Category: National

Reminder: We’re Better Off With Optical Scanners

OpEd News reminds us that it could have been much worse. A picture is worth a 1000 words!

For those who question the costs of our post-election audits, OpEd News reminds us that it could have been much worse. We could have been stuck with touch screens (DREs) which would have cost much more, are less safe even with a paper trail, and are much harder and more expensive to audit. A picture is worth a 1000 words! <read & view photo>

Also note that the November 2008 audit cost Connecticut about $0.06 per ballot cast.  That is a small price to pay when a typical high-turn-out election in Connecticut costs towns in the range of $5.00-$10.00 per ballot cast.   My polling place is a mile and a half away, so it costs me close to $1.00 round trip just to drive to vote.

A look back:  Hartford Courant Editorial, December 7, 2006:  A TrueVote Vindication, Connecticut owes TrueVote CT a debt of gratitude. <read>

What Can Science Do For Us? – Nothing Unless We Pay Attention

This, from Ash’s perspective, represents the crux of the problem. We have sophisticated statistical tools that we rely on for everything from medical research to verifying the flow of money through Las Vegas casinos but we simply haven’t chosen to mandate that they be used to verify election results. Even in cases like the elections in Sarasota, where they were deployed, the results were deemed legally irrelevant unless they provide an indication that election results were distorted by malice or intent. Sloppiness or incompetence, apparently, is acceptable, despite our country’s promise to respect the intent of the voters.

American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting, “”Science for Public Confidence in Election Fairness and Accuracy”  <read> statements by Ed Feltion and Arlene Ash.

it’s mathematically impossible to verify that the code they run will behave properly under all circumstances, which means that the best we can do is provide a verifiable and auditable record of the vote, allowing problems to be identified retrospectively. Even that’s difficult to reconcile with our expectations for anonymity; in describing the challenge of creating an algorithm that simultaneously encrypts and anonymizes the votes, Felten said, “we’ve reduced this to a previously unsolved problem—we’re really good at that in computer science.”

Until that problem is solved, many states are opting for optical scan voting or printing voter verifiable receipts, which can allow a post-election audit to identify significant problems. But running these audits raises a whole new series of issues, some of which are less a technical challenge than a matter of how carefully we want to listen to what an rigorous analysis of a vote tells us…

This, from Ash’s perspective, represents the crux of the problem. We have sophisticated statistical tools that we rely on for everything from medical research to verifying the flow of money through Las Vegas casinos but we simply haven’t chosen to mandate that they be used to verify election results. Even in cases like the elections in Sarasota, where they were deployed, the results were deemed legally irrelevant unless they provide an indication that election results were distorted by malice or intent. Sloppiness or incompetence, apparently, is acceptable, despite our country’s promise to respect the intent of the voters.

Answer Quick: What Do Premier/Diebold and Wal-Mart Have In Common?

Hint: It is not low prices for computer memory cards.

The Raw Story has the story <read>

To convince Utah decision-makers that Premier was a big company with a substantial presence, Kathy Dopp, founder of UtahCountVotes.org, reported that a company representative told the decision-makers in 2006 that Diebold “has about 20 offices in Utah.” When pressed further, the representative refused to give the locations of any of the offices. In fact, the White Pages lists 18 Diebold offices.

However, when calls were made to all of these offices, only one picked up the phone. And when the addresses of offices listed under Diebold in the White Pages were visited, the addresses turned out to belong to either a Wal-Mart, a Sam’s Club, or no building at all. In the end, 16 of the 18 Diebold offices in Utah listed in the White Pages were false listings…

A quick investigation by Bob Fertik on Democrats.com revealed that a similar scam existed in New York, with another Diebold listing in Buffalo turning out to be a Wal-Mart. Out of 13 listings in Florida, 5 turned out to be Wal-Marts. Similar office listings have been uncovered in Alabama, Mississippi, and New Hampshire.

CA: Bowen Considers Decertifying Premier/Diebold GEMS

CA, Secretary of State Deborah Bowen is considering decertifying the GEMS system. But it’s complex and unclear exactly what decertificaiton would mean. This is another case of being caught between the Glitches and the Gotchas, at the mercy of a broken system of certification and an oligarchy providing inadequate products.

Update: John Gideon attempts to get a straight answer from the EAC <email exchange>

**********

Based on the problems discovered in Humboldt, CA, Secretary of State Deborah Bowen is considering decertifying the GEMS system.  But it’s complex and unclear exactly what decertificaiton would mean.  This is another case of being caught between the Glitches and the Gotchas, at the mercy of a broken system of certification and an oligarchy providing inadequate products.

The Eurika Times-Standard has the story <read>

Chris Riggall, a spokesman for Premier Elections Solutions, said in a previous interview with the Times-Standard that the company had known of the programming error since 2004. Saying the certification process is too lengthy and time consuming to have had the software re-certified, Riggall said Premier instead issued “work around” orders by e-mail to its customers instructing them how to take steps to avoid the problem…

The transparency project that discovered the error passes every ballot cast in an election through an optical scanner after it’s been officially counted. The ballot images are then placed online, along with open-source software, created by volunteer Mitch Trachtenberg, that allows viewers to sort the ballots by precinct and scrutinize the vote as they see fit…

But, the possible decertification of the version of GEMS currently used in Santa Barbara and San Luis Obispo is raising some questions there for elections officials, especially with the state calling a special election in May. Officials in both counties said they are still looking into how they would proceed if the approval of their voting systems were to be withdrawn.

Meanwhile, some in the election watchdog community are pushing for either the Secretary of State’s Office or the federal Elections Assistance Commission to pursue punitive actions against Premier, which they say knowingly kept elections systems in place that had unacceptable error rates.

Riggall said Premier has done nothing disingenuous, and notified its customers immediately upon discovering the error in its vote counting system, carefully instructing them how to “work around” the problem.

”I don’t see that there is anything — absolutely nothing — in how we have handled this issue going back several years that has been disingenuous,” Riggall said.

Meanwhile, in Connecticut we don’t use this particular function of the GEMS system to accumulate election results.  We use GEMS for a different, unrelated function.  We have our vendor, LHS Associates us GEMS to program our elections.  We use an error prone three step system of manual transcription and addition to accomplish the accumulation of vote totals which also can and has been prone to errors.

WSJ Article: Thwarting an Internal Hacker – Not Quite

In the end, systems will always have trusted people who can subvert them.

Excellent article on the difficulties of preventing insider fraud in the Wall Street Journal, except that the title, Thwarting an Internal Hacker, may be a bit optimistic, compared to the details in the article:  <read>

In the end, systems will always have trusted people who can subvert them. It’s important to keep in mind that incidents like this don’t happen very often; that most people are honest and honorable. Security is very much designed to protect against the dishonest minority

In the online article there is a very good list of articles and past problems with electronic voting systems.  Each word points to a separate article:

Replacing trusted people with computers doesn’t make the problem go away; it just moves it around and makes it even more complex. The computer, software, and network designers, implementers, coders, installers, maintainers, etc. are all trusted people. See any analysis of the security of electronic voting machines, or some of the frauds perpetrated against computerized gambling machines, for some graphic examples of the risks inherent in replacing people with computers.

The heart of the article is a list:

There are five basic techniques to deal with trusted people:

1. Limit the number of trusted people…

2. Ensure that trusted people are also trustworthy…

3. Limit the amount of trust each person has…

4. Give people overlapping spheres of trust. This is compartmentalization; the idea here is to limit the amount of damage a person can do if he ends up not being trustworthy. This is the concept behind giving people keys that only unlock their office or passwords that only unlock their account, as well as “need to know” and other levels of security clearance…

5. Detect breaches of trust after the fact and prosecute the guilty… This is why audit is so vital.

Our challenge in Connecticut is to protect our optical scanners  in 169 towns where expertise is scarce, most officials are very part time,  and separation with overlap of duties is challenging and expensive.  As the Coalition reports have shown, even protecting ballots with a credible chain-of-custody is yet to be accomplished.

Less challenging to overcome, yet still in place, is our dependence on our vendor LHS for programming of all our memory cards before each election – just the type of vulnerablity that provides an opening for insider fraud.

VoiceOfTheVoters Radio: Electoral College Debate

Last night VoiceOfTheVoters.org held a debate, Electoral College v. National Popular Vote. Unfortunately, most of the debate is the usual partisan arguments. It is an example of Democratic support of the National Popular Vote for the wrong reasons and Republican opposition for equally wrong reasons. The exception is Part 3.

Last night VoiceOfTheVoters.org held a debate, Electoral College v. National Popular Vote.

February 11, 2009: Electoral College v. National Popular Vote (NPV) debated by Tara Ross, attorney and author of Enlightened Democracy: The Case for the Electoral College, and Jamie Raskin, MD state senator and professor of law at American U., with comments by Dan Ashby, Election Defense Alliance, and Rob Richie, FairVote. Audio:  Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4.

Unfortunately, most of the debate is the usual partisan arguments.  It is an example of Democratic support of the National Popular Vote for the wrong reasons and Republican opposition for equally wrong reasons.

We do highly recommend listening to Part 3 and the excellent articulation of the risks of the national popular vote given our current state by state election systems, by Don Ashby of the Election Defense Alliance.

CTVotersCount.org opposes the National Popular Vote at this time because of the clear risks given our current variety of unequal, unreliable voting systems from state to state <read> <read> Also note the comments by anonomous bloggers on our second post.  Just like the debaters on the  VoiceOfTheVoters, those in favor of the National Popular Vote never actually provide a rational rebuttal to our concerns – there is none.

Imagine A National Recount. What Could Possibly Be Worse?

I’d love to discuss the Electoral College and the importance of that institution, when you imagine a National Recount.” – Mark Ritchie, Secretary of State, Minnesota

What could possibly by worse?

As we have said before, we understand the appeal of the popular election of the President.  However, CTVotersCount is conditionally opposed to the popular election of the President, in any form, unless and until there are uniform election laws, enforceable, and enforced nationwide. <The Case Against>

Yesterday, the Secretary of the State of Minnesota, Mark Ritchie touched on the same subject in a speech to the National Association of Secretaries of the State (NASS) , winter conference, February 7, 2009 in Washington, D. C.:

“I’d love to discuss the Electoral College and the importance of that institution, when you imagine a national recount.”  -Mark Ritchie

What could possibly be worse?

A close Presidential election under a national popular vote, without a National recount.

SOS Ritchie reinforces our objection to a national popular vote without uniform laws.  Many states have a recount on close vote, but that is based on state totals not national totals.  Where it would be done well, it works under the electoral college to verify that the states votes for President are awarded based on the intentions of all the voters.  However, without other changes in the law a close national total does not imply a close vote in any states and would be unlikely to be close in any but a few states.  A close popular vote to be trusted would require a national recount with uniform standards – high standards such as those demonstrated in Minnesota.

Be Careful What You Ask For

Article in Akron Beacon Journal expresses concerns with a statewide recount. What about a nationwide recount? What would the National Popular Vote cause?

We have nothing against the well intentioned voters and legislators supporting the National Popular Vote Agreement. We encourage them to recognize and consider the impact of unintended consequences.

Article in Akron Beacon Journal expresses concerns with a statewide recount. What about a nationwide recount? <read>

Democrat Mary Jo Kilroy did not know she had defeated Republican Steve Stivers in a central Ohio congressional race until Dec. 5, more than a month after the 2008 general election.

The mix-up was the result of a contest too close to call when the polls closed, uncounted and disputed provisional and absentee ballots, tag-teaming lawyers and a litany of litigation.

For Ohio at large, that race exposed the continuing weaknesses in the state’s elections system.

Luckily for this state and the nation, the presidential race between Democrat Barack Obama and Republican John McCain was not close.

Imagine the chaos that would have ensued if Ohio were the last state standing in the presidential race because of uncounted provisional and absentee ballots. It’s not a stretch to think we would have been — and unless problems are addressed, could well be — the next Florida from 2000.

We have two points to make relative to this article.

First, we disagree with the thrust of the article that there is something wrong with counting carefully after a close election.   We are not familiar with the Ohio details, but waiting to Dec 2nd to get it right is well worth it.  Since we have absentee ballots, provisional ballots, military and overseas ballots they should be counted, especially when they may change the result.  These voters demonstrate a higher commitment to democracy, often working harder to vote than the average voter.

We  support of the careful process in Minnesota in the recent Coleman/Frankin statewide recount.  We have a national obsession, stoked by the media and apparent winners, with knowing the election results almost immediately.  We jump to the conclusion that the winner of the first approximate count on election night is actually the winner, even though there are many votes not yet counted and frequent errors in the reporting and accumulating of results.

If we want every vote to count and count accurately, then we need to take the time to get in right every time.  That includes counting very carefully when the results are close.

Second, imagine national popular election of the President.  Would we have a nationwide recount as careful as the Minnesota recount?  I doubt as we can rely on every state to do as good a job.  Some states without paper trails could not under any circumstances.  Could the country wait for a good job to be accomplished in all 50 states, with the media and the questionable initial winner pushing to complete the job?  Would there be endless suits?  Voters, parties and candidates going to court to challenge accuracy in many states.  With the National Popular Vote Agreement, could each state’s voters go to court against their state challenging the award of their electoral votes based on questionable counts from other states?  Could they go to court against those states for providing questionable numbers?

Worse.  Right now many states have recounts on close votes.  If there were a close presidential vote, only the states with close votes would actually do a recount – perhaps none.  But since every vote, every error  and every fraud could change the result, a close vote should require a national recount.  Even then, every state has its own way/standards for recounts.

Faced with 1) the facts of questionable counts, 2) the media and questionable winners sturring up worries, complaining of delays while filing suits, and 3) all the law suits – what would happen?  Would every reasonably close presidential election be decided by the Supreme Court?

The myth of every vote being equal, the risks of error and fraud, and the potential for legal chaos is why we are opposed to the popular election of the President, in any form, unless and until there are uniform election laws, enforceable, and enforced nationwide.

We have nothing against the well intentioned voters and legislators supporting the National Popular Vote Agreement.  We encourage them to recognize and consider the impact of unintended consequences.

Optical Scanners “Extremely Accurate” – In MN

the “gross” error rate is about 1 in 1000, or a gross accuracy of 99.91%.

Andrew Appel has analysed the official results of the Minnesota recount and pronounced them “Extremely Accurate”, <read>

There were 2,423,851 votes counted.

The recount added a total of 1,528 votes to the candidates, and subtracted a total of 642 votes, for a gross change of 2170 (again, not including absentee ballot qualification). Thus, the “gross” error rate is about 1 in 1000, or a gross accuracy of 99.91%.

A Winner In Minnesota

OpEd by Mark Halversen, Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota, testifies to the integrity of the Minnesota recount <read> A recount to count on As nonpartisan election integrity advocates with front-row seats at the U.S. Senate recount, we believe Minnesotans can be confident the process has been methodical and fair. The intense scrutiny given to each … Continue reading “A Winner In Minnesota”

OpEd by Mark Halversen, Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota, testifies to the integrity of the Minnesota recount <read>

A recount to count on

As nonpartisan election integrity advocates with front-row seats at the U.S. Senate recount, we believe Minnesotans can be confident the process has been methodical and fair. The intense scrutiny given to each step of the process and to each vote in the Senate recount has provided an incredible civics lesson for Minnesotans and the nation.

Hundreds of Minnesotans have volunteered as nonpartisan observers in at least one of four statewide manual counts — the 2006 and 2008 post-election audits, the 2008 judicial primary recount and, now, the U.S. Senate recount. These efforts were organized by Citizens for Election Integrity Minnesota in partnership with the League of Women Voters Minnesota and Common Cause Minnesota.

The winner is: Voting Integrity

Our current election laws effectively prevented the chaos that could have clouded the process.

Minnesota’s election process is characterized by transparency and openness. The most recent example is the live online streaming of the canvassing board’s review of the challenged ballots.

As we discussed recently, unlike Connecticut, Minnesota has the right idea, a complete, thorough, manual recount

A manual recount is the best way to be confident in the accuracy of the results in such a close race.

A meaningful recount is possible because the paper ballots provide a physical record of each voter’s intent and enable a way to independently verify the machine tally.

Although some have argued that a machine recount would have been cheaper and quicker than a hand count, it would not have been as accurate in determining voter intent.

Vote totals typically rise whenever there is a hand recount of a machine tally, as we’ve seen in this recount. This is because some voters mis-mark their ballots — for example, by circling an oval instead of filling it in — in such a way that optical scanners cannot detect their intent.

Just counting the paper is not enough. Counting the paper by hand is not enough. Minnesota could have done it much sooner if they just counted the paper by hand, but they do the whole job. Democracy can stand the wait, its speed that puts it in danger.
(See our recent post: Minnesota Recount vs. Connecticut Recanvass )