CTVotersCount.org

Updated: Candidate Withdraws Bounty On Republican Registrations

We tend to agree that it should be illegal. Sounds as bad or worse than some of the things that ACORN was only accused of doing.

We received the following press release from Denise Merill’s office <read>

MAJORITY LEADER MERRILL SEEKS LEGISLATION
BANNING BOUNTIES FOR REGISTERING NEW VOTERS

State House Majority Leader Denise Merrill (D-Mansfield, Chaplin) said Monday that she would immediately seek legislation banning bounties or other payments in exchange for the registration of new voters.

“I am very troubled by the practice of using money to influence or persuade a person to register to vote before an election,” Merrill said. “Any practice like this is fraught with the potential for voter fraud. I plan to seek immediately, by way of an amendment to a bill, legislation that would ban this practice.”

The issue arose over the weekend when it was disclosed in a newspaper report that the U.S. Senate campaign of Republican Linda McMahon was paying $5 for each Republican registered during a voter registration drive in Merrill’s district at the University of Connecticut.

“I was shocked that this was being done in my own district,” Merrill said. “The fact that someone might take advantage of a student in need of money is appalling.”

Although the practice may not be illegal, concern has been raised by the U.S. Justice Department, which has contacted state officials who are also looking into McMahon’s campaign voter registration drive.

We tend to agree that it should be illegal. Ms. Merrill and her campaign for Secretary of the State is a good example of someone that might be unfairly hurt by such a practice. In addition to possibly procuring votes for Ms. McMahon the effect would also preclude an unsuspecting student from being able to vote in the Democratic Primary if that would have become their choice as the campaign season progresses. Sounds as bad or worse than some of the things that ACORN was only accused of doing.

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Update: Senate candidate Linda McMahon has withdrawn the $5.00 bounty for Republican registrations. Courant Story: McMahon Decides Not To Offer Students Bonuses; <read>

After being criticized for offering to pay University of Connecticut students extra money for every Republican registered at a voter registration drive this week, U.S. Senate candidate Linda McMahon has decided not to offer the bonuses.

“We have dropped the bonus component of our voter registration drive,” said McMahon’s spokesman, Shawn McCoy, today. “The bonuses are in full compliance with the law, but Linda weighed the concerns that were raised and asked that we drop that component of the plan prior to the launch.”

Students who help with the drive will still receive $10 an hour, but will not be paid the $5 bonus, McCoy said, noting that this is not the first voter registration drive McMahon has worked on. It, however, is the first time the Republican candidate was going to offer bonuses, he said.

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A Similar Story Of Two Investigations of Registrations Going Farther: CA Voters Tricked Into Registering As Republicans With Pot Petition: <read>

Orange County authorities are launching an investigation into possible voter registration fraud after a local newspaper reported over a hundred cases of voters being tricked into registering as Republicans by petitioners who asked them to sign petitions for, among other causes, legalizing pot…

In a lengthy investigation published earlier this month, the paper pointed to an $8 “bounty” offered by the California Republican Party for each new registration as a cause for the problems. It identified multiple petitioners who work for vendors “with ties to the California Republican Party.” Back in 2006, a similar scandal led to the convictions of several petitioners.

Nov 09 Election Audit Reports – Part 2 – Inadequate Counting, Reporting, and Transparency Continue

“The main conclusion of this analysis is that the hand counting remains an error prone activity. In order to enable a more precise analysis, it is recommended that the hand counting precision is substantially improved in future audits. The completeness of the audit reports also need to be addressed…Submitting incomplete audit returns has little value for the auditing process.”

Late last week the University of Connecticut (UConn) VoTeR Center posted three reports from the November election on its web site <Pre-Election Memory Card Tests>, <Post-Election Memory Card Tests>, and <Post-Election Audit Report>. In Part 1 we discussed the memory card tests and in Part 2 we discuss the Post-Election Audit Report.

Highlights from the official report:

The VoTeR Center’s initial review of audit reports prepared by the towns revealed a number of returns with unexplained differences between hand and machine counts and also revealed discrepancies in cases of cross-party endorsed candidates (i.e., candidates whose names appear twice on the ballot because they are endorsed by two parties). As a result, the SOTS Office performed additional information-gathering and investigation and, in some cases, conducted independent hand-counting of ballots. …Further information gathering was conducted by the SOTS Office to identify the cause of the moderately large discrepancies, and to identify the cause of discrepancies for cross-party endorsed candidates…

This report presents the results in three parts: (i) the analysis of the original audit records that did not involve cross-party endorsed candidates, (ii) the analysis of the audit records for cross-party endorsed candidates, and (iii) the analysis of the records that were revised based on the SOTS Office follow up. The analysis does not include 6 records (0.8%) that were found to be incomplete. ..

The main conclusion in this report is that for all cases where non-trivial discrepancies were originally reported, it was determined that hand counting errors or vote misallocation were the causes. No discrepancies in these cases were reported to be attributable to incorrect machine tabulation. For the original data where no follow up investigation was performed, the discrepancies were small; in particular, the average reported discrepancy is much lower than the number of the votes that were determined to be questionable.

Further on in the report is another conclusion:

The main conclusion of this analysis is that the hand counting remains an error prone activity. In order to enable a more precise analysis, it is recommended that the hand counting precision is substantially improved in future audits. The completeness of the audit reports also need to be addressed. For example, in two of the towns when the second hand count was performed it was determined that the auditors did not count a batch of 25 ballots in one case and the absentee ballots in the second. This initially resulted in apparently unexplained discrepancies. Submitting incomplete audit returns has little value for the auditing process.

We note the details of the investigations to determine the accuracy of human and machine counting includes some counting of ballots and some telephone conversations with election officials:

The first follow up was performed to address substantial number of discrepancies in some precincts (discrepancies over 30 votes). All those Version 1.3 April 20, 2010 UConn VoTeR Center 15 unusual discrepancies were concentrated in four towns. As a result in those towns a second hand count of the actual ballots was performed by the SOTS Office personnel…

We now discuss a batch of records containing 218 (28.1% of 776) records where originally the reported discrepancies were under 30 (these do not include cross-party endorsed candidates). In this case the SOTS Office personnel contacted each registrar of voters and questioned their hand count audit procedures. In all instances, the registrars of voters were able to attribute the discrepancies to hand counting errors. Thus no discrepancies (zero) are reported for these districts. Given the fact that no discrepancies were reported for those records we do not present a detailed analysis.

We have several concerns with these investigations:

All counting and review of ballots should be transparent and open to public observation. Both this year and last year we have asked that such counting be open and publicly announced in advance.
Simply accepting the word of election officials that they counted inaccurately is hardly reliable, scientific, or likely to instill trust in the integrity of elections. How do we know how accurate the machines are without a complete audit, any error or fraud would likely result in a count difference, and would be [or could have been] very likely dismissed.
Even if, in every cases officials are correct that they did not count accurately, it cannot be assumed that the associated machines counted accurately.
Simply ignoring the initial results in the analysis of the data provides a simple formula to cover-up, or not recognize error and fraud in the future.

As we have said before we do not question the integrity of any individual, yet closed counting of ballots leaves an opening for fraud and error to go undetected and defeats the purpose and integrity of the audit.

We also note that in several cases officials continued to fail perform the audit as required by law or to provide incomplete reports.

On the other hand we note that only 6 records (0.8% of 776) were found to be incomplete. The statistical analysis does not include these records. While some problematic records are clearly due to human error (e.g., errors in addition), in other cases it appears that auditors either did not follow the audit instructions precisely, or found the instructions to be unclear. However, this is a substantial improvement relative to the November 2007 and November 2008 elections, where we reported correspondingly 18% and 3.2% of the records that were unusable.On the other hand we note that only 6 records (0.8% of 776) were found to be incomplete. The statistical analysis does not include these records. While some problematic records are clearly due to human error (e.g., errors in addition), in other cases it appears that auditors either did not follow the audit instructions precisely, or found the instructions to be unclear. However, this is a substantial improvement relative to the November 2007 and November 2008 elections, where we reported correspondingly 18% and 3.2% of the records that were unusable.

Improvement or not, our solution would be to require the towns involved to, correct their errors, comply with the law, and perhaps be subject to a penalty. Not pursuing such provides a clear formula for covering up errors and fraud.

Finally, since only “good” records were fully analyzed we question the value of some the reported statistics based only on those results. We do agree with the reports recommendations:

The main conclusion of this analysis is that the hand counting remains an error prone activity. In order to enable a more precise analysis, it is recommended that the hand counting precision is substantially improved in future audits. The completeness of the audit reports also need to be addressed. For example, in two of the towns when the second hand count was performed it was determined that the auditors did not count a batch of 25 ballots in one case and the absentee ballots in the second. This initially resulted in apparently unexplained discrepancies. Submitting incomplete audit returns has little value for the auditing process.

For the cross party endorsement, it is important for the auditors to perform hand counting of the votes that precisely documents for which party endorsement the votes were cast, and to note all cases where more than one bubble was marked for the same candidate. The auditors should be better trained to follow the correct process of hand count audit…

We also believe that our reporting of the analysis, and the analysis itself needs to be improved. A major change planned for future analysis is to assess the impact of the perceived discrepancies on the election outcomes (in addition to analyzing individual audit return records). This is going to be exceedingly important for the cases where a race may be very close, but where the difference between candidates is over 0.5% (thus not triggering an automatic recount)[*]

* CTVotersCount Note: Connecticut has an automatic ‘recanvass’, triggered at a difference of less than 20 votes or 0.5% up to a maimum difference of 2000 votes.

In January, the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition Report analyzed the November 2009 Post-Election Audit data and the observations of citizen volunteers:

In this report, we conclude that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of the continued lack of

standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies,

detailed guidance for counting procedures, and

consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

Compared with previous reports of November post-election audits:

The bulk of our general observations and concerns remain.

The accuracy of counting has improved. There was a significant reduction in the number of extreme discrepancies reported. However, there remains a need formuch more improvement.

There was a significant improvement in counting cross-endorsed candidate votes

The number of incomplete reports from municipalities has significantly decreased.

We find no reason to attribute all errors to either humans or machines.

There is no reason to modify the Coalition’s conclusion based on the official report. Many of the same concerns and conclusions we discussed last year still apply. See last year’s post for more details, here is a summary:

The investigations prove that Election Officials in many Connecticut municipalities are not yet able to count votes accurately
The audit and the audit report are incomplete
Even with all the investigations and adjustments we have many unexplained discrepancies [Unless we accept the belief of officials that they counted inaccurately, and in all those cases the machine counted accurately]
The Chain-of-Custody is critical to credibility
Either “questionable ballot” classification is inaccurate in many towns or we have a “system problem”
Accuracy and the appearance of objectivity are important
Timeliness is important
The problem is not that there were machine problems. We have no evidence there were any. The problem is that when there are or ever were, dismissing all errors as human counting errors, we are unlikely to find a problem
We stand by our recommendations and the recommendations of other groups
The current Audit Process in Connecticut demonstrates the need for audits to be Independent and focused on election integrity, not just machine certification reliability

As we said last year;

We recognize and appreciate that everyone works hard on these programs, performing the audits, and creating these reports including the Registrars, Secretary of the State’s staff, and UConn. We also welcome Secretary Bysiewicz’s commitment to solve the problems identified. Yet, we have serious concerns with the credibility of the audits as conduced and their value, as conducted, to provide confidence to the public in the election process.

Nov 09 Election Audit Reports – Part 1 – Problems Continue and Some Good News

We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose…The good news is that UConn has identified a likely cause of the “junk” data cards. Perhaps a solution is near.

Late last week the University of Connecticut (UConn) VoTeR Center posted three reports from the November election on its web site <Pre-Election Memory Card Tests>, <Post-Election Memory Card Tests>, and <Post-Election Audit Report>. In Part 1 we will discuss the memory card tests and in Part 2 the Post-Election Audit Report.

As we said last year: We should all applaud the unique memory card testing program, yet we must also act aggressively to close the gaps it continues to expose.

We note the following from this year’s reports:

An increase in the percentage of memory cards in the pre-election test.

[pre-election 2009] The VoTeR Center received in total 491 memory cards from 481 districts before the elections. This document reports on the findings obtained during the audit. The 491 cards represent over 80.6% of all districts, thus the audit is broad enough to draw meaningful conclusions.
[pre-election 2008] the VoTeR Center received and examined 620 memory cards [about 74% of districts] as of November 3, 2008. These cards correspond to 620 distinct districts in Connecticut. About 2/3 of these memory cards were randomly chosen by the VoTeR Center personnel during the visits to LHS and before the cards were packed and shipped to the towns. Another 1/3 of the memory cards came from the towns directly, where the cards were randomly chosen for preelection audit (this procedure applied to the town for which the cards were not selected at LHS).

And a significant drop in the percentage of memory cards in the post-election test:

[post-election 2009] The VoTeR Center received in total 120 memory cards from 49 districts [approximately 8.0% of all districts] after the elections. The cards were received during the period from December 12, 2009 to February 12, 2010. Among the received cards, 49 were used in the elections,
[post-election 2008] The VoTeR Center received in total 462 memory cards from a number of districts after the elections… Among these cards, 279 were used in the elections… The 279 cards represent over 30% of all districts,

As we understand it, the Secretary of the State’s Office asks all towns to send in memory cards for each district, they are not randomly selected. This means that we cannot be sure the percentages of “junk” data or procedural lapses reported actually represent a reliable measure of all memory cards and official actions, yet it seems reasonable to conclude that:

“Junk” data continues at an unacceptable rate:

[pre-election]The audit identified forty two (42) cards, or 9%, that contained “junk” data; these cards are unreadable by the tabulators, and easily detected as such. This is a high percentage of faulty/unusable cards. We note that this is consistent with the percentage reported for the pre-election audit of November 2008 elections. The percentage is lower than detected in the post-election audit for the August 2008 primary (15%), but higher than detected in the pre-election audit for the August 2008 primary (5%), post-election audit for the February 2008
[post-election] Concerning the remaining cards, 14 (12% of the total number of cards) were found to contain junk data, that is, they were unreadable, which is easily detected by the tabulators; had a card contained junk data at the time of the election,

So the problem of “junk” data continues at a likely rate toward the middle of past testing results. As we have said before 5%, 9%, 15%, even 1% is a huge failure rate for relatively simple technology such as memory cards.

Very good news on the “Junk” data cards:

We have determined that weak batteries are the primary cause of junk data on cards; a separate report will document this in more detail. It is recommended that batteries are replaced before each election.

It seems that UConn has identified a likely cause of the “junk” data cards. Perhaps a solution is near. We look forward to reading that separate report.

Officials continue to fail to follow procedures at a significant rate

[pre-election] The audit identified twenty-three (23) cards where the audit log indicates card duplication events. Card duplication is not authorized per SOTS Office instructions. Otherwise the cards were properly programmed for elections…There are 76 cards (15%) that were properly programmed, but were found in unexpected states or contained unexpected timing of events. This does not necessarily present an immediate security concern, however the findings indicate that the established procedures are not strictly followed in some cases.
[post-election] 14 contained junk data
2 were not programmed (formatted, but blank)
3 were involved in duplication
4 were non-standard cards (32KB instead of 128KB) [LHS not election official error] 4 were programmed for different elections

The main concern with such failures to follow procedures is that they are symptomatic that other procedures are frequently not being followed, yet each failure represents a possible lapse in security and election integrity.

Comments from our post on last year’s report still apply:

A non-random partial post-election audit of memory cards is useful, but it is insufficient
How many more tests, reports, and elections will it take before the junk data problem is significantly reduced? [Thanks to UConn, based on the 2009 report, we may have an answer soon]
Almost every failure to follow procedures is an opportunity to cause problems, cover up errors, or cover up fraud. [including not sending in cards for testing]. We can only hope that the Registrars of Voters will join in the commitment to meet a much higher standard.

For more details behind these comments please read our post on last year’s report.

Jon Kantrowitz Talks with Denise Merrill – Discussion of EDR, Early Voting and Vote Counting

John Kantowicz posted comments from a discussion he had with Secretary of the State candidate Denise Merrill on MyLeftNutmeg. This has led to a lively discussion of Election Day Registration (EDR), Early Voting, and Vote Counting with several activists and a registrar joining in the discussion.

John Kantowicz posted comments from a discussion he had with Secretary of the State candidate Denise Merrill on MyLeftNutmeg <read>

I had a nice talk with Denise Merrill, candidate for Secretary of the State, last night. She is not in favor of election day registration, but asked me for some evidence that it increases voter turn-out.

Here is the evidence:

Nine states have some form of Election Day voter registration: Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Montana began Election Day voter registration in 2006, North Carolina in 2007, and Iowa in 2008. Connecticut also has Election Day registration, but only for presidential elections. (North Dakota, unique among the states, has no voter registration requirement at all.)

She does favor early voting, by the way. While not allowing registration on Election Day itself (the last day to vote), the states of Ohio and North Carolina offer a period where voters can register and then early vote.

Voter turnout is much higher in states using Election Day registration than in states that did not. In the 2004 presidential election, voter turnout in same-day voter registration states was 12 percent higher than states that did not;] in the 2006 midterm elections, states with same-day voter registration had turnout rates 10-12 percent higher than in other states. In the 2008 election voter turnout was 7% higher in EDR states. The top five states all had Same Day Registration.

This has led to a lively discussion of Election Day Registration (EDR) and Early Voting with several activists and a registrar joining in the discussion. I would suggest reading the whole discussion. On MyLeftNutmeg, where I am ‘BlastFromGlast’, here are my comments there:

EDR, if it is done safely and effectively. Early voting done well is Expensive

EDR has been done well by other states at the polling place with no problems, I am in favor if its done well. However, doing it the way the legislature has proposed for the last couple of years is risky and disenfranchising.

The proposal has been to have it done in one central location per town and the ballots handled sort of like absentee ballots but with even less controls specified in the law than exist for absentee ballots. The risks are that 1)voters can be disenfranchised because they don’t get a chance to revote if they have over votes. 2) Unless there is a legal, enforced, and enforceable chain of custody the votes can be changed or trashed along the way.

Don’t think of EDR as a few votes. In can be 20-30% of the vote like it is in some other states, much more work than the current Presidential Ballot, and much more influential on election results.

EDR votes should be handled like any other vote in a full polling place with ballot clerks, machine tender, scanner and placed in the ballot box by the voter, who has an opportunity to correct the ballot for any reason including overvoting. Presumably new voters can make mistakes even more than the average voter.

To gain the same benefits from EDR as other states have, we need to vote in the same general way they do: Polling place EDR with the same voting methods as all voters.

EDR has savings as well as costs. Less registration work in advance of the election. Less arguments between Assistant Registrars and voters who think they registered (some who probably did). None of the hassles of the Presidential ballots. In the end it likely costs a bit more, especially since there would be more voters overall, which would overall be a good thing.

EARLY VOTING:
Early voting has its own risks but is also very expensive and difficult to do in New England with town by town voting.

The risk is that the ballots and the voting machines need to be kept secure between each voting session, the current level of security might be insufficient for EDR. Currently, machines and blank ballots are often delivered to polling places the night before and then returned to town hall after late on election night, but there is a whole new level of security needed to protect voted ballots and machines between early voting sessions. (And we need to beef up the current level of security which leaves ballots and machines in most towns subject to access by single persons, via a single key, for almost unlimited time, undetected).

Without changes in the State Constitution and dramatic changes in organization, early voting would require one polling place in each of 169 towns. Each day costing a minimum between $1,500 and $2,000 per town. Each day of early voting would thus cost several times what the post-election audit costs.

Of course early voting could also be accomplished by mail-in voting (also called unlimited absentee balloting) but that has its own risks) [With a couple editing fixes which I cannot do on comments at MyLeftNutmeg]

John Kantowicz continues with another thoughtful post: Denise Merrill and Counting Votes <read>

West Haven Registrar’s Actions Under Scrutiny

The complaints were filed by Charles Marino, former Democratic registrar of voters, and Deborah Evangelista, who worked 16 years as administrative assistant in the registrar’s office before Hufcut took office…Animosity between Hufcut and Marino goes back to 2008, when Hufcut unseated Marino as Democratic registrar in a heated primary election.

New Haven Register: State probing actions of W. Haven registrar <read>

WEST HAVEN — The state is investigating two election-violation complaints stemming from the March 2 Democratic Town Committee primary and subsequent recounts.

Nancy Nicolescu, spokeswoman for the state Election Enforcement Commission, confirmed the commission is reviewing two complaints against Democratic Registrar of Voters Michelle Hufcut. At a March 24 meeting, the commission approved investigatory subpoenas in the case, which authorized the state to seize materials related to the election in question.

The complaints were filed by Charles Marino, former Democratic registrar of voters, and Deborah Evangelista, who worked 16 years as administrative assistant in the registrar’s office before Hufcut took office.

Hufcut Tuesday confirmed the state came in this month and seized ballots and other election materials as part of the investigation. Regarding the complaints, Hufcut dismissed them as politically motivated.

“I don’t think there is any validity. I think it is their attempt to try to discredit me. I think once the state is finished with their investigation, I’ll be vindicated,” Hufcut said.

Evangelista said she and Marino filed the complaints because they were appalled by Hufcut’s handling of the election and recounts.

“It was a fiasco,” Evangelista said…

Animosity between Hufcut and Marino goes back to 2008, when Hufcut unseated Marino as Democratic registrar in a heated primary election. Hufcut at the time decided to challenge Marino after she read a University of Connecticut report that uncovered dead people on statewide voter registration lists, including West Haven.

We tend to go along with that last statement. We recall the controversy involving the two Registrars and the newly elected Hufcut at the November 2008 election, which also involved the Secretary of the State and her advice to Hufcut.

Video: Two Candidates At The JJB Dinner

Gerry Garcia and Denise Merrill, candidates for Secretary of the State at the Jefferson Jackson Bailey Dinner (Annual CT Democratic Party Fund Raiser)

Gerry Garcia and Denise Merrill, candidates for Secretary of the State at the Jefferson Jackson Bailey Dinner (Annual CT Democratic Party Fund Raiser) <By CTBob>

Gerry Garcia:

As Bob Says “Denise Merrill (who lost her voice, which resulted in the subtitles):”

CTBob gave Denise another chance with her voice recovered. Much on the environment. Why she is running for SOTS starts at about 1:40 in.

On Voting Integrity, Johnny We Hardly Agree With Ye

For the second time in as many weeks, I find myself disagreeing on an election integrity issue with John Nichols of The Nation.

We appreciate and admire Mr. Nichols. When it comes to media reform, he a combination of William Lloyd Garrison and Rachael Carson for our age. In that sphere we generally agree with him, we attended the Media Reform Conference sponsored by his group, the Free Press in 2007, and are half way through his latest book, The Death and Life of American Journalism: The Media Revolution that Will Begin the World Again. If we were not so involved in election integrity we would spend more time on media reform. Like election integrity it is a necessary ingredient to democracy; perhaps more fundamental; with a reformed media we would have a much easier time arousing the public and causing election integrity.

This week in The Nation: Going Postal in the Digital Era by John Nichols<read> we find much to agree with. He describes the decline of the U.S. Postal Service, the causes of the decline, the Service’s to value print journalism and democracy, and his proposed solutions. Yet, when unsupported conclusions are quoted as fact, we cannot overlook them:

These “efficiencies” threaten more than just the Postal Service. They pose direct and indirect threats to democracy. Oregon Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley noted as much when they asked Congress and the USPS to avoid taking steps that would damage their state’s mail-in balloting. “While we admire and encourage examination of avenues to modernize the postal service, the implementation of this proposal would pose a direct threat to democracy in Oregon,” wrote the senators, whose concerns have been echoed by election officials from around the country, which increasingly relies on the Postal Service to carry regular and absentee ballots.

The PRC’s Goldway [,Ruth, Postal Regulatory Commission (PRC) chair] has been at the forefront of arguments for taking state-based “Vote by Mail” experiments national. “Voters would not need to take time off from work, find transportation, find the right polling station, get babysitters or rush through reading complicated ballot initiatives,” she explains. “The country’s 35,000 post offices could provide information, distribute and collect voting materials and issue inexpensive residency and address identifications for voting purposes. Perhaps most important, given the concerns about voting machine security, mail ballots cannot be hacked. Tampering or interfering with mail is a federal crime, and the United States Postal Service has its own law enforcement arm, which works closely with a variety of enforcement authorities including the F.B.I. Trained election clerks can take the time to check signatures without delaying or discouraging voters. And the advantages of a paper trail outshine the glitter of black box electronic gadgetry.”

We disagree and offer this recent example from Dallas of vote “hacking” and our post on an opinion by the Board President of Coloradans for Voting Integrity, Keep Colorado’s voting integrity which includes our other references.

Perhaps Mr. Nichols is just not talking to a wide enough range people Just Monday last week we read another note in The Nation on Instant Runoff Voting (IRV):

I.R.V. BUZZ: Instant runoff voting, the smart reform that makes majority rule possible in multi-candidate elections, is finally capturing the imagination of the opinion leaders, who just might jump-start this movement at the national level. Über-influential New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman–not a frequent recipient of praise from this magazine–started things off with a March 24 column that noted how some Republicans had voted against healthcare reform because they feared retribution in party primaries, and how Democrats are similarly fearful on other issues. “When your political system punishes lawmakers for…doing the right things, it is broken,” he wrote.

What to do? “Break the oligopoly of our two-party system” with redistricting reforms that take the power to draw Congressional district lines out of the hands of partisans, argued Friedman, and “get states to adopt ‘alternative voting'” that allows voters to rank an independent candidate “your No. 1 choice, and the Democrat or Republican No. 2. Therefore, if the independent does not win, your vote is immediately transferred to your second choice, say, the Democrat. Therefore, you have no fear that in voting for an independent you might help elect your real nightmare–the Republican.”

The New Yorker’s Hendrik Hertzberg, a veteran reform advocate, welcomed Friedman aboard “for what we electoral-reform monomaniacs call…I.R.V.,” and an elated FairVote executive director Rob Richie chimed in with a note that “Hurt Locker won the best picture Oscar with this system, and voters handle it well in major elections in Minneapolis and San Francisco and in nations like Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.” Now if we could just get Friedman excited about reforming our broken “free trade” policies. JOHN NICHOLS

As luck would have it, we were scheduled to attend a Connecticut ACLU event that evening, featuring John Nichols as on one of two panelists on Media Reform. Once again, we agreed with everything he said on the panel. After the panel I mentioned my concerns with IRV. Mr. Nichols was very open to considering alternative views. He had received one email on the subject and asked if it was mine. It was not and he asked that I follow-up with an email. I did, with a summarized version of my recent testimony to the Connecticut legislature along with supporting links.

As we have said before, IRV is complex to compute, complex for voters, and does not provide the intended benefits. It is simply not true that IRV “makes majority rule possible in multi-candidate elections”. Sometimes it does and sometimes it does not, just like winner take all elections – but at an increased complexity, cost, and risk, especially in multi-district, statewide, and national elections.

These “efficiencies” threaten more than just the Postal Service. They pose direct and indirect threats to democracy. Oregon Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley noted as much when they asked Congress and the USPS to avoid taking steps that would damage their state’s mail-in balloting. “While we admire and encourage examination of avenues to modernize the postal service, the implementation of this proposal would pose a direct threat to democracy in Oregon,” wrote the senators, whose concerns have been echoed by election officials from around the country, which increasingly relies on the Postal Service to carry regular and absentee ballots.

The PRC’s Goldway has been at the forefront of arguments for taking state-based “Vote by Mail” experiments national. “Voters would not need to take time off from work, find transportation, find the right polling station, get babysitters or rush through reading complicated ballot initiatives,” she explains. “The country’s 35,000 post offices could provide information, distribute and collect voting materials and issue inexpensive residency and address identifications for voting purposes. Perhaps most important, given the concerns about voting machine security, mail ballots cannot be hacked. Tampering or interfering with mail is a federal crime, and the United States Postal Service has its own law enforcement arm, which works closely with a variety of enforcement authorities including the F.B.I. Trained election clerks can take the time to check signatures without delaying or discouraging voters. And the advantages of a paper trail outshine the glitter of black box electronic gadgetry.”

Inadequate Election Day Registration Pilot Nixed

We are conditionally for Election Day Registration and opposed this inadequate bill. Our opposition was based on authorizing a pilot program with inadequate evaluation provisions, piloting an inadequate, disenfranchising voting method.

CTMirror report: Panel Kills Primary Day voter registration bill <read>

The state legislature’s Appropriations Committee killed a bill Monday that would have allowed residents to register and cast ballots on the same day during the 2011 municipal primaries.

The pilot program, which was rejected 39-11 with bipartisan opposition, also had been opposed by municipal registrars of voters, who saw it as the first step toward general Election Day registration.

“What a nightmare it is for them, logistically, to implement this,” Sen. Daniel Debicella of Shelton, the ranking Republican senator on the Democrat-controlled Appropriations Committee, said.

Primaries are meant to allow political parties to resolve their respective nominations for offices, said Rep. Deborah Heinrich, D-Madison, adding she fears the bill would lead to a mass of last-minute registrations from voters interested only in casting a primary ballot, and not in remaining with their new party. “I don’t see that exactly as the system working,” she said.

Advocates of allowing same-day voter registration argue it is an effective tool to boost voter participation. Nine states currently offer some form of Election Day registration: Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Wisconsin and Wyoming.

“They are a rousing success” in those states, said Rep. John Geragosian, D-New Britain, co-chairman of the Appropriations Committee and a supporter of the measure defeated Monday.

We are conditionally for * Election Day Registration and opposed this inadequate bill in our testimony earlier this year. Our opposition was based on authorizing a pilot program with inadequate evaluation provisions, piloting an inadequate, disenfranchising voting method:

I support the good intentions and concepts behind H.B.5321, yet I have serious concerns with the specific approaches in the current bill.

I am generally opposed to the expansion of absentee balloting for any purpose. Absentee ballots have security and integrity risks not associated with regular voting. Election day registration may represent over 10% of the votes in an election. Beyond risks to integrity, in every election absentee voters are disenfranchised without their knowledge in two ways:

First, they may make a simple mistake in following procedures and have their ballot rejected.

Second, voters do not have the opportunity to revote their ballot if by mistake they overvote.

It would serve the voters of Connecticut much better if Election Day Registration (or EDR) were available at each polling place as is the case in five (5) of the six (6) states with EDR as of 2006. Connecticut could follow the examples of Maine, New Hampshire, or Minnesota. We are piloting a less than adequate system, I presume because of concerns with cost and integrity. I recall testimony before the GAE demonstrating the integrity and effectiveness of polling place EDR in Maine.

I would also recommend that any pilot program include a requirement for independent objective analysis with reporting back to the Legislature, rather than relying only on feedback from election officials. When Secretary Bysiewicz chose new election equipment in 2006, she included an independent professional analysis involving citizen evaluation, along with focus groups of citizens and election officials. Without that study we might well have doubled our costs and be voting today on inadequate touch screen voting equipment.

See our full testimony for how this bill could have been improved: <Testimony>

(*) When we say we are “Conditionally Against” a proposition, we mean that nobody has proposed a realistic safe way to accomplish the proposition. We remain open to the possibility that a means may be found that would pass the scrutiny of the majority of computer scientists, security experts, election officials, and voting integrity advocates.

When we say we are “Conditionally For” a proposition, we mean that other states have safe implementations of the proposition or computer scientists, security experts, election officials, and voting integrity advocates have recommendeda safe solution. We caution that a particular implementation or law may not meet a reasonable standard of safety.

Columnist Calls for Elimination of the Secretary of the State

Coming two weeks after April 1st, we assume the author is serious. We point out that transferring the functions of the Secretary of the State to the Attorney General or the State Elections Enforcement Commission would hardly eliminate much of the Secretary’s $8.4 million budget, especially if we still want to register businesses in the state, keep records, comply with election laws, train election officials, total results, assist election officials, and maintain an independent enforcement function. We also note that Hawaii has not been doing so well in elections without a Secretary of the State and is a case study in how not to outsource elections.

But to tear down a factory or to revolt against a government or to avoid repair of a motorcycle because it is a system is to attack effects rather than causes; and as long as the attack is upon effects only, no change is possible – Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance

CTPost: ‘A Modest Proposal’ for the Secretary of the State’s Office, by MariAn Gail Brown <read>

And, if we’re really serious about finding savings in this tough economic climate, why not get rid of her entire office with its $8.4 million budget?

Three states — Hawaii, Alaska and Utah — get along just fine without any secretary of state. And Arizona is poised to eliminate its secretary of state, and have its responsibilities assumed by a newly created lieutenant governor…

Sure, it’s one of four constitutional offices, but just because it’s been that way for more than two-and-half centuries doesn’t mean it has to be this way. We can and we should get rid of it. Of course, in the Land of Steady Habits, the secretary of the state’s job is an elective office authorized under our state Constitution.

That means it will take a constitutional convention to change. And the last time the Nutmeg State did some constitutional soul searching was 1965. Forty-five years is a long time to go without this kind of checkup. Let’s demand that our General Assembly vote to convene a Constitutional Convention for the express purpose of nixing the secretary of the state position.

Where might government transfer the functions this elective office is responsible for — items like election law, campaign oversight, voter registration, corporate filings and licensing? Connecticut already has a State Elections Enforcement Commission and an attorney general’s office. Most, if not all, of the secretary of the state’s workload can be delegated between those two agencies.

We also note that Hawaii has not been doing so well in elections without a Secretary of the State and is a case study in how not to outsource elections <read report, page 19>.

In a similar vein we could suggest eliminating columnists from newspapers along with the budget for editing, printing, and delivering their columns. After all the advertising department can type and the billing department prints and delivers invoices already.

Update: An advocate with experience in Utah points out:

Just because in Utah the Secretary of State’s office instead has the title “Lt. Governor” does not mean Utah does without all the functions of a Secretary of State. The Utah Lt. Governor is a member of the National Association of Secretaries of State. I would imagine that the other two states mentioned by the author likewise have officials who are members of NASS because they perform the equivalent functions despite not having the label of SoS. It is true that not all Secretaries of State handle elections. In Utah, the Lt. Governor hires a state Election Director but gets the final say re. elections but in some states there is a separate office having legal responsibility for elections.

just because in Utah the Secretary of
State's office instead has the title "Lt. Governor" does not mean Utah
does without all the functions of a Secretary of State.  The Utah Lt.
Governor is a member of the National Association of Secretaries of
State. I would imagine that the other two states mentioned by the
author likewise have officials who are members of NASS because they
perform the equivalent functions despite not having the label of SoS.
It is true that not all Secretaries of State handle elections.  In
Utah, the Lt. Governor hires a state Election Director but gets the
final say re. elections but in some states there is a separate office
having legal responsibility for elections.

Election Assistance Commission charged with shortchanging comment period on Internet Voting

Voter Action today delivered a letter to the US Election Assistance Commission charging that the federal agency is violating the federal Administrative Procedure Act by rushing – without appropriate time for public comment – proposed requirements for pilot programs implementing Internet voting for military and overseas voters in the 2010 election.

Voter Action charges EAC with violating the federal Administrative Procedure Act <read>

EAC rushing – without appropriate time for public comment — proposed requirements for pilot programs implementing Internet voting for military and overseas voters

Voter Action today delivered a letter to the US Election Assistance Commission charging that the federal agency is violating the federal Administrative Procedure Act by rushing – without appropriate time for public comment – proposed requirements for pilot programs implementing Internet voting for military and overseas voters in the 2010 election.

Voter Action charges EAC with violating the federal Administrative Procedure ActVoter Action charges EAC with violating the federal Administrative Procedure Act <read>