What is lacking in Connecticut’s Post-Election Audits (Part 1)

Some contend that Connecticut has the Nation’s toughest post-election audit law. We contend it has several holes, is not well executed by officials, and if a voting machine were ever to count inaccurately the audit would be unlikely to recognize that. Almost certainly, there will be bills and proposals to weaken and strengthen the audit debated this year. Today, we will focus on:

A Very Critical Vote That will Not Be Audited

Some contend that Connecticut has the Nation’s toughest post-election audit law. We contend it has several holes, is not well executed by officials, and if a voting machine were ever to count inaccurately the audit would be unlikely to recognize that. Almost certainly, there will be bills and proposals to weaken and strengthen the audit debated this year. Today, we will focus on:

A Very Critical Vote That will Not Be Audited

From the law:

The offices subject to the audit pursuant to this section shall be, (1) in the case of an election where the office of presidential elector is on the ballot, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State, but in no case less than three offices, (2) in the case of an election where the office of Governor is on the ballot, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office selected in a random drawing by the Secretary of the State, but in no case less than three offices, (3) in the case of a municipal election, three offices or twenty per cent of the number of offices on the ballot, whichever is greater, selected at random by the municipal clerk, and (4) in the case of a primary election, all offices required to be audited by federal law, plus one additional office, if any, but in no event less than twenty per cent of the offices on the ballot, selected in a random drawing by the municipal clerk.

Overall pretty simple, if not clear in detail. Certain offices are randomly selected for audit, so every office is subject to selection. The random selection is designed to catch error fraud, by randomly selecting districts any place there might be an error fraud would be equally likely to be audited, so it seems.  And by randomly selecting offices for audit then any vote miscounted by error or fraud would be equally likely to be audited, so it seems.

I am sure you have guess by now, based on my saying “so it seems”, that it is actually not so. Just one of the problems is the word “Offices”. We do not just vote for offices, we also vote on questions on the ballot – a bonding issue, a budget in some towns, a change in a charter, or a change in the State Constitution. None of those are subject to audit and thus if there were an error or fraud anywhere or everywhere in Connecticut on one of those issues, an audit would never catch it.

Town have all sorts of bonding issues, budges, a change in a charter, or as my town and New London have had, a vote to remove or replace public park land. Do we have to point out that people care about those issues, voters, officials, and many insiders in the election process? Should those issues be exempt from the audit? We say no!

In 2008 there was and in 2014 there will be high interest questions on the ballot. In 2008 voters decided if we wanted a Constitutional Convention – a few days before the election polls said the vote would be ‘yes’. There was a campaign by officials to promote ‘No’. No won by a sizable margin. We think that was likely the correct winner based on the actual votes. Yet if it had been a bit closer, because of an error later discovered by activists, the result might have been in question, the error in the initially reported results might have been enough to avoid a recanvass to make sure a close vote was accurate. Should this question have been exempt from the audit? We say no!

In 2014 voters will a see a question to decide if we will give the Legislature the power to decide on early voting, including unlimited absentee voting for Connecticut – both of which are currently prohibited by the Constitution.

November is a long way off. But, in the Legislature and with the public there are strong feelings on both sides of this question. We expect it to generate a lot of op-eds, news stories, letters to the editor and blog posts. What if the vote is close? What if the vote is close, but just over the threshold for a recanvass? Should this question be exempt from the audit? We say no!

Should questions be exempt from the audit? We say no!
They are not exempt from the possibility of error and fraud.

PS: Here is an example of another gap that at minimum threatens credibility, a local election, very hotly contended, run by a single registrar <read>

Testimony: National Popular Vote

Yesterday was the annual public hearing on the National Popular Vote Compact. Yet it was different, the most thorough and thoughtful hearing I have seen in ten years of testifying and observing the Government Elections and Administration Committee. Unfortunately, it was not televised – you really needed to be there.

Yesterday was the annual public hearing on the National Popular Vote Compact. Yet it was different, the most thorough and thoughtful hearing I have seen in ten years of testifying and observing the Government Elections and Administration Committee. Unfortunately, it was not televised – you really needed to be there.

You can read our testimony here: <read> Here is the summary:

My testimony this year is similar to that in past years. Nothing has changed to make this Compact any safer, nothing to make it less risky to democracy. Yet, events over the last year make the dangers all the more apparent.

In the past year, partisans in various states continue to promote voter Id laws, and with the Supreme Court’s effectively eliminating the voting rights act, it has been open season in other states for laws aimed at suppressing the vote. That is the kind of inequality that is contained by the Electoral College.

I understand the theoretical advantages of the national popular vote, yet there are extreme risks in its mismatch with our existing state-by-state voting system.

Many concepts such as Nuclear Power, GMOs, DDT, and Fracking have benefits, but also have unintended, unrecognized, and unappreciated consequences. This Compact is another

What often appears simple is not. The Compact would cobble the national popular vote onto a flawed system designed for the Electoral College. It does not change that system. It heightens the risks.

This is not a partisan issue. It has been opposed by prominent members of both major parties, including:

  • Susan Bysiewicz (D), former Secretary of the State
  • Arnold Schwarzenegger (R), former California Governor
  • Mark Ritchie (D), MN Secretary of State and former President of the National Association of Secretaries of State
  • Daniel Patrick Moynihan(D), former Wesleyan professor and U.S. Senator
  • William Cibes (D), former State University System Chancellor

Major concerns include:

  • The 12th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act which govern declaring the President have been called a “Ticking Time Bomb” because of strict rules, coupled with ambiguity, causing problems seen in 1876 and 2000. The Compact would exacerbate that risky system.
  • There is no official national popular vote number compiled in time, such that it could be used to officially and accurately determine the winner in any close election.
  • Even if there were such a number, it would aggravate the flaws in the system. The Electoral College contains/limits the risk and the damage to a few swing states. With a national popular vote, errors, voter suppression, and fraud in all states would count against the national totals.
  • There is no national audit or recount available for close elections, to establish an accurate popular vote number. Only in some individual states, if close numbers happened to occur in those states, would there be even a fraction of a national recount. About half of the states have audits or close vote recounts.
  • With the Compact there is every reason to believe that any close election would be decided by partisian action of the Congress or the Supreme Court.. As in Gore v. Bush, since the founding, close election controversies have all been decided in seemingly partisan decisions by Congress, special commissions, or the Supreme Court.
  • This Compact will not make every voter equal. The state-by-state variations in the franchise and access to voting will remain intact, enfranchising and disenfranchising different voters in states.

I urge you to consider the risks and chaos made possible if Connecticut were to endorse the National Popular Vote Compact, including reading the attached editorials and arguments.

You can read all the testimony from everyone, present and not, here: <read>

But that is insufficient to get a flavor for the hearings. The transcripts (available sometime soon) may help, but they cover a six and one-half hour hearing, only a small portion of which is represented by the written testimony.

Most of the hearing centered on just the issues I have been raising since 2007. They have never gotten as thorough an airing. It was not just the large number of individuals testifying, prepared to discuss those subjects, it was also the Chairs setting the tone, and members all asking great questions and getting thorough answers.

Rep McGee started by explaining that many of his constituents did not understand how the Electoral College worked, followed by Rep Becker starting the discussion of the difficulties in determining the winner under the National Popular Vote. Most of the rest was those in favor attempting to describe how well the system would work under the Compact. While those of us opposed refuted those arguments with facts, and speculation based on past actions of officials.

Some dismissed that any Secretary of the State anywhere, or Registrar in Connecticut would avoid accurate counting of a critical tally. Dismissing past inaccurate counts in NY, as a poor example, since they did matter in the result – that in a critical situation the counts would have been resolved sooner. Others like me are not so sure given the actions of Catherine Harris in Florida, Ken Blackwell in Ohio, and the history of 1876.

I pointed out an instructive situation close to home. In Bridgeport Connecticut in November 2010,  the Secretary of the State stood by helplessly as a very questionable count was recorded, and many questioned the result in a close race for Governor. In the best interests the Secretary and the local Registrars worked out an agreement to audit all the districts to determine accurate counts. Yet, that agreement was nixed by the lawyers for Bridgeport, acting in what I assume was their view of the best interests of Bridgeport.  Those inaccurate, questionable results remain on the books today. Nothing has been done to improve the system so that in a future debacle the Secretary or Registrars, no matter how well intending, could end up in a similar bind.

(I lead the Citizen Recount of Bridgeport in 2010. We concluded that many votes were not counted and totals inaccurately accounted, yet that the correct Governor was certified. Beyond ballots not being counted , there were  in some districts many more ballots than checked-in voters, and in other districts many fewer ballots than checked-in voters. Nobody has or has reason to dispute our results. Yet they are not official and we still have a system we cannot trust to correct itself officially.)

3rd Harford Elected Registrar maybe eliminated by Council

So may the 1st and 2nd Elected Registrars

The Courant has long been opposed to a third and even a second Registrar in Hartford. The Editorial Board would rather see the Council appoint registrars, as authorized in a Charter Revision last year. As we explained at that time, contrary to claims by the Courant, the proposal could result in an untrained, unqualified, politically appointed registrar or registrars.

Now we learn that the Courant and supporters now believe they got something else wrong in explaining the Charter Revision to the public.

So may the 1st and 2nd Elected Registrars

The Courant combines news reporting with an Editorial: Third Registrar Is Nonessential Employee -Third Registrar Is Nonessential Employee <read>

The Courant has long been opposed to a third and even a second Registrar in Hartford. The Editorial Board would rather see the Council appoint registrars, as authorized in a Charter Revision last year. As we explained at that time, contrary to claims by the Courant, the proposal could result in an untrained, unqualified, politically appointed registrar or registrars.

Now we learn that the Courant and supporters now believe they got something else wrong in explaining the Charter Revision to the public, when they said:

The charter changes would allow the city to appoint “one or more” trained, nonpartisan registrars. It would require a small change in state law, which hopefully will be forthcoming.

Now we have the news in the Editorial:

Now another twist. It was widely thought that the city would need a change in state law to
implement the charter change. But this month lawyers for the council and the secretary of the
state reviewed the statutes and think the change can be implemented without a statutory change — in other words, a town can choose to appoint rather than elect registrars, as municipalities can do with town clerks. “The statutes seem to contemplate that registrars can be appointed, if allowed by charter,” said Av Harris, spokesman for the secretary of the state.

But not necessarily only one, if they are now correct the partisan Council may need to appoint at least two:

But there caveats. While not crystal clear, the laws appear to require that there be two registrars
and that they be from the major parties. This is because the registrars have duties involving party primaries, and only the major parties are allowed to hold primaries. Nonetheless, if you are paying the bills, two registrars is better than three.

 

Citizen Study Finds State Audit Flawed From the Start

Crosspost: Coalition Districts in the Random Drawing Study, Nov 2013

Citizen Study Finds State Audit Flawed From the Start

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Inaccurate List of Election Districts

Based on concerns with the integrity of the random drawing in previous elections, the Coalition initiated a project to thoroughly check the integrity of the list of districts in the drawing for the November 2013 election.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “The credibility of our elections depends on the integrity of the Post-Election Audits. The integrity of the audits in-turn depends on the integrity of the drawing.”

The report found,

  • Fewer discrepancies in the random drawing list than were found in November 2012 and efforts by the Secretary of the State’s Office to improve the accuracy of the list.
  • Seventeen (17) voting districts missing from the drawing list or recanvass list. The selection of two (2) fewer districts for audit than required by law.
  • The audit law calling for the random selection and auditing of 10% of voting districts is not being faithfully executed, leaving the integrity and credibility of the audit and our election system open to question and expose it to the potential of future manipulation.
  • The law intended to fix past problems is not being followed. — A failure rate of 67
  • Fully complying with the law is complicated by the loose definition of voting district in the law.

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Backup Data>

Crosspost: Coalition Districts in the Random Drawing Study, Nov 2013

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Backup Data>

Citizen Study Finds State Audit Flawed From the Start

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Inaccurate List of Election Districts

Based on concerns with the integrity of the random drawing in previous elections, the Coalition initiated a project to thoroughly check the integrity of the list of districts in the drawing for the November 2013 election.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “The credibility of our elections depends on the integrity of the Post-Election Audits. The integrity of the audits in-turn depends on the integrity of the drawing.”

The report found,

  • Fewer discrepancies in the random drawing list than were found in November 2012 and efforts by the Secretary of the State’s Office to improve the accuracy of the list.
  • Seventeen (17) voting districts missing from the drawing list or recanvass list. The selection of two (2) fewer districts for audit than required by law.
  • The audit law calling for the random selection and auditing of 10% of voting districts is not being faithfully executed, leaving the integrity and credibility of the audit and our election system open to question and expose it to the potential of future manipulation.
  • The law intended to fix past problems is not being followed. — A failure rate of 67
  • Fully complying with the law is complicated by the loose definition of voting district in the law.

<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Backup Data>

Legally Questionable Solution Proposed for Bickering Registrars

The the West Hartford registrars do not get along, resulting in trading complaints, long lines at polls, and an inability to solve that without intervention by the Secretary of the State. The latest is an attempt by the town to fix the problem, despite the fact that the registrars are publicly elected officials charged with running the elections. In our opinion, best that the Town Council members can do is to work with their Town Committees to find candidates who, if elected would work together, or to find satisfactory candidates to win in primaries.

Courant report: West Hartford To Hire Administrator For Registrars’ Office <read>

As was reported last year, the West Hartford registrars do not get along, resulting in trading complaints, long lines at polls, and an inability to solve that without intervention by the Secretary of the State.

The latest is an attempt by the town to fix the problem, despite the fact that the registrars are publicly elected officials charged with running the elections:

The town will hire an office manager to take over the administrative functions of the embattled registrars of voters office, where town officials said long – standing problems between the registrars contributed to long lines and frustration among voters in the 2012 elections.

The plan will leave more time for the elected registrars to perform their statutory duties, such as running elections.

In a memorandum dated Feb. 6, Deputy Corporation Counsel Patrick Alair laid out a plan for a “complete overhaul” of the office. The memo was discussed at Monday’s meeting of the committee to review operations of the registrars o f voters, formed by Mayor Scott Slifka shortly after the 2012 election…

Under the plan, the registrars would serve as more of a governing body, while a paid staff member performs administrative tasks. The staff member will be an assistant town clerk, though the title may change as the job description is finalized, the memo stated. Town clerks and assistant town clerks are legally able to register voters…

“How the registrars execute all of their duties is largely left to them to work out between themselves with whatever support and advice their municipalities may provide. This system provides ample opportunity for error even in the best – managed situations,” Alair wrote. “When the registrars are unable to work together to sort out those details, however, the system collapses.”

Leading up to the problems on Election Day 2012, the office had been embroiled in conflict for nearly a decade since a failed attempt to revamp it.

Unfortunately, we do not see this as a solution as long as the registrars do not agree, since they are legally responsible for critical decisions.

Brazell continues to object to the idea of an assistant and says “she would not work willingly with a new administrator if one was appointed,” Alair wrote.

On Tuesday, Brazell said she was “not happy” about the new plan “because I think it’s running fine just the way it is.” When asked if she would cooperate with a staff member since one is going to be hired, she said, “of course…

Thornberry agrees with the new plan, officials said. She could not be reached for comment Tuesday.

Town council members on both sides of the aisle are supportive of the new plan

In our opinion,  best that the Town Council members can do is to work with their Town Committees to find candidates who, if elected would work together, or to find satisfactory candidates to win in primaries.

Time to ignore Voter Id, Voting Rights Act, and other attempts to game the system.

Yesterday, the Government Elections and Administration Committee voted to take up the National Popular Vote Agreement/Compact. Today we have a CTMirror story on the efforts of highly funded national lobbyists working with Democrats and Republicans to tout the bill. Reading the article, one would get the impression that only Republicans are against the bill

In the last year, not much has changed. Except that the risks should be more obvious given the activity in some states to suppress votes, especially after the Supreme Court effectively ended the Voting Rights Act.

Yesterday, the Government Elections and Administration Committee voted to take up the National Popular Vote Agreement/Compact. Today we have a CTMirror story on the efforts of highly funded national lobbyists working with Democrats and Republicans to tout the bill:  Presidential popular vote advocates lobbying CT GOP <read>

Reading the article, one would get the impression that only Republicans are against the bill. We posted this comment:

As well as Republicans in favor, there are Democrats opposed.  Some of those on record as opposed include Bill Cibes, Susan Bysiewicz, the Late Dainel Patrick Moynihan, and Mark Ritchie SOS of Minnesota. Most see that the flaws in our system exposed by the 2000 election would be exacerbated by this compact. One issue would be the wide open contest to increase and decrease votes by all sides.Cognitive dissonance or lack of rational thought are needed to explain how a person can support this and simultaneously be disturbed  by the voter suppression efforts launched after the Supreme Court ended the Voting Rights Act, and have been underway before that.

For the reasons to oppose the Compact, and for details on the objections by well respected democrats, you can review our testimony from last year: <read> And these Op-Eds from last year <here> and <here>

In the last year, not much has changed. Except that the risks should be more obvious given the activity in some states to suppress votes, especially after the Supreme Court effectively ended the Voting Rights Act.

Experts demonstrate how to hack email voting

Security researchers say they have developed an interesting trick to take over Gmail and Outlook.com email accounts – by shooting down victims’ logout requests even over a supposedly encrypted connection.
And their classic man-in-the-middle attack could be used to compromise electronic ballot boxes to rig elections, we’re told.

Thanks to a friend for passing on this link to a ‘how to’ demonstration from last summer’s Black Hat 2013:  Gmail, Outlook.com and e-voting ‘pwned’ on stage in crypto-dodge hack – Once you enter, you can never leave logout <read>

Security researchers say they have developed an interesting trick to take over Gmail and Outlook.com email accounts – by shooting down victims’ logout requests even over a supposedly encrypted connection.

And their classic man-in-the-middle attack could be used to compromise electronic ballot boxes to rig elections, we’re told.

Ben Smyth and Alfredo Pironti of the French National Institute for Research in Computer Science and Control (INRIA) announced they found a way to exploit flaws in Google and Microsoft’s web email services using an issue in the TLS (Transport Layer Security) technology, which encrypts and secures website connections.

Full details of the attack are yet to be widely disseminated – but it was outlined for the first time in a demonstration at this year’s Black Hat hacking convention in Las Vegas on Wednesday.

In short, we’re told, it uses a TLS truncation attack on a shared computer to block victims’ account logout requests so that they unknowingly remain logged in: when the request to sign out is sent, the attacker injects an unencrypted TCP FIN message to close the connection. The server-side therefore doesn’t get the request and is unaware of the abnormal termination….

The attack does not rely on installing malware or similar shenanigans: the miscreant pulling off the trick must simply put herself between the victim and the network. That could be achieved, for example, by setting up a naughty wireless hotspot, or plugging a hacker-controlled router or other little box between the PC and the network.

The researchers warned that shared machines – even un-compromised computers – cannot guarantee secure access to systems operated by Helios (an electronic voting system), Microsoft (including Account, Hotmail, and MSN), nor Google (including Gmail, YouTube, and Search).

Maybe you use some other email system. But maybe that is a system that has yet to be hacked, publicly. If you send in a vote, what system does your recipient use?

Early Voting, the good, the not-so-good, and the ugly

For Connecticut, we favor in-person early voting, if we are willing to pay for the convenience. We oppose no-excuse absentee voting for security reasons.

Yet another study confirms previous studies that Early Voting Reduces Turnout: Election Laws, Mobilization, and Turnout The Unanticipated Consequences of Election Reform <read>

From the abstract:

State governments have experimented with a variety of election laws to make voting more convenient and increase turnout . The impact s of these reforms va y in surprising ways, providing insight into the mechanisms by which states can encourage or reduce turnout. Our theory focuses on mobilization and distinguishes between the direct and indirect effects of election laws. We conduct both aggregate and individual level statistical analyses of voter turnout in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections . The results show that election day registration has a consistently positive effect on turnout while the most popular reform – early voting – is actually associated with lower turnout when it is implemented by itself . We propose that early voting has created negative unanticipated consequences by reducing the civic significance of elections for individuals and altering the incentives for political campaigns to invest in mobilization.

Instead of reading the paper, we suggest the authors’ article summarizing their findings: The Case Against Early Voting <read>

The authors actually contend more reasons for concern than a bit of reduced turnout:

As the Presidential Commission on Election Administration notes in its new report, “no excuse” early voting — meaning it is open even to those who don’t qualify for an absentee ballot — has grown rapidly in recent decades in what the commission called a “quiet revolution.” In the 2012 election, almost one-third of ballots were cast early — more than double those cast in 2000 — and 32 states now permit the practice, allowing citizens to vote an average of 19 days before Election Day.

The commission rightly notes that early voting has its advantages for individual voters — not just avoiding long lines, but in many cases also getting to vote on weekends without having to miss work or school. But early voting run amok is bad for democracy. The costs to collective self-governance — which the report refers to only in passing, in a single sentence — substantially outweigh the benefits. Instead of expanding the practice, we should use this moment as an opportunity to establish clear limits on it before it becomes the norm.

Why? For all its conveniences, early voting threatens the basic nature of citizen choice in democratic, republican government. In elections, candidates make competing appeals to the people and provide them with the information necessary to be able to make a choice. Citizens also engage with one another, debating and deliberating about the best options for the country. Especially in an age of so many nonpolitical distractions, it is important to preserve the space of a general election campaign — from the early kickoff rallies to the last debates in October — to allow voters to think through, together, the serious issues that face the nation.

The integrity of that space is broken when some citizens cast their ballots as early as 46 days before the election, as some states allow. A lot can happen in those 46 days. Early voters are, in essence, asked a different set of questions from later ones; they are voting with a different set of facts. They may cast their ballots without the knowledge that comes from later candidate debates

In reality, the authors apparently are not against all early voting, just long early voting periods:

Moreover, there are other ways of achieving some of the benefits of early voting, such as old-fashioned absentee ballots or setting up more polling places. Even a limited few-days-early voting period could convey most of the advantages of the practice while limiting the most severe democratic costs.

Early voting is a matter of degree: Even Election “Day” lets people cast ballots at different times. But at the moment, there is no upper bound at all on the growing practice, and the president’s commission made no mention of such an option. With the group’s report opening a new round of discussion over voting policy, now is the time to consider whether the “quiet revolution” of early voting has gone too far.

For an alternative view, we have a critique from Doug Chapin: So Yesterday: “The (Rather Outdated) Case Against Early Voting” <read>

There are, to be sure, evidence-based arguments that early voting isn’t the turnout machine it’s often sold to be – indeed, Barry Burden and three colleagues have a provocative new paper that suggests that early voting actually DECREASES turnout in the absence of opportunities for same-day registration. There is also a growing realization of the need to do cost-benefit analyses of lengthy voting periods and identify the best time to open the process when significant numbers of voters are ready to take advantage of early voting.

But the argument that early voting deprives voters of an opportunity to cast ballots in a simultaneous expression of public opinion “at a particular moment” is rather outdated given the current state of the field. That sense is amplified by the authors’ recommendations for fixing the problem via “old-fashioned absentee ballots or setting up more polling places” – options which are unattractive or unavailable to many election officials.

For Connecticut, we favor in-person early voting, if we are willing to pay for the convenience. We oppose no-excuse absentee voting for security reasons. 

  • For many of the reasons pointed out by the authors of the Politico article, we favor a relatively short period of early voting, perhaps a week or ten day period, not necessarily every day, with a variety of convenient times during the day, evenings, early morning and weekends.
  • In Connecticut, with local election management, such early voting could be expensive, especially for small towns that have a single polling place on election day. There are some compromises and and alternatives: Provide for in-person absentee-like voting, which would has the security benefits of in-person early voting and some of the disenfranchising aspects of absentee voting; bite the bullet and do for voting what we have done for probate: Regionalize, Professionalize, Economize.
  • We are opposed to no-excuse absentee voting because of the known and proven fraud issues. We point out that its long period does not reduce the concerns with a long in-person early voting period.

American Voting Experience: A Laudable Report

It seems we have several surprisingly refreshing Government reports in recent weeks, two on reigning in NSA spying, and now an excellent report on improving election administration, the election experience, and a contribution to realizing the ideals of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution.
Many will find a lot to like in the report. Some parts might be taken out of context as it often points out the benefits, costs, and risks of various solutions. Some will use the report to justify doing anything, such as their favored solution, to a problem. That said, we will likely be referencing many areas in the report going forward

It seems we have several surprisingly refreshing  Government reports in recent weeks, two on reigning in NSA spying, and now an excellent report on improving election administration, the election experience, and a contribution to realizing the ideals of our Declaration of Independence and Constitution. The American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Administration <read>

Its long, yet refreshingly readable for the average citizen. The .pdf is 112 pages, yet the introduction and main body constitute a bit less at 84 pages. I have read it all, and so have many others.  Let me start with overall impressions:

  • It is readable tutorial covering several areas to a moderate level of depth and detail: Causes and cures for lines; The variety in voting methods, laws, and practices; The synergy between problems and solutions, especially improving registration systems; The need to soon replace aging systems and hardware; the systemic problems in making better systems available; The value, costs, challenges, and security tradeoffs expanding early voting; Serving Military and Overseas Voters responsively and responsibly.
  • The report remains true to its promise of staying within issues and solutions that can be agreed upon by members of both major parties.
  • Given its size, I find very very little to disagree with in the report. Two or three minor quibbles, too minor to mention.
  • There is a lot to be done in many many areas covered in the report, many details to be filled in. There in, will lie many issues to debate, potential for making things better, worse, or wasting huge sums with little actual change.
  • It is most detailed and potentially effective recommendation is in better online voter registration systems and cross checking between states for duplicate/out-of-date registrations and the benefits throughout the system.
  • Its best articulation of problems and opportunities are in the areas of reducing lines, pollworker training, pollworker recruiting and improving ballot design. Its all very common sense, but somehow the system got to be the way it is, and by-and-large not moving to solve the problems.
  • The toughest details to be determined are how to create, pay for, and determine the best way forward to truly better software, hardware, and manual systems.

Many will find a lot to like in the report. Some parts might be taken out of context as it often points out the benefits, costs, and risks of various solutions. Some will use the report to justify doing anything, such as their favored solution, to a problem. That said, we will likely be referencing many areas in the report going forward:

  • We completely agree with its take on Military and Overseas Voting, that recommends against online/Internet voting, yet effective online registration, ballot tracking, and ballot distribution systems.
  • We applaud its recognition that unlimited absentee voting or mail-in voting represents a significant risk for fraud, while early voting, voting centers, and in-person absentee voting can be safe.
  • We agree with its overview of the software/hardware challenges going forward. The problem may not be quite as imminent, yet the  challenges to get going and find good solutions will require a transformation, years of work in regulation, cooperation, and not so common sense between industry, computer scientists, other experts, officials, and government.

How can the NSA, Microsoft, Google etc. vote?

A post got us thinking: Every Scary, Weird Thing We Know the NSA Can Do. Lets add some corollaries relevant to voting and elections:

A post got us thinking: Every Scary, Weird Thing We Know the NSA Can Do.  <read>

It seems they missed that the NSA and others with access can vote!

This post originally appeared on the website of The Brian Lehrer Show.

The trove of documents leaked by Edward Snowden has revealed the elaborate tricks the NSA can use to monitor communications and data around the world. Here, a running list of things we now know the NSA can do, based on media reports and other publicly available documents—so far. If we missed any, let us know in the comments page or by tweeting @brianlehrer.

  • It can track the numbers of both parties on a phone call, as well location, time and duration. (More)
  • It can hack Chinese phones and text messages. (More)
  • It can set up fake Internet cafes. (More)
  • It can spy on foreign leaders’ cellphones. (More)
  • It can tap underwater fiber-optic cables. (More)
  • It can track communication within media organizations like Al-Jazeera. (More)
  • It can hack into the U.N. video conferencing system. (More)
  • It can track bank transactions. (More)
  • It can monitor text messages. (More)
  • It can access your email, chat, and Web browsing history. (More)
  • It can map your social networks. (More)
  • It can access your smartphone app data. (More)
  • It is trying to get into secret networks like Tor, diverting users to less secure channels. (More)
  • It can go undercover within embassies to have closer access to foreign networks. (More)
  • It can set up listening posts on the roofs of buildings to monitor communications in a city. (More)
  • It can set up a fake LinkedIn. (More)
  • It can track the reservations at upscale hotels. (More)
  • It can intercept the talking points for Ban Ki-moon’s meeting with Obama. (More)
  • It can crack cellphone encryption codes. (More)
  • It can hack computers that aren’t connected to the internet using radio waves. (More)
  • It can intercept phone calls by setting up fake base stations. (More)
  • It can remotely access a computer by setting up a fake wireless connection. (More)
  • It can install fake SIM cards to then control a cell phone. (More)
  • It can fake a USB thumb drive that’s actually a monitoring device. (More)
  • It can crack all types of sophisticated computer encryption. (Update: It is trying to build this capability.) (More)
  • It can go into online games and monitor communication. (More)
  • It can intercept communications between aircraft and airports. (More)
  • (Update) It can physically intercept deliveries, open packages, and make changes to devices. (More) (h/t)

Did we miss any? Mischaracterize any capabilities? Let us know in the comments, or tweet @brianlehrer.

Lets add some corollaries relevant to voting and elections:

  • It can set up fake Internet cafes
    • They can use those to monitor, identify, change and drop votes submitted over the Internet or by email. And change ballots presented to voters.
  • It can tap underwater fiber-optic cables
    • And monitor, identify, change and drop votes submitted over the Internet, by email or fax. And change ballots presented to voters.
  • It can monitor text messages.
  • It can access your email, chat, and Web browsing history
  • It can map your social network
  • It can access your smartphone app data
    • They could determine your politics and intercept your electronic or absentee vote and eliminate it before it is counted.
      Because—>
  • It can physically intercept deliveries, open packages, and make changes to devices

They could use these facilities in a variety of ways to disrupt elections:

  • Change electronic results as they are transmitted or posted, confusing or changing the initially reported winner.
  • Discover embarrassing past statements or activities of candidates and caused these to be published.
  • Discover embarrassing past statements or activities of candidates and use them to intimidate candidates once elected.
  • Plant rumors about candidates.