CO Legislature, Election Officials want to create “a favored class of citizens”

The ballot access issue has been debated in Colorado for too long. It is time for ballots to be confirmed as public records

Colorado is considering a law to restrict their Freedom of Information Law to limit ballot access to ballots to most citizens. They say it would create “a favored class of citizens” we say it would make most Coloradans second class citizens. Denver Post editorial: Hickenlooper should veto ballot access measure <read>

A rapidly growing coalition of groups from across the political spectrum — from Common Cause to the Colorado Union of Taxpayers — is urging the governor to veto a bill governing public access to voted ballots. We hope he listens carefully to their arguments, because an important principle is at stake.

Does access to public records apply equally to all citizens in this state, or should the law open some records only to special classes?

The Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) states that “all public records shall be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times.”

By contrast, the ballot bill — which began as Senate Bill 155 but was grafted onto House Bill 1036 at the eleventh hour — says an “interested party” won’t have to wait like the rest of us until an election is certified to enjoy transparent government. And it defines interested parties as not only the candidates themselves but also political parties and even representatives of issue committees that gave money to ballot measures.

Why should the principle of open government be accorded to them and not to other groups just as interested in an election’s outcome?

Why should their ability to inspect records be greater than that of the humblest citizen with no clout or money to spend on politicking?

As members of the Colorado Lawyers Committee Election Task Force wrote in an analysis, the bill’s “restriction of CORA rights during an election to political parties and candidates creates — for the first time — a favored class of citizens … .”

When we first wrote about this bill in March, we described it as a flawed measure that left too much discretion to county clerks and failed to improve procedures that fueled worries about voted ballots being linked to specific voters. But we were also relieved that the clerks had retreated from their earlier opposition to any public access to voted ballots.

The more we consider this complex bill, however, the worse it looks — and our unease is heightened by its crude handling. Not only was it appended to an unrelated measure having nothing to do with elections, it also was rushed through the House with little notice and limited debate.

The ballot access issue has been debated in Colorado for too long. It is time for ballots to be confirmed as public records <read> <read>

60 Districts Selected for Post-Election Audits

Yesterday, with the assistance of Coalition members, Secretary of the State Denise Merrill selected sixty districts from the Republican Presidential Primary for post-election audit.

Yesterday, with the assistance of Coalition members, Secretary of the State Denise Merrill selected sixty districts from the Republican Presidential Primary for post-election audit <read>

Less than 10% of districts were selected since many towns used paper ballots without optical scanners. The audit only tests the accuracy of optical scanners, ignoring the regularly proven possibility that people can count inaccurately. Since the drawing was held after the official start of the audit period, we expect that many towns will not give the three days notice required in the Secretary of the State’s audit procedures. (In Connecticut audit procedures and likely also regulations are not enforceable.)

Which, if any, of Connecticut’s 169 towns would be secure for Internet voting (let alone email and fax voting)?

Some of the smaller Connecticut towns have very part time registrars who maintain office hours as infrequent as one hour a week. Registrars in their 70’s and 80’s whose towns have not provided them with access to email. Towns that have resisted laws to require them to post meeting minutes on the web as too challenging and costly? How will those towns accept and provide security for email and fax voting? How about even our larger cities? How well prepared are they and can they be?

Last week the Legislature, without public hearings, passed email and fax voting, stuffed in an otherwise popular bill. It would mandate each of Connecticut’s 169 towns and 339 registrars of voters to implement voting via email and fax from any location in the world. As is well know, email and fax are totally insecure.

Less well known, is how unprepared and unable our nations cities are in securing the internet. It should be obvious since our corporations, including networking giants,  intelligence community, and military forces are not able to secure their networks. For a lesson in cyber security of the internet (with email being the most vulnerable), consider Homeland Security expert Bruce McConnell’s recent talk <read/view>

Recently the New York Times highlighted a report on the security of our nations cities: U.S. Study Cites Worries on Readiness for Cyberattacks <read>

A study commissioned by President Obama to assess the nation’s ability to respond to terrorist attacks and man-made and natural disasters has found that state and local officials have the most confidence in their public health and medical services but are the most concerned about whether agencies can respond to cyberattacks…

But it was the report’s findings about cybersecurity that appeared to be the most troubling, and they continued a drumbeat from the Obama administration about the need for Congress to pass legislation giving the Department of Homeland Security the authority to regulate computer security for the country’s infrastructure.

The report said that cybersecurity “was the single core capability where states had made the least amount of overall progress” and that only 42 percent of state and local officials believed that theirs was adequate.

Although a little more than 80 percent of officials said they had adopted measures to address the issue, 45 percent said they did not have a formal program to prevent and respond to attacks.

The report said that roughly two-thirds of those officials reported that they had not updated their “information security or disaster recovery plans in at least two years.”

The preparedness report said that a little less than two-thirds of the companies in the United States had sustained cyberattacks and that “only 50 percent of owners and operators at high-priority facilities” like electrical grids said that they reported such attacks.

Since 2006, there has been a 650 percent increase in the number of reported cyberattacks in the United States, rising to 41,776 in 2010 from 5,503 in 2006, according to the report.

Some the smaller of Connecticut towns have very part time registrars who maintain office hours as infrequent as one hour a week. Registrars in their 70’s and 80’s whose towns have not provided them with access to email.  Towns that have resisted laws to require them to post meeting minutes on the web as too challenging and costly? How will those towns accept and provide security for email and fax voting? How about even our larger cities? How well prepared are they and can they be?

Courant does So-So fact check of its latest editorial

The nation’s oldest continuously downsizing newspaper did a So-So job of fact checking its latest editorial, reviewing the legislative session. Here is our analysis, which actually is the Courant’s Report Card: Accuracy: C-; History: F; Prognosis: F

The nation’s oldest continuously downsizing newspaper did a So-So job of fact checking its latest editorial, reviewing the legislative session: This Legislature: The Good, The Bad And The So-So <read>

Here’s The Courant’s report card…

The bill also allows tests, in a handful of schools, of a rigorous teacher evaluation system and lets schools get inept teachers out of classrooms faster, among other things…

Election Day Registration: One in three eligible voters in Connecticut does not even bother to register to vote, so the bill allowing Election Day voter registration is good. Now, how about online registration? Voting by mail? Weekend voting? Making it less of a chore to do one’s civic duty, as many other states have done?

Here is our analysis, which actually is the Courant’s Report Card:

Accuracy:  C- The Election Day Registration bill, H.B. 5024, covered two items, the other one was Online Registration, taking up approximately the first half of the bill. Trusting this paper’s editorials could lead you astray, even on basic facts.

History: F  The Courant said  Government accountability would be a priority this year, yet never mentioned or used that standard in evaluating the year in the Legislature. Accountability also applies to our media.

Prognosis: F  This editorial is comes just before the latest round of downsizing takes effect.


Campaign finance bill hacked, with risky email and fax voting provision, passed

Email and fax voting are more dangerous than Internet voting. Has your email been hacked? Would you trust emails allegedly from your bank asking for your social security number and account number? Would you send them over the Internet in an email reply?
It seem like just last week that the Legislature mandated email access for all registrars.
We question the constitutionality of the secret vote waiver included in the bill.

Email and fax voting are more dangerous than Internet voting. Has your email been hacked? Would you trust emails allegedly from your bank asking for your social security number and account number? Would you send them over the Internet in an email reply?

H.B. 5556 is about campaign finance, but recently nestled in sections 23 to 25 is a provision for email and fax voting for military and overseas voters. Last night it passed both houses of the Legislature.

Sec. 23. Section 9-153e of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective from passage):

A member of the armed forces who is an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector, or the member’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed, may apply before a regular election for a blank absentee ballot to vote for all offices being contested at the election. The clerk shall make such ballots available for this purpose beginning not earlier than ninety days before the election. Application shall be made upon a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State or on the federal postcard application form provided pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 100 Stat. 924, 42 USC 1973ff et seq. , as amended from time to time, or any other applicable law and shall be issued only if the applicant states that due to military contingencies the regular application procedure, as set forth in section 9-140, cannot be followed. Upon receipt of the application, the municipal clerk shall issue the ballot and a cover sheet pursuant to section 25 of this act, either by mail or electronic means, as requested by the elector, which shall be prescribed and provided by the Secretary of the State, and a list of the offices to be voted upon indicating the number of individuals for which each elector may vote. As soon as a complete list of nominated candidates, including the party designations of such candidates, and questions is available, the clerk shall send such list to each applicant. If the list of candidates and questions is not available when the ballot is issued, the clerk shall include a statement indicating that such list shall be mailed as soon as it becomes available. The ballot shall permit the elector to vote by writing in the names of specific candidates and offices for which he is voting. The elector may also vote on the questions in a manner prescribed by the Secretary of the State. If such ballot is issued by electronic means, the clerk shall include a certification prescribed by the Secretary of the State that the elector shall be required to complete, sign and return with the completed ballot in order for such ballot to be counted. If the military contingency no longer exists, application for an additional ballot for all offices may be made pursuant to the provisions of section 9-153b.

Sec. 24. Section 9-153f of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective from passage):

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 9-140, any elector who is living, or expects to be living or traveling before and on election day, outside the territorial limits of the several states of the United States and the District of Columbia and any member of the armed forces who is an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector, or the member’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed, may apply for a blank absentee ballot to vote for all offices being contested at an election or primary. Application shall be made upon a form prescribed by the Secretary of the State or on the federal postcard application form provided pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 100 Stat. 924, 42 USC 1973ff et seq. , as amended from time to time, or any other applicable law. The municipal clerk receiving such an application shall, as soon as a complete list of candidates and questions to be voted upon at such election or primary becomes available, issue the ballot and a cover sheet pursuant to section 25 of this act, either by mail or electronic means, as requested by the elector, which shall be the blank ballot prescribed and provided by the Secretary of the State under section 9-153e, as amended by this act. The clerk shall include with the ballot a complete list of the offices to be voted upon, the number of individuals for which each elector may vote, the candidates, and, in the case of an election, the party designation of each candidate and questions to be voted upon. If such ballot is issued by electronic means, the clerk shall include a certification prescribed by the Secretary of the State that the elector shall be required to complete, sign and return with the completed ballot in order for such ballot to be counted. If application for an absentee ballot is made at the time of availability of regular absentee ballots as provided in section 9-140, the provisions of section 9-140 shall prevail. Except as otherwise provided in this section, the procedures governing the issuance of ballots under this section shall conform as nearly as may be to the procedures provided in section 9-140.

Sec. 25. (NEW) (Effective from passage) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of chapter 145 of the general statutes, for any election or primary held on or after August 14, 2012, an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector who applies for an absentee ballot pursuant to the provisions of section 9-153e or 9-153f of the general statutes, as amended by this act, may return such ballot, and certification, if required by said section 9-153e or 9-153f, and the cover sheet prescribed by the Secretary of the State pursuant to subsection (b) of this section, by facsimile or electronic mail and such ballot shall be counted with other absentee ballots in accordance with the provisions of section 9-150a of the general statutes, provided (1) the municipal clerk receives such electronically returned ballot, certification and signed cover sheet prior to the closing of the polls on the day of the election or primary, as applicable, and (2) such elector does not also mail the original ballot or a hard copy of the ballot to the municipal clerk.

(b) Not later than June 1, 2012, the Secretary of the State shall prescribe a cover sheet for electronic transmission of absentee ballots. Such sheet shall provide instructions for returning a ballot by electronic means and to include the elector’s name, telephone number, facsimile number or electronic mail address from which the ballot was returned, as applicable. Such cover sheet shall include the following statement: “I understand that by faxing or emailing my voted ballot I am voluntarily waiving my right to a secret ballot only to the extent that the appropriate election official must receive and process my ballot. Signature: …. Date: …. “

There have never been hearings on fax and email voting in Connecticut. Last year there were hearings on Internet voting. Later last year a requirement for Internet voting was hidden in a long bill of technical changes to election law. Several weeks after its discovery, after strong opposition by the Secretary of the State, it was watered down to requiring a report on Internet voting by the Secretary. Subsequently the Secretary held a symposium with national experts exposing the risks of Internet voting, apparently” to no avail. This year the bill hacking occurred later in the process, leaving no time for opponents to discover and react to the provision.

The debate was mostly about the campaign finance disclosure provisions aimed at counteracting Citizens United. The Governor’s staff is questioning the constitutionality of the bill and raising the potential for a veto. We question the constitutionality of the provision for individual voters to waive “their” right of secret voting – our understanding is that the purpose of secret voting includes our right to not have their vote exposed, purchased, or intimidated – they cannot waive our right to a secret vote.

Implementing the bill might be a challenge for many of our election officials, it seems like just last week that a bill was passed requiring towns to provide registrars with email accounts to converse with the Secretary of the State. Perhaps it should have provided for faxes,  fax phone lines, and email to converse with military and overseas voters.

We applaud Secretary Merrill and her office for their stand against the bill <read>

Village Independent Democrats’ resolution against National Popular Vote initiative

Echoing the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the Village Independent Democrats passed a resolution against the National Popular Vote initiative, urging the Governor and Legislature to vote against the initiative.

Last month the Village Independent Democrats passed a resolution against the National Popular Vote initiative (formally titled as the Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote an Interstate Compact forwarding it with a cover letter to New York Governor Cuomo and leaders of the legislature, urging them to vote against the initiative. Many of their thoughtful points echo our concerns with the generally unanticipated consequences of changing to a popular vote without election integrity reforms:

WHEREAS the popular vote in some States other than New York has been unfairly affected by barriers to voting, such as lifetime disenfranchisement due to felony conviction, requirement for government-issued photo ID and/or other documents, which creates unfair restrictions on certain groups of voters such as minorities, the poor, the disabled, and the elderly; and

WHEREAS many States use paperless electronic voting machines that cannot be independently audited, and only a few States perform any audits of their elections, so that in most states malicious tampering and innocent errors that increase or decrease vote tallies cannot and will not be detected; and

WHEREAS federal legislation would be required to compel all states to participate in meaningful audits of their elections for national offices, but Congress has not passed such legislation during the past nine years during which it has been introduced, and

WHEREAS New York State is the only state that worked diligently for four years to obtain electronic voting equipment that consists of secure machines and software by requiring electronic voting equipment to pass testing by an independent testing lab prior to purchase, so that our vote tallies are likely to reflect the votes cast; and

WHEREAS New York’s participation in the NPV initiative would constitute our endorsement and toleration of insecure voting systems, and of prejudices and restrictions against minority and less powerful voting groups; and

WHEREAS New York’s participation in the NPV initiative would be contrary to the principles of New York State and would compromise the voting freedoms and principles we endorse;

THEREFORE the Village Independent Democrats urges our State Assembly and State Senate to oppose any legislation supporting NPV.

The Village Independent Democrats reflect the concerns of the late New York Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who said:

There would be genuine pressures to fraud and abuse. It would be an election no one understood until the next day or the day after, with recounts that go on forever, and in any event, with no conclusion, and a runoff to come. The drama, the dignity, the decisiveness and finality of the American political system are drained away in an endless sequence of contests, disputed outcomes and more contests to resolve outcomes already disputed. That is how legitimacy is lost.

For all of CTVotersCount posts on the National Popular Vote, see <CTVotersCount Index>

EDR passes House and Senate

We opposed this unique form of Election Day Registration. We hope we are wrong. We hope that Connecticut’s 339 registrars implement the bill effectively, fairly, safely, and uniformly. That no one is lulled into complacency by low EDR voting in 2013 for the municipal elections and that chaos does not await us in a future high interest election in 2014 or 2016.

Yesterday, H.B. 5034 passed the Senate and is now heading to the Governor’s desk for his signature. The bill provides for Election Day Registration (EDR) and online voter registration. Since Governor Malloy proposed the bill and praised its passing, it will become law. Secretary of State Merrill also praised its passing.

CTVotersCount readers know that we are in favor of EDR and online registration. However, we did not support this bill because the EDR as proposed risks the rights of EDR voters, all voters, and is unlikely to achieve the same success as EDR in other states.<see our testimony for details>

According to a PEW report, other states have achieved 3% to 7% increased turnout with an increase in registration with 10% to 20% of voters registering by EDR (presumably once EDR is available many voters who would have registered earlier take advantages of the opportunity, as well as those who would not have registered earlier).

Despite such evidence from other states, Secretary Merrill attributes their higher than average turnout of 10% solely to  EDR. We doubt our less convenient method will match their increases of 3% to 7%:  <video>, press release:

Denise Merrill
Secretary of the State
Connecticut

For Immediate Release: For more information:
May 5, 2012 Av Harris: (860) 509-6255
Cell: (860) 463-5939
-Press Release-
Merrill: Final Passage of Election Day Registration, Online Voter Registration Moves Connecticut Elections into the 21st Century
Secretary of The State Looks forward to Enacting HB 5024 that Would Modernize Elections, Lead to Higher Voter Participation

Hartford: Secretary of the State Denise Merrill today lauded the final legislative passage of House Bill No. 5024 “An Act Concerning Voting Rights” – a measure proposed by Governor Dannel P. Malloy that once enacted will allow eligible Connecticut residents to register to vote and cast ballots on Election Day, and will also enable eligible Connecticut residents with a driver’s license to register to vote from any computer or mobile device with an internet connection. The Connecticut State Senate endorsed the bill today by a vote of 19-16. The measure was approved by the House of Representatives on April 30, 2012 by a vote of 83-59.

“This common sense yet long overdue reform is something we have tried to implement in Connecticut for years, and now we have made history by moving elections in our state into the 21st Century,” said Secretary Merrill, Connecticut’s chief elections official. “This will make the right to vote much easier to exercise for the eligible voters of Connecticut and lead to increased voter participation. We have the technology to allow eligible voters to register online from any computer or mobile device, and we have the security in place to allow those late deciding, busy and mobile voters to register and cast ballots on Election Day. This will also make our voter lists more accurate. I commend both Representative Russ Morin and Senator Gayle Slossberg, the chairs of the Government Administration and Elections Committee, and leadership in both the Senate and House for seeing this bill through to passage this year. I also commend the leadership shown by Governor Malloy in proposing this legislation and I look forward to watching him sign it into law.”

Connecticut becomes the 11th state to enact Election Day Registration. Some states such as Maine, Minnesota and Wisconsin have had Election Day Registration on the books since the 1970s. Studies have shown that voter turnout in states with Election Day Registration is on average 10% higher than national voter turnout figures. Once signed into law, Election Day Registration would only be available for November General Elections, not for primaries, starting in 2013. The new law will also create an interface between the existing Centralized Voter Registration System and the database housed at the state Department of Motor Vehicles that would verify the identity of a voter wishing to register online prior to approval by the local Registrar of Voters.

Av Harris
Director of Communications
Connecticut Secretary of the State Denise Merrill
(860) 509-6255 ofc
(860) 463-5939 cell

We hope we are wrong. We hope that Connecticut’s 339 registrars implement the bill effectively, fairly, safely, and uniformly. That no one is lulled into complacency by low EDR voting in 2013 for the municipal elections and that chaos does not await us in a future high interest election in 2014 or 2016.

International concerns with Internet voting

We note two articles this week, from Canada and Switzerland with citizen/scientists’ concerns with Internet voting.

We note two articles this week, from Canada <read> and Switzerland <read> with citizen/scientists’ concerns with Internet voting.

From our neighbors to the north:

In a letter to the chief electoral officer of Canada, Hallman laid out his concerns with online voting. Many are the same concerns he had with Huntsville’s voting method. The concerns include the loss of ballot verifiability and the ability to recount the ballots, the possibility of electronic tampering, loss of privacy when voting, lack of oversight by scrutineers and returning officers, loss of transparency, vote tracking through the use of personal identification numbers, vote buying, multiple votes, and software system bugs. Hallman argued that while commercial software suppliers who run electronic voting systems go to great lengths to guarantee the security of their systems, they cannot know if their systems have been compromised. And such a method intrinsically requires the use of unsecured computers by the voter, he said.

And from Switzerland, where they know something about keeping identities secret:

Swiss e-voting systems lack transparency and are vulnerable to attack by malevolent software, a study has found. The authorities are looking for solutions but officials point out that there is no such thing as absolute security, even with the traditional ballot paper vote. With the systems used so far in electronic voting trials “citizens cannot verify if their vote has been registered and counted correctly. They are obliged to trust the administration and authorities completely,” Eric Dubuis, information technology professor at the Bern University of Applied Sciences, told swissinfo.ch. Under the mandate of the Federal Chancellery, Dubuis co-authored a study on verifiable e-voting systems – systems that allow the voter to trace all the steps of his or her vote and to check that there has been no manipulation and that the vote has been duly counted.

The Bern researchers came up with a project system that allows each individual to verify the process from A to Z, without compromising voting secrecy. Thanks to a special autonomous “electoral machine” with an integrated camera as well as a personal voting card with a chip, the system set up by the researchers also eliminates the risk connected to malevolent software – or malware.

They are correct that all systems are vulnerable, yet paper ballot systems voted in person are less vulnerable than unverifiable electronic systems without paper records. We have seen schemes before for voter verifiable electronic systems, but are skeptical of systems close to impossible for the average voter to understand, requiring skill, and time to verify individual votes.

For all our posts on Internet voting <CTVotersCount Index>

EDR – Proponents cannot have it both ways

Proponents tout gains in turnout, but then estimate very few will use Election Day Registration (EDR) when it comes to claiming it won’t cost municipalities much and would not result in lines etc.

John Hartwell interviewed Secretary of the State Denise Merill on Stream on Conscience

John Hartwell interviewed Secretary of the State Denise Merill on Stream on Conscience  <view>

Although I am a supporter of EDR in theory. I am against the current Election Day Registration (EDR) bill as it portends chaos in a popular election and denies EDR voters the rights to privacy booths, ballot clerks, their votes being counted publicly by optical scanner, and does not provide a right to register if they are in line at 8:00 pm.

States that have successfully implemented EDR have seen turnout increase 3% to 7% with 10% to 20% EDR registrants to get the increased turnout. (They use a different model than CT, so it is hard to predict if our model will have the same results in turnout and voter appreciation)

Poponents tout those gains in turnout, but then estimate very few will use EDR when it comes to claiming it won’t cost municipalities much and would not result in lines etc. (Underestimating the result here would increase the odds of chaos if other states’ turnout estimates are the correct  ones)

In this interview the Secretary claims early on (8:25 in the video) that states recently implementing EDR have a 10% increase in turnout, but then later finds it hard to accept John’s example of 10% of voters in Westport using EDR (21:20) as “assuming a very large number”. Contrary to the Secretary’s contention that “it is all done by computer”, registering someone who is registered elsewhere in Connecticut involves calling a registrars office, that office calling a polling place, and then responding back to make sure the voter had not previously voted.

It is correct that testing in a low turnout election (2013) would be a good time to roll out the system. However, that can also generate a false sense of confidence, with a huge turnout and huge EDR turnout in a later more popular election (2014 or 2016).

Listen to the entire interview. Many other items of interest are discussed. The Secretary is worried about gangs at polls intimidating voters in the past and potential for chaos at the polls this fall (16:30).

More details on our concerns with the current EDR bill <here>

Extra/missing ballots a problem in Pennsylvania, not in Connecticut

In Philadelphia its a problem to be investigated when there are several voting districts with a few more ballots than voters. In Connecticut we have no confidence that such differences would be found or considered worthy of resolution or investigation.

In Philadelphia it is a problem to be investigated when there are several voting districts with a few more ballots than voters <read>

Philadelphia city commissioners are investigating an unusual series of over-votes in last year’s primary election – 83 voting divisions citywide where the official vote totals were bigger than the recorded number of voters who showed up.

In most locations, the discrepancies were small, just a handful of votes. In many instances, minor procedural mistakes could account for the anomalies.

But so far, the bulk of the over-voting has not been explained.

Until they understand what happened, the commissioners say, they cannot rule out the possibility of deliberate, illegal efforts to run up votes for favored candidates, with the perpetrators losing count as they tried to cover their tracks.

In Connecticut we have no confidence that such differences would be found or considered worthy of resolution or investigation. There is no requirement that voters be compared with ballots in our post-election audits and recanvasses. In fact, even though the Citizen Bridgeport Recount found huge differences in both directions (more ballots than voters in some districts, and more voters than ballots in other districts) there has never been an official recognition of the problem. Also unlike many other states we do not require voters to sign in, a significantly more reliable and auditable process than the check-in marks by poll workers – because officials and voters make sure the correct name is marked, and there is a signature which can provide some evidence in fraud investigations.

At a 20th Ward polling place near Temple University in North Philadelphia, only six people signed the poll book, required before they were ushered to a voting machine.