CTVotersCount.org

Testimony: Worse than online voting, fax and email voting

I applaud this Committee for holding hearings on this Unconstitutional, Risky, Unnecessary, and Discriminatory bill. Last year, without hearings, this concept it was placed far down in an unrelated emergency bill.

Today we submitted testimony against Senate Bill 647 to the Veterans’ Affairs Committee on a bill to allow email and fax return of votes for Military voters. The bill:

AN ACT CONCERNING VOTING BY MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY SERVING OVERSEAS.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

That sections 9-153e and 9-153f of the general statutes be amended to allow any member of the armed forces who is an elector serving overseas, or the member’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed, to return their absentee ballot by electronic mail or facsimile.

Statement of Purpose:

To allow military persons serving overseas to return their ballot by electronic mail or facsimile.

From our testimony:

I applaud this Committee for holding hearings on this Unconstitutional, Risky, Unnecessary, and Discriminatory bill. Last year, without hearings, this concept it was placed far down in an unrelated emergency bill.

Compared with Online voting email and fax voting is a riskier, cheaper alternative:

Email and Fax Voting Is More Risky Than Online Voting:

Every week we hear of the compromise of email, databases, and severs maintained by large businesses and government agencies.

We are all familiar with emails and faxes, we send or are sent to us, never being received. All network communications are subject to interception, substitution, or deletion. Military voters and registrars are not exempt from these problems.

· President Obama has called the protection of government and private information and communications networks “one of the most serious … security challenges of the 21st century,” (Hartford Courant May 30, 2009.)

Registrars Are Not Equipped To Implement Email Or Fax Voting:

Currently some towns do not provide Internet to their registrars and some do not provide email.

Frequently, published email addresses for registrars are out of date.

To whom would soldiers email votes? The Democratic or Republican Registrar? To a common email account? Who will process that? How can anyone be sure ballots that successfully arrive at an email account are not dropped or changed?

Who manages the Fax? Who can see or discard the ballots that come via the Fax?

We quote Governor Malloy’s veto message on the Constitutionality of a similar bill last year:

I agree with Secretary of the State Denise Merrill that this provision raises a number of serious concerns. First, as a matter of policy, I do not support any mechanism of voting that would require an individual to waive his or her constitutional rights in order to cast a timely, secret ballot, even if such waiver is voluntary. Second, as the Secretary of the State has pointed out, allowing an individual to email or fax an absentee ballot has not been proven to be secure. In 2011, the United States Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, issued a report on remote electronic voting. The report concluded that remote electronic voting is fraught with problems associated with software bugs and potential attacks through malicious software, difficulties with voter authentication, and lack of protocol for ballot accountability.

We will be disappointed, but not surprised if the Veterans’ Affairs Committee ignores the discriminatory nature of this proposal, as we said:

This Bill Is Discriminatory: Many overseas voters are veterans but not members of the Military. Some serve in remote areas or challenging conditions. Including: State Department, CIA, and NGO staffs, plus Military Contractors, and Peace Corps volunteers.

And Unnecessary:

This Bill Is Unnecessary: Conventional solutions for effective, safe, and economical Military voting are available and proven. The state with the best results for overseas voting, Minnesota, does not use online voting. Let’s emulate their example.

Among others, we were joined in opposition testimony by Verified Voting:

OPPOSITION TO BILL NO. 647 – Understanding that email and fax voting are forms of internet voting – in fact they are the least secure forms. We dishonor our military by providing them insecure means to vote.
Chairs Leone and Hennessy and Members of the Committee, Verified Voting works tirelessly around the country and in Washington D.C. to support expanded opportunities for our military personnel to vote.However we oppose Bill No. 647 because it would dishonor our military personnel with an insecure means to vote. Email and fax voting are internet voting and are not secure. Those serving to secure our democracy should not be provided an unequally insecure means to participate in that democracy. That is what 647 would do.

Verified Voting was a strong supporter of the federal MOVE Act, passed in October 2009. The MOVE Act continued to show excellent gains in voter enfranchisement amongst military personnel in the 2012 General Election. We are members of the Alliance for Military and Overseas Voting Rights (AMOVR), where we join many military personnel support colleagues to work on their behalf year round.
We take support for military voting seriously and oppose 647 on strict empirical grounds of insecurity.
We strongly recommend against allowing ballots to be cast over the internet, via email, internet?based fax, or through internet portals. Online voting presents a direct threat to the integrity of elections in Connecticut, because it is not sufficiently secure against fraud or malfunction. Cyber security experts with the Department of Homeland Security have publicly warned against internet voting…

Allowing ballots to be cast by email, internet?based fax, or through internet portals ? at least with the current security tools ? is an invitation to partisan operatives and nation?states to tamper with the integrity of our elections. The problem is particularly pernicious because it is unlikely that such attacks will be detected. Attacks on consumer and business bank accounts can be detected because the accounting systems are reviewed by multiple parties and auditable records exist. Bank statements, unlike our voted ballots, are not anonymous. This makes it critical that the physical ballot which the voter inspected is returned for counting. If a purely electronic form is transmitted, that unsecured vote is not verifiable by the voter and does not constitute an auditable record of the vote.

Also see CTNewsJunkie coverage of Sen Slossberg and Rep Morin’s press conference, surrounded by veterans and the Rhode Island Secretary of State. The article includes some of our testimony and a veteran apparently unaware of the free express mail return of voted ballots <read>

State Of The Union, voting

The value and risk will be in the details. Will the commission effectively address problems without causing unintended consequences? Or will it be a mixed bag of expensive reforms like the Help America Vote Act? Time will tell if the Commission and the Congress follow through on sensible reforms and heed the advice of advocates to consider voting integrity as part of actual reforms.

On Tuesday President Obama mentioned improving voting in the State Of The Union address:

We must all do our part to make sure our God-given rights are protected here at home. That includes our most fundamental right as citizens: the right to vote. When any Americans – no matter where they live or what their party – are denied that right simply because they can’t wait for five, six, seven hours just to cast their ballot, we are betraying our ideals. That’s why, tonight, I’m announcing a non-partisan commission to improve the voting experience in America. And I’m asking two long-time experts in the field, who’ve recently served as the top attorneys for my campaign and for Governor Romney’s campaign, to lead it. We can fix this, and we will. The American people demand it. And so does our democracy.

Perhaps the President was at least in part influenced by letters from advocates, sent after his previous reference to fixing the problems surfacing in last November’s election <here> <hear>

Here are the high level details spelled out by the Whitehouse <read>

Reduce Long Voting Lines: The Presidential Commission on Election Administration will develop recommendations for state and local election officials to reduce waiting times at the polls and improve all citizens’ voting experience.

Commonsense, Non-Partisan Solutions: The Commission will be co-chaired by two recognized practitioners and experts in the field, Bob Bauer and Ben Ginsberg, whose experience in this field include Bauer’s role as General Counsel for the President’s campaign and Ginsberg’s as National Counsel for Governor Romney’s campaign…

There are many good improvements possible. But often what seems like common sense turns out to be incorrect reasoning . For instance, as we have pointed out here many times, early voting actually reduces turn-out, flying in the face of the common sense notion that it would obviously increase turn-out. <here> <here>

We are also skeptical of another section:

Assist members of the military and other voters: The Commission will also make
recommendations to improve the experience of voters facing other, comparable
obstacles in casting their ballots, such as members of the military, overseas voters,
voters with disabilities, and voters with limited English proficiency.

We hope that when assisting the members of the Military and other Overseas voters that the Commission will look to states that have been successful in the practical implementation of the MOVE Act. Rather than the common sense counter factual argument that “If we can bank safely online line, why can’t we vote online” (We cannot because voting is a much harder to secure application and online banking is safe for us only because banks pay the billions lost each year in looses due to fraud)
Time will tell if the Commission and the Congress follow through on sensible reforms and heed the advice of advocates to consider voting integrity as part of actual reforms. In addition to skepticism we are hopeful reading these words from the details that may lead the Commission in a positive direction:

Practical Reforms: By Executive Order, the President will charge the
Commission to consider such issues, and identify practical, commonsense steps
that state and local election officials can take to improve the Election Day
experience. The Commission will also identify the practices of voting
jurisdictions where voters have the best Election Day experience.

For more reactions see <TheVotingNews> <BradBlog>

Edmonton rejects Internet voting 11-2

It has been a matter of consideral discussion and evaluation in Edmonton, Alberta. Should they jump on the bandwagon and double the cost of elections to accept the risks of Internet voting? For now, Edmonton is solidly on the side of science, rejecting Internet voting for very good reasons.

Like DDT, Nuclear Power, Fast Food, and GMOs, Internet voting has some very attractive, beneficial aspects, yet there are often unknown, overlooked, or downplayed real or potential problems. It takes a lot of careful research and evaluation to determine the net current and future risks and benefits.

We have written recently of the debates, the costs, the risks, and the Citizen Jury lacking technical participation.

http://tinyurl.com/EdRejects

EDMONTON JOURNAL

Edmonton council defeats proposal for Internet voting this fall

– The future of Internet voting in Alberta is unclear after Edmonton city council turned down a proposal Wednesday to allow online ballots as part of October’s civic election.

Although city staff insisted the system was extensively tested over the past year, including a mock “jelly bean” election and confirmation by a citizen jury, councillors worried the process isn’t entirely secure.

“The fact is, if major banks can be hacked, what’s guaranteeing our voting system wouldn’t be hacked?” Coun. Kerry Diotte asked.

There were also fears someone could collect other voters’ email addresses, picture identification and passwords, then cast multiple ballots in a hotly contested race.

“If you want to coerce someone, it’s easier to do that with Internet voting than it is at a voting station,” Coun. Tony Caterina said.

“At this point in 2013, I don’t think you’re ready to answer all these questions.”

There was little support for the initial proposal to permit Internet ballots before the Oct. 21 election in advance polls, which attracted 15,000 people in 2010.

But council voted 11-2 against a compromise motion to allow it just for special ballots, used three years ago by about 800 shut-ins, election workers and people away from Edmonton for an extended period.

Don Iveson and Ben Henderson were the only councillors to favour the move, arguing electronic ballots are as secure as the paper version.

“I think there’s, frankly, some paranoia about the technology because it’s unknown,” Iveson said.

“I understand the instinct to want to test it further, but those risks that people will behave badly aren’t going to go away.”

City clerk Alayne Sinclair said an outside consulting company was hired to try to breach the jelly bean election system, but along with a NAIT computing class and 10 other hackers, they didn’t succeed.

While one computer programmer says he cast two ballots in the mock election, showing it’s vulnerable to fraud, he appears to have done this by registering twice, which wasn’t being controlled, Sinclair said.

“We were told by the professionals that for all of the time people say they can penetrate the system, there’s no example anywhere that anyone has.”

Providing Internet ballots would have cost $400,000.

The city has already paid $400,000 to test the system developed by Spain’s Scytl, but Coun. Linda Sloan had philosophical as well as money concerns.

“Do we really want to configure a system where people can vote in their pyjamas? … Voting is an act of civic engagement,” she said.

“I’m not convinced this is a direction we want to take, particularly because it privatizes both the act and the system of voting.”

The province has been working with Edmonton, St. Albert and Strathcona County since last year on how to introduce Alberta’s first Internet voting, already used in dozens of centres in Ontario and Nova Scotia.

Grande Prairie, the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, Airdrie, and Lethbridge were also studying the idea.

Officials in the two capital region municipalities don’t know what will happen now that their largest partner has backed out.

“The intention of the pilot was to have the three of us do it together,” said Jacqueline Roblin, Strathcona County’s manager of legislative services.

“Now that Edmonton is no longer on board, I’m not sure how this will proceed.”

But Kalina Kamenova, who spent months working on public consultation for the scheme as research director at the University of Alberta’s Centre for Public Involvement, said she thinks city council made the wrong decision.

Most councillor concerns were already addressed by the 17-member citizen jury, which after days of discussions and hearing from experts supported online voting, Kamenova wrote in an email.

“It is surprising that councillors went against the verdict of the citizen jury and overlooked Edmontonians’ overwhelming support for this innovative voting option,” she wrote, emphasizing this is her opinion.

“It makes you wonder why so much money is being spent by the city for public involvement when citizens’ input doesn’t really have any impact on decision-making.”

© Copyright (c) The Edmonton Journal

Oversease Vote Foundation and US Vote Summit

There were several panels discussing the statistics from the November election and what is next. Two talks were particularly interesting, contrasting, and relevant. Take a look yourself and contemplate the difference between a successful, economical, conventional system to serve overseas voters and an expensive, risky, and unproven system of Internet voting yet to be implemented.

The 7th Annual Overseas Vote Foundation (OVF) Summit was held on Jan 24th at George Washington University. Not sure, but it looked to me like the auditorium used for Crossfire. The Summit atmosphere was collaborative not confrontational.

Here is the agenda: <agenda> The Summit can be viewed here: <videos>
Anyone seriously interested in absentee voting methods and success can benefit from watching the entire Summit.

The OVF does a great job serving military and overseas voters, providing a web site to help work through the registration and absentee voting process for overseas and military voters. <OVF web> Last year they expanded their services to similarly serve all U.S. Voters <U.S. Vote web>

The good news from the Summit was that overseas and military voters are becoming more successful in voting. This is largely due to states efforts to comply with the MOVE Act (Military and Overseas Voters Empowerment Act) and to the efforts of the OVF itself.

There were several panels discussing the statistics from the November election and what is next. Two talks were particularly interesting, contrasting, and relevant:

Mark Ritchie, Secretary of State of Minnesota. Minnesota has one of the highest levels of voter turnout – with Election Day Registration, without early voting, without no-excuse absentee voting. Similarly they have the highest success rate for overseas and military voting – without Internet voting – they fully support the MOVE Act in electronic ballot delivery, using a special version of the OVF system to provide support and a web interface to those voters. They have an above 99% success rate for absentee voting, with military and overseas voters slightly better than domestic voters! See Ritchie’s talk in segment 2 <video> We also note Ritchie’s general understanding that in Minnesota when a good suggestion is made, that it is acted upon.
Alison Lundergan Grimes, Kentucky Secretary of State made the case for Internet voting in support of our troops. Kentucky also uses the OVF system. She toured Iraq with several other Secretaries of the State and concluded Kentucky can improve its performance for military voters by implementing Internet voting. We note also her call out to West Virginia’s Secretary for their success in Internet voting. We also note that our understanding is that the West Virginia Legislature is yet to endorse the continued use of that expensive pilot. The talk is 1hr and 29 min into segment 3 <video>

Take a look yourself and contemplate the difference between a successful, economical, conventional system to serve overseas voters and an expensive, risky, and unproven system of Internet voting yet to be implemented.

Testimony: Polling Place Posting, Enforcement, Early Voting, and Internet Voting

Yesterday, in the midst of the gun control hearings drawing a couple thousand, we spent an hour in a snowy entrance line to testify on two bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee. We had planned on testifying on H.B. 5600, however, with many testifying on H.J. 16, I offered additional information to the Committee on that bill and on Internet voting, which was also discussed.

Yesterday, in the midst of the gun control hearings drawing a couple thousand, we spent an hour and a half in a snowy entrance line to testify on two bills before the Government Elections and Administration Committee. We had planned on testifying on H.B. 5600, however, with many testifying on H.J. 16, I offered additional information to the Committee on that bill and on Internet voting, which was also discussed.

H.B. 5600, generically titled “AN ACT CONCERNING THE REGISTRARS OF VOTERS” dealt with three items:

Requiring towns to provide Internet access for all Registrars of Voters
Requiring the posting of voter ID requirements at all polling places
Increasing the authority of the Secretary of the State by making procedures and directives enforceable by the State Elections and Enforcement Comission

We testified in favor of all three concepts. <testimony>.

Hard to imagine it, yet some towns do not provide Internet access in this day and age, even with it is available town staff.
Posting voter ID requirements is to provide uniformity such that voters are not illegally turned away or illegally allowed to vote. I suggested that lists of registered write-in candidates should also be posted.
In general we welcome more enforcement, yet the text of the proposed bill is in some areas two broad and in others too narrow. I also needs some further work to assure clarity and transparency. (Read the testimony)

H.J. 16 is the Constitutional Amendment from last year that needs to be approved again by this Legislature and then Connecticut voters in 2014 “RESOLUTION APPROVING AN AMENDMENT TO THE STATE CONSTITUTION TO GRANT INCREASED AUTHORITY TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REGARDING ELECTION ADMINISTRATION.”

The amendment would allow the Legislature to specify early voting such as in-person early voting or no-excuse absentee voting. We assumed, incorrectly, that there would be little discussion and that major debates would occur in 2015 if the amendment passes.

Secretary of the State, Denise Merrill, made a brief statement summarizing and supporting the bill which lead to perhaps forty-five minutes of pro and con questioning by the Committee, which also included questions on the largely unrelated topic of Internet voting for the Military. Others added testimony on the bill as well.

Scrapping most of my prepared remarks, I dedicated about half of my allocated three minutes to H.J. 16 and Internet voting. I provided the committee with information on the risks, costs, and value of various early voting methods, Internet voting, and how Connecticut might best serve all Overseas voters, including the Military.

The Committee was very attentive and open to considering my testimony: <testimony>

Especially the sources of the information that all forms of early voting decrease turnout. I promised to followup with links to the references.
I suggested following the example of Minnesota which had the greatest success in serving overseas voters, without risky, expensive, and ineffective Internet voting.
I reaffirmed my support of polling place Election Day Registration (EDR), its potential to increase turnout, while also reaffirming my prediction of disappointing results and concerns for very long lines.

Update: CT-N video, my testimony is about 75% of the way in <watch>

OP-ED: Voting Requires Vigilance. Popular Isn’t Always Prudent

Our Op-Ed published yesterday by CTNewsJunkie, outlining the integrity risks of the National Popular Vote Compact, now being considered by the Connecticut Legislature, for the fourth time since 2007.

Our Op-Ed published yesterday by CTNewsJunkie, outlining the integrity risks of the National Popular Vote Compact, now being considered by the Connecticut Legislature, for the fourth time since 2007: Voting Requires Vigilance. Popular Isn’t Always Prudent <read>

by Luther Weeks | Jan 21, 2013 7:16pm
Posted to: Opinion

One third of Americans vote on machines, without the paper ballots we use in Connecticut. Our president is chosen based on faith in those unverifiable machines, vote accounting, and unequal enfranchisement in 50 independent states and the District of Columbia.

In 2000, we witnessed the precarious underpinnings of this state-by-state voting system combined with the flawed mechanism of the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Accounting Act. The Supreme Court ruled votes could not be recounted in Florida, because even that single state did not have uniform recount procedures. What could possibly make this system riskier?

The National Popular Vote Compact now being considered in states, including Connecticut, would have such states award their electoral votes to a purported national popular vote winner. The Compact would take effect once enough states signed on, equaling more than one-half the Electoral College. Then the President elected would be the one with the most purported popular votes. Sounds good and fair at first glance. Looking at the touted benefits and none of the risks many legislators, advocates, and media influence the public to make the Compact popular in some polls. Popular is not always prudent. Voting requires vigilance.

The Compact, cobbled on an already precarious system, would exacerbate its flaws, adding additional risks. Currently errors, voter suppression, and fraud can only sway the result in the few swing states. With the Compact errors, suppression, and fraud in every state would count toward the popular vote total.

Compact supporters overlook and proponents befog the reality that there would be no official national popular vote total available in time for states to choose their electors. The only official popular vote total is the sum of the Certificates of Attainment sent by each state to the national Archivist. They cannot be used for choosing electors, since certificates are not required to be sent until seven days after electors are chosen and are not required to arrive in Washington until fifteen days after the electors must be chosen. Supreme Court decisions in 2000 and 1876 stress that these dates must be strictly followed.

Even if the totals could be obtained in time from each state, they would not be audited and could not be recounted. Compact proponents obfuscate this by describing how some states routinely perform audits or recounts. They conveniently ignore that about one-third of the states do not have audits and recounts; many voting machines cannot be audited; state recounts are based on close-vote margins within a state, so even in those states, recounts would not be triggered by a close national vote. Just as critical, there would be insufficient time for recounts or audits given the strict Constitutional deadlines. The Supreme Court would likely reject any recount going beyond state borders, using the same reasoning used to reject the 2000 Florida recount, as insufficiently uniform.

Additional legal challenges and maneuvers under the Compact would also be available for partisans bent on sending any reasonably close election to the Supreme Court or Congress. States not signing the Compact could delay certifying and transmitting results until the latest deadline. Partisans could dispute results in their states or sue their Secretary of State for using uncertified results from other states, delaying reporting or negating the state’s Electoral College vote.

Nothing is available, but legal challenges, even in Compact states, to deter a future partisan Secretary of State from failing to follow the Compact.

Supporters and opponents debate other contentions for and against the Compact, most of which are subjective and speculative. e.g. Which is more ideal, the current Federal system or the popular vote? Would small states or large states benefit more from the Compact? Where would candidates campaign and join with PACs in media buys? How equal would every voter actually be, given the state-by-state system of voter enfranchisement, disenfranchisement, suppression, and registration?

An accurate, fair, and credible popular vote requires a uniform, workable national voting system we can trust. That is, a system with uniform enfranchisement, paper ballots, effective audits, and national recounts, enforceable and provably enforced as a prerequisite to a considering a national popular vote.

Luther Weeks is executive director of CTVotersCount.

If it feels good, do it! – Oh! No! Canada!

Based on the theory that if voters like Internet voting and nobody has recognized a problem, it should be implemented, no matter what the cost, no matter what risks identified by experts. The voting version of unhealthy living, If it tastes good, eat it!. Technically know as common sense, that works sometimes, and at other times brings us common sense ideas like the earth revolving around the sun.

A couple of years ago we posted: Damn the science; Damn the integrity; If it feels good do it. Based on the theory that if voters like Internet voting and nobody has recognized a problem, it should be implemented, no matter what the cost, no matter what risks identified by experts. The voting version of unhealthy living, If it tastes good, eat it!. Technically know as common sense, that works sometimes, and at other times brings us other commons sense ideas like the earth revolving around the sun.

Our neighbors up to the north in Warterloo and Edmonton are using that common sense to justify Internet Voting:

From the Waterloo Record: Waterloo to look into online municipal election voting <read>

WATERLOO — The City of Waterloo will investigate using online and telephone voting for the 2014 municipal elections.

Council went against the best informed person it had at the table and voted Monday to look into internet and telephone voting for the 2014 municipal election. The city will seek proposals from companies with voting technology, and wants the cities of Cambridge and Kitchener to consider using it as well.

Coun. Jeff Henry grew up in Markham which has used internet voting for several years and also been part of University of Waterloo student elections where electronic voting was used.

“My skepticism comes with knowledge,” Henry said.

He raised issues with security and democracy, similar to concerns expressed by Kitchener politicians when they debated the idea. For more than a year the city studied the process and found issues with security, cost, democracy and guideline issues.

I think this is a great idea,” Coun. Karen Scian said. “I think if we can figure out how to do it securely and figure out how to engage more people to vote and make it easier for people to vote then the whole community benefits.

Tim Jackson, a member of the Barnraisers council, urged councillors to take the jump, earning himself a spot on a committee that will review the request for proposals.

“As the most intelligent community in the world it’s almost a given that we should be embracing the concept of electronic voting,” Jackson said.

City clerk Susan Greatrix said it is expected online voting would add costs to the election process.

“I don’t anticipate there would be a reduction in election costs,” Greatrix said. “It would be much more expensive than traditional voting.”

Kitchener’s last election cost about $400,000. Adding online voting could add more than $300,000 to those costs.

Coun. Henry and Coun. Scott Witmer voted against the idea, but the proposal passed.

Nothing has been decided on which voting method will be used. That decision is expected later this year when staff have evaluated proposals on the idea.

Edmonton Journal: Internet voting option proposed for Edmonton civic election <read>

Edmonton should allow Internet voting for advance and special ballots in next October’s civic election, a report released Thursday recommends.

The proposal, following more than a year of study that included a test “jelly bean election” and the verdict of a citizen jury, would make Edmonton the first western Canadian city where candidates can be chosen online…

But the province and the 17-member citizen jury suggested allowing anyone who wants to take part in the advanced poll, starting almost two weeks before the Oct. 20 election, to register and pick their candidates online.

There were about 6,000 advanced votes in the last election out of a total 199,000 ballots cast, a turnout of 33 per cent.

“We wanted to honour the citizen jury process, and the citizen jury told us they wanted to have at least 10 days of voting,” Sinclair said.

“I guess from everyone’s perspective it’s a voting option. We want to make sure there are no barriers.”

Checks done by an outside company during last fall’s jelly bean election, which asked people to select their favourite candy colours, food and other preferences, showed the system is secure from hackers, the report said.

To ensure the process isn’t rigged, at least four out of seven members of an electoral board must produce their digital key cards and passwords to open or close the ballot box, and recounts are possible.

“Because we demonstrated it was safe and secure, the province is OK with us proceeding,” Sinclair said…

An online city survey done last fall showed three-quarters of the 400 respondents agree Edmonton should provide the option of Internet voting.

More than nine out of 10 people who opposed it were concerned about security.

We commented on the Edmonton system as part of a final exam for the Coursera course, Securing Digital Democracy. Since the course is complete and all exams graded, I can provide my answer:

1.         Threat – Imposter Sites

Someone could create a site that could easily be confused with the actual site, act like that site to provide information, register voters and accept their votes, then act like the voter to register that voter and vote on the actual Edmonton system. Reference the following FAQ:

23. How can I verify that I am accessing the actual voting system(no phishing)?

When accessing the voting system, ensure that you are accessing the following website: https://internetvoting.edmomton.ca. The voting system website will have the ‘s’ following ‘http’ indicating that the connection is encrypted and secure

1) The FAQ highlights how important it is to interact with the system through a specific URL starting with ‘https’. 2) Yet, the FAQ page itself is an ‘http’ not a ‘https’ page so that it is itself not protected and could be intercepted, to lead the unsuspecting voter to a fake site for instruction, registration, and voting. 3) This version of the FAQ above is actually a fake with the city name in the URL changed, to lead the unsuspecting voter to a criminal relay site.

2.         Threat – Coercion

A coercer could watch a voter vote under threat. One way to reduce that threat would be provide the opportunity for a voter to subsequently vote again and have that vote count, not the observed coerced vote, however, this system only allows one vote, according this FAQ:

28. Once a vote has been cast, can it be changed?

No. Once a vote has been cast [i.e. you confirm your vote] it cannot be changed. This process is the same as dropping the ballot into the ballot box in a traditional paper-based election, ensuring complete voter anonymity and secrecy of the ballot.

Ironically, this attribute which facilitates coercion is touted as related to protecting secrecy.

3.         Threat – Malware, Client Side Attack

The system provides for use of a variety of browsers and operating systems, including older windows versions, XP, and Vista, initial versions of which were subject to many security issues. Perhaps we need to ask more questions: What precautions or methods are employed to prevent or recognize client side attacks? What testing on each browser/operating system combination? Was there any open-ended testing? If so, who performed that testing? What were the results?

I am skeptical that there is any awareness of such client side or other threats. None of the FAQs address the possibility of client side or server side threats. The whole thrust of the test is voter satisfaction, not on assessing the security of the test. The public test makes no mention of testing security, makes no offer to the public to attempt to break the system, there is no guarantee that anyone successfully compromising the test will be exempt from civil or criminal penalties. This view is reinforced by noting that the research team associated with the project includes several professors of political science but none with apparent expertise in computer science, security or related fields.

Another day, more internet heists revealed

We and others have posted several times, debunking the frequently repeated statement that “If we can use ATMs and the Internet for banking, why can’t we use the internet for voting”. The answers are 1) Voting is a different application and riskier; and 2) Internet banking is not safe, banks loose billions to electronic fraud every year, yet it is less than they make and save using the Internet.

A new story of heists by an individual: Alleged ZeuS Botmaster Arrested for Stealing $100 Million from U.S. Banks <read>

A 24-year-old Algerian man remains in a Thai jail awaiting extradition to the United States, where he is suspected of masterminding more than $100 million in global bank heists using the ZeuS and SpyEye Trojans.

Malaysian authorities believe they’ve apprehended the hacker Hamza Bendelladj, who they say has been jetsetting around the world using millions of dollars stolen online from various banks. He was arrested at a Bangkok airport enroute from Malaysia to Egypt…

Bendelladj is suspected of stealing funds from 127 U.S. banks in the past six years using ZeuS- and SpyEye-infected machines to drain accounts in minutes. Victims are said to have been compromised through fake financial Web pages between December 2009 and September 2011. The FBI, which has been hunting for the hacker behind the schemes for three years, has not released details of alleged crimes listed in arrest warrants awaiting the man after he is extradicted to the agency’s Georgia division…

During the event, Bendelladj reportedly beamed and joked about his ranking as an international criminal. He earned the moniker “the happy hacker” because of numerous photos that all show him smiling broadly in photos taken during his airport arrest.

Review some of our past posts on threats to Internet voting <here>

Dummies’ Guide to Rigging a Colorado Election

Not everything that Marilyn recommends would work quite the same or as well in Connecticut. A strategy for Connecticut insider election thieves would be to rig memory cards and then provide incomplete post-election audit reports, or to claim that any discrepancy in such reports between machine and hand counts is human error.

Thanks to Marilyn Marks we have this guide: Steal This Election!–Dummies’ Guide to Rigging a Colorado Election <read>

This guide is for novices to Colorado politics and elections. Colorado has recently gained a reputation as a lawless Wild West state where candidates and parties can rig an election with impunity. Given that most officials appear to have little interest in election reform, it’s only fair to level the playing field for all the would-be players.

Connecticut election administration has also been called the Wild West.

Not everything that Marilyn recommends would work quite the same or as well in Connecticut. For now, we do not have unlimited absentee voting or automatic mail-in voting. However, that might change in the future. Yet we have little reason to take comfort. We do little checking of absentee ballot signatures. We also have a history of fraud by absentee ballot. Similar to many other states, many Connecticut voters would never question the integrity of even one of our registrars (especially those in our own town), and for the most part those registrars share absolute trust in each of their staff members and poll workers. Unfortunately, this is one of the 15 attributes of “Security Theater” from security expert Roger Johnston: “Strong emotion, over confidence, arrogance, ego, and/or pride related to security”.

A strategy for Connecticut insider election thieves would be to rig memory cards and then provide incomplete post-election audit reports, or to claim that any discrepancy in such reports between machine and hand counts is human error.

An Oscar Performance: Blame the Customers and Users.

Unprofessional systems “professionals” often resort to blaming the users for systems that are difficult to understand and use. Similarly, software vendors blame their customers for the inadequacies of the systems they have sold to or implemented for those customers.

Wired: E-Voting Snafu Pushes Back Oscar Nomination Deadline <read>

This year, Oscar voters are getting a deadline extension, giving members an extra day to vote on the nominees for this year’s Academy Awards after technical issues plagued the first attempt by The Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences to allow online voting.

The Academy announced in early 2012 that it would be making e-voting available to members, and as is often then case in the move from analog to digital, the transition to the new voting platform hasn’t been without hiccups. In a recent Hollywood Reporter analysis, many Academy voters complained of issues with logging in to the voting site — something an Academy representative attributed to voters “forgetting or misusing passwords” – difficulty navigating the site once they were logged in, and even the potential for hackers to infiltrate the website and influence the vote.

“They should have had more lead time than, ‘Here you go; this is what we are expecting now,’” one Academy voter told THR. “We’re talking about many elderly people who are not that computer literate. They might think that it’s simple, but the simplest thing isn’t simple to many people…. There will probably be a large percentage of people who will just say, ‘Screw it’ and not even vote this year.”
Documentary filmmaker Morgan Spurlock tweeted just last week that “the password they sent didn’t work for my log in – and they couldn’t e-mail me a new log in, only snail mail.” Some even called it a “disaster” and expressed worry that the website would be susceptible to hacking. Others worried that frustrations with the new system could lead to low voter turnout.

However, Lori Steele, the CEO of the company that developed the electronic voting system for the Academy, said that despite those reports, the majority of the feedback her firm Everyone Counts had received was positive and that voters had access to a 24-hour telephone support line and assisted voting stations in Los Angeles, New York and London. She also added that the deadline extension was the result of the Academy simply wanting to give voters more time and not because of any particular issue with the e-voting site.

“Voting through our platform has gotten really rave reviews from most members and the user experience went through multiple levels of user testing with members and the satisfaction rate is extremely high,” Steele said in an interview with Wired. “There have been some issues — as you’ve read — with passwords and that simply means the system is working, so those wouldn’t be the reasons that this would be extended.”