Update: Greenwich Audit: Is it worth $1200 $480?

Greenwich Time article: Greenwich picked – yet again – to audit primary results. Greenwich registrars and Secretary of the State debate value of audit and random selection of Greenwich.

Plus – Registrar and we agree: Audit Absentee Ballots Too!

8/20/2010: Greenwich Time article Greenwich picked – yet again – to audit primary results <read>. Greenwich registrars and Secretary of the State debate value of audit and random selection of Greenwich.

We note that Greenwich has about 24 voting districts. Everyone should expect that on a statewide 10% (or 5%) random selection audit, any city with that many districts will almost always have at least one district selected for audit.
In other states with audits, each county must audit a minimum number of districts and many of those counties are smaller than Greenwich in districts, population, and resources.
Contrary to the article, no candidate loses or picks up votes in Connecticut post-election audits. No matter how inaccurate the machine or human count, candidates would have to bring the matter to court and presumably ask for a recount to change the results in any way.
Looking at the web site for Greenwich we find that “They are also responsible for hiring and training over 200 official poll workers as well as maintaining all voting equipment used for the election.” Which at $140 per poll worker would come out to $28,000. Actually we expect they pay lots more than that for the election, since the audit will certainly involve much less than a half a days work, compared to the 17 hour election day and training. Running an election, maintaining the equipment, printing ballots and the ongoing costs of voter registration and the registrars office would seem to dwarf the $1,200.
Even so, we are sympathetic to Greenwich and other municipalities. We are in favor of the state paying the cost of audits as the towns selected perform the work for every voter’s benefit.
Finally, those familiar with our Ten Myths In the Nutmeg State would understand that we do not find the Connecticut post-election audits all that stringent. those familiar with statistics would understand also that it is not the percentage of the districts selected, but the total number of districts counted and number and size of loopholes that determine the power of an audit.

Greenwich picked – yet again – to audit primary results
Neil Vigdor, Staff Writer
Published: 09:53 p.m., Thursday, August 19, 2010

Greenwich’s election officials, have once again received marching orders from the state that they must perform an audit of last week’s primary results from Riverside School.

Six of the seven times since the state started mandating audits three years ago, the town has been picked for a recount, irking its two registrars of voters.

“We’ve been chosen every time,” said Sharon Vecchiolla, the town’s Democratic registrar. “We could do without it.”

Out of a total of 722 voting precincts throughout Connecticut, 73 were randomly selected by the secretary of the state’s office for an audit, which must be conducted between Aug. 25 and Sept. 15. “I was stunned Stamford didn’t get an audit,” Fred DeCaro III, the town’s Republican registrar.

The audit will take place at 9:30 a.m. Aug. 25 in the Town Hall Meeting Room, with eight paid poll workers hand-counting the ballots cast for lieutenant governor in last week’s Republican primary won by Mark Boughton over Lisa Wilson-Foley and the Democratic primary won by Nancy Wyman over Mary Glassman. Greenwich had 12 poll locations for the primary.

Under Connecticut law, election results from 10 percent of all voting precincts in the state must be audited after elections, a mandate that was put in place in three years ago when mechanical lever machines were replaced with electronic scanners. The fax-like machines read blackened ovals on paper ballots that resemble standardized test answer sheets.

“I think we wouldn’t mind if it was dropped to 5 percent of polling places instead of 10,” DeCaro said.

Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz defended the audit mechanism, saying that the threshold of 10 percent is the most stringent in the nation.

“I think it is a good check and important for voter confidence in our election system,” Bysiewicz said. “I think a high threshold of 10 percent is appropriate because that’s what the University of Connecticut’s computer science department recommended as a threshold that would ferret out fraud or a computer breach.”

The state not only relies on UConn for guidance on audit sample sizes, it sends the results there for a post-mortem and uses the university to test the memory cards in voting machines before elections.

Bysiewicz said that the electronic voting machines have a near 100 percent accuracy rate since they were introduced, except for isolated instances of human error by those casting ballots.

“It means not only that our votes are secure, but that our votes are counted properly,” Bysiewicz said.

A bingo barrel was filled with the names of all 722 polling places, with a representative from the League of Women Voters of Connecticut randomly drawing individual precincts one-by-one to be audited, according to Bysiewicz.

“There are many cities of good size that had more than one precinct and there are towns that had six,” Bysiewicz said. “Sometimes towns manage not to get chosen. The idea is over the course of time, every town has one or more precincts chosen.”

Bysiewicz noted that the city of New Britain once had nine polling places chosen all at once.

A total of 319 ballots were cast at Riverside School in the GOP primary for lieutenant governor, compared to 193 in the Democratic primary.

The cost of the audit to taxpayers was estimated at $1,200 by DeCaro, who said each person doing the hand counts will be paid $140.

After the November 2008 election was audited, John McCain picked up eight votes on Barack Obama in town, while Christopher Shays picked up 14 votes on Jim Himes for Congress. It was a moot point for McCain and Shays, however, who both lost their races.

No irregularities were discovered during the other previous audits done by the town, which occurred after the November 2007 municipal election, the February 2008 presidential primaries, the August 2008 Democratic congressional primary and the September 2009 Democratic tax collector primary.

Greenwich was not selected for an audit after last November’s municipal elections, while two Stamford precincts were.

Despite the hassle of conducting frequent audits, DeCaro said it was much better than the alternative of no checks and balances.

“I wouldn’t be in favor of eliminating the audits entirely,” DeCaro sad[sic].

Update: 9/26/2010 Audit actually took an hour and counters paid $60.00 each, not $140.00; Greenwich Time article <read>

Eight paid poll workers spent less than an hour hand-counting the ballots…The eight poll workers were paid $60 each to do the hand count, [$480.00 assuming the registrars are salaried]

And another Greenwich Time article where we completely agree the registrar: Greenwich registrar recommends audit of absentee ballots <read>

If the state is going to make cities and towns go to the trouble of auditing election results, Republican Registrar of Voters Fred DeCaro III said it should require absentee ballots to be included in hand counts.

Out of the 24,996 votes cast in the Aug. 10 primary in Greenwich, 2,330, or just under 10 percent, were done by absentee ballot, according to the registrars of voters.

All absentee ballots are counted by poll workers at Town Hall, not in the individual precincts where the voters live that are subject to state-mandated audits.

“Why not include absentee ballots?” DeCaro said Wednesday following an audit of the lieutenant governor primary results from Riverside School.

See my comments on both articles at the Greenwich Time site.

Fighting the last [election]war – Be careful what you ask for!

There are several recent stories about the low turnout in the August 10th primary and Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz suggesting the primary date be changed from August to June. This is not a voting integrity issue, yet we place it in the category of “Fighting the last [election] war” (i.e. Changes/reforms that look good when attempting to correct a recent, assumed election problem, without looking at all the consequences.)

Due to the low turnout, Bysiewicz is calling for several election reforms she believes will boost voter turnout in future primary elections.

“Obviously, turning voters out to a primary in the middle of the summer when many people are on vacation is a challenge,” she said. “I believe there is much more we can do to make our elections easier and more accessible for Connecticut voters. One step we could take is to move the primary date from August to June, a time when more voters are likely to pay attention.”

This is not a voting integrity issue, yet we place it in the category of “Fighting the last [election] war” (i.e. Changes/reforms that look good when attempting to correct a recent, assumed election problem, without looking at all the consequences. ) We say “Be careful what you ask for”:

Starting in June would move the whole campaign season forward by two months: Earlier primary, earlier state conventions, earlier pre-convention announcements, gaining support, election committees etc.

Many voters complain already that campaigns are too long
Many officials complain they are always campaigning
Would the Legislature’s “Short Session” be two months shorter, or would they pay less attention to state business?
Would candidates want/need more money for longer campaigns (A sure media winner)
Would challenging primary candidates find it harder to start earlier.

Finally, its unlikely that lower turnout is due to more travel in 2010 than in 2006 – more likely, its less interest in the differences between candidates and more turnoff by campaign tactics.

Update: 9/28/2010 Susan Bysiewicz op-ed in the Courant advocating June primaries, no-excuse mail voting, and election day registration: How To Solve The Problem Of Low Voter Turnout <read>

As CTVotersCount readers know, we favor election day registration, and oppose any expansion of mail-in voting, including no-excuse absentee voting. Mail-in voting has security risks and can also unintentionally disenfranchise voters. The way to motivate voters is to give them a reason to vote.

Governments Hide Information; People Take Risks for Democracy

This kind of intimidation will hit the hearts of volunteers and no volunteer will come forward if this kind of thing happens in future, that’s the reason I’m going to take in on, and I’ll face it, so that the volunteers get inspired by me…whatever research we have done, whatever work we have done is right

– Hari Prasad

J. Alex Halderman, Freedom To Tinker: Electronic Voting Researcher Arrested Over Anonymous Source <read view>

The Government of India, the world’s largest democracy, insists that its voting machines are safe and secure. Yet, they refuse to let researchers have access to test the machines. Apparently a concerned insider obtained a voting machine and made it available to researchers who analyzed the machine and pointed out several security flaws. So as governments do to whistle blowers and those who bring uncomfortable facts, they have arrested the Indian member of the research team in an effort to determine the source of the voting machine and to intimidate. In the words of Hari Prasad (from the video):

This kind of intimidation will hit the hearts of volunteers and no volunteer will come forward if this kind of thing happens in future, that’s the reason I’m going to take in on, and I’ll face it, so that the volunteers get inspired by me…whatever research we have done, whatever work we have done is right…

Two weeks ago at the EVT/WOTE conference there was a panel on these voting machines, shortly after the warrant for Hari was issued. It was a heated, open, and fair discussion between researchers and representatives of the Indian Government. The Election Commission is not evil, they believe they are doing the right thing, but the effect is bureaucracy protecting itself. The result of the panel was a letter from researchers and attendees to the Indian Election Commission (I am one of many signers).

Electronic Voting Researcher Arrested Over Anonymous Source

What are they hiding? Contrary to their statements, the voting machines are not tamper proof.

Post-Election Audit Drawing: 73 Districts 45 Municipalities Selected

Today the Secretary of the State’s Office conducted the random drawing. Members of CTVotersCount and the League of Women Voters performed the selections.

The Official Press Release: Secretary of the State’s Office Draws Precincts to Have Statewide Primary Results Audited: <read>

Video: Dan Wallach channels Stephen Colbert

Must Watch: From the EVT/WOTE conference, Dan Wallach presents today’s word: “Out of Site, Out of Mind”

Must Watch: From the EVT/WOTE conference, Dan Wallach presents today’s word: “Out of Site, Out of Mind” <video>

In addition to channeling Stephen Colbert, Dan was challenging Mark Lindeman’s performance last year of his ballad “Plaudits for Audits” <watch and listen>

UCONN: Failed memory cards caused by weak batteries, inadequate design

This week at the 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop on Trustworthy Elections in Washington, D.C., Dr. Alex Shvartsman and his team from the Uconn VoTeR Center delivered a significant paper. It covered research into the cause of the complete failure of the AccuVote-OS memory cards, at an unacceptable rate — We suggest the costs of mitigating the problems should be born by the manufacturer and/or distributor since the ultimate cause is the inadequate design of the memory cards for their intended purpose.

This week I attended the 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop on Trustworthy Elections in Washington, D.C., Dr. Alex Shvartsman and his team from the Uconn VoTeR Center delivered a significant paper. It covered research into the cause of the complete failure of the AccuVote-OS memory cards, at an unacceptable rate. <See our earlier coverage>. <The Research Report>

[W]e determined the time interval from the instant when a battery warning is issued by the AccuVote to the point when the battery does not have enough voltage to retain data on the memory card.We show that such interval is about 2 weeks. Thus timely warnings cannot be provided to protect against battery discharge and loss of data during the election process…

Recommendations

we determined the time interval from the instant when a battery warning is issued by the AccuVote to the point when the battery does not have enough voltage to retain data on the memory card. We show that such interval is about 2 weeks. Thus timely warnings cannot be provided to protect against battery discharge and loss of data during the election process…

The lifetime of the Energizer battery, when its voltage remains above the 2V needed for data retention in standby mode, at that current load, according to its datasheet [9] is 9,000 hours or approximately one year.

Given that it is possible that a memory card is used for elections once a year, it leads us to the same conclusion: For each election, a decision would be made, whether or not to replace the batteries for this election. The decision would be based on the amount of time since the batteries were last replaced and on the estimate of the service life of the battery (e.g., using the procedure at the end of the previous section).

Discussing the challenge with Dr. Shvartsman at the workshop, it seems that replacing the batteries is more complicated than might be assumed. The battery is under the memory card label, so replacement includes completely removing all remnants of the old label then preparing and placing a new label on the memory card. Shvartsman estimated the replacement cost, including labor, may be on the order of $10 per memory card.

We suggest that $10 per year per card is well worth avoiding most of the problems associated with the current huge, unacceptable failure rate. The total cost would be about $40,000 per year, somewhere in the range of $0.025 per ballot cast. To put this in context, ballot printing is about $0.45 per ballot and election costs average in the range of $5.00 to $8.00 per ballot cast. We also suggest the costs of mitigating the problems should be born by the manufacturer and/or distributor since the ultimate cause is the inadequate design of the memory cards for their intended purpose.

PS: Dr. Shrvartsman is mentioned prominently in an article posted at Verified Voting: Voting Technology Research Gets In-Depth <read>

Jerry Farrell signs “Commitment for Connecticut” program (Corrected)

According to Stamford Plus, Secretary of the State Candidate Jerry Farrell has signed the Commitment for Connecticut from Citizens for Change. Checking both the Citizens for Change site and Farrell’s site, we have been unable to locate copies of the completed, signed commitment form.

Update/Correction: An earlier version of this post read: “According to Stamford Plus <read> and his personal Facebook page“. In an email, Farrell Campaign Manager, Gregg Hannan asked me to verify that it was in Jerry’s Facebook. I thought I saw it in his personal Facebook, however, I cannot find it – I must have been reading and blogging too fast. I apologize.

******************

According to Stamford Plus <read> Secretary of the State Candidate Jerry Farrell has signed the Commitment for Connecticut from Citizens for Change. Checking both the Citizens for Change site and Farrell’s site, we have been unable to locate copies of the completed, signed commitment form. Checking the web we find the blank commitments for various Connecticut offices, including the Secretary of the State:

CANDIDATE COMMITMENT
CT SECRETARY OF THE STATE

Distribution to All Declared Candidates Only – Notice(s) Applies

1. I will not serve more than _________ terms.
2. I will oppose same day voter registration.
3. I will streamline the candidate filing process to facilitate participation and
install certification of eligibility validation for all electoral offices.
4. I will simplify the citizen signature process required of candidates to petition
on to any party primary ballot or general election ballot.
5. I will advocate for the repeal of the business entity tax.
6. I will support priority legislation that requires: transparency in all state and
local spending government[sic]; online posting of every state and local
expenditure; and independent external audits.
7. I will decrease the total annual budget for this agency from the current
aggregate actual expenditures to a level that is the lower of either an overall
reduction of _______ percent; or a total that is equal or lower than the last
full fiscal year’s total actual expenditures for this agency.
Signed by: Date:
Print Name: _______________________________________ CONNECTICUT

Yesterday, we emailed the Farrell Campaign to ask for the term limits he committed to in question #1 and the budget cut percent in question #7. We also have asked for clarification of his ideas for streamlining the candidate filing process (#3) and simplifying the citizen signature petition requirements (#4). We will provide an update once we have a response from the campaign.

Comment:

#1: We must note the irony that while some are concerned with candidates pledging to maximum terms, the question minimum terms has been raised in both the Secretary of the State race and Attorney General race where several have been asked if they would commit to serve out their first term and longer, not running for higher office.

#2: We conditionally favor election day registration, however, only if it is done in ways that protect voting integrity and provide equivalent identification checks to those performed for current voter registration.

#3, #4: These seem a bit to vague to evaluate without more details.

#6: We note that #6 applies to both the state and municipalities. It may represent an extensive local mandate. We have observed several hearings over the last two years in the Connecticut Legislature where municipal clerks testified against the posting of minutes on web sites, based on the cost of such postings. We are generally in favor of open and transparent government along with effective audits. In the Secretary of the State’s Office, we would start with detailed posting of district by district election results, followed by audits that are independent of the Secretary of the State’s Office.

We are not familiar with Citizens for Change, it seems to only have commitments for Connecticut candidates. Their web identifies their founder, Richard Olivastro and says:

About Us

In the entire length of the human experience, America’s more than two century existence is but a short time. Yet, America’s birth stands as the singular moment of change in man’s relation to man and the primacy of self-government. If it is an aberration, we consider it the perfect aberration and therefore worth conserving, preserving, cultivating and promoting. If change is a constant, then responsible citizens need to engage in every public process to ensure change always moves towards greater individual freedom and away from statism, servitude, socialism, collectivism, fascism and communism.

Richard Olivastro

Prof. Ron Rivest, MIT: Military/Overseas Internet Voting Risks and Rewards

Yesterday, MIT Professor Ronald L. Rivest provided his analysis of Internet voting for military and overseas voters.The talk centered on the balance between risks and rewards of using Internet voting vs. paper ballots for military and overseas voting. You will find many of Ron’s slides entertaining, some a bit technical, yet all serious. The conclusions are straight-forward and convincing:

“The risks of “internet voting” more than negate any possible benefits from an increase in franchise.”

Yesterday, MIT Professor Ronald L. Rivest provided his analysis of Internet voting for military and overseas voters in an entertaining and occasionally technical slide presentation at the UOCAVA Workshop on Remove Voting Systems, in Washington, D.C <View>

Professor Rivest is a security expert, the ‘R’ in RSA Security, and 2002 winner of the Turing Award, the highest honor in computing. When Ron talks security, everyone including legislators and election officials should listen carefully.

The talk centered on the balance between risks and rewards of using Internet voting vs. paper ballots for military and overseas voting. You will find many of Ron’s slides entertaining, some a bit technical, yet all serious. The conclusions are straight-forward and convincing. Some of the highlights below, view the presentation for the details and graphics:

Evaluation Criteria:

Availability and usability

Cost

Staffing requirements

Security and auditability

Rivest points out that paper based absentee voting and mail-in voting is already risky and recommends such voting be limited – in order to limit the overall election risk:

Unsupervised remote voting vulnerable to
vote-selling, bribery, and coercion.

Communication with voter, and transmission
of ballots, may be unreliable/manipulable.

believe remote voting should be allowed:

only as needed

for at most 5% of voters

UOCAVA voting meets these criteria.

The risks to democracy:

If adversary determines election outcome,
all voters are disenfranchised!

We no longer have a democracy in action…

What is “loss” when election is stolen?
Just the 100% loss of franchise?

Let’s add an additional Hall of Shame Factor (HOSF), for stolen elections. (Not only shame, but if elections are (or could be) stolen, voters may get cynical and not vote again!)

Will Adversary attack voting system?

Is the Pope Catholic?

Will someone pick up $20 left on sidewalk?

There is nothing to deter attacker – Adv can attack anonymously over the Internet until he succeeds.

Do you know of any computer systems that have never been attacked?

Prob(Adv will attack voting system) = 100%

Internet voting has additional security problems

Platform insecurity (both client and server)

Network insecurity

Set of attackers enlarged from:

just those who can touch paper ballots, to

anyone on the planet with a computer

Attacks can be automated, executed on a massive scale, and done so anonymously

Will they succeed?

Large institutions (banks, Google) are successfully attacked all the time. They have much better staff and budgets!

Bob Morris (NSA) said: “You will always underestimate the effort the enemy will make to break your system.”…

Who has more IT capability – your local election IT staff or the Chinese?…

We do not currently have the technology to make internet voting secure (and may never).

We can’t make such technology appear by wishful thinking, just trying hard, making analogies with other fields, or running pilots.

It is imprudent (irresponsible?) to assume that determined effort by adversaries can’t defeat security objectives of internet voting.

Risk Assessment Conclusion:

Based on this risk assessment, we expect Internet voting for UOCAVA voter to disenfranchise many more voters than it would franchise.

The apparent gains in franchise for internet voting are misleading and illusory—the apparent gains are more than cancelled by the risks.

Argument is robust — conclusion remains the same even if numbers are varied significantly. In addition, there may be a DDOS attack with probability near 100%.

Summary:

Remote voting is trade-off between franchise and risk.

The risks of “internet voting” more than negate any possible benefits from an increase in franchise.

Faith in Technology: Drilling, Driving, and Voting

“Deep anxiety aroused by the deaths in the water and on the interstates is calmed by the ameliorating belief that technology will save us, and if not now, soon. After all, the promise of technology is in the better life to come.”

Food for thought. As states and voters consider Internet for voting, based on faith in vendors that say it works, and ignoring the vast majority of independent technologists and studies that say it is unproven and risky, we point to this cautionary tale: Why Do We Worship at the Altar of Technology? <read>

If there is one true religion in the US, it leads us to worship at the altar of technology. Christian or Jew, Muslim or atheist, we accept the doctrine of this shared faith: that technology provides the main path to improving our lives and that if it occasionally fails, even catastrophically, it will just take another technology to make it all better. It is this doctrine that connects BP’s Deepwater Horizon and Toyota’s sudden acceleration debacles – and the responses to them…

Of course, corporations don’t see this as their first mission, operating as they do on cost containment and profit maximisation, not cutting-edge technology as an end in itself. But their customer base has been convinced that each time they buy a new car, they are buying the future and lucky that the world’s smartest geologists and engineers are helping fuel their experience of it. Never mind that the technology they are largely buying is media and telecom gadgetry

As the article points out oil and automobiles are linked by more than technology. The analogy to voting also breaks down in another way — when it comes to voting technology, vendor profit maximization is directly linked to the technology.

Our response to BP and Toyota’s failures expose the danger in our faith. Deep anxiety aroused by the deaths in the water and on the interstates is calmed by the ameliorating belief that technology will save us, and if not now, soon. After all, the promise of technology is in the better life to come.

Recall the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) designed to use technology to save us from the alleged problems with punch-cards and lever machines, yet effectively providing us with new expensive voting equipment left vulnerable to the same risks as our previous voting systems, error and fraud.

In fact, like oil and automobiles, the problem with voting is not the technology. The problem is believing that technology itself is the source of the problems, the only necessary component of a solution, and fervent faith that the proposed next technology is the solution.

[We cannot help but point out the related natural human tendency to avoid responsibility. We seldom read that a driver drove off the road, into a house, or a tree. It seems it was almost always the car that went off the road.]

IRV: Is it legal in Connecticut? Can our scanners compute it?

Recently we posted and commented on an article in The Day, covering the Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) proposal for New London. The article quoted Secretary of the State Bysiewicz on the constitutionality of the IRV and if our AccuVote-OS scanners could be used for an IRV election. The post prompted comments and the need for more complete answers. We queried the Secretary of the State’s Office and Jeff Silvestro, General Manager of LHS Associates. Mr. Silvestro responded:

We queried the Secretary of the State’s Office and Jeff Silvestro, General Manager of LHS Associates. Mr. Silvestro responded:

There are two parts to this answer:

1. Yes, the AVOS can handle IRV. We currently run similar elections in Cambridge, MA and have previously run IRV elections in Burlington, VT. Burlington no longer runs IRV since the citizens voted to move away from this method last year.

2. No, it cannot be done in CT. In order for the AVOS to handle an IRV election we would need to use software other than GEMS, currently GEMS is the only software certified for use in CT. Also an older version of firmware would need to be installed in each AVOS unit, this older firmware is also not currently certified in CT. Lastly, the ballot layout for an IRV election would not match the current specification used for ballot layout in CT.

The Secretary of the State’s Office responded:

When the Secretary served as Chair of the Government Administration and Elections Committee in the Legislature, she was open to conducting hearings on this issue. During her tenure as Secretary, she has remained opened to exploration of the various types of run off voting that have been put forward by various groups. While the office would defer to the Attorney General for an interpretation of law, we do believe that there are constitutional and statutory issues that would need to be examined and addressed, such as minority representation, in implementation. Additionally, the current certified voting machines cannot accommodate preferential voting, and changes to firmware would be required, along with new certifications, both federally and at the state level.

In summary, it is clear that legally our machines cannot support fully counting IRV elections for the foreseeable future. And there are several Constitutional issues and statutory issues which may well make IRV illegal or unconstitutional at this time.

There are two parts to this answer:
1. Yes, the AVOS can handle IRV.  We currently run similar elections in Cambridge, MA and have previously run IRV elections in Burlington, VT.  Burlington no longer runs IRV since the citizens voted to move away from this method last year.
2. No, it cannot be done in CT.  In order for the AVOS to handle an IRV election we would need to use software other than GEMS, currently GEMS is the only software certified for use in CT.  Also an older version of firmware would need to be installed in each AVOS unit,  this older firmware is also not currently certified in CT.  Lastly, the ballot layout for an IRV election would not match the current specification used for ballot layout in CT.