The Risks of Mail-In and No-Excuse Absentee Voting

Voting at your precinct on a paper ballot has been the gold standard in elections around the world and in Boulder County for a long time. When comparing the security of precinct polling place voting to the security of the mailed ballot, there is little doubt about which is gold and which is tin. [Or in Connecticut which is more befitting our nickname, ‘The Constitution State’ and which ‘The Nutmeg State’]

Daily Camera:  Guest opinion: Keep Colorado’s voting integrity <read>

The opinion covers most of the reasons we are concerned when the Legislature moves toward no-excuse absentee voting.  Mail-in voting seems so good to the voter, just like high-fat, high-sugar fast food, but it is not good for democracy:

it is worth reviewing the vulnerabilities of this method of voting and how voting by mail weakens the integrity of our elections.

Voting at your precinct on a paper ballot has been the gold standard in elections around the world and in Boulder County for a long time. When comparing the security of precinct polling place voting to the security of the mailed ballot, there is little doubt about which is gold and which is tin. [Or in Connecticut which is more befitting our nickname, ‘The Constitution State’ and which ‘The Nutmeg State’]

Neither the chain of custody of a ballot mailed from the clerk`s office nor the chain of custody of the ballot mailed back by the voter is as secure as the chain for votes cast at a polling place or hand-delivered to the clerk`s office. While the U.S. Postal Service is among the best in the world, its margin of error is greater than our elections can afford. Low-income urban dwellers do not receive their ballots as reliably as property owners with stable addresses. Of course, transient and marginalized peoples lose ballot access. There are instances in Boulder County and elsewhere when ballots turned up in Dumpsters rather than ballot boxes on Election Day.

Elected officials will state authoritatively that absentee ballot fraud doesn`t happen when, if the truth be told, they don`t know. Researchers at Project Vote have found that absentee voter fraud is more common in local, county, and municipal elections than in general elections. There are four known forms of absentee ballot fraud: forging signatures or signing fictitious names, coercing or influencing a vote, vote buying, and misappropriating absentee ballots. It`s happened in a mayoral race in Miami and a Dodge County (Georgia) sheriff race.

Many Coloradans fear union hall voting brunches as much as church congregations` voting breakfasts during the two-week run-up to Election Day. The potential for voter intimidation is much greater with mailed ballots than at the polls. And while voting at the kitchen table is convenient, the secrecy of the ballot can be compromised in ways that do not exist at the polls.

To this we would add that in addition to ballots lost in the mail or “lost in the mail”: Significant numbers of voters are disenfranchised when their ballot is disqualified because of an innocent mistake in completing the envelopes properly, or when they overvote and are not given the opportunity they have in a polling place to correct that problem.

Guest opinion: Keep Colorado’s voting integrity

One Vote, Or Three Votes They Are All Important

Two recent interesting stories in the Courant that relate to past posts, both point to the value of individual votes: Case 1: One Vote “Creates” A Difference. Case 2: Three Votes Lead To One Controversial Vote.

Two recent  interesting stories in the Courant that relate to past posts, both point to the value of individual votes.

Case 1: One Vote “Creates” A Difference

In the first case we recall the single vote victory in Haddam that was quite controversial because of an apparent violation of the chain-of-custody:  Chain of Custody Education In Haddam:

The unofficial vote count after the Nov. 3 election showed Republican Chester Harris beating Democratic incumbent Sabrina Houlton by one vote. Because of the slim margin, the town held a recount Nov. 10, which showed the same result…

The next day, DeBold told Democratic Registrar Pat Hess what she had found. Hess authorized DeBold and Town Clerk Ann Huffstetler, also a Democrat, to open the sealed envelopes containing the ballots to review the tally sheets and to amend the recount.

Hess said Tuesday that she knew representatives from both parties needed to be present during all vote-counting procedures, but the GOP registrar could not attend that morning and they wanted to get the new tallies quickly to file the proper paperwork with the secretary of the state’s office. She said there was no intentional wrongdoing.

The additional vote for Houlton meant the race was a tie. State law mandates that the town must hold a runoff election between tied candidates. The election will be Tuesday.

Chester Harris won the runoff.  One more vote for Sabrina Houlton would have made quite a difference.  Harris has quite different views which he is bringing to the Board of Education.  No matter your opinion of his views, that one vote would have made quite a difference.  Yesterday the Courant had a front-page story on Harris: Haddam School Board Member Rejects Evolution <read>

About three weeks ago he met with several high school science teachers and school administrators in the district, which serves the woodsy, Connecticut Valley towns of Haddam and Killingworth.

“I sort of got stuck on one thing with them, which was basically the teaching of evolution in the schools and how it tends to ride roughshod over the fact that various religions — Christian, Hebrew, Muslim — hold a theistic world view,” Harris said one morning during a break from his job driving a school van. “Evolution is basically an assumption that there is no God.”

Case 2: Three Votes Lead To One Controversial Vote

A few days ago we reported on a District Town Committee election recanvass between two slates of candidates. There was a three vote margin between the lowest winner and the highest looser.  The recanvass dropped several votes from the winners, but not the lowest winner: A Thought Provoking Day at another Recanvass.

Now we learn that the entire town committee vote for chairman was a tie, controversially broken by a temporary chair – one more winner for either slate would have made a difference and/or avoided a controversy: Hartford Democratic Town Committee Election Challenged Over Chairman’s Double Vote : <read>

At issue is whether Ramon Arroyo, who was temporarily elected chairman and who oversaw Thursday’s vote, was within his rights to vote twice for the apparent winner, Georgiana “Jean” Holloway. Arroyo’s second vote broke a 33-33 tie between Holloway and Sean Arena, who was seeking a second two-year term as chairman.

Testimony: Rescanning On Same Type Scanner Would Gut Post-Elecition Audit

The current bill is based on three assumptions, all of which are erroneous because:
1. A count by an identical scanner and memory card is NOT equivalent to a manual count.
2. The audits DO NOT cost too much.
3. People in Connecticut CAN count votes accurately

Friday was the public hearing on S.B. 364 proposed by the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut (ROVAC).  It would replace the manual hand count post-election audit by a rescanning by the same model of ES&S/Premier/Diebold AccuVote-OS optical scanner with a duplicate memory card.

Here is the prepared introduction to my testimony:

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks. I am Executive Director of CTVotersCount and Executive Director of the Connecticut Citizens Election Audit Coalition.  I have personally observed twenty-five (25) post-election audits. Today, I am speaking for CTVotersCount. (I am also a certified moderator and a retired computer scientist)

I am opposed to the current Senate Bill 364 which would gut the current post-election audit law by eliminating the manual count and substituting an almost useless recount by the same type of machines and duplicate memory cards.

Instead, CTVotersCount recommends our alternative bill which would clarify the ballot chain of custody, make the audit procedures enforceable, while improving the efficiency and integrity of the audit – without increasing costs.

The current bill is based on three assumptions, all of which are erroneous because:

1. A count by an identical scanner and memory card is NOT equivalent to a manual count. In the words of a League of Women Voters Report:

An audit count that simply repeated the original counting procedure, whether electronically or by hand, would add little value to the election-validation process.

2. The audits DO NOT cost too much.  Based on municipality requests for reimbursement to the State and citizen observations, the costs of the 2008 audit are estimated at $82,000 and the cost of the 2009 audit at less than $41,000.  (Under our proposal the 2008 audit would have likely have cost 20% to 30% less than it did.)

3. People in Connecticut CAN count votes accurately. Officials in other states have regularly counted paper ballots quite accurately with less than 1/8th difference rate as Connecticut officials, at a lower cost.  The keys are better methods, documentation, training, and organization.

My written testimony includes details supporting estimates for the costs of the audits, the ability of people to count votes accurately, and the advantages of our proposed alternative bill.

I have also delivered testimony to the committee from several computer scientists from Connecticut and around the country attesting to the fallacy of auditing by identical computers and the costs of manual counting in other states.

In summary: Saving money is an important goal, yet the value delivered for expenditures and the value lost in the name of savings should be recognized and considered.  Should we stop inspecting highways, bridges, school buses, and election systems because it costs money? Or should we continue because they protect the value of our investments in infrastructure, save lives, and protect Democracy?

Thank you.

My complete testimony.

Fortunately the Committee did not have to rely exclusively on my testimony and experience observing post-election audits:

  • Two Coalition Post-Election Audit Observers gave a real-world voters’ view of the current process and its limitations:  Tessa Marquis and Mary Rydingsword.
  • Christine Horrigan and the Connecticut League of Women Voters testified in opposition to the current bill.
  • Out-of-state experts who provided testimony that audits don’t cost that much and that using similar machines and memory cards is of little value: David L. Dill, Jeremy Epstein, Candice Hoke, Peter G. Neumann, and Barbara Simons, along with two Computer Scientists from Connecticut, the President and a member of TrueVoteCT who lent their names to the testimony: Michael Fischer and Ralph Morelli <testimony>

There is a sound technical basis for verifying electronic vote tallies by manually counting a sample of precincts or vote subtotals. As computer scientists and election experts, we know very well that there is no reliable way to ensure that a security-critical computer system, such as a vote scanner, is free of malicious software that can change votes — or is even bug-free, for that matter.

It has been shown time and time again that there is a clever way to defeat every defense that has been invented. Furthermore, basic errors and gross security holes have been exposed in every existing voting device examined by computer security professionals to date. Errors are routinely detected in elections – and many smaller errors are probably missed. In 2008, hand-counted tabulation audits have discovered errors that led to incorrect vote totals. Computers can greatly increase the convenience and accuracy of elections – but only if we double-check the results independently of the hardware or software by hand counting a randomly selected sample of the ballots.

  • A special thanks to Barbara Simons for her own independent testimony: <testimony>

Senate Bill 364 appears to be based on the flawed premise that simply rerunning paper ballots through vote counting scanners used for the initial count can replace the manual audits currently required by law. Unfortunately, this assumption is wrong. Because the proposed rescan is not an audit, it will not achieve the goals for which the manual audit was intended. I urge the legislature to retain the manual hand counts in the existing audit legislation.

  • Also Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, testified her opposition to the bill.

Our hope, based on the overwhelming opposition to be bill, based strongly on well established science, is that the bill will either be completely rewritten based on our recommendations or not moved forward by the Committee.

We also note that the testimony on this bill and other election bills considered, resulted in interest by the Committee and important discussions of the details of how incorrectly marked ballots are counted, the importance of careful recanvasses, and the ballot chain-of-custody.

We expect that in a few days all of the written and verbal  testimony will be available <here> and <here>

Another instructive issue:

In other testimony we agree with Registrars who testified for improvement/removal of the quirks in Connecticut law which require multiple moderators in each polling place when more than one party has a simultaneous primary.  And perhaps with even less justification, in elections, officials can be recruited from any town to serve in another, in Presidential primaries too, yet in local, state, and other Federal primaries all officials must come from the town of the polling place.

The basic problem is that our election statutes are a hodgepodge.  Some sections apply to primaries, others Federal elections, others state elections, others local elections, others local primaries, others referendums etc.

As partially covered in our proposed revisions (see our proposed bill in our testimony) there is a need for clarifying, consolidating, and rationalizing the ballot chain-of-custody.  The law has different rules for moving and preserving absentee ballots, polling place ballots cast in all paper elections, and polling place ballots cast in optical scan elections.  That last item covering the majority of ballots and elections, polling place ballots cast in optical scan elections, is a hodgepodge of unclear language partially reflecting lever machines and ballot boxes, while reverencing a hard to follow chain of law leading to sections referencing absentee ballots.  It seems to be more of a chain-of-confusion and ambiguity than a chain-of custody we can rely on or expect officials to understand!

A 74 page bill is being considered to fix some of the continuing reverences in the law that remain focused on lever machines and are inappropriate for optical scanners.  Between mixing lever machines and scanners, even DRE’s (which have not been used in Connecticut), incomplete recanvass laws, and chain-of-custody laws, there remain plenty of issues to address in the future.

The Times: They are a Antitrust’n, but it is not enough

“The Justice Department’s work should not end with blocking this one sale. It also needs to keep a close eye on widespread reports of anticompetitive behavior by Election Systems and Software and other vendors.”

NY Times Editorial:  Antitrust and Your Vote <read>

The good news:

When the nation’s largest voting machine manufacturer, Election Systems and Software, acquired the voting machine business of Diebold, the nation’s second-largest manufacturer, it set off alarms for anyone who cares about election integrity. The combination meant that 70 percent of the nation’s voting machines would be provided by just one company.

The Justice Department has now announced that it intends to block certain parts of the deal on antitrust grounds. That is a very welcome step, but the department and Congress need to do more to protect the vote.

The Justice Department is right to try to block the deal between the voting machine makers. It was a clear violation of antitrust law and a clear threat to the public interest. Less competition would mean less choice for states and localities looking to buy and service voting machines — and even less incentive for industry to produce first-rate products. We hope a federal court approves the Justice Department’s decision and that Election Systems and Software quickly finds a buyer.

But it is not enough:

The Justice Department’s work should not end with blocking this one sale. It also needs to keep a close eye on widespread reports of anticompetitive behavior by Election Systems and Software and other vendors. It should look in particular at how Election Systems handles sales of service contracts for voting machines, which are a big revenue generator, that make it hard for other companies to compete.

Congress also should hold hearings to investigate that and other reports of anticompetitive behavior in the industry. It also should set strong standards for voting machines, including a federal requirement for paper trails and audits. The security of the vote is too important to leave those decisions up to local governments or an industry with a less-than-stellar track record.

We agree.

Canada May Join Internet Voting Race To The Bottom

“Democracy depends upon a fair, accurate and transparent electoral process with outcomes that can be independently verified. Conventional voting accomplishes many of these goals – private polling stations enable citizens to cast their votes anonymously, election-day scrutineers offer independent oversight and paper-based ballots provide a verifiable outcome that can be re-counted if necessary.”

Article in The Star by Michael Geist: Hackers, viruses threaten online voting validity <read>  Michael Geist holds the Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law.

New trials would require the approval of a legislative committee, but the province’s Chief Electoral Officer acknowledged that online voting may be coming, noting “online voting is something that’s on the forefront of people’s minds … people say, ‘I can do my banking online, but I can’t do my voting online.’ ”

The enthusiasm for Internet voting is understandable. At first blush, there is a certain allure associated with the convenience of Internet voting, given the prospect of increased turnout, reduced costs and quicker reporting of results. Moreover, since other security sensitive activities such as banking and health care have gravitated online, supporters argue that elections can’t be far behind.

Yet before rushing into Internet voting trials, the dangers should not be overlooked.

Democracy depends upon a fair, accurate and transparent electoral process with outcomes that can be independently verified. Conventional voting accomplishes many of these goals – private polling stations enable citizens to cast their votes anonymously, election-day scrutineers offer independent oversight and paper-based ballots provide a verifiable outcome that can be re-counted if necessary.

Geist gives an educational overview of problems:

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the organization that administers the domain name system, ran an online board of directors election in 2000. The experience was fraught with technical difficulties, leading a reviewer to conclude “the technical weakness in the registration system made it virtually impossible to assess the integrity of the voters’ list, the security of the PINs, and secrecy of vote.”

More recently, the Netherlands used Internet voting as part of its 2006 parliamentary elections. The online option was an alternative for Dutch citizens working or living abroad. Nearly 20,000 valid Internet votes were received at a cost of approximately 90 euros per Internet voter. Two years later, the country implemented a ban on Internet voting…

Caution on Internet voting appears prudent, since experts have identified a long and costly list of necessary precautions, including random spot checks and post-vote verification programs to preserve anonymity. Given the security risks, opening the door to provincial or federal Internet voting seems premature. In the zeal to increase voter turnout, the reliance on Internet voting could inadvertently place the validity of the election process at risk.

As CTVotersCount readers know we have long opposed internet voting, unless and until a viable mechanism is reviewed and approved by the majority of Computer Scientists, Security Experts and Advocates. <reference> <reference>

Michael Geist holds the Canada Research Chair in Internet and E-commerce Law at the University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law

A Thought Provoking Day at another Recanvass

Based on my observations and discussions everyone there was working hard to do a good job. And I have no reason to question the integrity of the recanvass…At the end, I was left with several areas where I would want to change the law/regulations/procedures to increase the integrity and transparency of the recanvass process. I also have a few suggestions for election officials as well…I am also left with a new appreciation that one of the primary benefits of a recount, recanvass, or audit is for the loosing candidates.

As CTVotersCount readers may recall, last September I blogged on a morning spent at a recanvass in Cromwell. Yesterday I observed a recanvass in Hartford. It was a very educational day for me.  Hopefully my participation was good for the candidates, the officials involved, and election integrity.

Let us start with some basics.  Connecticut has a recanvass after a close election.  People, including yours truly, often refer to the recanvass as a recount.  It is quite different.  See Recanvass Procedure Manual from the Secretary of the State’s Office and our post, Minnesota Recount vs. Connecticut Recanvass.  And as Ted Bromley from the Secretary of the State’s Office reminded me during the recanvass: A recanvass is not the same as a post-election audit.  There are different purposes and different rules.

So that no misimpressions are left, let me say that based on my observations and discussions everyone there was working hard to do a good job.  And I have no reason to question the integrity of the recanvass.  During the course of the recanvass I had several discussions with the Registrar, Olga Iris Vaquez, Tony the Head Moderator, Ted Bromley, and Lucien Pawlak from the Secretary of the State’s Office.  I often brought up points of disagreement or concern.  Most ended in agreement with my opinion or my education to their opinion.  In every case discussions remained cordial with gracious acceptance of officials when they had to change or redo work and my acceptance of their authority when differing opinions remained.

At the end, I was left with several areas where I would want to change the law/regulations/procedures to increase the integrity and transparency of the recanvass process.  I  also have a few suggestions for election officials as well.

I am also left with a new appreciation that one of the primary benefits of a recount, recanvass, or audit is for the loosing candidates.  A properly conduced recanvass that results in the loosers accepting the result and moving on is an important benefit – even if the election result is changed and the winners and loosers change.

Background and overview of the day

The election was between two slates of candidates for the Democratic Town Committee in Hartford.  The election covered four voting districts and involved two slates of candidates with ten candidates each, slate “B” and slate “C”.  Hartford is a one party town, so the Democratic Primary often determines the Town Council, Mayor, and State Legislative elections, while the Democratic Town Committee determines the endorsed candidates.  So these elections are perhaps more important than the general election, and about as important as the primary.

To my knowledge, I had only met four people in the room prior to the recanvass:  Ted and Lucien from the Secretary of the State’s Office and two other citizens who came to watch and support voting integrity.  I knew none of the candidates on either slate.  My understanding was that slate “B” was the challenge slate and the original election result left them with one winner and nine loosers – with three votes separating the highest looser from the lowest winner.  The election was less that 400 or so voters and ballots.  (I have a theory: the more candidates and the more that can be voted for in a race, the more likely two candidates in the middle will be close and a recanvass will be mandated)

A recanvass is not a manual count of ballots – it is a slightly improved machine recount.  A recanvass is not a thorough, adversarial review of ballots like the recounts we are familiar with from Florida in 2000 and Minnesota in 2008 – it does involve an assessment of voter intent by officials – as I understand it, the public, parties, and candidates have no standing to object to procedures and official judgments.  And the ability to observe the process is limited.

The recanvass was scheduled for 9:00am.  I arrived just a bit early and met or was introduced to the Registrar and several of the members of slate “B” and their supporters who were present.  The Registrar indicated that they were waiting for representatives from the Secretary of the State’s office to arrive before starting.  I think the representatives Ted and Lucien arrived about 9:30 and left sometime before 11:00.  The audit concluded at about 1:00pm.  In addition to the Registrar and Moderator, I counted seven other election officials.

The room was the Town Council meeting room in town hall.  The council sits in a raised semi-circle.  There is a wooden rail separating the front of the semi-circle from the public seating, which is perhaps a dozen feet from the rail.  Most of the activity occurred behind the rail.  There were two optical scanner boxes – one was used for the absentee ballot optical scanner and the other for the four district optical scanners, in sequence.  Some counting activity occurred on the council table, other activity on a table between the rail and the public seating.

The Moderator conducted the recanvass and did all the work associated with testing, feeding ballots through, and printing tapes for the four district optical scanners.  Another official supervised the absentee optical scanner and fed ballots with the help of two other officials. Four additional officials did the manual ballot counting at the front table and two of them reviewed ballots for questionable markings at a table behind the rail.

Even though the officials said they were waiting for the Secretary of the State’s staff, it suddenly dawned on me that the four at the front table were opening envelopes and counting ballots – yet I had not noticed unsealing of ballot bags etc.  I decided to observe what they were doing.  This resulted in the first discussion and controversy.  The Moderator asked me to observe from the seats – that I could not stand there.  After some discussion with the “B” slate, they appointed one candidate as an observer – the procedures say:

each such [party] chairman may send two representatives to be present at such recanvass.  Such representatives may observe, but no one other than a recanvass official may take part in the recanvass.  If any irregularity in the recanvass procedure is noted by such a representative, he shall be permitted to present evidence of such irregularity in any contest relating to the election.

Everyone seems to interpret that similar standing applies to slates or independent candidates.  Yet, it is quite ambiguous what exactly “Such representatives may observe” actually means.

As for voters and other members of the public, the procedures say:

All recanvass procedures shall be open to public observation, however, no member of the public can actively participate or interfere with the conduct of the recanvass.

Again, the meanings of “observe” and “interfere” are open to wide interpretation.

After further discussion, slate “B” asked me to be one of their two observers and they conveyed that to the Registrar and Moderator.  I attempted to observe the four counters, Tony did not want me so close.  I wanted to be close enough to actually see the ballots and forms the counters were using, as observers are allowed in post-election audits.  I wanted to walk around the table and get a view from the position and angle I chose, also as observers are allowed to do in audits.  Tony insisted I stay along the rail which allowed me to get, perhaps four feet from the backs of the counters on one side of the table – I could observe some parts of the ballots but not everything, and not all that clearly.  I agreed to disagree and accept his authority.

Soon I realized that the team was not counting cast ballots.  They were counting envelopes of spoiled ballots – which apparently were not sealed in carrying cases – just in envelopes with unnumbered “tamper-evident” seals.  (As readers know I have concerns about the chain of custody of ballots, one of the least secure ways of protecting ballots is sealing in envelops with unnumbered “tamper-evident” seals – just create a new envelope labeled like the original and apply a new unnumbered seal.)

After Tony had read the first district through the scanner, I pointed out that the procedures called for two opposing officials (not slate representatives) review each ballot for questionable marks before scanning. Tony felt that because the machine had read all the ballots originally they were all ok – an assumption also held by several registrars in each post-election audit.  It took quite a bit of discussion involving me, Tony, the Registrar, and Ted before everyone agreed to follow the process in the manual.  Tony completely accepted the need to redo the entire process for the district with a new memory card based on the manual requirement.  I was impressed with the diligence of the two officials in carefully reviewing each ballot.  In each of the four districts there were about a handful of ballots set aside for hand counting.  I think going through the process Tony understood the reason that a properly functioning machine may not accurately count voters’ intent.

As in most observations, over time, officials became comfortable with observers and tended to not object when I observed more closely.  I moved around and closer to the officials as they counted the questionably marked ballots a the table in front of the rail.  I noted two or three ballots where there assessment of voter intent on the ballot was that it was an overvote – there were were too many bubbles filled in, and likely the scanner missed one or two because of the way the ballot was filled out.  I noted one of the ballots had markings that were highly inconsistent between the bubbles – they counted it as an overvote – I suppose it could be argued in court that some of the marks should not count and it was actually not an overvote – I’m not sure how I would come down – I would probably agree with the officials decision to treat it as an undervote.

At the end of the day, from unofficial calculations, most of slate “C” lost from one to three votes.  This was a learning/confirming experience for me.  One of my criticism’s of the post-election audit process and reporting requirements is that it only anticipates positive ‘questionable votes” that might not have been read by the scanner.  I have contended that there are also negative such votes and the lack of recognition of that possibility causes some of frequent officials’ confusion in accounting for such votes in the audits.  Here was dramatic proof that such concerns are real, and in this election those represented the major difference in the count. (Presumably the ballots were read by the machine, the machine did not count an overvote, so it did not classify some of the marks as votes.  But the voter clearly overvoted, resulting in an actual count of -1 for several candidates.

Here I also had a short debate with Tony.  He had the counters “spoil” the overvote ballots and put them in the spoiled ballot envelope.  I tried to reason with Tony and offered to provide an extended explanation, yet he insisted and I quickly yielded to his authority.

Here is the problem: Voters are allowed to overvote and undervote by their choice.  These ballots actually represent the wishes of a voter who voted and is checked off.  Putting them in the spoiled envelope has several potential problems.  1) If a later recount or court action is required, people can be confused why the counts are off.  2) Even if they remember the change, there is no record of the change -which district, how many ballots etc. 3) And its only the judgment of the officials that makes the ballots overvotes – a court review might change the assessment. But with such ballots left unidentified, there is no way to find and evaluate them.  4) Even if the officials were correct, without the ballot there is room for charges, counter charges, and bad feelings on the part of loosing candidates.

When the third district questionables were being counted I noticed another issue.  One ballot had the apparent signature of the voter writ large on the ballot. It only had one bubble filled in, for one candidate on slate “C”.  I noted the candidate and the exception.  Even though Connecticut law would exclude such a vote where the voter might be identified, the recanvass  manual makes no mention that I know, that officials need to take such identifying marks into account.

This is my third recanvass as an observer.  The first was a lever machine recanvass for the 2006 Courtney/Simmons race for the U.S. Congress.  I went to a mass training given by National Democratic Party lawyers – they interpreted Connecticut law to be that observers could note issues that could later be used to dispute results in court and cause an actual recount.  This was just one of those types of issues.

I did not know why the officials pulled that ballot for hand counting.  Maybe because of the signature, maybe not.  Could I have missed more by not observing the officials as they reviewed ballots for questionable marks?

I moved to the table behind the rail to observer the officials reviewing ballots for the fourth, and last, district to be counted.  To my surprise the officials tried to stop me, and then insisted that I should have an escort everywhere I observered,  (a requirement not mentioned or in effect earlier).  I argued and also mentioned that that was their responsibility if they insisted, not mine.  The officials complained that they could not do their work because I was bothering them – my interpretation was that it was the other officials insisting on a escort and questioning if I could observe from behind the rail that was disrupting them.  In any case, I observed where I wanted to, they supplied no escort and everything went smoothly thereafter.  I observed no voter identifiable ballots for the fourth district, yet the question of the first three districts and all the absentee ballots remains open.

I photographed the machine tapes posted on the wall.  The officials agreed to let me photograph all the hand count hash sheets and later the single sheet providing totals for all the candidates in each district.  The totals for each district were read aloud.  Candidates on slate “B” and other members of the public added the four districts together and saw from their unofficial totals that the election results would hold.  Tony left with four sheets to add them officially on a spreadsheet, to file with the town clerk.  The slate would get a copy later, and I headed for a bus home.

As far as I know, slate “C” had no representatives present.  If I were on slate “C” I would make sure we were represented.

Some unsealings and sealings involved two officials checking the seal numbers and public announcements, others involved a single person and were not all that apparent.  Much of the process was not initially obvious to the public.  I had to fdetermine what what was going on by observation or asking the leaders.

What I would change in the law/regulations/procedures:

I would rather have a recount like the ones in Minnesota and elsewhere:

  • Manual, hand counting
  • Reviewing each ballot for voter identification
  • Adversarial review of all ballots, and absentee ballot materials

Failing, that and continuing the spirit of the current recanvass:

  • I would allow several observers per slate/independent candidate. One more than enough to have one per concurrent activity: Machines being setup/used, counting teams, questionable mark reviewing, tallying area etc,
  • I would allow public observers to the extent there were insufficient slate/independent observers, selected by lot if necessary.
  • I would allow observers to go anywhere and see anything just like we can based on procedures in audits.  And get reasonably close, to actually see well.  Standing just behind any person should be fine.
  • I would have the votes with questionable marks include any stray marks that might  identify an individual – and have the counters determine and reject such ballots.

In summary, I would like to have legitimate, reasonable things specified in the law/regulations/procedures, rather than have nagging questions of accuracy/integrity, and rely on legal action to establish/enforce such things that seem to be common sense.

Suggestions for officials conducting recanvasses:

  • Go beyond the procedures and allow everything suggested above
  • Invite reasonable levels of observation and transparency
  • Don’t set the room up in a way that separates officials from observers or makes in difficult to observe
  • Describe or at least announce each part of the process before it is done
  • Invite observers to see seals and verify numbers for themselves
  • Train officials to expect and to be comfortable with reasonable, close observation

RoundUp: Registrar Error or Election Fraud? – Saving $$$ or Empowering Voters?

Our Editorial: One clear theme in Connecticut this year is saving money. That is certainly an important goal, but the value delivered for expenditures and the value lost in the name of savings should be recognized and considered. Should we stop inspecting highways, bridges, school buses, and buildings because it costs money? Or should we continue because it protects the value of our investment in infrastructure and saves lives? Should we save on election audits and voting? Or should we further empower voters and strengthen voting integrity because we value fair elections and a participatory democracy?

We are likely to have several busy news days over the next few weeks as the General Assembly considers changes to the election laws and the 2010 election heads towards the May party conventions.

Court Rules In Hartford Primary

One slate in Hartford recently accused a registrar of illegally certifying another slate.  There is also a potential conflict of interest (probably legal) given that the registrar and two of her relatives are on the slate <earlier coverage> Now a court has ruled the slate should be removed from the ballot, yet because of an appeal the election will go forward with both slates on the ballot. <Courant Article>

“The court has made a finding that there are names on the ballot that do not belong there” [Plaintiffs’ Attorney] Sweeney said…But [Hartford Corporation Counsel] Rose argued that the case boiled down to “an error by the registrar” and said that the court did not have the authority to remove the names from the ballot.  [Judge] Peck said she decided not to terminate the stay because if her ruling is eventually overturned, the election would have already been held.

Courant Proposes Cost Savings At The Expense Of Voters

Also today, the Courant has an editorial proposing centralized voting and no excuse absentee voting to save money in elections: Would ‘Vote Centers’ Work? <read>  The article touts success in Indiana in saving money.  The focus of the editorial is on saving money, but likely at the expense of voter convenience:

Voting centers, an alternative to precinct-based elections, are usually set up in strategic locations and save money because they require fewer workers and voting machines. Centralized electronic voting records are used to ensure security. In some places, centers open before Election Day for early voting. Ideally, vote centers will give local election officials the flexibility to anticipate election turnout and modify the number of locations and the level of staffing…

If the centers have to be open for weeks before the election with paid staff, that might eliminate the savings. If they were only open on Election Day, that might cause crowding that would discourage voting or make it difficult for workers to assist older or handicapped voters. The change in location could inconvenience voters who travel by public transportation…

Even with these caveats, the idea should receive a public airing. We are looking at a massive budget deficit. If regional election centers will save some money, they should be on the table. Perhaps the place to start is with a good idea Ms. Bysiewicz put forward last year, “no excuse” absentee ballots.

We note that these are not early voting centers that add to the convenience of voters, they are a few polling places replacing many at the expense of voter convenience, especially for those dependent on public transportation:  From an article reporting the results in Indiana – the savings based on dramatically consolidating polling places: <read>

Vote centers allow ballots to be cast at any county voting location instead of at home precincts. The Indiana Fiscal Policy Institute reported recently the centers would save every county money. Tippecanoe, Cass and Wayne counties have been piloting the idea.

House Democrats aren’t buying the plan. House Elections Chairman Rep. Kreg Battles of Vincennes wants more study because of questions over electronic poll books, security and other matters.

A Porter County Commissioners task force study in 2009 found the cost savings to taxpayers could climb as high as $200,000 per year. The study showed the county’s poll worker numbers would drop from 640 to about 120.

Vote centers also would mean fewer voting machines would be needed. They cost about $4,000 each and need to be replaced every 10 years.

Vote centers would be an added convenience for citizens who would have the choice of voting near work, home or their child’s school. The bill should pass.

Depending on where they work, live, and their children go to school.  Its hard to imagine that dramatically less polling places would leave many voters closer to the polls.

As we have stated many times we are opposed to the expansion of absentee voting for any purpose.  It disenfranchises voters without their knowledge and risks voting integrity.

Our Testimony On A Flawed Bill

Yesterday we testified to the General Administration and Elections Committee on a bill for Election Day Registration in Connecticut.  We support Election Day Registration and testified in favor of the original bill submitted last year.  Over the course of the year that bill was changed to a form of absentee voting with little safeguards.  This year that bill has been resurrected. I testified in favor of the concept and against the details in the bill.  Once again the motivation is to provide an image of voter empowerment with a focus on saving money and the convenience of election officials: <H.B.5321>  <Testimony>

I support the good intentions and concepts behind H.B.5321, yet I have serious concerns with the specific approaches in the current bill.

I am generally opposed to the expansion of absentee balloting for any purpose. Absentee ballots have security and integrity risks not associated with regular voting. Election day registration may represent over 10% of the votes in an election. Beyond risks to integrity, in every election absentee voters are disenfranchised without their knowledge in two ways:

  • First, they may make a simple mistake in following procedures and have their ballot rejected.
  • Second, voters do not have the opportunity to revote their ballot if by mistake they overvote.

It would serve the voters of Connecticut much better if Election Day Registration (or EDR) were available at each polling place as is the case in five (5) of the six (6) states with EDR as of 2006.  Connecticut could follow the examples of Maine, New Hampshire, or Minnesota. We are piloting a less than adequate system, I presume because of concerns with cost and integrity. I recall testimony before the GAE demonstrating the integrity and effectiveness of polling place EDR in Maine.

I would also recommend that any pilot program include a requirement for independent objective analysis with reporting back to the Legislature, rather than relying only on feedback from election officials. When Secretary Bysiewicz chose new election equipment in 2006, she included an independent professional analysis involving citizen evaluation, along with focus groups of citizens and election officials. Without that study we might well have doubled our costs and be voting today on inadequate touch screen voting equipment.

There are several ways in which polling place EDR could be accomplished. Any EDR method will increase some election day costs, yet there would also be savings in other election day and pre-election day costs.

Major improvements to the bill would include:

  • Requiring voting booths, a ballot box tender, and ballot clerks in central EDR locations to provide the opportunity for a smooth, secure voting process, along with a clear opportunity for voters to correct errors on their ballot.
  • Allowing single polling place towns to provide EDR in the same building as the polling place, with voters voting by optical scanner as usual.
  • Requiring towns with central count absentee ballot locations to use an optical scanner for EDR ballots, rather than the using the “absentee ballot” like process.

In summary, the focus should be on enfranchising voters and encouraging participation, while maintaining voting integrity.

We note no testimony in public in favor of the bill’s absentee-like mechanisms for voting.  Perhaps some was submitted on paper.

Our Editorial:

One clear theme in Connecticut this year is saving money. That is certainly an important goal, but the value delivered for expenditures and the value lost in the name of savings should be recognized and considered.  Should we stop inspecting highways, bridges, school buses, and buildings because it costs money?  Or should we continue because it protects the value of our investment in infrastructure and saves lives?  Should we save on election audits and voting?  Or should we further empower voters and strengthen voting integrity because we value fair elections and a participatory democracy?

Secretary of the State a ‘long shot’ for Garfunkel

Garfunkel, who has been Norwalk’s town clerk for nearly a decade, also believes he’s the right person to fill the office being vacated by Susan Bysiewicz. Garfunkel says he’s a manager, not a lawmaker.

From the Hour: Secretary of the State a ‘long shot’ for Garfunkel <read>

Democrat Andrew S. Garfunkel describes his bid for the office of Secretary of the State as a “long shot.” For one thing, he’s competing with the state house majority leader for his party’s nomination.

But Garfunkel, who has been Norwalk’s town clerk for nearly a decade, also believes he’s the right person to fill the office being vacated by Susan Bysiewicz. Garfunkel says he’s a manager, not a lawmaker.

“(The secretary of the state) is a position that is managerial for the state, and I believe that my years of experience (as town clerk) step up to the level of the Secretary of the State’s office,” Garfunkel said. “I’m coming from that direction as opposed to from a legislative direction into the position. Right now, I have contacted personal friends and colleagues and discussed these issues with them.”…

Garfunkel is hopeful that his affiliation with the Connecticut Town Clerks Association will help secure his name recognition as he seeks his party’s nomination in May…

He has performed on stage and worked as a construction contractor before being elected town clerk in 2001. He completed two and a half years of course work to earn state certification as a municipal clerk and has served as a mentor to clerks in Newtown, Danbury, and Trumbull.

Garcia: Small Fundraisers to Qualify For The Citizens Election Program

“Your investment in me today is an investment in a healthy democracy,” Garcia said. He vowed give voice to the voiceless by getting more people to the polls.

New Haven Independent: Clean Money Quest Begins At The Bar <read>

To make it to the state Capitol without special interest money, Gerry Garcia had to get to Christopher Martin’s early, to woo New Haveners with bottles of Heineken and slices of filet mignon on toast.

The event Wednesday night was one of many small fundraisers Garcia is hosting as he seeks the Democratic nomination for secretary of state.

Garcia (at right in photo), who lives in East Rock, is the only Democratic candidate for statewide office who has signed up to participate in the state’s clean elections program. The program offers public matching money to office-seekers willing to run “clean”—to limit the size and types of contributions they’ll accept.

To qualify for a public grant, Garcia has to raise $75,000 in small donations of between $5 and $100. That’s what brought him to Christopher Martin’s Restaurant & Pub on State Street, a few blocks from his Bradley Street home.

About 25 people, mostly political insiders, showed up to mingle on an elevated platform toward the back of the bar. They schmoozed over pesto tortellini, wild-caught shrimp cocktail, southern-fried chicken wings and bottles Heineken and Beck’s…

“Your investment in me today is an investment in a healthy democracy,” Garcia said.

He vowed give voice to the voiceless by getting more people to the polls. He stressed his ability to reach out to Latino citizens. Garcia, a Puerto Rican Jew, is one of only two Latinos seeking statewide office this year.

Merrill Endorsed By 71 House Dems

The Secretary of the State’s office is “a place where fair and clean elections must be guarded,”

Christopher Keating’s blog at the Courant <read>

“I’ve put about 10,000 miles on my car,” Merrill said. “I am not exploring. I am running for Secretary of the State.”

A longtime legislator and former co-chairwoman of the budget-writing appropriations committee, Merrill is one of the most experienced and knowledgeable lawmakers at the Capitol.

The Secretary of the State’s office is “a place where fair and clean elections must be guarded,” she said.

Merrill has strong support in the House, while another candidate, Sen. Jonathan Harris of West Hartford, has support on the Capitol’s third floor in the Senate.

Merrill was endorsed by some of the highest-ranking and longest-serving lawmakers in the state, including House Speaker Christopher Donovan of Meriden, deputy Speaker Bob Godfrey of Danbury, Rep. Jack Thompson of Manchester, transportation committee co-chairman Tony Guerrera of Rocky Hill, deputy speaker Marie Kirkley-Bey, and Rep. Mary Mushinsky of Wallingford – the dean of the House.

Our goal is that all candidates in the race recognize the key role that the Secretary of the State should play in election integrity and that election integrity be an important part of the discussion.  It should be a prime consideration for party delegates and for voters in choosing among candidates.