcut in the registrar’s office early Tuesday, he asked her to leave, citing the state law. When she refused, he called police, demanding that she be arrested or removed from the building.
Hufcut defended her presence at City Hall, arguing she was merely trying to get some training from Callegari in handling a large election. She noted that she was not campaigning at City Hall, as she is running unopposed for the office.
“I was simply there to observe and help,” she said, also noting that she was in a back office and not near the actual polls, which were in the basement of City Hall. Hufcut said she spoke to Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz about her plan to shadow a registrar and that Bysiewicz approved the plan.
Adam Joseph, spokesman for the secretary of the state, said he could not confirm whether Bysiewicz approved the plan. He said Marino and Callegari contacted Deputy Secretary of the State Lesley Mara about the situation and were told that it is “inappropriate” for Hufcut to be at the polling station on Election Day.

“We felt that because today is a presidential election, it would be best if she were not in the office,” he said. Mara also informed Marino that Hufcut was not in his office at the directive of Bysiewicz.

Marino said he called police and then he and his staff walked off the job for about two hours and refused to go back to work until Hufcut left the building. He said the absence did not affect voting or vote-counting in West Haven.

Police Officer Angelo Moscato confirmed that police responded to a call at City Hall Tuesday morning. Upon arrival, officers separated Marino and Hufcut and diffused the conflict. Hufcut eventually left the building, ending the dispute.

I inquired of Lesley Mara and she kindly pointed me to the law <9-326>

It seems to be true that in the law candidates are not allowed near the polling place except to vote, election officials (that includes registrars) being an exception. Perhaps a case could be made about where Ms. Hugcut was located, not being one of those excluded places, maybe not. Presumably, Mr. Marino and his staff saw no actual danger to voting with Ms. Hugcut in the building, out of their sight, since they left.

One of those cases where “the law is an ass”, likely an understandable obscure unanticipated consequence. Ironically Mr. Moreno was able to oversee his own primary with Ms. Hugcut, have unsupervised access to the ballots before and after the election, and lead the post-election audit of that election as well, all fully legal under the law – a substantial danger to election integrity and confidence, one that we would like to see changed.