Essex students assist Secretary in random drawing


Yesterday we observed the random drawing of 68 districts and alternate districts for the post-election audit. Just as last time, it was an effective and educational event for all those present and participating. After each district was drawn they were marked on an map of the State. See the <press release> for more details and a list of the districts chosen.


Yesterday we observed the random drawing of 68 districts and alternate districts for the post-election audit. Just as last time, it was an effective and educational event for all those present and participating. After each district was drawn they were marked on an map of the State.  See the <press release> for more details and a list of the districts chosen.

September Primary Post-Election Audit Drawing

Yesterday, Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, conducted a random drawing of 15 districts for post-election audit of the September 2015 primary. There were 143 districts in the primary, yielding 15 as 10%. Several of the districts were exempt from selection (but not from determining the 10%) based on close vote recanvasses.

Yesterday, Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, conducted a random drawing of 15 districts for post-election audit of the September 2015 primary. There were 143 districts in the primary, yielding 15 as 10%. Several of the districts were exempt from selection (but not from determining the 10%) based on close vote recanvasses.

Here is the press release

To all media:

Secretary of the State Denise Merrill today randomly chose 15 voting precincts from the September 16, 2015 primary to have their machine totals audited. There were also five alternate precincts chosen in case the chosen precincts cannot be audited for any reason. State law mandates that 10% of all voting precincts have their machine totals audited following any election or primary. There were a total of 143 voting precincts where primaries were held on Wednesday September 16, 2015.

The following voting precincts were chosen for a post primary election audit (in alphabetical order):

Municipality Polling Precinct
Bethel Stony Hill Fire House 2
Durham Korn School 2
East Windsor Town Hall
Ellington Ellington High School
Middletown Middletown High School District 6
Middletown Snow School Gym District 8
Naugatuck Cross Street School
New Britain Stanley Holmes School District 11
New Haven Bella Vista 11-01
New Haven Clarence Rogers School Ward 30-1
Portland Portland Senior Center
Stamford Salvation Army District 2
West Haven Ann V. Molloy School Voting District 7
West Haven John Prete Senior Housing Voting District 5
West Haven Surfside Senior Housing Voting District 2

Alternate Polling Precincts Chosen (in the order chosen):

Municipality Polling Precinct
Bethel Frank A. Berry School 3
Naugatuck Old Terrace
Hartford Liberty Christian Center Voting District 1
New Britain Chamberlain School District 9
New Haven Atwater Senior Center Ward 14

Av Harris
Director of Communications
Connecticut Secretary of the State Denise Merrill
(860) 509-6255 ofc
(860) 463-5939 cell

Statistician battles government to determine whether vote count is flawed

“Paper receipts are the obvious answer,Florida gave recounts a bad name. But there is something much worse than a recount: the utter inability to recount votes, and reconstruct voters’ true intent, in light of a serious computer error.”

Actually slightly worse and even more suspicious might be having paper ballots and being barred from using them to verify elections.

“Paper receipts are the obvious answer,” Ramasastry [associate professor at the University of Washington School of Law] said. “Florida gave recounts a bad name. But there is something much worse than a recount: the utter inability to recount votes, and reconstruct voters’ true intent, in light of a serious computer error.”

Actually slightly worse and even more suspicious might be having paper ballots and being barred from using them to verify elections.

A recent article in LJWorld.com [Lawrence Kansas] highlights the barriers put in front of a statistician looking to check election results by reviewing the paper record of the election: Kansas statistician battles government to determine whether vote count is flawed <read>

Wichita State University mathematician Beth Clarkson has seen enough odd patterns in some election returns that she thinks it’s time to check the accuracy of some Kansas voting machines.

She’s finding out government officials don’t make such testing easy to do.

When Clarkson initially decided to check the accuracy of voting machines, she thought the easy part would be getting the paper records produced by the machines, and the hard part would be conducting the audit. It’s turned out to be just the opposite.

“I really did not expect to have a lot of problems getting these (records),” Clarkson said. But Sedgwick County election officials “refused to allow the computer records to be part of a recount. They said that wasn’t allowed.”

Instead, Clarkson was told that in order to get the paper recordings of votes, she would have to go to court and fight for them…

Of course we are not in Kansas, we in Connecticut, where so far, nobody has gone to court and fully tested if ballots are actually public records open to public inspection.  As we said in Myth #9

Myth #9 – If there is ever a concern we can always count the paper.

Reality

The law limits when the paper can be counted.

  • Audits can protect against error or fraud only if enough of the paper is counted and discrepancies in the vote are investigated and acted upon in time to impact the outcome of the election.  See myths #1 and #2.
    • An automatic recanvass (recount) occurs when the winning vote margin is within 0.5%. The local Head Moderator moderator or the Secretary of the State can call for a recanvass, but even candidates must convince a court that there is sufficient reason for an actual recount.
  • Recounting by hand is not required by law. In early 2008 the Secretary of the State revised her policy of hand recanvasses.  We now recanvass by optical scanner.
  • In 2010, the Citizen Recount showed huge discrepancies in Bridgeport, never recognized by the ‘system’.

Too Reliable Computers: A threat to life and to democracy!

Most people are aware of the risks of unreliable computers, yet tend to be oblivious to the distinct risk of too reliable computers.  If computers were as unreliable as people, we would not be at risk of excess trust and overconfidence.

One particular anecdote from lasts night’s Newshour highlights the risks of computers that are too reliable, yet not perfect.  When it comes to medicine (or robotic weapons) too reliable computers can cause harm, including death.  When it comes elections too reliable computers can kill democracy.

Most people are aware of the risks of unreliable computers, yet tend to be oblivious to the distinct risk of too reliable computers.  If computers were as unreliable as people, we would not be at risk of excess trust and overconfidence.

One particular anecdote from lasts night’s Newshour highlights the risks of computers that are too reliable, yet not perfect.  When it comes to medicine (or robotic weapons) too reliable computers can cause harm, including death.  When it comes elections too reliable computers can kill democracy.

This week the Newshour is covering Artificial Intelligence, a subject first covered in the McNeil-Lehrer Report in 1985, if I recall correctly. Last night’s segment was Why We’re Teaching Computers to Diagnose Cancer <read/video>

Here is the critical excerpt:

DR. ROBERT WACHTER: A lot of medicine kind of lives in that middle ground, where it’s really messy. And someone comes in to see me and they have a set of complaints and physical exam findings all that. And it could be — if you look it up in a computer, it could be some weird — it could be the Bubonic plague, but it probably is the flu.

HARI SREENIVASAN: Wachter is also concerned about fatal implications that can result from an over-reliance on computers. In his book, he writes about a teenage patient at his own hospital who barely survived after he was given 39 times the amount of antibiotics he should have received.

DR. ROBERT WACHTER: So, in two different cases, the computers threw up alerts on the computer screen that said, this is an overdose. But the alert for a 39-fold overdose and the alert for a 1 percent overdose looked exactly the same. And the doctors clicked out of it. The pharmacists clicked out of it. Why? Because they get thousands of alerts a day, and they have learned to just pay no attention to the alerts.

Where the people are relegated to being monitors of a computer system that’s right most of the time, the problem is, periodically, the computer system will be wrong. And the question is, are the people still engaged or are they now asleep at the switch because the computers are so good?

There are several related problems all contributing to increase the risk of too reliable computers:

  • High Reliability: Most of the time the computers are more accurate than people, especially when the people are unsure of the diagnosis or remedy.
  • Irrational Trust: The people are told and correctly believe the machine is more reliable than they are, especially when they are unsure or outside their expertise. Its likely our nature instilled by evolution to trust what has proven accurate.  Its only irrational when the trust exceeds the risk.  People are good at estimating accuracy, but not so good at intuiting the risks of lower probability events. We have biases for irrational fear and irrational trust, both can be costly, yet in different ways.
  • Mesmerization: We get jaded or used to things going a particular way and miss the details that may indicate something is different. Here it is medical staff used to seeing irrelevant or low level warnings, missing the implications of a similar significant risk.  Airline pilots, railroad engineers, drivers, doctors, and dentists among many others are subject to Mesmerization.

Another similar situation is too great a trust in vehicle electronics.  Either a manufacturer relying on electronics to always apply the break or accelerator correctly when the pedal is pushed, or people trusting that car computers always work as designed and tested, with no danger of being hacked.

How does this apply by analogy to elections and too reliable voting machines?

It seems that almost everyone trusts electronic voting machines.  We are used, for the most part, to computers working when they seem to work.  When we use a spreadsheet we tend to assume it is working properly.  Yet, beyond the chance of error in the spreadsheet software, we tend to trust the formulas put into spreadsheets by people.  Even though we are flawed individuals,we tend to forget that equally flawed individuals (even ourselves) may have made a simple error in creating formulas e.g. adding up only some of the numbers, double counting others, or made a “small, harmless” change after testing the spreadsheet.

Election officials tend to have trust in voting machines. They are told that all types of voting machines or online voting machines are created by very smart people and include certification and “military grade” security.  Yet, we are given no effective proof of those claims and typical officials are not able to judge such proofs. Officials see reports of tests and post-election audits that claim the machines are flawless, increasing their trust in the machines.  Typically if they count ballots by hand and they do not match the machine counts, they count again and usually the machine was accurate.

On the other hand, those that are familiar with election equipment, computers and computer science know:

  • No computer or software can ever be proven error free. In fact, most, even modestly complex, software is very likely to have multiple undetected bugs.
  • It has not happened often, but computers and computer systems have counted incorrectly. Including in CA, FL, N.J., D.C., and in Connecticut.
  • Without paper ballots and effective post-election audits there is no reason to trust that machines count accurately, or to know how often they do not.
  • Machines are programmed for each election and voting district, so errors can be introduced into the system at any time.
  • Beyond errors, insiders have multiple means of changing election results.  Often a single individual insider can change results alone or with the help or by the intimidation of outsiders.
  • A voting machine can be entirely accurate, yet its results or the total result can be changed independently of the voting machine.  Unless the results are audited end-to-end or in each step of the process, the result cannot be legitimately trusted.

What about Connecticut?

  • We have post-election audits, but they are not conducted in a manner that gives justified confidence.  Errors in machine results have been detected, yet most differences between machine results and manual audits have been accepted as a human counting error without investigation.  This makes common sense since usually when results are checked the human was wrong the first time – common sense that is at least as risky and unjustified as the unjustified trust in medical artificial intelligence directives in the Newshour story above.
  • Connecticut is considering legislating Machine Audits, based on procedures to be approved by the Secretary of the State.  Common sense supports a method demonstrated by UConn and the Secretary of the State’s office and touted in a paper presented at a conference – unjustified common sense.  There is no scientific justification for that method demonstrated, and worse, every reason to believe that it would be subject to unjustified official trust in computers and mesmirization.  Professor Alex Shvartsman of UConn has agreed that the procedures is insufficient to provide public verification.

Fortunately, there is a very effective solution available.  We have proposed a sound method of Machine Assisted Audits based on proven scientific methods.  Using Machine Assisted Audits in an effective manner could result in more accurate, trusted audits at less cost and stress to local election officials. If machine audits become law, we will work to insist on effective transparent and publicly verifiable procedures are employed. (Still, we would much prefer a law that mandated sufficient requirements now, that could not be weakened by a future Secretary of the State) <read more in our comments on the bill before the Connecticut General Assembly>

 

S.B. 1051: Too much, too little, too risky

Last week the Government Administration and Elections Committee passed a modified version of S.B. 1051, hailed by the Secretary of the State and ROVAC (Registrars Of Voters Association of Connecticut) as a ‘bipartisan’ compromise.

Yet, all the compromising seems to be the agreement of election officials on a bill that would make registrars jobs easier while adding largely undefined and unchecked powers for the current and future Secretaries of the State.

Last week the Government Administration and Elections Committee passed a modified version of S.B. 1051, hailed by the Secretary of the State and ROVAC (Registrars Of Voters Association of Connecticut) as a ‘bipartisan’ compromise.

Yet, all the compromising seems to be the agreement of election officials on a bill that would make registrars jobs easier while adding largely undefined and unchecked powers for the current and future Secretaries of the State.

Two members of the Republican minority voted against the bill primarily because it would give the Secretary sole authority decide to temporarily remove registrars from office for any complaint filed by the Secretary or failing to maintain certification. We agree it goes too far in that provision.  It should and does provide a more objective means for permanently removing registrars.  We fail to see where a provision for the Secretary to temporarily remove registrars would have solved the recent problems noticed in the heat of election days. If that were the only weak and risky provision we might be able to live with the bill and some of its helpful provisions.

We are all in favor of effective training, certification, and fair procedures for removing registrars from office.  The bill has what we suspect will turn out to be relatively weak certification requirements and an alternate procedure for removal by charges from the state’s attorney and any superior court judge.  Even that seems to be a bit weak, requiring only a single judge to rule on removing an elected official from office. Consider:

  • Their is an ‘advisory’ committee to create certification.  In the existing law, never implemented, the committee was not advisory.  Now the current or future Secretary of the State approves the certification program.
  • The committee consists of six members, five appointed by the Secretary.
  • Decertifying a registrar does take concurrence of a majority of the committee.
  • Strengthening the existing law, sitting registrars must be certified within two years of taking office, except perhaps untended,  the law requires registrars who are appointed to fill the remainder of two-year terms to complete certification by the end of the term.
  • We can hope that the actual certification, examination, and continuing education result in relevant, meaningful requirements.

We support professionalization.  Certification in election matters is only part of that.  Additional skills, education, and experience also play a part. We are skeptical that without increased compensation that many highly skilled, organized, and experienced individuals will be attracted to the jobs in small towns.  We wonder how much certification would have prevented the problems seen in recent years in Hartford, West Hartford, and Bridgeport. We support professionalization through regionialization.  That might be the result of another bill passed by the committee, S.B. 1083.

There are other risky, insufficiently defined provisions in the bill associated with closing of the polls and reporting results:

  • One requires quicker reporting of partial results “Once completed, the vote totals produced by the tabulator shall be prepared for transmission to the Secretary of the State”.
  • This is ambiguous.  Yet, according to the Secretary’s testimony on the bill, it seems that the intention is to transmit the results from optical scanners to the central GEMs system for automated calculation of results.
  • To connect our optical scanners to the GEMS requires reversing longstanding security policy implemented by the Bysiewicz administration to keep the scanners sealed from communication that risks infecting the scanners with fraudulent code.
  • We add that the GEMS system is no gem.  It figured prominently in the reporting errors discovered in the Humboldt Project.  We also recall Bev Harris demonstrating to Howard Dean how easy it would be for him to change election results on the GEMS, undetected.
  • Maybe it will turn out OK.  Once again, we are left to hope that in the end, this Secretary and all future secretaries work to maintain security of the scanners, memory cards, and their programming.

Further, the bill gives officials 48 hours after the election to report the rest of the results: hand counted ballots, write-in ballots, and for checkers to sign the pollbooks.

  • We are all for giving officials time to get thing right. Especially in situations like Bridgeport in 2010 where there are huge numbers of unexpected ballots to count by hand.  We wish the media could hold off the pressure for “results, any results”.
  • Yet, these changes seem to lack any security and transparency requirements.  If counting is stopped to continue later, we need convincing, sufficient, enforceable, and enforced security for ballots and checkin lists. We need formal requirements for notification of the public of when counting will resume.
  • When it comes to checkin lists, we see no point in not having checkers total and sign the lists at the polling place on election night — except it they are using electronic pollbooks and the lists are not printed until later by someone else — then we see nt good reason to have them sign printed paper lists that they have not created, from a system they do not understand, and have not held in custody.  Perhaps they or the polling place moderator should have a form to record the number of voters the machine reports as having checked in – signed and submitted on election night.

Finally, we come to electronic auditing.  The bill has this provision near the end:

Notwithstanding   any provision of title 9 of the general statutes, the Secretary of the State, in consultation  and  coordination  with  The  University  of  Connecticut, may  authorize  the  use  of  electronic  equipment  for  the  purpose  of conducting any audit required pursuant to section-320f of the general statutes,  as  amended  by  this  act,  for  any  primary  or  general  election held on or after January 1, 2016, provided (1) the Secretary of the State prescribes  specifications  for  (A)  the  testing,  set-up  and  operation  of such equipment,  and  (B)  the  training  of election officials  in  the  use  of such equipment; and (2) the Secretary of the State and The University of  Connecticut  agree  that  such  equipment  is  sufficient  in  quantity  to accommodate  the  total  number  of audits  to  be conducted.  Nothing  in this  section  shall  preclude  any  candidate  or  elector  from seeking additional remedies pursuant to chapter 149 of the general statutes as a result of any information revealed by such process.

As readers of CTVotersCount know, we have long been supporters of machine assisted auditing.  We are here left to hope that the Secretary and UConn do the right thing i.e. support a method of auditing that is transparent and meets the requirements of evidence based elections, such that the public can verify the results of the audit without depending on officials.  How is that possible? It has been outlined by three leading experts in the field of election auditing and prototyped in CA and CO.

In fact, we provided a bill which included a provision for safe machine assisted auditing this year, S.B. 1041. Even though that bill received wide support and no opposition in testimony, it did not move forward.

If S.B. 1051 moves forward in its current form we are left to hope that the Secretary and UConn will use its provisions to provide safe verifiable auditing.  Yet, left with the concern that they might not, and that some future Secretary and some future UConn scientist or UConn leader collude to disregard science to provide some all but useless, untrustworty version of electronic “black-box” auditing.

CORRECTED: Testimony On Five Bills

Monday I testified to the Government Administration and Elections Committee on five elections bills. For one bill and against four others.

Most of the testimony was on the Secretary of the State’s bill, S.B. 1051, that would turn elections over to a single registrar in each town under the direction of an official appointed by the town council or similar body.

Monday I testified to the Government Administration and Elections Committee on five elections bills. For one bill and against four others.

Most of the testimony was on the Secretary of the State’s bill, S.B. 1051, that would turn elections over to a single registrar in each town under the direction of an official appointed by the town council or similar body. Like the registrars, I testified against that bill. Unlike the registrars, I only favor a couple of the many details in the bill, while they support many of them.

Most of my testimony was on S.B. 1041 which I drafted and was endorsed by the Citizen Audit. It would greatly strengthen the post-election audits, while reducing costs by about 40%. I am pleaed that ROVAC (Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut) endorsed the bill, except for two clauses.(*)

My testimony, which also points to the text of each bill:

https://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/15/03/SB1041ElectronicAudit20150309.pdf
https://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/15/03/SB1042ElectronicAudit20150309.pdf
https://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/15/03/SB1051SingleRegistrar20150309.pdf
https://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/15/03/HB6904SingleRegistrar20150309.pdf
https://ctvoterscount.org/CTVCdata/15/03/HB6950ElectronicAuditCrossEndorsed20150309.pdf

There is also a recording of the nine-hour hearing at CT-N: <video>
I would suggest:
5:50 My Testimony and Matt Waggner the 2nd person after me.
0:00 The Secretary of the State’s Testimony

 (*) An earlier version of this post incorrectly stated that ROVAC subsequently changed its position in later testimony.  (The problem of listening too quickly when bills are numbered 1041 and 1051). We regret the error.

Testimony on two well-intended, yet (hopefully) fatally flawed bills

A week ago Friday, I testified against two well-intended, flawed bills that hopefully will not go forward.  One illustrates a terribly written bill that may have some underlying merit, yet leaves the public with no opportunity to understand the merits, the risks, and propose reasonable solutions.  The other intended to save work for registrars of voters, would not save much work at the expense of the voters and pollworkers.

A week ago Friday, I testified against two well-intended, flawed bills that hopefully will not go forward.  One illustrates a terribly written bill that may have some underlying merit, yet leaves the public with no opportunity to understand the merits, the risks, and propose reasonable solutions.  The other intended to save work for registrars of voters, would not save much work at the expense of the voters and pollworkers.

My prepared remarks:

Chairs and members of the Committee, my name is Luther Weeks. I am Executive Director of CTVotersCount, a webmaster, and a Certified Moderator.

I have three objections to S.B. 27 as drafted.

First, as written the bill is way too broad, likely unconstitutional, and would shut down the Internet as we know it.

Second, Public access to voter lists is an important check – that only qualified individuals are registered and that people that did not vote, are in fact listed as not voting.

Finally, without knowing what might be proposed in a workable, detailed bill, it is difficult to provide testimony to the Committee that would articulate the benefits of keeping some information off the web vs. the risks to democracy of suppressing that information.

The public should have another opportunity to comment on a more fully formed bill.

I oppose S.B. 601. It is intended to reduce work for officials in counting and accounting for multiple votes for cross-endorsed candidates. However, the bill would do little to reduce work for officials and have unintended, negative consequences, especially for voters.

The first thing to note is that our current optical scanners likely cannot meet the certification requirements of this bill. If the certification requirements are interpreted to de-certify our scanners, then until they are replaced, the only legal method for voting in Connecticut would be paper ballots and hand counting.

In any case, S.B. 601 fails to do what the title implies, “eliminate overvoting for a candidate”. It would require a more error prone process than we have today.

It would result in a less positive voting experience for voters and for poll workers as voters are told they have “done something wrong” and need to vote again.

Time savings, if any, would be minimal and offset by increased time explaining the problem to voters, replacing their ballots and added hand counting of more ballots.

This change will be unnecessary, with electronic election night reporting, all calculations would then be handled automatically, relieving moderators of the allocation task.

Several times in the past I have testified against similar bills, pointing out similar concerns.
I encourage you to drop this bill as your predecessors have so wisely done.

Thank you.

You can see my full testimony at <S.B. 27> and <S.B. 601>.  All the testimony at <S.B. 27> <S.B. 601>

For S.B. 27 it is interesting to note than nobody in favor of the bill appeared in person to explain what the bill was intended to prevent.  A few days later, we can deduce the motivation from some of the testimony submitted, <here>.  Unfortunately, the bill is way overkill for the problem.  Perhaps there is a middle ground, yet the public needs access to voter lists including, name, address, age (if not birthdate), party and voting history.  Why should such information only be made available electronically to political parties and candidates, while leaving it only on paper in town hall for voters to check that only eligible citizens are registered and that individuals listed as voting actually did so.  Perhaps sites could be prohibited from posting the list, while the towns or the state required to publish it – in any case, it should already be a crime to use the list other than its intent. It seems that the Senate sponsor was not interested enough in the bill to come or event write testimony in favor of it, nor was anyone who proposed the bill. Hopefully the bill will not move forward, and perhaps someone will write a more reasonable bill, open to more responsive testimony.

Bills similar to S.B. 601 have been proposed in the past.  They actually are designed by the Registrars of Voters Association of Connecticut (ROVAC) to save themselves a small amount of work, imposed by the Legislature.  As you can see from my testimony the scheme would save little work, cause voters work, causes voters disenfranchisement, more work for pollworkers, and may even outlaw our current voting machines.  In any case there are simpler, better solutions, suggested by me and others who testified.  Notice that some registrars testified for the bill, others against, while everyone else, including the municipal clerks association testified against it.

Citizen Audit Cites Improvements, Faults Flaws, in Official Election Audits

SOTS Office makes improvements, significant Registrars of Voters flaws continue

Improvements noted by the Citizen Audit include:

  • Small, yet significant improvements in and corrections to the Official Audit Procedures made by the Secretary of the State’s Office (SOTS Office) at the request of the Citizen Audit.
  • Increased integrity and credibility of the audit based on a Citizen Audit of the random drawing of districts and races. (As reported separately on 1/21/2015)
    • Significantly fewer errors in the random drawing list in November 2014 compared to November 2013.
    • Public and transparent drawing of races to be audited after the November election.

The audit observation report concluded that the official audit results do not inspire confidence after eight years and fourteen audits, because of the continued:

  • Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
  • Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities.
  • Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering such investigations.
  • Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

The audit observations also uncovered tabulator errors and inadequate election procedures which cause some votes for registered write-in candidates to not be counted.

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “We appreciate improvements made by the Secretary of the State’s Office. We remain disappointed after eight years that significant improvements remain to achieve a credible audit, especially by local election officials, in too many municipalities.

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release>
Detail data/municipal reports <Nov> <Aug>

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release>
Detail data/municipal reports <Nov> <Aug>

SOTS Office makes improvements, significant Registrars of Voters flaws continue

Improvements noted by the Citizen Audit include:

  • Small, yet significant improvements in and corrections to the Official Audit Procedures made by the Secretary of the State’s Office (SOTS Office) at the request of the Citizen Audit.
  • Increased integrity and credibility of the audit based on a Citizen Audit of the random drawing of districts and races. (As reported separately on 1/21/2015)
    • Significantly fewer errors in the random drawing list in November 2014 compared to November 2013.
    • Public and transparent drawing of races to be audited after the November election.

The audit observation report concluded that the official audit results do not inspire confidence after eight years and fourteen audits, because of the continued:

  • Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
  • Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities.
  • Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering such investigations.
  • Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

The audit observations also uncovered tabulator errors and inadequate election procedures which cause some votes for registered write-in candidates to not be counted.

Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks stated, “We appreciate improvements made by the Secretary of the State’s Office. We remain disappointed after eight years that significant improvements remain to achieve a credible audit, especially by local election officials, in too many municipalities.

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release>
Detail data/municipal reports <Nov> <Aug>

2nd Graders Draw 77 Districts for Audit – Secretary Draws Races for Audit

DrawingYesterday, four members from the Citizen Audit attended the random drawing of districts and races for the November 2014 post-election audit. The districts were drawn by 2nd graders of Gilead Elementary School in Hebron.

DrawingMapYesterday, four members from the Citizen Audit attended the random drawing of districts and races for the November 2014 post-election audit.  The districts were drawn by 2nd graders of Gilead Elementary School in Hebron.

The students did a great job, replacing the usual contingent of adults from the Citizen Audit.  And when we observe a local audit, we can claim in all honesty, “Somebody else must have drawn your town!”

There were some other changes and surprises as well:

  • Apparently based on urging from the Citizen Audit, Secretary Merrill drew the races for audit in public, providing for public observation of the integrity of the selection.  Previously, in every even year election, those races were selected in secret.
  • Also we were pleased to learn that Secretary’s Office has taken steps to improve the integrity of the random drawing. Once again, based on requests and reports from the Citizen Audit.
  • Finally, both observers and election officials will have to scramble as the audit will need to be performed in just 6 days, compared to the usual 15-21 day period.  The Secretary set that date based on a requirement in the law which was not always followed in the past

Here is the Press Release, with more details and the lists of selected towns. <read>

Op-Ed: End Exemptions To Post-Election Audits

[I]t doesn’t make sense that the Connecticut’s post-election audit law exempts all votes on questions, election day registration, originally hand-counted ballots and absentee ballots from our post-election audit. Election integrity and public confidence demand that all ballots be subject to random selection for audit. Exempt ballots already determine many elections, while the number and percentage of exempt ballots is growing.

Op-Ed for Connecticut Citizen Election Audit published today at CTNewsJunkie

Op-Ed for Connecticut Citizen Election Audit published today at CTNewsJunkie:   <read>

OP-ED | End Exemptions To Post-Election Audits

by Luther Weeks | Oct 15, 2014

When auditing town expense accounts, would it make sense to exempt some departments? When inspecting trucks, would it make sense to exempt school buses? When inspecting restaurants, would it make sense to exempt diners? Any exemption is an opening for errors to go undetected and an opportunity for fraud.

Equally  it doesn’t make sense that the Connecticut’s post-election audit law exempts all votes on questions, election day registration, originally hand-counted ballots and absentee ballots from our post-election audit. Election integrity and public confidence demand that all ballots be subject to random selection for audit. Exempt ballots already determine many elections, while the number and percentage of exempt ballots is growing.

Currently about 9 percent of ballots are absentee ballots, many elections and primaries are decided by much lower margins than 9 percent. If the State enacts early voting, following other states those numbers will almost certainly rise to over 30 percent within a few years. Compare that to the race for governor in 2010, which was officially decided by about 0.6 percent—more than triple the 2000 vote margin necessary for a recanvass. Since Connecticut recently initiated Election Day registration, we can anticipate those votes to reach 10 percent of votes in a few years, which will further add to the totals exempt from the audit.

In 2010, the audit counted over 23,000 ballots from Bridgeport for the governor’s race. We found many counting and accounting errors, especially with emergency paper ballots that were counted by hand on election night. Less known is that a handful of other towns also had similar numbers of emergency hand-counted ballots in 2010. There are hand-counted ballots in every election – all of these are currently exempt from the post-election audits.

Officials in many states hand-count votes accurately in audits, using uniform, proven and effective counting methods. In Connecticut, many municipalities use ad hoc, inadequate methods to manually count ballots. Even under the ideal planned conditions of audits, many officials argue that they cannot count ballots accurately by hand and attribute almost all differences large and small, to their own errors. Many towns manually count large numbers of ballots at the end of a demanding seventeen-hour-plus election day, when there is no expectation, planning, staff, or training to count large numbers of ballots by hand on election night. How many voters are aware that many towns now avoid scanners and hand-count all votes in some primaries? Yet, we have no audit to assess how accurate these manual-counts are.

In November 2012 officials in one town investigated a difference and determined that polling place officials mistakenly read 151 ballots into a scanner a second time. Despite checks that could have caught the error before certification, the discrepancy was not detected until the audit. In another town, a similar error was made in the central count of absentee votes. It was discovered by citizens reviewing election records and resulted in reversing the official result on a highly charged question. How common are such errors? We will never know until we stop exempting absentee ballots and questions from the audit.

The good news is that we do not have to spend more to increase confidence in our elections. Connecticut is one of twenty states with hand-count audits. Our existing audit, at 10 percent of polling places, seems among the strongest. A small state needs to audit more to achieve the same confidence as a large state. This is because the statistical confidence of an audit, just like the confidence of a poll, is more dependent on the number of units counted than on the percent of the votes or voters in the election. We can reduce that 10 percent, even counting fewer total ballots, and gain confidence by subjecting all ballots to audit, while using efficient, proven counting methods.

Luther Weeks is executive director of the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit.