Category: National

Exit Polling Nixed in Middle of Wisconsin Election

Government Accountability Board halts citizen election accountability. Despite prior approval, volunteer citizens group barred from doing what Corporations have been doing for years.

From BradBlog: Wisconsin ‘Government Accountability Board’ Shuts Down Recall Election Exit Polling – Says nonpartisan polling ‘electioneering’ because candidates’ names appear on exit poll ‘ballot’ <read>

According to a press release (see below) issued yesterday by EDA, despite local volunteer pollsters being equipped with copies of GAB regulations and a letter from the head of GAB outlining permission for exit polling, the rules were apparently changed during the day and pollsters forbidden to hand out the exit polling ‘ballot’ voters were asked to complete anonymously.

EDA National Chairperson Sally Castleman told The BRAD BLOG, “The numerous red flags that came to light in the Wisconsin Supreme Court election this spring alerted many Wisconsinites to the need for citizen oversight in their elections. With official vote counts being conducted secretly inside computers, exit polling is one of the very, very few mechanisms left to the public for assessing the legitimacy of official outcomes.” Castleman added, “We need to see this level of public participation all over the nation in order to halt the privatization of our elections.”

From the press release:

Despite having the GAB Regulations (§§5.35 (5), 7.37 (2) ) in hand plus a letter from Kevin Kennedy, head of the GAB, both clearly allowing exit polling, the GAB today through GAB member David Buerger, has said that the group is “electioneering” because candidates names appear on the polling “ballot.” He further dictated that no voter would be allowed to touch an exit poll ballot, that pollsters can only verbally ask the voters their responses. This despite the fact that Edison-Mitofsky, the polling company commissioned by the Media Consortium to conduct Exit Polling nationally over the last many years, uses written polling ballots that the voters fill in themselves.

The polls were being run by concerned Wisconsin citizens volunteering under the guidance of Election Defense Alliance and Protect California Ballots, two non-partisan organizations with the mission of restoring transparency to our elections. Both organizations have run non-partisan exit polls many times in the past in close to a dozen states. Neither group has ever been harassed in such a way before.

“This is reasoning beyond specious”, said Jonathan Simon, Director of Election Defense Alliance. “Exit polling in this country has been going on for decades. To call it ‘electioneering’ simply because candidates names appear on the poll ballot, when all names appear without any advocacy involved, is absurd. This is concealment in OUR elections. Public participation is being forbidden!”

And from the press release, related charges we have not seen elsewhere which require more detail for verification:

Despite the fact that the law says a photo ID is requested but not required for this election, reports have been received from Glendale that voters are not being allowed to vote without photo ID.

In another related story, robo-calls, reportedly coming from Virginia, are being made to Democrats throughout the primary districts today telling them not to vote today because an absentee ballot is in the mail.

Update: Here is another story on those robo calls: <read>

The phone calls, which were traced to a tele­mar­ket­ing com­pany in Vir­ginia, car­ried the fol­low­ing mes­sage from Wis­con­sin Right to Life exec­u­tive direc­tor Bar­bara Lyons:

Hello, this is Bar­bara Lyons from Wis­con­sin Right to Life. I’m call­ing today to let you know that you will be receiv­ing an absen­tee bal­lot appli­ca­tion for the upcom­ing recall elec­tions in the mail in the next few days. These recall elec­tions are very impor­tant and vot­ing absen­tee will ensure that your vote is counted and that we can main­tain a pro-family, pro-life state Sen­ate. We hope that we can count on you to com­plete that appli­ca­tion and send it back to us within seven days. Thank you for your sup­port. Wis­con­sin Right to Life can be reached by call­ing 877–855-5007.

…“Wis­con­sin Right to Life con­demns blog­gers who are falsely and viciously report­ing that Wis­con­sin Right to Life is mak­ing calls telling peo­ple not to vote today. That is com­pletely untrue,” Lyons said . “Wis­con­sin Right to Life has not ever and is not now mak­ing phone calls to sup­press votes.”

Round-Up: O Me O My O – Errors in Jersey and Fraud in Ohio

We frequently highlight stories of election error and fraud nationwide. We do this as a service to provide references to counter the frequent statements from election officials and legislators claiming no record of such errors and fraud.

Editor’s Note: We frequently highlight stories of election error and fraud nationwide. We do this  as a service to provide references to counter the  frequent statements from election officials and legislators claiming no record of such errors and fraud.

O Me O My O –  How They Add Votes In Ohio

Secretary of State turns investigation over to prosecutors: Elections chief suspects voter fraud – Secretary of State seeks criminal investigation <read>

Looks like certain fraud and perhaps a strong case for prosecution:

Ohio Secretary of State Jon Husted wants the attorney general and the Lawrence County Prosecutor to determine if a group of Democrats attempted voter fraud in the 2010 general election.

If so, it could mean prison time and a fine for anyone convicted of these crimes.

On Tuesday Husted turned over to Mike DeWine and J.B. Collier the findings of his investigation into the applications of 119 Lawrence County absentee ballots for further review and possible prosecution…

At issue are applications for absentee ballots that were sent to two post office boxes — 42 were sent to a box in the name of Ironton resident Charles Maynard and 77 were sent to a box in the name of Russell Bennett of Chesapeake during the fall of 2010.

“Of the 77 absentee ballot applications marked to be sent to Russ Bennett’s P.O. Box, 68 reportedly were hand-delivered to the Lawrence County Board of Elections office by a man named Butch Singer,” according to the letter sent to Mike DeWine and J.B. Collier.

In October a board of elections employee noticed that the handwriting in the “Send Ballot To” portion of the applications differed from that in the section with the voter’s name. The board then contacted 10 voters to see where they wanted their ballot sent.

“All 10 voters replied that they wanted their ballots mailed to them at their home address, suggesting that the ‘Send Ballot To’ portion of the absentee ballot application was completed after the voters filled in their application form,” Husted’s letter states.

Incidents like this demonstrate the reality of absentee/mail voting risks and why we would limit such voting to those genuinely unable to vote in person.

Humans and Machines Err In Garden State

In New Jersey, a voting machine is misprogrammed, then apparently a faulty or lax pre-election test fails to recognize the error.  Finally, the surprise result causes an investigation: “Human error” found in Fairfield election results <read>

A supposed malfunction of the problematic and much-debated Sequoia AVC Advantage voting machines is being chalked up to human error.

Results from Primary Election day last month puzzled two candidates who expected the exact opposite. Less than a month later, there’s a line in the sand being drawn between a second election and inspection of the voting machine itself.

“On Election Day, the votes cast for Candidates Vivian and Mark Henry registered for Candidates Cynthia and Ernest Zirkle, respectively,” read a statement addressed to all affected by the Democratic County Committee election in Fairfield.

According to documents provided to The News, Cumberland County Board of Elections Director Lizbeth Hernandez takes responsibility and regrets a pre-election programming error.

Attached to a legal petition filed by the Zirkles were 28 affidavits from voters swearing they supported the two candidates.

Those 28 votes of the 43 total cast on June 7 make up the majority.

How frequently do such errors occur? We have no way of knowing. The good news is that in this instance the error was discovered and will be corrected. Yet, it is rare that so few voters are involved and that such strong evidence can be developed so that an investigation is initiated. Since New Jersey has paperless touch screen voting machines a re-vote will be required.

There is a tendency to dismiss these errors as “only” “human errors”, just as we dismiss transportation accidents as pilot, controller, or engineer errors. However, whatever role inadequate human capabilities or inadequate systems play in the equation, these are voting integrity issues that can be significantly reduced with better procedures, training, and systems, along with corrective measures like paper ballots and post-election audits.

Here in Connecticut we have paper ballots so that if such a problem were discovered we would not need a re-vote, just a recanvass or a recount. Yet we have little no reason to celebrate. We have many referendums  or special elections in single towns with all memory cards programmed identically. In many cases there is no obvious reason to believe, let alone realistically prove, which candidate or decision “should” have won – too  close an election or too many voters to realistically get enough  affidavits.  And referendums and special elections are exempt from post-election audits such as they are.

David Jefferson: Email Voting — A National Security Threat in Government Elections

While all Internet voting systems are vulnerable to such attacks and thus should be unacceptable to anyone, email voting is by far the worst Internet voting choice from a national security point of view since it is the easiest to attack in the largest number of different ways.

Security expert David Jefferson, articulates the vulnerabilities of email voting, perhaps the most vulnerable form of Internet voting (and that is saying a lot, since all forms of Internet voting are very risky). <read>

David Jefferson is a computer scientist and researcher at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California where he studies cyber security and ways to protect the nation’s military, civilian, and government networks from cyber attack.  He is also the Chairman of the Board of Verified Voting, and has been studying electronic and Internet voting for over a decade, advising five successive California Secretaries of State on voting technology issues.

Excerpts:

Neither the Internet itself, nor voters’ computers, nor the email vote collection servers are secure against any of a hundred different cyber attacks that might be launched by anyone in the world from a self-aggrandizing loner to a foreign intelligence agency. Such an attack might allow automated and undetectable modification or loss of any or all of the votes transmitted.

While all Internet voting systems are vulnerable to such attacks and thus should be unacceptable to anyone, email voting is by far the worst Internet voting choice from a national security point of view since it is the easiest to attack in the largest number of different ways.

The technical points I am about to state are not my opinions alone. The computer security research community in the U.S. is essentially unanimous in its condemnation of any currently feasible form of Internet voting, but most especially of email voting. I strongly urge legislators in states considering e-mail voting to request testimony from other independent computer network security experts who are not affiliated with or paid by any voting system vendor. Email voting is extremely dangerous in ways that people without strong technical background are not likely to anticipate.

Here are the problems with email voting:

1. Lack of privacy:

2. Vote manipulation while in transit:

3. Server penetration attacks:

4. Ballot files can carry malware into the election network:

5. Voters’ computers infected with malware:

6. Denial of service attacks:

7. Email ballots are unauditable; attacks are undetectable and irreparable:

8. Multiple simultaneous attacks:

9. These facts will not change:

10. Similar problems with FAX voting:

11. Move toward Internet distribution of blank ballots.

For these reasons I strongly urge states that do not currently provide for email voting not to start down that path. In my professional opinion this path leads only to a major risk to U.S. national security, exposing our elections to easy manipulation by anyone in the world.

Voter fraud? Or thinly disguised agenda?

Where there is smoke we expect fire. Where there are extraordinary claims we need at least reasonable evidence.

From New Mexico, officials claim voter fraud, but withhold evidence: In voter fraud case, officials err on the side of secrecy <read>

My efforts to obtain the evidence behind Secretary of State Dianna Duran’s claim that she has found instances of foreign nationals illegally voting have been shot down again, this time by the Taxation and Revenue Department

Two months ago I asserted that Secretary of State Dianna Duran failed the open government test because she put a number of hurdles – some of them illegal – in front of my efforts to obtain the “evidence” she claims to have found of foreign nationals illegally voting in elections.

Where there is smoke we expect fire. Where there are extraordinary claims we need at least reasonable evidence.

Will Internet voting cost small Canadian town $10,000 to 30,000?

No. That is the estimated cost of the “business case”. It sounds like they are asking the right questions, but may be getting in over their head in doing the “business case”.

As CTVotersCount readers know, our Secretary of the State has been charged by the Legislature “within available appropriations, recommend a method to allow for on-line voting by military personnel stationed out of state”. Its quite a task to do what the Defense Department, scientists, and security experts say cannot be done with today’s technology, at any cost, while taking resources from operations and other initiatives to make the report.

Grande Prairie, Alberta, Canada is considering the same thing for its elections, but wisely is considering funding a detailed business case, including security and recountability before proceeding: <read>

Munic­i­pal Affairs Min­is­ter Hec­tor Goudreau requested the busi­ness case in order to for­mal­ize a city request to pilot online voting.

“The busi­ness case would need to address the per­ti­nent issues, such as the need for Inter­net vot­ing in the city, who is the licensed provider, how is secu­rity guar­an­teed, how is voter val­i­da­tion dealt with, what are the costs, and how are results ver­i­fied and recounts con­ducted,” Goudreau wrote.

The estimated costs of the business case?

Audrey Cerny, City Hall’s leg­isla­tive ser­vices man­ager, told the com­mit­tee it would take at least four to five weeks of staff time to develop a busi­ness case. But she said it is pos­si­ble to develop one that is less costly than the esti­mated $30,000.

“It is depend­ing on how much exter­nal con­sul­tant time is needed,” she said. “If the con­sul­tant is uti­lized for a fewer num­ber of days, the costs obvi­ously could be lower. So essen­tially it could be $10,000.”

In order for the province to study the con­cept and make a deci­sion in time for the 2013 munic­i­pal elec­tion, a busi­ness case would have to be fin­ished by Sep­tem­ber or Octo­ber, she said. That means an out­side con­sul­tant would be necessary.

“There’s no guar­an­tee (our) inter­nal resources may be able to fully com­plete this with­out using an exter­nal con­sul­tant,” she said.

It sounds like they are asking the right questions, but may be getting in over their head in doing the “business case”. We are bit skeptical that it can be done will for $30,000 or $10,000. Yet, perhaps with effective research into what others have tried a general cost estimate can be obtained and a review of the the security risks can be developed. They should also be wary of the vendor being selected as part of the business case, or of relying on vendors for “helping” with the security and recount portions of the evaluation.

How Anonymous Are Paper Ballots?

A new research report brings into question the degree of anonymity in paper ballots. The finding raises potential concerns for states and election jurisdictions considering the merits of either making ballots available for public review or releasing them under freedom of information requests. We find reasons for concern with ballot anonymity and reasons for skepticism that the result will hold under additional research.

A new research report brings into question the degree of anonymity in paper ballots:  New Research Result: Bubble Forms Not So Anonymous <read overview> <report>

From the overview:

Today, Joe Calandrino, Ed Felten and I are releasing a new result regarding the anonymity of fill-in-the-bubble forms. These forms, popular for their use with standardized tests, require respondents to select answer choices by filling in a corresponding bubble. Contradicting a widespread implicit assumption, we show that individuals create distinctive marks on these forms, allowing use of the marks as a biometric. Using a sample of 92 surveys, we show that an individual’s markings enable unique re-identification within the sample set more than half of the time. The potential impact of this work is as diverse as use of the forms themselves, ranging from cheating detection on standardized tests to identifying the individuals behind “anonymous” surveys or election ballots.

The data is based on a sample of 92 ballots filled out at the same time, on the same form, using the same writing instrument:

To test the limits of our analysis approach, we obtained a set of 92 surveys and extracted 20 bubbles from each of those surveys. We set aside 8 bubbles per survey to test our identification accuracy and trained our model on the remaining 12 bubbles per survey…

Additional testing—particularly using forms completed at different times—is necessary to assess the real-world impact of this work. Nevertheless, the strength of these preliminary results suggests both positive and negative implications depending on the application. For standardized tests, the potential impact is largely positive. Imagine that a student takes a standardized test, performs poorly, and pays someone to repeat the test on his behalf. Comparing the bubble marks on both answer sheets could provide evidence of such cheating. A similar approach could detect third-party modification of certain answers on a single test.

The possible impact on elections using optical scan ballots is more mixed. One positive use is to detect ballot box stuffing—our methods could help identify whether someone replaced a subset of the legitimate ballots with a set of fraudulent ballots completed by herself. On the other hand, our approach could help an adversary with access to the physical ballots or scans of them to undermine ballot secrecy. Suppose an unscrupulous employer uses a bubble form employment application. That employer could test the markings against ballots from an employee’s jurisdiction to locate the employee’s ballot. This threat is more realistic in jurisdictions that release scans of ballots.

The finding raises potential concerns for states and election jurisdictions considering the merits of either making ballots available for public review or releasing them under freedom of information requests. We find reasons for concern with ballot anonymity and reasons for skepticism that the result will hold under additional research. Before concluding a number of serious implications, it is critical to do longitudinal studies, as recommended in the report, and to study several other challenging dimensions.  Considerations and directions include:

  • On a small sample, a 51% chance of the most likely individual being correctly identified may not be all that useful, not knowing which 51% are the correct identifications.
  • How does the probability of the detection of correct correspondent vary with the number of voters? 100, 200, 400, 800 etc.
  • Are there classes of voters that clump and are hard to distinguish and others that are fairly unique?  Is this similar to blood type classifications, with more types, but much less distinct classes? Or is it similar to DNA with many variations, but again nowhere near as distinct?
  • From looking at a lot of ballots in audits and recanvasses it is clear to me that people do make consistent marks in bubbles on a single ballot, with a single instrument, on a single day, however:
    • Do voters make the same marks over time and in different contexts?
    • To what extent do single voters or collective groups of voters fill in bubbles the same way from election to election?  I suspect it varies from person to person as well,. For me I suspect I am very inconsistent from election to election, except that I do tend to fill in complete bubbles – which would place me in a large class of voters difficult to distinguish individually.
    • Filling out an SAT or survey can be quite different than voting. In an SAT we think more and in different ways, under much more stress. In a survey we may hardly think or care at all.
  • In Connecticut we use felt tip pens in polling places. To what extent does such a thicker instrument make the classification more or less accurate? I would suspect the thicker the instrument the more difficult the classification in general.
  • In longitudinal studies (using forms filled out on different occasions, days, weeks, months, or years apart): How much more difficult is identification when the instrument varies? e.g. Felt tip pens can be drier or wetter, vary in thickness based on use.  Pencils can vary by sharpness, vary by manufacturer. Pens and pencil marks may vary in the way the instrument is be able to be gripped or is gripped on a particular occasion.
  • What good are past examples from one type of test/ballot type to another?  I suspect difficulties based on bubble size, bubble shape, rectangles, or connecting lines – even shape of ballot/test form, layout, lighting, sitting vs. standing etc.
  • For example, let us say an employer, union, government entity, criminal enterprise, or church wanted to use this method to test votes of individual employees/members, without their knowledge. What accuracy/confidence could they expect with samples from presumably a small subset of voters in a precinct when attempting to identify their ballots in a sea of ballots filled out by other voters?

More research is necessary before we can conclude the degree to which bubble analysis can be used to identify voters.  Even so there would be trade-offs between public the positive value and risks of public availability of ballots for review. There are mechanisms of election transparency short of public disclosure of complete paper ballots  – methods which could reduce risks but at some risks to credibility and transparency. Of course we could eliminate paper ballots all together and take the greater risks of errors, skulduggery, and lack of confidence of electronic voting like we have seen in recently in New Jersey, last year in Kentucky and several years ago in Sarasota.

Flip-Flopping has its place, but not in voting

Reading and listening to the media we are led to believe that flip-flopping is the worst possible political sin. Wrong. Much of the time we spend writing, voice-mailing, or speaking with legislators is working to convince them to understand a more complete picture; to change their positions on issues.

Brad Friedman covers the case of a voting machine flip-flopping in Los Vegas and the history of flip-flopping and completely missing votes: Las Vegas Mayoral Candidate Sees Own Vote Flipped to Opponent on Touch-screen Voting Machine <read>

It took two tries, but Carolyn Goodman, candidate for Mayor of Las Vegas, and wife of current Mayor Oscar Goodman, was finally able to vote for herself today on Nevada’s illegally-certified, 100% unverifiable Sequoia AVC Edge touch-screen voting machines. At least she thinks she did. Whether her vote will actually be counted for her is something that nobody can ever know…

The failure that Goodman had, and noticed, is just the latest in a string of celebs and candidates who have had similar problems with 100% unverifiable voting machines — as still used by some 20 to 30% of voters in the U.S. — either flipping their vote, or not allowing them to vote at all…

[Randy] Wooten was running for mayor in the rural Poinsett County town with a population of just 80 people that year, when he learned, after the close of polls on Election Night, that he had received a grand total of ZERO votes, as reported by the county’s ES&S iVotronic touch-screen voting systems.

As AP noted at the time Wooten said, “I had at least eight or nine people who said they voted for me, so something is wrong with this picture.” Among those people who Wooten believed had voted for him: himself and his wife.

In Praise Of Flip-Flopping

Reading and listening to the media we are led to believe that flip-flopping is the worst possible political sin. Wrong. Much of the time we spend writing, voice-mailing, or speaking with legislators is working to convince them to understand a more complete picture; to change their positions on issues.

In 2005, Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, publicly tested and was about to choose unverifiable touch screen (DRE) voting machines similar to those in Los Vegas – then she looked at the evidence, considered additional information from vocal advocates, and flip-flopped. That is why we have voter verifiable paper ballots and optical scanners in Connecticut, with a side benefit of saving about half the cost of DREs.

Welcome to Post-Confidence Elections

Laws and procedures which are not enforced for elections in the name of “trust us” and “it would be too much work”, are no more real than the laws and Constitutional provisions ignored in the name of national security. “It is time to learn from this recount, fix the problems it uncovered and ensure that future elections are different.”

Monday, Tom Englehardt wrote  a post: Welcome to Post-Legal America, subtitled: Dumb Question of the Twenty-first Century: Is It Legal? Post-Legal America and the National Security Complex <read>

Is the Libyan war legal? Was Bin Laden’s killing legal? Is it legal for the president of the United States to target an American citizen for assassination? Were those “enhanced interrogation techniques” legal? These are all questions raised in recent weeks. Each seems to call out for debate, for answers. Or does it?…

My answer is this: they are irrelevant. Think of them as twentieth-century questions that don’t begin to come to grips with twenty-first century American realities. In fact, think of them, and the very idea of a nation based on the rule of law, as a reflection of nostalgia for, or sentimentality about, a long-lost republic. At least in terms of what used to be called “foreign policy,” and more recently “national security,” the United States is now a post-legal society…

It’s easy enough to explain what I mean. If, in a country theoretically organized under the rule of law, wrongdoers are never brought to justice and nobody is held accountable for possibly serious crimes, then you don’t have to be a constitutional law professor to know that its citizens actually exist in a post-legal state. If so, “Is it legal?” is the wrong question to be asking, even if we have yet to discover the right one.

Then today, news that the “apparent” loser in the Wisconsin Supreme Court recount decided concede and not to pursue legal challenges. <Brad Blog overview and details> Sadly we agree with the candidate’s logic. From her statement:

Wis. Stat. §5.01(1) provides that the state election laws “shall be construed so as to give effect to the will of the electors, if that can be ascertained, notwithstanding informality or failure to comply with some of its provisions.” It is questionable whether even the statewide extent of noncompliance uncovered by this recount would cross the bar raised by this statutory language. Moreover, Wisconsin courts have held that absent connivance, fraud or undue influence, substantial compliance with the statutory voting procedures is sufficient.

Which brings me to Waukesha and the question of whether– or if — there was manipulation of some ballots, given the fact that so many bags were unsealed to the point of being wide open. Here again, evidence of opportunity to manipulate or alter ballots is not enough. There would have to be compelling proof that the integrity of the ballots has been compromised. The numerous glaring anomalies in Waukesha certainly warrant further, independent investigation. However, the defects or irregularities in the sealing and securing of the ballot bags, as documented in the recount minutes, would not be sufficient to meet the threshold set by law.

As an attorney, as an officer of the court and as someone who understands both the power and the limits of the law, it is my obligation to evaluate and recognize the legal grounds on which I can and cannot act. I have reviewed the record, the evidence and the law. It would serve no purpose to bring a suit with insufficient legal basis. That is not the kind of lawyer I am.

I suppose it depends on what “substantial” means in “substantial compliance”.

Reading the story of the recount and the election itself, leaves us with little reason to have confidence that elections run like this one in Wisconsin, with fallible accounting and the lack of ballot security result in the winner actually chosen by the people. We have no reason to believe this election is atypical for Wisconsin – just that initial numbers were close enough to require a recount, so critical to receive national attention. Like the candidate, JoAnn Kloppenburg, we cannot say that the result is incorrect, only that elections run this way provide no confidence in the system and could be incorrect by error or won by skulduggery.

Wisconsin is not alone. The chain of custody and security of ballots in Connecticut is no more reliable than  in Wisconsin. Until election administration and security is fixed in every jurisdiction in the Nation, we are now knowingly in the era of post-confidence elections. Kloppenburg has asked that the system be improved:

We did the right thing in asking for a recount in this very, very close election. The recount shed light on significant and widespread issues with elections in Wisconsin. The magnitude of those issues surprised clerks, election volunteers, and observers from both campaigns. The problems and gaps ought to be addressed as quickly as possible. And they ought to be fixed.

That is why my campaign is submitting a letter to the Government Accountability Board which summarizes the anomalies, irregularities and in some cases the unexplained mysteries uncovered in this recount. I call on the GAB to take action, along with local clerks, to improve the security, accountability and transparency of the election process in Wisconsin, and to ensure that every vote counts and is counted accurately. The GAB must improve compliance with basic election procedures.

We are also doing the right thing by declining to pursue legal action. Based on the record established in this recount and based on Wisconsin law, the will of the electors has been determined. It is time to learn from this recount, fix the problems it uncovered and ensure that future elections are different.

A good start would be appropriate penalties for officials at all levels responsible for breaking security and the law, followed by sufficient improved election procedures which are enforceable and actually enforced. Penalties should fit the consequences of the loss of public confidence in the system and the consequences of the potential for incorrect or fraudulent election results.

Laws and procedures which are not enforced for elections in the name of “trust us” and “it would be too much work”, are no more real than the laws and Constitutional provisions ignored in the name of national security.

Podcast: Talk of the Nation: Voter fraud, voter ID, and absentee voting fraud.

The main arguments are presented from both sides. We believe that the case for significant individual voter fraud has not been made. Yet, it is appropriate that the debate continue, with more details than can be covered in a half-hour segment. Everyone agreed that absentee ballot fraud is significant and frequent, much more extensive than individual voter fraud. That is the primary reason we oppose any form of increased mail-in voting, including no-excuse absentee voting.

Talk of the Nation held a discussion yesterday by proponents and opponents of voter ID laws, now passed and proposed in several states, Voter ID Debate Ramping Up Again For 2012 <listen>

Most of the hour is devoted to a discussion/debate on the merits of voter ID.  The main arguments are presented from both sides. We oppose voter ID. We believe that the case for significant individual voter fraud has not been made, (was not successfully made on this show), that in fact there is little individual voter fraud, and that many would be disenfranchised by voter ID. Yet, it is appropriate that the debate continue, with more details than can be covered in a half-hour segment.

In the last minutes of the debate, everyone agreed that absentee ballot fraud is significant and frequent, much more extensive than individual voter fraud. That is the primary reason we oppose any form of increased mail-in voting, including no-excuse absentee voting. Absentee voting risks also deserve an extended debate.

Brad Friedman questions value of “Faith Based ‘Recount'” – we agree.

What’s the point of having a “recount”, or of using security procedures and physical seals for the ballots after the election, if violations of those procedures and seals are of little concern to the state’s top election agency?

Brad Friedman at BradBlog provides updates on the lack of integrity in the Wisconsin Recount: Tale of the Tapes: Wisconsin’s ‘Dog-and-Pony Show’ Faith-Based Supreme Court Election ‘Recount’ <read>

What’s the point of having a “recount”, or of using security procedures and physical seals for the ballots after the election, if violations of those procedures and seals are of little concern to the state’s top election agency?

Worse, if the results printed on the poll tapes are the ultimate proof of the accuracy of results, what happens when — as discovered among poll tapes from the City of Pewaukee in Waukesha County late last week — the “recount” uncovers “Official Results Report” poll tapes dated a full seven days before the actual election was held?

Or, worse still, what happens when poll tapes failed to print at all on Election Day, as has been seen in a number of towns across the state?…

Faith-Based ‘Recounts’

“Even if the container or [ballot] bag is somehow opened later, or if the chain of custody is broken,” the G.A.B. wrote on their website in response to the concerns late last week, “election officials have the original print-out tape from the machine, as well as the electronic memory device from the machine. This enables election officials to determine the election night vote count.”

Setting aside that the “recount” process in WI does not include examination of “the electronic memory device from the machine[s]” at all, the print-out tapes from the systems may enable election officials to know what the tabulation machines reported — either accurately or inaccurately — as the “election night vote count”, but do those digital elements actually tell us what the intent of voters was? If they do, then why bother to have a “recount” at all?

“If the ballots had been tampered with between the election and the recount, there would be a break in the chain of custody and an unexplained difference in the results [of the ‘recount’],” says the G.A.B., suggesting that they seem to have little or no idea how election fraud may be carried out under their very own noses…

As if the opened ballot bags, missing and scratched-out serial numbers, and mis-dated poll tapes aren’t enough, the minutes from the “recounts” in three different cities in two different counties have revealed that the so-called “Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trails” on touch-screen voting machines didn’t actually print at all, because the paper rolls were inserted backwards.

Most disturbingly, no one noticed or bothered to complain about it during the election! What does that tell us about the validity of the so-called “paper trails” printed out with touch-screen voting machines in Wisconsin, and the many other states which use the exact same unverifiable voting systems?

We are always told we can “trust” the results of 100% unverifiable touch-screen voting machines because voters review the “paper record” before they hit the “Cast Vote!” button. Unfortunately, as we’ve been explaining for years, no, they don’t — and here, once again, is more evidence…

And if these new photos of duct taped ballot bags from the Village of Menomonee Falls in, you guessed it, Waukesha County (as taken by an observer who has asked not to be identified) doesn’t “invoke confidence”, we don’t know what will…

Sadly there is no reason to believe that a full statewide recanvass in Connecticut would generate more confidence than the recount in Wisconsin. Our observations of recanvasses reveals huge variations in the process from municipality to municipality, especially in the quality of the review of ballots for marks that might not have been read correctly by the machines. Also the Coalition observations of post-election audits continue to demonstrate concerns with ballot chain of custody.