GOOGLE: Internet Attacked; Activists Targeted; Freedom To Be Restored

Google disclosed significant attacks on their servers and GMail, along with attacks on other corporations. They will change their policy limiting the freedom of Chinese citizens. Another demonstration that the risk to democracy posed by Internet voting is not just a possibility voiced by computer scientists and security experts.

Google disclosed significant attacks on their servers and GMail, along with attacks on other corporations.  They will change their policy limiting the freedom of Chinese citizens.  Another demonstration that the risk to democracy posed by Internet voting is not just a possibility voiced by computer scientists and security experts.

Google announcement: A new approach to China <read>

Like many other well-known organizations, we face cyber attacks of varying degrees on a regular basis. In mid-December, we detected a highly sophisticated and targeted attack on our corporate infrastructure originating from China that resulted in the theft of intellectual property from Google. However, it soon became clear that what at first appeared to be solely a security incident–albeit a significant one–was something quite different.

First, this attack was not just on Google. As part of our investigation we have discovered that at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of businesses–including the Internet, finance, technology, media and chemical sectors–have been similarly targeted. We are currently in the process of notifying those companies, and we are also working with the relevant U.S. authorities.

Second, we have evidence to suggest that a primary goal of the attackers was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists. Based on our investigation to date we believe their attack did not achieve that objective. Only two Gmail accounts appear to have been accessed, and that activity was limited to account information (such as the date the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of emails themselves.

Third, as part of this investigation but independent of the attack on Google, we have discovered that the accounts of dozens of U.S.-, China- and Europe-based Gmail users who are advocates of human rights in China appear to have been routinely accessed by third parties. These accounts have not been accessed through any security breach at Google, but most likely via phishing scams or malware placed on the users’ computers…

These attacks and the surveillance they have uncovered–combined with the attempts over the past year to further limit free speech on the web–have led us to conclude that we should review the feasibility of our business operations in China. We have decided we are no longer willing to continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and so over the next few weeks we will be discussing with the Chinese government the basis on which we could operate an unfiltered search engine within the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well mean having to shut down Google.cn, and potentially our offices in China.

Our earlier coverage of the risks of the Internet and Internet voting. <Obama/Government Concerns> <Bankers Concerned>

Update: NPR Fresh Air: Fighting Cybercrime, One Digital Thug At A Time <Read or Listen>

Attacking corporate Web sites and stealing personal financial information is no longer just the work of hackers. These days the mob is also taking an interest…

They’ve argued for years that increasingly organized bands of hackers are a threat to everyone who uses the Internet, from individual consumers to banks and credit card companies, to the U.S. government.

Joseph Menn is a journalist who covers cyber-security and other technology issues for the Financial Times. His new book, “Fatal System Error,” is a look at the hacker underworld where cyber-criminals in the former Soviet bloc and elsewhere commit extortion, fraud, identity theft and even politically motivated attacks on the Web sites of governments and dissidents…

DAVIES: Right. Now, of course, the critical question there is how does one of these miscreants, these cyber-criminals, get control of thousands of computers to simultaneously try to log onto your Web site and thus overload it?

Mr.?LYON: It’s there’s unlimited ways to do it. These guys have these very sophisticated, amazing softwares that basically can hunt down computers on the Internet that have real common holes in them and then remotely install software that allows them to control those computers.

DAVIES: Right, and the term for someone whose computer has been a computer that’s been taken over by an external operator is a bot, as in robot, right?

Mr.?LYON: Yeah, they’re basically a bot. They’re kind of a tool for your, you know, your whims.

DAVIES: Right, and just to make this clear, we’re talking about this could be many listeners in our audience, for example, who might have been happily using their computers for months, not knowing that somebody somewhere, maybe in Ukraine, has had some program, has gotten into their computer and is actually, without them knowing it, using their computer to flood some Internet site somewhere as part as part of an extortion effort.

Mr.?LYON: Yeah, I mean, that’s exactly how it works, and it’s not necessarily like the person in Estonia is logged in to your computer and running it physically. Their your computer has a little piece of software that links into another location that kind of aggregates them all together so you can send commands in a mob or in a mass and say, basically broadcast a message saying, okay, all you computers go and attack this.

Are  you sure your computer is safe?  If you are a Military or Overseas voter are you sure your computer or the one you are using has not been hacked to change your vote or throw it out if it is for the “wrong” candidate?

Failing that perhaps the Russians help attack candidate web sites and Chinese will just continue to steal our business and military web sites (covered in the NPR story).

The [security] industry is paranoid…the Internet was not built for this purpose [security].

All Things Considered, Not Such A Good MOVE?

Veterans, military dependents and other U.S. civilians living overseas will have to as well. Changes in federal law mandate that voters must request a new absentee ballot each year in order to participate in state and federal elections, instead of the previous practice of requiring new applications only every few years.

We have criticized Connecticut officials for supporting the well intended, yet flawed, Military and Overseas Voters Empowerment Act (MOVE)  because of provisions which open the door to unproven Internet voting which threatens democracy.  Supporters of the act tell us we should accept the risks of Internet voting pilot programs, because the rest of the bill would help our troops overcome problems they have had in getting their votes in by election deadlines.

Now we learn of a flaw in the bill which will actually make it more difficult for military and overseas voters to vote this year. Direct from the Stars and Stripes: Overseas military will have to register again to get ballots this year <read>

Veterans, military dependents and other U.S. civilians living overseas will have to as well. Changes in federal law mandate that voters must request a new absentee ballot each year in order to participate in state and federal elections, instead of the previous practice of requiring new applications only every few years.

“The message is for military voters to send in that (federal postcard application) as soon as possible, because they won’t be able to vote without it,” said Bob Carey, director of the Federal Voting Assistance Program. “You need to submit a new postcard every year, and every time you change duty stations, and every time you move.”

Veterans, military dependents and other U.S. civilians living overseas will have to as well. Changes in federal law mandate that voters must request a new absentee ballot each year in order to participate in state and federal elections, instead of the previous practice of requiring new applications only every few years.

“The message is for military voters to send in that (federal postcard application) as soon as possible, because they won’t be able to vote without it,” said Bob Carey, director of the Federal Voting Assistance Program. “You need to submit a new postcard every year, and every time you change duty stations, and every time you move.”

Detroit: The Limitations of Paper Ballots and Recounts

The value of paper ballots and recounts depends on the chain-of-custody and the integrity of election officials. Bev Harris reports in a letter the almost unbelievable, sad situation in a Detroit Mayoral race recount

The value of paper ballots and recounts depends on the chain-of-custody and the integrity of election officials.  Bev Harris reports in a letter the almost unbelievable, sad situation in a Detroit Mayoral race recount: <read>

From: Bev Harris
Subject: BBV Bulletin: DETROIT – CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION REQUESTED FOR ELECTIONS VIOLATIONS

…Ex-candidate Tom Barrow has filed a formal request for investigation along with stunning documentation of chain of custody breach in the recent Detroit mayoral election. Black Box Voting has been in close contact with Barrow, and we will be reviewing additional documents related to this case. The allegations are fascinating…

the full complaint and its accompanying Exhibit provides a pretty good primer for citizens and candidates who want to watchdog elections. Full details of the 79-point complaint…

#13 – Throughout the day, O’Hara, McDonald and Butler reported observing numerous individuals with large bags and back packs entering and remaining in the absentee counting station area. They also reported that at 8pm, the counting room security completely broke down and the general public was permitted to freely access the restricted access areas

# 23 – three people from ES&S, (the voting equipment computer company) had just signed in at 7:55 am along with one more individual from Premier. [note that the location uses ES&S machines, but not Premier machines; why were technicians entering the building, and why was anyone from Premier there at all?] …

# 44. … notwithstanding the seal differences, nearly all of the cases opened were disallowed and deemed not able to be recounted because there were significant discrepancies between the number of voters in the poll books and the number of voter ballots in the case along with other violations. # 48. Now broadly suspicious, Complainant without anyone’s knowledge created his own informal security system to reveal to him of any breaches to the building after hours…

# 74. Finally, on Monday, December 21, 2009, Complainant and his Team arrived at the recount location to obtain an explanation of why numerous time clocks on numerous polling computers showed dates and times which seemingly indicated that the polls had been electronically closed hours before the statutory required 8pm poll closing time…

# 76. Complainant immediately confronted county recount election staff who called the weekend security guard. After speaking with the guard in full sight of the room of observers, Ms Cynthia Hawthorne, explained to the room of over 30 people that the guard just admitted to her that 2 people had indeed come to the door, the door was opened and the guard invited the strangers in and allowed them to tour the “secure” area … Footnote # (10) Indeed, precinct 20-04 [certified as having hundreds of ballots] was an empty case with no voted, unused or spoiled ballots inside.

Detroit seems blatant, however, it takes just one failure in ballot integrity to bring an election result into question.  We have  our own chain-of-custody issues in Connecticut as well: <Haddam> <Coalition Audit Report>

Do Voters Deserve Same Protections As Small Businesses, Schools, and Non-Profits?

The American Bankers Association has issued guidelines that small businesses should use separate computers for banking transactions to avoid viruses that can steal funds.

The American Bankers Association has issued guidelines that small businesses should use separate computers for banking transactions to avoid viruses that can steal funds.

UPI: Businesses warned about online banking <read>

The FBI and the American Bankers Association have issued a warning to small business owners to use a separate computer for online banking.

Small businesses, as well as churches, non-profit organizations and local government agencies and school districts, are prime targets for cyber theft, USA Today reports. The criminals depend on “banking Trojans,” malicious software spread through the Internet that allows them to steal funds by manipulating electronic transfers.

It seems the risks are real, money has been lost.  In our view similar risks exist for internet voting, military, overseas, or otherwise.  As we have and others have said previously, officials need to prove the viability of internet voting before anyone uses it. <The MOVE Act and references>

We also can’t help but wonder about home banking as well.  What exempts us all from this risk?

President Appoints Cyber Czar

Our concern is with the disconnect that has otherwise intelligent people concerned with cyber security based on strong evidence, coupled with the almost simultaneous support for voting by Internet, email, and fax.

Several stories covering the President’s appointment of a Cyber Czar, officially a Cyber-Security Coordinator <read>

After months of delay, President Obama on Tuesday named a cyber-security coordinator to oversee the vast task of protecting the nation’s computer systems in the public and private sectors…

But the selection process ran into division and disarray that, critics said, affect the government’s cyber-security efforts. The administration has sparred with business interests over cyber-security policy and has grappled with bureaucratic infighting among the law enforcement and intelligence agencies involved…

In praising Tuesday’s appointment, the chairman of the Senate’s Homeland Security and Government Affairs committee called on the administration to move faster to safeguard cyber-networks nationwide. Experts have cited threats posed by international organized crime as well as hackers connected to the security forces and spy agencies of China and other nations. China denies it is trying to hack U.S. systems.

We have previously covered the President’s concernsOur concern is with the disconnect that has otherwise intelligent people concerned with cyber security based on strong evidence, coupled with the almost simultaneous support for voting by Internet, email, and fax.

Reference:

Technologists’ Statement On Internet Voting

CIA Agent: Electronic Voting Risky

Overseas And Military Voting Reform Approved By Senate – With Risky Provision

Washington State Secretary of the State proposes Militairy Internet voting

Voters, Voter Action: Win In Pennsylvania Supreme Court

voters have a right under the Pennsylvania Constitution to reliable and secure voting systems and can challenge the use of electronic voting machines “that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized” through voter verification or independent audit.

Voter Action Press Release <read>

PENNSYLVANIA STATE SUPREME COURT ALLOWS VOTING RIGHTS CASE TO PROCEED

Dec 18 2008 | State’s Highest Court Denies Pennsylvania Secretary of State Permission to Appeal Lower Court Ruling in Voters’ Favor Case Challenging the Use of Electronic Voting Machines Now Moves Toward Trial PHILADELPHIA, PA – Pennsylvania voters challenging the continued use of unverifiable electronic voting machines in their state won another major round on Tuesday when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a ruling allowing their case to proceed toward trial. The state’s highest court, in a one-sentence order, denied the Pennsylvania Secretary of State’s petition seeking permission to appeal a lower court ruling decided in the voters’ favor. In April 2007, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania had ruled that voters have a right under the Pennsylvania Constitution to reliable and secure voting systems and can challenge the use of electronic voting machines “that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized” through voter verification or independent audit…

“Across the country, states are realizing that electronic voting systems cannot be trusted,” says Michael Churchill, senior counsel with the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia and another lawyer for the voters in this case. “Like voters in other states, Pennsylvania voters have a right to a voting system which will properly count their votes.

I am not a lawyer ,but to me, this is an important decision and precident.  If this decision holds,  it would presumably mean that Pennsylvaina voters are entitled to a lot more than reviewing the source code of DRE voting systems.  Voting systems include the entire process of voting, not just the electronic systems.  If  systems  “that provide no way for Electors to know whether their votes will be recognized” are unacceptable, then systems with inadequate audits with no way for citizens to verify their paper ballots were counted accurtely would also seem to be inadequate.  Of course this would only apply to Pennsylvania, and be most valuable as a precedent to citizens of other states depending on the language in their constitutions vs. Pennsylvania’s.

Miles Rapoport: Demos Leader and former CT Secretary of the State

A longtime friend profiles Miles Rapoport, former Connecticut Secretary of the State, and Demos.

A longtime friend profiles Miles Rapoport and Demos at the Huffington Post:  Demos Promotes Participatory Democracy <read>

Coming of age in the sixties, Miles applied his smarts and competitive energy to community organizing and then electoral politics. He became a successful grassroots organizer in Connecticut, then served in the state legislature and as secretary of the state. But in 2001, he may have found his true calling when he was named president of Demos, a Manhattan-based non-partisan research and advocacy organization gearing up to oppose the myriad right-wing think tanks then dominating Washington.

Demos has done pioneering work on a wide variety of issues. One of its principal efforts has been expanding democratic participation, especially among people often left out of the process. The organization has championed Same Day Registration, which has increased voter turnout by 7 to 10 percent in the ten states that have it. And Demos has vigorously pressed states to implement largely ignored provisions of the 1993 National Voter Registration Act that require them to register people to vote when they receive social services.

Like the author, I consider Miles a friend, we were not schoolmates but we met when our sons were schoolmates.  I suspect despite the following story, the President is also a friend:

With all the amazing work Demos is doing, it’s still comforting to know that Miles isn’t perfect. Early in his tenure, he had lunch with a Demos board member he felt needed to be more active. When it became clear the member just couldn’t devote the necessary time, they agreed it was probably a good idea that he leave the board. And with that, Barack Obama was a Demos board member no more. Holding a mock gun to his head, Rapoport explains, “as Hillary Clinton once said, ‘Based on the information I had at the time, it seemed like a good decision.'”

NY-23: Richard Hayes Phillips Corrects The Record

The author has since learned that only the cumulative results for each contest, not the results for each election district, are actually certified to the State. Thus it is not strictly correct that these negative numbers appeared in the certified results. But they did appear in the district (precinct) totals from which the certified cumulative results were derived.

Last week Richard Hayes Phillips reported in an article in the Governeur Times “Impossible Numbers Certified in NY-23” as we carried here.

This week in a letter to the editor, he corrects the record based on further information: Letter to the Editor on NY-23 Results <read>

It was reported last week that the St. Lawrence County Board of Elections had certified impossible numbers for the special election in New York’s 23rd Congressional District.  Just hours before certification, I received from the Board, in a .pdf file, by e-mail, their results for each election district (precinct).  These contained, for six election districts (four in Canton, one in Massena, and one in Oswegatchie), more votes counted for the candidates than the reported number of ballots cast and, therefore, negative numbers for “blank ballots” or “undervotes.”  These negative numbers actually appear, in a computer printout, in the .pdf file

The author has since learned that only the cumulative results for each contest, not the results for each election district, are actually certified to the State.  Thus it is not strictly correct that these negative numbers appeared in the certified results.  But they did appear in the district (precinct) totals from which the certified cumulative results were derived.

In response to the article, the Board of Elections, as always, has provided the data needed to analyze the situation.  Only the numbers for “total” ballots cast and for “blank” ballots have changed for the six districts in question; the vote totals for the candidates remain the same.  For comparative analysis, the Board has provided a breakdown of how many voters in each district voted in which manner (machine, absentee, affidavit, or special federal).

A comparison of these data confirms that there were enough “machine” voters (actual voters at the polls) to account for the vote counts for the individual candidates in these six districts. This is what my audit of the poll books had shown, as reported in the original article…

Thus, neither the “whole number” of ballots cast, nor the negative numbers for “blank votes” or undervotes, e-mailed to me by the Board of Elections just hours before certification, can possibly be explained in five of six cases.  No vote counting system should ever produce negative numbers. If negative numbers for “blank” votes are allowed by the computer program, “phantom votes” can be entered into the count, and this is a grievous flaw in the system.

Secretary Bysiewicz, Senator Dodd, and Representative Courtney Support MOVE Act

We point out that our troops are dedicated to defending democracy. When their votes can be changed or coerced because they are neither secure nor secret, it goes beyond their ballots, it threatens the election results, and the very democracy that they and their predecessors sacrifice to preserve. Here we see not a conspiracy, but a “domino theory” where prototypes not fully evaluated, lead to acceptance for the military and overseas voter, and then justified for all voting because it “seems to work, the voters like it, and election officials like it”. In other words, faith-based voting integrity.

In a press conference today, Secretary of the State Susan Bysiewicz, Senator Chris Dodd, and Representative Joe Courtney expressed strong support for  the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act <Press Release>

While we support our troops and their commitment to democracy, we do not support the MOVE Act in its current form.  We object to one provision of the Act passed by the Senate, passed by the House, and signed by the President.  Like the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), the MOVE Act is well intended, aimed a solving a real problem, yet has unintended consequences.

The problem of military and overseas voting has several good solutions that have been used in some states and localities and have been effective.  The MOVE Act incorporates many of those good solutions.  Yet, it also authorizes pilots of electronic submission of actual votes electronically.  As of this time there is no known proven method for the security and secrecy of electronic submission of ballots, no proven method of auding such votes, and the bill contains no mandate for the evaluation of pilots for security and secrecy.

We have written about this issue several times, followed the technical issues with other advocates, security experts, and computer scientists.  Most disappointing is that so many members of Congress supported the bill so quickly, without technical scrutiny.  Most surprising is Secretary Bysiewicz support after her office spent so much time this spring working to remove electronic voting provisions from a military voting bill before the Connecticut Legislature (The bill was eventually changed to eliminate the electronic voting, but never considered by either house).

We point out that our troops are dedicated to defending democracy.  When their votes can be changed or coerced because they are neither secure nor secret, it goes beyond their ballots, it threatens the election results, and the very democracy that they and their predecessors sacrifice to preserve.  Here we see not a conspiracy, but a “domino theory” where prototypes not fully evaluated, lead to acceptance for the military and overseas voter, and then justified for all voting because it “seems to work, the voters like it, and election officials like it”.  In other words, faith-based voting integrity.

References:

Our coverage of the MOVE Act and reaction of advocates in MA to a similar bill.

Technologists Statement on Internet Voting

The Internet and Voting: Worth Doing Right, by Barbara Simons

Secretary Bysiewicz endorsement of a bill that specifically prohibited electronic submission of ballots

Secretary Bysiewicz testimony against the electronic voting provisons of the bill in CT this year

The latest from Verified Voting on the MOVE Act: <Newsletter>

Modified language from the MOVE Act was included in the National Defense Authorization Act (HR 2647, now Public Law No: 111-84) signed by President Obama on October 28. The new law includes, as Section 589, a provision for Technology Pilot Projects, which could include the electronic submission of voted ballots. The new language in the engrossed bill does call on the National Institute of Standards and Technology to work together with the Election Assistance Commission to develop “best practices or standards” within 180 days of the bill’s signing. While the law does not establish any requirement to adhere to such standards or best practices, nor is there a process for determining such adherence in proposed projects. EAC and NIST have announced their intention to produce best practices for Military and Overseas voters by the end of the calendar year. Verified Voting advocates a more thorough security review of any proposed use of the internet for the transmission of voted ballots.

Bills In CT, MD, WA, Risk Security Despite DoD Concerns

Documented threats to the internet and military networks

Update: 12/22/2009 Sec. Bysiewwicz Ob-Ed <read>

Some may say that these changes should have been made a long time ago. I agree. This is a change I and many of my fellow Secretaries of State have sought at the federal level for years, and is similar to a bill I proposed in the Connecticut General Assembly this past legislative session.

I also recognize, however, that we must step gingerly when allowing the electronic transfer of ballot materials to any voters, so as not to compromise the integrity and security of our elections. Still, the MOVE Act is a giant step forward that will guarantee that our brave  Military men and women serving their country overseas will have the opportunity to use the right they are putting their lives on the line to defend. I look forward to implementing it in 2010.

Yes New York, There Is No Virus In NY-23

A couple of days ago a news story about a virus in the election equipment used in New York’s 23rd Congressional District Special Eection. We should not rely on the assessment of frustrated election officials to understand the risks of technology or the assessment of the cause of problems with voting and voting technology. Bo Lopari sets the record straight in his blog. But it is not all good news.

Update: A Richard Hayes Phillips: Impossible Numbers Certified in NY-23 <read>

Richard is the author of Witness To A Crime proving several beyond doubt several forms of skulduggery in Ohio-2004.  We hosted Richard for a book signing in Connecticut last year.  I had forgotten that he is a resident of Canton, NY, within NY-23.  His report may not prove fraud or that the incorrect candidate was certified, yet it certainly demonstrates incompetence and holes in the computer-human system.

For six election districts in St. Lawrence County (the 2nd, 4th, 6th, and 7th districts in Canton, the 14th district in Massena, and the 2nd district in Oswegatchie) negative numbers appear in the column for “blank” ballots, known in other states as “undervotes.” …

In Canton’s 7th district, the certified results show a total of 148 ballots cast. The results of those votes were counted as 88 votes for Owens, 11 votes for Scozzafava, and 80 votes for Hoffman. The problem is that these numbers add up to 179 votes counted for the candidates, and there were only 148 ballots cast; St. Lawrence County certified these numbers to the state as accurate with the number of ‘blank’ ballots reported as -31.

Update: A second opinion from Howard Stanislevic <read>

An article quoting an election official who claimed there was a “virus” in the voting system has been criticized for the misuse of this term. While technically, the critics may be correct — a bug discovered in the software is not necessarily a virus — critics also seem unaware of the history of the machines in question.

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Original Post:

A couple of days ago a news story about a virus in the election equipment used in New York’s 23rd Congressional District Special Election.  We should not rely on the assessment of frustrated election officials to understand the risks of technology or the assessment of the cause of problems with voting and voting technology.  Bo Lopari sets the record straight in his blog <read>

How do I know? Well, in the first place, the Dominion ImageCast scanners in question run the Linux operating system, which is nearly immune to viruses due to its inherent ability to lock out programs that lack explicit permission to run, unlike the highly vulnerable Windows operating system. Second, the State Board of Elections gave an account of the problem at their public meeting on November 10, and which I confirmed in a phone conversation with staff earlier this week. Here’s what really happened:

But it is not all good news:

Let’s be clear. While no votes were lost due to the ability to independently count the paper ballots, a problem did occur that affected certain machines around the state. The issue was a bug in the Dominion source code that caused the machine to hang while creating ballot images for certain vote combinations in multiple candidate elections (the ImageCast, like the other scanner used in New York, the ES&S DS200, creates digital images of each ballot which can be reviewed after the election). So if, for example, a “vote for three candidates out of five” race was voted in a certain way, the scanner would hang. This is one reason why the defect affected some, but not all machines with ballots containing this type of race, because only certain combinations of votes caused the memory problem. But here’s the thing – the problem was discovered before the election.