CTVotersCount.org

We still disagree with the Courant on reforming the office of registrar

The comprehensive solution is to “Do for Elections what we have done for Probate“. Consolidation, Professionalization, and Regionalization. Not a panacea, but in our opinion a prerequisite. And change it in the Legislature by following the requirements of State law.

New editorial on old subject: Hartford Doesn’t Need Three Registrars – A Crazy Waste: One for each party is too costly <read>

The election must be held, of course, and the registrars must try harder to find the money in their stash to pay for it. At the same time, Hartford must quick-step down the path of reforming this bureaucratic colossus.

There are three registrars: a Democratic registrar and staff, a Republican registrar and staff, and a Working Families Party registrar and staff. When the Working Families registrar position was created, there were fewer members of that party registered to vote than there are members of a baseball team.

Requiring a registrar for such a party is a needless waste. Hartford is broke. Mayor Pedro Segarra recently announced an additional 12 layoffs at a time when the city’s non-school, non-public safety, non-registrar payroll is down to bare bones.

Hartford needs only one registrar. It should be a nonpartisan, professional, appointed position.

The city charter revision commission now empaneled should study the issue and include a provision on how best to reform the registrars’ office in its report next January.

Here is where the Courant Editorial Board gets it wrong, in our opinion:

It would be illegal for any town in Connecticut to disregard the State law, with regard to how and how many registrars are elected or appointed. Of what value would an item in a local Charter Revision Commission Report be?
The number of registered voters in a party is not the only measure of importance. Our analysis of the 2011 municipal election shows six Democratic Party candidates receiving an average of 3,732 votes, four Working Families Party candidates receiving and average of 2,036 votes, and the Republican Party with three candidates averaging just 966 votes.
In the past the Courant has advocated for a single registrar. That is and was a flawed idea, which would leave a risky system subject to political skulduggery: Downsizing Newspaper Recommends Downsizing Registrars <read> And more recently they seem to at least have understood the law, suggesting it was up the the Legislature: Too Many Registrars? Or Too Little Thought? <read>
The Courant is correct, we need professional, appointed election administrators. But they should not be appointed locally, especially in single party dominated towns, like Hartford or Bridgeport. As we have said before, and for quite some time: The comprehensive solution is to “Do for Elections what we have done for Probate“. Consolidation, Professionalization, and Regionalization. Not a panacea, but in our opinion a prerequisite.

UConn Memory Card Report: More garbage in, some good information out

Once again, we applaud Dr. Alexander Shvartsman and his team for developing the technology to perform these innovative tests, the diligence to perform the tedious tests, and the fortitude to report the facts. Compliance by officials leaves much to be desired:

Prior to the primary 110 out of 598 districts sent cards, that is 18.5% compliance
After the primary 105 out of 598 districts sent cards, that is 17.6% compliance,
however, only 49 of those cards were used in the election, a compliance rate of 8.2%

Last week, the University of Connecticut UConn released its latest memory card report: Technological Audit of Memory Cards for the April 24, 2012 Connecticut Primary Elections <report>

We can easily echo our summary of the previous report.

We applaud Dr. Alexander Shvartsman and his team for developing the technology to perform these innovative tests, the diligence to perform the tedious tests, and the fortitude to report the facts.

We do not applaud the lack of cooperation of officials in the audit or the lack of official compliance with memory card procedures. We are left wondering if this is the level of compliance and cooperation when officials know their efforts will be disclosed: “What is their compliance when their actions are unlikely or impossible to scrutinize?” Can you imagine such numbers from any other technology or Government function? Where is the outrage?

Take a look at these statistics for the election with 598 districts each expected to send in a card before and after the elections:

Prior to the primary 110 out of 598 districts sent cards, that is 18.5% compliance

After the primary 105 out of 598 districts sent cards, that is 17.6% compliance,

however, only 49 of those cards were used in the election, a compliance rate of 8.2%

UConn expressed doubts, as we also have, that the cards were actually selected randomly as directed.

UConn concluded that there is a need for compliance with directives and procedures, not only in the rate of sending in cards, but in following election procedures:

We make the following concluding remarks and recommendations.

The SOTS Office should continue publicizing proper procedures and continue offering training. In particular, to reinforce the need to prepare all cards for election prior to the election dayand prior to the pre-election audit.

Fewer cards are being duplicated at the districts, and it is important to continue reiterating that cards must never be duplicated. Any cases of duplication should recorded in the moderators’ logs and be brought to the attention of the SOTS Office with a documented explanation of why this is necessary.

It is important for the districts to report any problems during pre-election testing (and any card problems) to the SOTS Oce as soon as possible upon completion of the tests.

It is important for the districts report to the SOTS Office any unexpected behavior of the tabulators that seem to necessitate a restart or a memory card reset. It would be helpful if moderators’ logs contained records of machine restarts, perceived causes, and reasoning for the restart or reset. There was at least one documented case of a tabulator malfunction during this primary election. In such cases it is strongly recommended that the problematic tabulator is tested by the Center personnel (either at the district or in our laboratory).

The current number of cards with unreadable data (junk data) continues to be high. We have determined that weak batteries are the primary cause of this. The vendor developed a new non-volatile, battery-less memory card, and our ongoing evaluation continues to conrm their compatibility with the AV-OS machines used Connecticut. A limited pilot using the new cards was successfully performed in Vernon. It is expected that a broader pilot deployment of the new cards by the SOTS Oce will occur in the near future. The use of the new card should eliminate the major cause of memory card failures.

It is important that cards sent for the pre-election audit are selected at random. One card randomly selected from four cards in each district is to be randomly selected for the audit. While the districts are encouraged to submit all malfunctioning cards to VoTeR Center, all such cards need to be identied separately from the cards randomly selected for the audit. When a suciently large collection of cards is selected randomly for audit, the results of the audit meaningfully represent the overall State landscape and help identify technological and procedural problems that need to be solved. Should the selection not be at random, for example, by avoiding sending duplicated cards in for audit, the results are less representative, and may lead to masking technological problems. Therefore training should continue stressing the need to submit appropriate cards for the pre-election audit.

For the post-election we received fewer than expected number of cards, 155, out of which only 49 were used in the election. This is a very low number. It would be extremely important in the future to obtain substantially larger numbers of cards from the actual use in the elections.

It is indeed good news that their has been a successful first test of new memory cards. Hopefully, further testing will be successful and will result in a relatively speedy full deployment:

New non-volatile (battery-less) memory card was recently developed by the vendor. Our preliminary analysis of this card concermed that it is compatible with AV-OS systems deployed in Connecticut. A pilot deployment of the new cards was done in the Town of Vernon using 12 of the new cards. The cards performed well, no failures were detected, and no such cards lost their data. However this is a very small sample of cards. We are currently performing in-depth testing of the non-volatile cards and as of this writing the results are encouraging.

A broader pilot is being planned by the SOTS Oce to occur in the near future. The use of the new card should eliminate the major cause of memory card failures.

53 districts in 49 municipalities selected for post-election audit

Yesterday with assistance from Coalition volunteers, Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill conducted the random selection of districts for the post-election audit.

Particularly striking is the rapid consolidation and dramatic drop in the number of polling places over time:

Yesterday with assistance from Coalition volunteers, Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill conducted the random selection of districts for the post-election audit. They are listed in this official press release.

Particularly striking is the rapid consolidation and dramatic drop in the number of polling places over time:

523	Aug 2012 Primary
598	Apr 2012 Presidential Primary
726	Nov 2011 Municipal Election

This is not necessarily a negative trend, in many of our towns where people drive everywhere. Not such a good idea and actually is not part of the trend in our larger cities. What is behind this is saving money, less work recruiting pollworkers, less locations to manage, and less work setting setting up of equipment, while fueled this year by Federal and state redistricting requiring redrawing voting districts anyway. Also after five years of optical scanners, it is obvious that single scanners can handle the volume of all but less than a handful of very large polling places.

The local audit counting period will extend until Sept 17th, 2012

Courant stands for election integrity ( with Windsor/Hartford log of events)

Such questions must be answered so that all voters can have faith in the integrity of the system.

We would add to the Courant’s concern in this obvious and difficult situation, that part of the cure is more attention to detail ahead of time and in every election, this close or not. Learning from experience and reducing the odds of lingering questions.

It was a close primary in Windsor/Hartford with the first official count at a tie, then followed by a recanvass leaving two ballots missing or overcounted on election day. Today the Courant supports the current apparent loser in bringing questions to court: ‘Landslide Leo’: 1-Vote Margin In District 5 Bears Further Scrutiny <read>

Who could blame first-time candidate Brandon McGee for asking the state Superior Court to take a look at the vote-counting procedures in his state House district after the Aug. 14 primary election?

Last week, registrars said union activist Leo Canty defeated Mr. McGee by one vote — 774 to 773 — to win the Democratic nomination for the 5th House District seat in Windsor and part of Hartford. The Democratic winner will face Windsor board of education member Paul Panos, a Republican, in the Nov. 6 general election.

Enough doubt has been raised about the vote that taking it to court is a reasonable course for Mr. McGee to follow.

The initial tabulation on election night and a subsequent recount showed first a McGee victory by one vote, then a tie and then the one-vote margin for Mr. Canty. There apparently is a missing paper absentee ballot, as well as one lost McGee machine vote, after the recount, in Windsor. There are also procedural questions…

Such questions must be answered so that all voters can have faith in the integrity of the system.

We have long said that while, useful, Connecticut’s recanvass are weak versions of recounts. Recanvasses are insufficient in very close races. Even a recount in this situation may not be adequate to determine the actual choice of the voters.

The issue here seems to turn more on the two “missing” ballots. Are they actually missing or were there miscounts on election day? As we and many officials point out people can count inaccurately, especially if they do not take measures to verify their work. It is possible for machines to count inaccurately, or for jams or ballots to be mishandled so that ballot(s) are counted twice. Also, Connecticut’s check-in procedures make it easy for counts to be off by small numbers in either direction.

We have no horse in this race. Even though I attended both recanvasses, I was not an official observer, was only able to observe from a distance, and was not privy to0 conversations/details discussed between officials and official observers – especially conversations relating to the “missing” ballots. I did see some inadequate procedures/actions in both recanvasses, that provide potential integrity holes, but have no evidence of a faulty count. One of my major concerns with recanvasses is the inadequate review of individual ballots for potential voter intent issues – this does not seem to be a significant factor in this case of a vary simple ballot, presumably experienced voters, and apparently few close calls in the actual ballots. Unfortunately, I missed the last exciting hours of the Windsor recanvass. (I went out for a quick meal, but found the building locked when I returned.)

We would add to the Courant’s concern in this obvious and difficult situation, that part of the cure is more vigilance and attention to detail ahead of time and in every election, this close or not. Learning from experience and reducing the odds of lingering questions. For example, to date, the system has never recognized a problem with the results in Bridgeport in 2010, or with the significant discrepancies in that election in the number of voters checked-in vs. ballots*. When campaigning, our current Secretary of the State recognized the problem in lack of uniformity in a recanvass crossing Bloomfield and Hartford. Unfortunately, no changes have been made to correct that problem, perhaps we would not be in this situation today if procedures, training, and vigilance had increased.

* Since the Bridgeport Recount was not official, we would not expect it to change official results. Still, there has never been any official recognition or attempted cure for the inaccurate counting and discrepancies between check-in lists and ballot counts. There are new laws to reduce the chances of running out of official ballots and to make copied ballots so that voting does not get interrupted by lack of ballots or weather emergencies. There is no routine audit of check-in lists vs. ballot counts.

Update: Windsor Patch: McGee Files Complaint, Seeks Hearing on Primary Results <read>

According to a statement released by McGee, the complaint filed in court alleges election officials:

“improperly allowed absentee ballots to be counted that were not counted by tabulation on primary Election Day or during the recanvass;

“improperly allowed absentee ballots to comingle, allowing for an improper count;

“and lost a ballot that was cast in McGee’s favor in Windsor’s John F. Kennedy voting district.”

The complaint says the actions specified are in violation of state statues, and requests a court hearing be held.

While alleging improper actions were taken by election officials, McGee was explicit in saying, “…nowhere in this action is my campaign alleging any wrongdoing by either Mr. Canty or Mayor Trinks.”

“I want to ensure that those who exercised their right were not deprived of their voice, and that the will of the people is ascertained without question of process,” he added.

In detailing the recanvass, the complaint, according to McGee, names Hartford Democratic Registrar of Voters Olga Iris Vazquez, Hartford Town and City Clerk John Bazzano, Windsor Democratic Registrar of Voters Anita Mips, Windsor Town Clerk Agnes Pier, Secretary of State Denise Merrill, the state elections enforcement committee, and fifth assembly district candidates Canty and Trinks.

Update 8/31/2012: Hartford Clerk Testifies In Hearing On 5th State House District Primary Vote <read>

Update 9/6/2012: Testimony Continues In Disputed 5th Statehouse District Democratic Primary<read> Take some of the summary statements about the testimony with a few grains of salt.

Update 9/7/2012: Testimony In Disputed Democratic Primary Race Focuses On Elusive Ballot <read>

Update 9/12/2012: Testimony Ends In 5th General Assembly District Election Complaint <read>

Among other things:

[Superior Court Judge A. Susan] Peck added that she was concerned about the fact that 525 ballots were cast in Windsor, but poll workers only crossed off 523 names, violating state law.

Yes, but we suspect being a little off happens frequently. We have no statistics to go on, unfortunately the check-in lists and easy to make a small number of errors. We point to huge errors in Bridgeport in 2010 which, unfortunately, raised little concern at the time or since, from the unofficial Citizen’s Bridgeport Recount Report:

In several districts the counts of ballots differed from the check-in list counts, and in several districts, our counts of the check-in lists differed from the counts on the moderators’ reports. In many districts check-in list counts closely paralleled ballot counts, yet some counts were over by 21 ballots or less or under by 30 ballots or less. While some variation can be expected due to the difficulty of interpreting some check-in marks, we found several districts where the check-in lists were clearly not counted accurately. In one district, results were under by 117 ballots less than voters checked- in based on our counts.

Update 9/14/2012 Peck Orders Second Recount In 5th Assembly District <read>

Update 9/18/2012 Uncounted, Missing Ballot Found in 2nd Windsor Recanvass <read>

Update 9/18/2012 Town Clerk: Unopened Absentee Ballot Erroneously Marked “Deceased” <read>

Update 9/18/2012: Now it is down to opening that one vote <read>

Update 9/19/2012: A revote Oct 2nd in Hartford/Windsor <read>

Update 9/19/2012: Third Shoe Drops, Trinks drops out <read>

2004 not so long ago, does it take a conspiracy? Consider the context, 2012.

A recent conversation and a video bring back memories and posts covering the 2004 election.

We should cautiously consider the context. 2004 was our last close presidential election. We are in the midst of an apparent multi-state, swing-state, open conspiracy to suppress votes via unnecessary voter ID. And the 2012 election may again be close, like those in 2004 and 2000.

A recent conversation and a video bring back memories and posts covering the 2004 election.

The question I asked myself and answered was “Do I believe the 2004 election was stolen by a conspiracy?” The short answer is “Probably not, it was likely was stolen by several small conspiracies and individual actions”. A conspiracy takes just two or more people conspiring to commit a crime. Four years ago we reviewed Witness to a Crime, by Richard Hayes Phillips, the evidence he generated showed a variety of problems with the 2004 results in Ohio. The evidence seems to point to at least several small conspiracies that together added up to enough votes changed to alter the Ohio result, and the election result. As we have said before, to our knowledge none of the accusations in Witness to a Crime have ever been refuted. We also witnessed the voter suppression in Ohio, perhaps the least likely to be a conspiracy was the Secretary of State, Ken Blackwell, rejecting voter registrations not submitted on very heavyweight paper.

Less certain is the claim that votes were manipulated on external severs, and the related small airplane death of a potential conspirator.

Several of these actions, conspiracies, and suspicions were covered yesterday on DemocracyNow!, interviewing Craig Unger on his new book about Karl Rove, Boss Rove.

The video also reviews the sad story of the unfortunate, strategic prosecution/persecution of Gov Don Siegelman. That is half the story. The other half is his stolen re-election.

We should cautiously consider the context. 2004 was our last close presidential election. We are in the midst of an apparent multi-state, swing-state, open conspiracy to suppress votes via unnecessary voter ID. The 2012 election may again be close, like those in 2004 and 2000.

Secretary’s Office and registrars test new election reporting system

From what we can tell, the system may well meet the needs for better reporting that would dramatically move us forward in the PEW criteria, and more importantly, toward higher accuracy and higher election integrity. Yet, the devil is often in the details. After implementation for election night, the system should also be extended to report the results of recanvasses and post-election audits.

For some time, we have been calling for a better election night reporting system that would be subject to addition and transcription errors, contain detailed district data, and provide data to candidates and the public. It was one of the items on our list of What Could a Secretary of the State Do, started in the 2010 campaign for that office:

Provide detailed, accurate, downloadable, election information and notices on the Secretary of the State’s web site

In a PEW study the Connecticut site ranked 48th out of 50 states. We could debate if we should be higher in the rankings, or instead work to emulate and surpass the top ranked states.

The process of accumulating voting results in Connecticut is an error-prone three step process of addition and transcription, from polling place, to town hall, to the Secretary of the State’s Office, and to the web. Citizens have identified errors large and moderate – errors of a magnitude which could change election results, the initiation of recanvasses, or ballot access. See <here> <here>

Without reliable, publicly posted results, post-election audits cannot be accomplished which inspire confidence and provide integrity. A trusted audit requires selecting districts for audit against previously posted results. Since we audit against optical scanner tapes, and the tape results are not posted, then we fail to meet that requirement.

We applauded when it was one of the items in the Elections Performance Task Force Report released this spring:

15. The Secretary recommends immediate implementation of a statewide web-based electronic reporting system for election results.

CTNewsJunkie covers the test with views from several registrars: State Used Primary to Pilot New Election Results Reporting System <read> Last week we discovered, and along with other advocates, reviewed the webcast which described the system to registrars that were part of the pilot.

From what we can tell, the system may well meet the needs for better reporting that would dramatically move us forward in the PEW criteria, and more importantly, toward higher accuracy and higher election integrity. We especially appreciate the input of district Moderators’ Returns and the promised immediate public access to all the detailed data. Yet, the devil is often in the details: Will the Moderators’ Returns include the critical Moderator’s Log? Should the data be reviewed by the Head Moderator before it is available to the public? I would seem easy for a moderator after a 17 hour day to make a data entry error that might go unnoticed. There will be a lot of training necessary if each moderator is expected to input the data in each polling place. Perhaps most multi-polling place towns should start with data entry in a central location with the moderators observing and checking while someone else inputs the data. We are also skeptical of the “Smart Phone” interface – in a Municipal Election, especially, there is a lot of data to enter and the Moderator’s Return can be extensive as well – how long will that take with a small smartphone screen and a small keyboard?

In any case, this seems to be a great start toward a much improved process. After implementation for election night, the system should also be extended to report the results of recanvasses and post-election audits.

Has anyone here seen my old friend Accuracy?

Seems like after just about every election we see media reports of potential and impending ‘recounts’, when there is no such thing in the applicable election statutes. Some may think we are too picky expecting the press and our chief elections official to be precise. Many people call ‘primaries’ ‘elections’ but in the statutes they are different things, just as ‘recounts’ and ‘recanvasses’ are different things in our statutes and in common use.

Accuracy matters in word and in deed.

Seems like after just about every election we see media reports of potential and impending ‘recounts’, when there is no such thing in the applicable election statutes. See these stories: CTNewsJunkie, MyLeftNutmeg, the Courant, and the CTMirror. Where do that all get that same inaccurate idea? Perhaps from the Secretary of the State’s press release, subtitled: SECRETARY OF THE STATE NOTIFIES REGISTRARS AND TOWN CLERKS IN NEW HAVEN,WEST HAVEN, HARTFORD AND WINDSOR THEY HAVE UNTIL TUESDAY AUGUST 21ST TO COMPLETE RECOUNTS IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISTRICTS 5 & 116 <read> At lease she pointed them to the right statutes that use the word ‘recanvass’:

Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes 9-311 and 9-311a, recounts are to be conducted by election moderators and supervised by Registrars of Voters. The recounts for the 2012 Primary Elections must be complete by Tuesday August 21, 2012.

Some may think we are too picky expecting the press and our chief elections official to be precise. Many people call ‘primaries’ ‘elections’ but in the statutes they are different things, just as ‘recounts’ and ‘recanvasses’ are different things in our statutes and in common use. When we think of recounts we think of the slow and controversial process in Florida in 2000, or the deliberate, adversarial, and ACCURATE process in Minnesota in 2008.

We have said it all before, several times, that a recanvass is not a recount, a recanvass is useful, but a recount is sometimes advisable. Perhaps we said it best in this op-ed: CTMirror Op-Ed: State recanvass law inadequate for close elections <read>

This could be quite confusing if they think there was a ‘recount’ in Windsor/Hartford, but the close result ends in a court battle for a ‘recount’.

We point out that words matter. Seems like just a few days ago the Secretary of The State was able rule that the Democratic Party had line 1 on the ballot, while the Working Families Party could not since they were not really the type of party referenced in the applicable statute.

Canadian election disrupted in broad daylight

Canadian Broadcasting story: NDP gives up: convention cyber attacker remains a mystery <read>

The source of the cyber attack that disrupted voting at the NDP’s leadership convention in March remains a mystery, and further investigation to find out who was responsible has been dropped.

The NDP was the victim of what’s known as a distributed denial of service attack when thousands of members were trying to vote online throughout the day on March 24. These kinds of attacks result in websites crashing or slowing down because the server is flooded with bogus requests for access.

Legitimate voters couldn’t access the NDP’s website to vote and organizers ended up extending the time allotted for each voting round, delaying the final result until hours after it was expected. Thomas Mulcair was finally declared the winner at about 9 p.m.

Scytl Canada, the company contracted to run the voting, quickly detected what was going on soon after voting began that day and reacted accordingly. They were able to keep the voting going by increasing the system’s capacity and by blocking some of the bogus IP addresses.

Scytl, an international company based in Spain, conducted a forensic analysis after the convention but came up dry when trying to pinpoint exactly who was behind the co-ordinated campaign.

Several points worth noting and much to be learned from this story:

A denial of service attack is about as simple as it gets. No insider knowledge required, no understanding of the details of the target application, no new technology to invent.
Denial of service has its limitations. No votes are stolen, although many can be suppressed. The attack is obvious and will be detected.
This was a highly professional system by a leading vendor. That was not enough to prevent the attack, yet expertise and preparation may have been a factor in limiting the disruption.
In this case the disruption was moderately successful, in a relatively small election. A strong denial of service attacks have shut down highly regarded systems for longer periods, hours and days.

What value is an attack that everyone sees? That depends. Courts have been reluctant to grant re-votes, for good reasons. Results of a vote can depend strongly on the other races and issues on a ballot, get out the vote efforts, and even the weather. An apparently semi-successful attack like this one could be successful if it biased the results toward those who could be expected to have the time, opportunity, and inclination to keep trying, or those expected to vote at particular times of the day, or those expected to vote online if it is an alternative to in-person voting. Perhaps there is suppression in just one area with voters strongly favoring one party or ballot proposition, or there is a local contest that would be expected to have a different result it re-voted separately from a national or state-wide election. There is also the possibility of braking news just before or after the election that would change the result on a later vote.

The hunt for actual votER fraud continues

I find it hard to imagine an immigrant or felon taking the time and the risks to vote illegally, especially when so many registered voters don’t take the time to vote, and so many eligible voters don’t bother to register. Those who imagine the nightmare, cannot find significant actual votER fraud.

Here is a short post from Mother Jones articulating that hunt and the examples supplied by one of the most prominent votER fraud imaginers, Hans von Spakovsky: Repeat After Me: In-Person, In-Person, In-Person <read>

There are plenty of other types of voter fraud, of course. There’s registration fraud, where you send in forms for Mary Poppins and James Bond. There’s insider fraud, where election officials report incorrect tallies. There’s absentee ballot fraud, where you fill in someone else’s absentee ballot and mail it in. But a voter ID law does nothing to stop those kinds of fraud. Even in theory, the only kind of fraud it stops is in-person voter fraud…

Hasen[Author of The Voting Wars] provides what few examples he can. Hans von Spakovsky, a Bush-era Justice Department appointee, claimed to have found an occurrence of impersonation fraud in a 1984 case in Brooklyn. But when Hasen finally managed to get a copy of the DA’s report (von Spakovsky refused to share it), it turned out that the fraud consisted almost entirely of insiders manipulating registration books and cards. What little impersonation fraud they found was possible only thanks to collusion with corrupt election officials. Von Spakovsky also brought up a 1997 case in Miami, but that turned out to be absentee ballot fraud. In a later op-ed, he pointed to a case in Kansas, but a court ruled that, in fact, no illegal votes had been cast.

So there you have it. Hasen apparently doesn’t know of any confirmed cases of in-person voter fraud, and the folks who have tried their best to find some have failed…

UPDATE: Rick Hasen emails to say that he recently came across a case that might be genuine in-person voter fraud. The allegation is something stupid (a mother taking her teenage son to vote in her husband’s place), not something corrupt, but still. It’s a case! [Which we suspect could have been identified just by the checkers doing a bit of age guessing]

Conflict of interest generates knee-jerk call for election reform

As we have said before in several ways, modernization and solving election problems in Connecticut will be almost impossible to achieve within the existing system of 338+ local registrars, many of whom are very very part time. The comprehensive solution is to “Do for Elections what we have done for Probate”. Consolidation, Professionalization, and Regionalization. Not a panacea, but in our opinion a prerequisite.

Press release: Mayor Segarra & Hartford Legislators Call For Election Reform – Registrar of Voters Primary Raises Concerns <read>

This year in Hartford, there is a primary for one of the offices of Registrar of Voters. By the law the current party registrar is responsible for conducting primary elections for their own party. But that naturally creates a conflict of interest when the sitting registrar is also a candidate. This happens quite frequently in Connecticut and is not the only conflict. There can be a conflict when the registrar as a party member and usually a Town Committee member has taken a vote or a position for a particular candidate. Or as happened in Hartford in 2010, the registrar is on a slate for a Town Committee election. A registrar could also be a candidate for higher office and is often the spouse or close relative of a candidate. The list of potential conflicts is almost endless.

Shortsighted, stop gap solutions:

The two failed bills referenced in the press release are stop gaps. One would only apply to large city Town Committee elections. The other would only apply to elections for Registrar of Voters. We also do not like the idea of the Secretary of the State appointing the replacement registrar, that could create an appearance of a conflict of interest and the Secretary may not be that familiar with local individuals qualified and conflict-free to assume the duties. And in Hartford and occasionally other towns we have a third-party registrar candidate running with the sitting registrars administering the election. From the 1st bill:

That title 9 of the general statutes be amended to require (1) a registrar of voters who is a candidate in a primary or at an election, for the office of registrar of voters, to recuse himself or herself from official duties relating to such primary or election, and (2) the Secretary of the State to appoint a person to assume such duties during such period.

Every even year election, the registrars are candidates so they both would be replaced, for half of the elections! Where would 338+ qualified candidates be found? Especially if the state mandated certification of Registrars of Voters is ever materialized? Remember in most primaries and all elections there are multiple contests, it might be difficult to define fairly segregate the duties associated with one contest from the others.

A Comprehensive Solution

As we have said before in several ways, modernization and solving election problems in Connecticut will be almost impossible to achieve within the existing system of 338+ local registrars, many of whom are very very part time. The comprehensive solution is to “Do for Elections what we have done for Probate“. Consolidation, Professionalization, and Regionalization. Not a panacea, but in our opinion a prerequisite.