Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits

(Full disclosure: I contributed to, participated in reviewing, and editing this document)

Released today at a press conference in Alexandria, VA, after many months of work:

http://www.electionaudits.org/files/best%20practices%20final_0.pdf

These principles were written to guide the design of high-quality post- election audits. They were developed by an ad hoc group comprising many stakeholders, including election officials, public advocates, computer scientists, statisticians, political scientists and legislators.

Nearly all US elections today are counted using electronic voting systems. Such voting systems have produced result- changing errors through problems with hardware, software, and procedures.[1] Errors can also occur in hand counting of ballots or in the compiling of results. Even serious error can go undetected if results are not audited effectively.

No person, voting official, legislator, or expert can comprehend the whole voting and auditing process. At some point we must rely on the considered judgment of experts rather than only on individual experience. Using these principles state legislators can assess and improve current election and post-election audit laws. Using the principles and best practices election officials can improve the integrity and confidence of the post-election audit process. In turn providing integrity and confidence in our elections and democracy.

The last page of the document has the list of endorsing groups:

VerifiedVoting – Common Cause
Brennan Center For Justice – American Statistical Association
Advocate groups from MN, MI, MA, CO, FL and CT

Update:  PCWorld Coverage

Update: New Mexico Independent Coverage

The Future Of Post-Election Auditing? – Faster, More Economical, Greater Confidence

Can we audit or recount by machine, rather than hand-counting? My conditional answer remains a strong NO. However, as we have discussed before it is quite possible in theory to develop voting machines or auxiliary scanners with capabilities that can greatly reduce the cost, while increasing the integrity of audits, and increasing the confidence in elections.

Now a team in Humboldt County, CA is providing a demonstration of technology and procedures that can provide all these benefits. The Humboldt County Election Transparency Project:

This type of system holds great promise for Connecticut and any other state with optical scan voting. We will address the possibilities for reducing the costs and increasing the integrity of our elections. Today we will address the Humboldt project as a demonstration of public auditing and recounting:

Our Project aims to provide images of each counted ballot, so that any person or organization wishing to do an independent count will have access to a complete set of ballot images.

They also note as we have pointed out many times:

Voting systems such as that used in Humboldt County, which use optically scanned paper ballots, do leave an audit trail of all cast ballots. This audit trail becomes far more valuable if it is actually used to verify the count.

Here is the basic plan:
Continue reading “The Future Of Post-Election Auditing? – Faster, More Economical, Greater Confidence”

Ten Myths In The Nutmeg State – Revised, Downward

We have been distributing our document, Ten Myths About Electronic Voting In Connecticut, since early February to citizens, election officials, and legislators. To date, exactly no (ZERO) errors or inaccuracies have been brought to our attention.

But in reviewing the Myths we find that things have changed – for the worse:
Continue reading “Ten Myths In The Nutmeg State – Revised, Downward”

Election Observer Arrested – Taken Away In Handcuffs

“The judge dismissed the case on motion of state’s evidence, because they hadn’t produced a prima faceia case,”

Update 4/16/2009: Brad Friedman has the story <read>

“The judge dismissed the case on motion of state’s evidence, because they hadn’t produced a prima faceia case,” Risner told The BRAD BLOG by phone just after the hearing. Moreover, the judge found “Nelson over-reached as he had deprived the Libertarian’s of an observer.”

Risner says the court found that Brakey’s actions had led to important improvements in the procedures implemented by the Pima County Department of Elections. The attorney also tells us that he plans to take civil action against Nelson. “We’ll probably be issuing a notice of claim that we’ll sue him for personal damages.”

Brakey was ecstatic. “We really won big,” he said today. “We didn’t even have to put up a defense” since the judge simply dismissed the county’s case after they’d heard it. He added that Nelson “really made a fool of himself” on the stand

***********Original Post:

This news video is the best way to understand the story <video>

Read the story from <The Election Defense Alliance> and <Brad Friedman>

Pima County (Tucson), Arizona’s Election Integrity advocate and expert, John Brakey was arrested last night while performing his job as an election supervisor, on behalf of both the Democratic and Libertarian parties, during a post-election hand-count audit of ballots…

The problem erupted after Brakey had noticed a number of ballot bags being counted in the post-election audit were missing their proper security seals. He began to ask questions about those bags, which eventually led to his arrest at the demand of Pima County’s Brad “Election Director Gone Wild” Nelson, a man with whom Brakey has had a number of unfortunate (for Nelson) run-ins over the years…
In one bag, instead of the signed official certification sheets, there was instead a slip of white paper with what Brakey said were “two illegible, scrawled signatures.”

Arizona vs. Connecticut – you decide:

  • Arizona is in the West
  • Connecticut Election management has been characterized as the Wild West
  • Arizona Recounts are hand counts of the paper
  • Secretary Bysiewicz recently changed Connecticut back to machine recounts based on requests from Registrars to make their jobs easier
  • In Puma Arizona they keep the ballots under video surveillance and guard
  • In many Connecticut towns the ballots are kept in vaults, rooms, or cabinets without servalence and 24×7 access by either Registrar. In some towns access is available to each member of the Registrar’s staff.
  • We have yet to hear of any observer in Connecticut being arrested

You’ll note in the KGUN video, that Brad Nelson admits the ballot bags that Brakey was concerned about were, indeed, unsealed.

“All of these bags have been under 24 hour video surveillance, as well as a deputy sherrif have been watching these bags since they’ve come in on election night. So we have protected the bags,” Nelson is quoted as saying.

Why do hand counts? Why keep the ballots under seal, with real security, and surveillance?

In the Puma race, the Democrat won on the original reported count. With the hand count incomplete, currently the Republican candidate is in the lead. Without complete integrity, no matter who is eventually declared a winner, there will be a cloud over Arizona and the office holder.

Some argue for illusion over integrity – That we would be better off without paper records so that the original count provided by election officials, touch screen machines, or lever machines would always have to be accepted and the public never disturbed by the knowledge that people make errors or do fraud with and without computers.

Times Editorial: Internet Voting – Bad Experiment

Lately we have been complementary of New York Times editorials, and less so of some news. Once again they hit the nail on the head when it comes to the the risks of internet voting, especially the proposed “experiment” risking our democracy in Florida <read>.

The words “Florida” and “Internet voting,” taken together, should send a chill down everyone’s spine. Nevertheless, Florida’s Okaloosa County is seeking permission from the state to allow members of the military to vote over the Internet in November.

Internet voting is fraught with problems, including the possibility that a hacker could break in and alter the results. The Okaloosa plan, in particular, has not been sufficiently vetted…

Any Internet voting system should be vetted in the most public way possible, with the nation’s computer experts invited to examine how it works.

In 2004, a group of academics reviewed an Internet voting system that the Pentagon was considering. The system was scrapped after the group identified numerous security flaws. There was a very real possibility, the professors warned, that the system could be used to steal votes. The Okaloosa system does not have all of the weakness of the Pentagon system — which would have allowed people to vote from their home PCs — but it has some of them.

The issue here goes beyond a single county.
All Americans have a stake in ensuring that presidential ballots are cast using reliable voting systems.

Serious, Senseless, Nonsense in Palm Beach

Update: As more details come out the story keeps changing. But the problem also gets larger. The latest is that 2500 ballots may actually be missing, the results of additional races in the same election may be questionable, and good old chain-of-custody issues may be more or as much as a problem as anything electronic <read>
******
Florida just keeps on being the poster state for what is wrong with our election systems. The story(s) from Palm Beach makes it look like the three stooges are in charge. Daily Voting News has several articles and comments over the last couple of days DVN 9/2 DVM 9/3. I will cover just some of the most interesting/unbelievable reports here.

In summary as best I can piece together from the many reports:

  • Election night totals followed by a machine recount showed 3400 less ballots in the recount.
  • The main reason the 1st machine count and 2nd machine counts differ by some 3400 votes is that they were testing vote tabulation at the same time they were counting the primary and double counted some precincts.
  • To recount they ran the ballots through different scanners and found an amazing 2700 votes that the machine would not read and they counted them by hand, then the tired election officials added/subtracted etc and declared the result.
  • In a hurry to meet certification deadlines, officials signed blank certification forms without knowing that many discrepancies had been detected..
  • The official in charge of all this was the looser in the three way race. The other two candidates were separated by 18 votes and 60 votes in the original and recounts. If the original margin had been larger, we would have had no recount – no attention to this problem.

From the Palm Beach Post:

The much-vaunted paper ballot was sold as a way to make sure every vote counted.

Instead, its debut in Palm Beach County threw the election process into turmoil as officials announced Tuesday that about 3,400 ballots that were counted in last week’s election did not turn up when a recount was conducted over the weekend.

I disagree with this for two reasons:

  • It would not be a mess if the paper were actually used as intended -for a hand count of the ballots
  • Because the paper exists it is possible to recount and audit. That is occurring, so far, in a very flawed process. Without the paper all we would have is illusion.

And another from the Palm Beach Post:

Indian River County’s three-member canvassing board approved the Aug. 26 primary results on Tuesday — but those numbers are absent the more than 5,000 votes that had to be removed from the election night totals due to the ballots in 40 precincts being counted twice.

And an editorial from the same Palm Beach Post:

Supervisor of Elections Arthur Anderson, who finished last in a three-way race for reelection, is breaking in a new voting system and learning, literally, as he goes. He’ll be in charge in November, when voters pick his successor as well as the next president. Turnout could be five or six times greater than last week, which would stress a system that already seems too fragile.,,

There is no simple explanation for Palm Beach County’s confusion. Dr. Anderson’s spokeswoman warned not to expect answers before the end of the week. But those will be answers from the people who made the mistakes. While state law doesn’t authorize intervention, Dr. Anderson has to seek help, starting with Secretary of State Kurt Browning, a former Pasco County elections supervisor.

For Mr. Abramson, the county’s explanations will be too late. He’ll surely sue. That’s one way to get answers. The better way would be for Dr. Anderson to realize that the public can’t wait for a lawsuit. The general election is 62 days away. He must provide answers, and quickly.

From John Gideon’s Daily Voting News Summary 9/3:

Canvassing Board approved the primary election results. Hopefully the reader will recall that Indian River had over 5000 ballots that were counted twice because someone decided to do a test in the middle of a real election and then failed to properly remove the results in that test. The result was ballots from 40 polling sites that were counted twice. Luckily an observant poll worker realized the totals for her site were double what they should have been. She pointed out the mistake and the county found their error.

Tomorrow the board must do a state mandated audit to ensure their voting machines were correctly counting the votes. If the poll worker hadn’t been observant and if this audit were to find the problem, or any other problem that might exist with the vote count, NOTHING can/could be done because the results have already been approved by the Canvassing Board.

One has to wonder what some officials in Florida are thinking when they make stupid rules. This audit is newly mandated. Why didn’t they mandate it to happen before canvassing the election? Post election audits are great. We need them everywhere and following every election but they have to be timed in such a way as to mean something if problems are found. If they don’t have a purpose (to ensure the votes were properly counted) then they are a waste of tax money….

RoundUp – Documented Failures & Real Risks

Update: Another recent story:

1. Brad interviews Gov. Don Siegelman, former political prisoner and now a free man:

Computers don’t steal elections – people steal them with computers:

people don’t want to believe that elections are stolen in this country. They don’t want to believe that we go to war under false premises. And they don’t want to believe that their Department of Justice is used as a political tool. But in fact, in this administration, one can argue that those things have indeed happened…

People who’ve looked at this election and have studied the figures — they’ve done regressive analysis of voting trends — say it’s a statistical impossibility. There was electronic voting manipulation in the 2002 governor’s race in Baldwin County.

Six minute <video and transcript>.

2. Florida shows why Machine Recounts are risky:

After initial denials by her office, our Connecticut Secretary of the State has reversed her earlier policy of paper recounts for close elections, we have strongly opposed this. Here is an example from Florida via Brad Friedman: <read>

16,632 Votes Reportedly ‘Unaccounted For’ in Palm Beach County Primary Election ‘Recount’
Just 18 Votes Separate Candidates in Circuit Judge Race Where Votes Are Said Lost in Re-tally on Sequoia Optical-Scan Voting Systems

The question remains as to how many votes were lost in other races on the same ballot which were not included in last night’s re-tally.

How about Connecticut vs Florida?…we are more at risk because Florida, unlike Connecticut, provides for hand recounts in some circumstances…

Florida state law disallows hand-counting of paper ballots which have already been counted by machine, other than in special circumstances. We’ll see if this ends up being one of those circumstances. Theoretically, a hand-count would determine the correct totals for the race, where the machine-count has misreported totals. [UPDATE: Palm Beach Post reports the machine recount was close enough to allow for a hand-count of over votes and undervotes. See more in the update at end of this article.][* preceding brackets in original]

3. New York Times demonstrates computer vulnerability and one way not to run elections like a business:

We have often compared voting computers to ATM’s. slot machines, gas meters, and electric meters. Now the news that store computers (Point of Sale Devices) are often compromised by insiders. Just the same type of attack via memory cards computer scientists have been warning about. <read>

Thanks to a software program called a zapper, even technologically illiterate restaurant and store owners can siphon cash from computer cash registers and cheat tax officials.

While zappers are most likely to be used by medium and small businesses, the take is anything but small change. A 12-store restaurant chain in Detroit used a zapper to skim more than $20 million over four years, federal prosecutors say.

Zappers — also known as automated sales suppression devices — are a new twist on an old fraud. “The technology is new and getting newer, but the concept is as old as having two sets of books,” said Verenda Smith of the Federation of Tax Administrators, the association of state tax administrators.

Zappers alter the electronic sales records in a cash register. To satisfy tax collectors, the tally of food orders, for example, must match the register’s final cash total. To hide the removal of cash from the till, a crooked business owner has to erase the record of food orders equal to the amount of cash taken; otherwise, the imbalance is obvious to any auditor…
While merchants, security experts and government agencies know of these devices, they exist in such a shadowy realm that it is difficult to assess how big the problem may be or how to address it.

“We can’t get our arms around how much this is in use,” Ms. Smith said. The Internal Revenue Service said it did not track the use of zappers.

Zappers are a worldwide phenomenon. They have been found in Germany, Sweden, Brazil, Australia, France and the Netherlands.

Could this possibly happen in Connecticut?

One of the first reported zapper cases in the United States was Stew Leonard’s dairy, whose owner was convicted in 1993 of skimming $17 million over 10 years. The theft was uncovered after Mr. Leonard tried to board a plane to St. Martin with an unreported $50,000.

Caught Between The Glitches and The Gotyas

We have been covering a significant report by VotersUnite.org, Vendors are Undermining the Structure of U.S. Elections. , the report summarizes the bind Connecticut and other states are in:

Violations of Federal Law Leave States in a Double Bind. The federal government fails to meet its HAVA deadlines for giving guidance to the states on how to comply with HAVA, yet states are held accountable to comply.

News from Florida of our vendor, Diebold Premier continues to reveal the disappointing quality of their products and the Federal testing programs. From the Harold Tribune a short sour story <read>

Two Diebold glitches in one month? That’s no way to rebuild confidence in automated elections.

Sarasota and Hillsborough counties experienced one of the problems Tuesday night. They suffered delays from a software flaw that revealed itself when officials tried to integrate absentee ballot totals into overall election results…

The manufacturer is Premier Election Solutions, formerly known as Diebold — a name long connected to doubts about the security of voting.

Earlier this month, Premier accepted blame for the other glitch — a coding error that can sometimes prevent precinct vote totals from electronically transferring to central tabulation systems. The problem could afflict 34 states.

Good news, bad news

The good news about these flaws is that faulty counts can be detected by cross-checks and refuted by a paper trail of ballots. The votes still exist, in other words, though they can be harder to find.

The bad news is that confidence has been shaken, yet again, in automation that is critical to democratic elections. The extra vigilance required to thwart these potential glitches adds to election administrators’ burden and cost.

The fact that the Premier problems occur intermittently, undiscovered during certification or testing procedures, is especially troubling. In Sarasota County, for example, the high-speed scanner/software glitch did not surface in a mock election held last month…

Despite many reforms since the 2000 fiasco, voting systems are nowhere near as credible, secure or user-friendly as they should be.

Here is the good news and bad news for Connecticut:

The good news is that these latest glitches do not apply here because we total results manually from election night paper tapes, rather than accumulating memory cards.

The bad news is we are totally dependent on Premier and their distributor, LHS, for our elections – they are rightfully in the spotlight and being sued for poor quality and generally remain in denial. The lack of security and poor quality of the AccuVote-OS has been proven by independent scientific studies commissioned by CT, CA, and OH.

Moderate good news is that Connecticut has chosen optical scan which is the best system available which meets standards set by the Help America Vote Act.

The bad bad news is that there is no alternative in sight. All the vendors have poor products with no better products or vendors in sight. While some states are improving their laws, procedures, and actions, proposed Federal laws in the Senate would “fix” the Help America Vote Act by making the situation much worse.

The Outsourced State

Last week we covered a significant report by VotersUnite.org, Vendors are Undermining the Structure of U.S. Elections. The report describes the multiple ways that states have become dependent on vendors for elections, how Federal laws and actions have placed election officials in an impossible bind, how arrogant vendors take advantage of the situation, that elections are at risk, and democracy in peril. It also highlights some states that are completely dependent on vendors for almost every phase of every election.

Looking at Connecticut, we outsource less than the states that are highlighted in the VotersUnite report. You could conclude that we are much better off, our elections much less at risk. You might be wrong.

The VotersUnite report uses the theme of outsourcing being a tunnel that undermines elections. Here are the major outsourced elements covered by the report. Like most states, Connecticut does not outsource them all (here we cross out those not completely outsourced by Connecticut):

  • Equipment
  • Software
  • Installation
  • Training/Troubleshooting
  • Ballot Programming
  • Pre-Election Testing
  • Maintenance/Repairs
  • Election Day Assistance
  • Results Retrieval
  • Trouble Shooting/Investigation
  • Recount Management

We prefer a different theme: “A chain is only as strong as its weakest link(s)”.

Two of these elements represent a significant risk to Connecticut elections:

  1. Ballot Programming – Before each election memory cards are programmed by a vendor, LHS Associates, in Massachusetts, by people over which we have no supervision.
  2. Maintenance/Repairs – Over this last summer each of our optical scanners was subject to mandatory maintenance planned and performed by LHS Associates.

This summer’s maintenance was to be performed under the observation of election officials but not the public – how hard would it be for a busy, untrained, non-technical election official to look away for a few seconds while a scanner was open, giving the vendor time to replace the permanent program chip in the machine with one with the same external label but with a rogue program inside? What guarantee is there that the original chip had the approved program when the scanners were originally delivered?

“Oh” you say, “this is so far fetched and local officials perform pre-election testing before each election.”

A recent paper by the University of Connecticut clearly demonstrates the ways in which clever coding in the permanent memory of our AccuVote-OS optical scanners can defeat pre-election testing. The report title almost says it all: Tampering with Special Purpose Trusted Computing Devices: A Case Study in Optical Scan E-Voting <read>

Also a memory card test by UConn commissioned by the Secretary of the State surprisingly revealed that less than half of local election officials were able to fully follow pre-election testing procedures.

Reports by UConn and those commissioned by the Secretaries of State of CA and OH also demonstrate the risks of the memory cards and their vulnerability to insiders.

The companies we keep:

Recall that our State’s chief election official incorrectly believes that LHS invented the AccuVote-OS