CTVotersCount.org

[Why NOT] Let Overseas Military Fax Votes Home ?

Connecticut does need to improve the voting process for military voters — but Internet voting is not the answer.

Every day, headlines reveal just how vulnerable and insecure any online network really is, and how sophisticated, tenacious and skilled today’s attackers are. Just last week, we learned that the U.S. has already experienced our first-ever documented attack on an election system, when a grand jury report revealed that someone hacked into the Miami-Dade primary elections system in August 2012.

Earlier in March, the Courant ran an editorial in favor of online, email, and fax early voting: Let Overseas Military Fax Votes Home <read>

We have testified twice this year against this risky, expensive, unconstitutional concept, providing information on safer, economical alternatives <here> <here>

Today, to its credit, the Courant published an op-ed by Pam Smith of VerifiedVoting. org, articulating Why Not: Internet Voting Puts Election Security At Risk <read>

Connecticut lawmakers are considering legislation to allow military voters to cast ballots over the Internet. The intention of this legislation is well-meaning — Connecticut does need to improve the voting process for military voters — but Internet voting is not the answer.

Every day, headlines reveal just how vulnerable and insecure any online network really is, and how sophisticated, tenacious and skilled today’s attackers are. Just last week, we learned that the U.S. has already experienced our first-ever documented attack on an election system, when a grand jury report revealed that someone hacked into the Miami-Dade primary elections system in August 2012.

A chilling account in The Washington Post recently reported that most government entities in Washington, including congressional offices, federal agencies, government contractors, embassies, news organizations, think tanks and law firms, have been penetrated by Chinese hackers.

They join a long list that includes the CIA, FBI, Department of Defense, Bank of America, and on and on. These organizations have huge cybersecurity budgets and the most robust security tools available, and they have been unable to prevent hacking. Contrary to popular belief, online voting systems would not be any more secure.

Not surprisingly, a senior cybersecurity official with the Department of Homeland Security warned election officials last year that online voting is premature and not advisable at this time. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (the federal body tasked with researching Internet voting) issued a statement shortly after, warning that secure Internet voting is not feasible with the tools currently available. Because the agency determined that Internet voting cannot be done securely, it has not developed testing or certification standards for systems.

So why are state lawmakers considering online voting for the military?

First, there is a mistaken perception that because we can shop and bank online, we should be able to vote online securely. But shopping or banking online are far from secure. Banks and online merchants lose billions every year to online fraud. They factor this into the cost of doing business.

There is, however, no acceptable level of vote fraud or manipulation. Moreover, elections have unique properties that are unlike banking or e-commerce. In a financial transaction, both parties can check each online transaction by reviewing a statement or receipt. But we vote by a secret ballot. Neither the voter nor the election official can verify that a ballot has been received the same way it was sent. This makes online voting especially susceptible to undetected hacking.

Second, we have seen a big push for Internet voting (including via email and digital fax) because the vendors of online voting systems have targeted state lawmakers and election officials with aggressive marketing and sales campaigns. The vendors have made extraordinary claims of security and auditability — all of which are unsubstantiated by any publicly reviewable research or documentation. None of these systems are subject to any standardized security testing or certification and claims of security are backed only by the vendors’ words.

There are things we can do to improve the voting process for our military voters without risking the integrity of their ballots or the security of our elections.

We can:

1. Move registration deadlines closer to the election. Virginia did this in 2012 and it paid big dividends, allowing service members to receive and return their ballots up to Election Day.

2. Allow our troops to use the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot to register and vote. Many states now allow service members to do both. It’s the military voter equivalent of Election Day Voter Registration. This widely used, practical reform would make absentee voting much easier for service members stationed outside of Connecticut.

3. Count military ballots postmarked by Election Day, and received seven days after. This would still give election officials enough time to count the ballots before certification, and would give our troops an opportunity to vote on Election Day.

Our legislators are right to act to improve voting for our brave men and women in uniform, but online voting is not yet the answer. Instead, the General Assembly should look to make the voting process easier and more accessible with some simple, common-sense improvements.

ACLU Forum on Electoral Dysfunction

On Wednesday night I participated on a panel in Waterford, CT on Electoral Dysfunction, sponsored by the ACLU, Common Cause and the LWV. It was a very good discussion with a variety of views from the panel, a wide range of excellent questions, and unsurpassed moderation. In the near future we may have video available. I promised to provide more information here on the topics covered.

Introduction

I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you tonight.

CTVotersCount is dedicated to voting integrity for the benefit of the voters of Connecticut. We want your vote to count; We want your vote counted accurately; And we wanted it counted exactly once.

As a technologist, I am dedicated to the responsible, effective and efficient use of technology.

Beyond elections and technology, I am committed that Democracy Flourish and to Government that Works for Everyone.

Basic and Bold Steps

Last November, President Obama saw the long lines and said “We need to fix that. In response we posted three sets of basic and bold steps to fix our elections and democracy; For Connecticut Elections; For U.S. Elections; and steps Beyond Election Integrity. Ten basic and bold steps in all. Tonight I will highlight just four.

First, for Democracy: Media Reform – A necessary requirement for democracy according to the founders. Saving the Internet is a last ditch start.

If you want more details on these or any of the other topics I discuss today, visit CTVotersCount.org tomorrow.

Second idea, for U.S. Elections: Mandate paper ballots optically scanned, nationwide; With recounts and independent manual audits; H.R. 12 co-sponsored by each of Connecticut’s House Members would do just that.

Next, fix the 12^th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act; [I wonder how many of you know what they are? I will have more to say later].

Finally for Connecticut: Do For Elections What We Have Done For Probate:

Regionalize, Professionalize, Economize

Our town-by-town election system relies on 339, registrars of voters, often very part time, inadequately funded and trained. This system limits our capacity for serving voters and providing voting integrity. We can save money, yet also improve service and integrity.

Regionalization is key to efficient early voting and fixing our woeful ballot chain-of-custody.

IRV

Now for IRV and the NPV. I have three concerns with IRV

First, surveys show voters do not understand IRV. I am opposed to any voting scheme that requires a smarter voter.

Second, in close elections, where it might have value, it can take days or weeks to determine a winner, IRV is technically challenging to count, audit, and recount. The challenges grow with the size of the jurisdiction.

Finally, IRV does not deliver as promised – it provides the smarter voter with an impossible challenge to help and not hurt their candidate.

That is all I will say for now on IRV. Like all voting methods can be a crap shoot.

National Popular Vote Agreement

There are more serious issues with the National Popular Vote Agreement.

Like many of you, I learned in the fifth grade, in Ms. Hesbelt’s class, of the odd and unique Electoral College. She taught that we should elect our President by National Popular Vote. I believed that. I still do.

I have come to view our election system, through the eyes of a computer scientist. Reading the Agreement in 2007, I immediately saw unrecognized problems. Since then, I have continued to study our presidential election system, the Agreement, and those unrecognized problems,

I am convinced that the Agreement, cobbled onto an already risky system for determining the winner adds to that systems flaws. Seriously so.

I suspect, many of you also believe in electing the President by popular vote.

Today I do not expect to change many long held beliefs, but ask you to be to open some to ideas that you are not aware of, some consequences you have yet to consider –unintended, unrecognized, and unacknowledged consequences of the Agreement.

Choosing the President is governed by the 12th Amendment and the Electoral Count Act. The Supreme Court has ruled that they must be followed exactly — Causing the debacles in 1876 and 2000. Legal scholars call these laws a “Ticking Time Bomb”. The Agreement would not change that.

Just some states have audits and recounts. In 2000 the Supreme Court ruled that there was no time for Florida’s recounts and that they were insufficiently uniform.

Some say Recounts and Audits are unnecessary in a national popular vote. Some say they are possible under current law. I beg to disagree.

Many believe Al Gore won the popular vote in 2000. I say, “Without audits, how do you know”.

If just Florida had sufficient, timely recounts in 2000, and just Ohio had sufficient audits in 2004, we might have had a different candidate declared President. Or! Or we might have a lot more evidence and confidence that the winner was correctly decided.

Under the Agreement there would be no recount or audit to verify results in any election. Current audits and recounts, available in only about half the states are based, on close votes within a single state. Most could not be accomplished in time to satisfy Electoral Count Act. There is no national body to call for a recount, audit, or assess results.

Even worse, there is no official national popular vote number available in time to determine a winner, for Secretaries of State to choose their electors.

The official numbers are required to be sent to the Federal Government days after electors must be chosen and vote in each state. If you think that a future Ken Blackwell or Catherine Harris would not delay their official results to hamper the process, I would like to know what planet you live on.

Add to these risks several items;

There are many reasons under this scheme that voters, candidates, and officials could challenge the results provided and used by Secretaries of State. Any close election would likely end in a Supreme Court; likely to choose the President based on the precedents set in 2000 and 1876.

The Agreement does not make every voter equal, and cannot make every vote equal. Each state has a different franchise. A different level of voter suppression or encouragement.

The result of the Compact will be a race to the bottom without uninform voting methods, access, enfranchisement and integrity from state to state.

Currently fraud, error, and suppression is limited to swing states, with the Agreement it would be open season, without audits, recounts, or an official popular vote number.

Many of you will ask “If we elect our Governor by popular vote, why not the President.” The answer is that we have uniform election laws across Connecticut. We have an equal franchise, audits, and recanvasses.

Finally, let me encourage you to keep an open mind. Consider these unrecognized consequences. There are prerequisites to a trusted, credible National Popular Vote.

Thank you,

We had two minutes each to reply to questions from the audience. A couple of those merit additional links.

Media Reform – for ideas on where to start, I suggested John Nichols excellent book: The Death and Life of American Journalism
Better Voting Systems – I could only allude to the possibility and promise of better voting systems designed to serve the voters and officials, while providing election integrity. We are aware of two efforts, led by Dana DeBeauvoir, Travis County Texas, and Dean Logan, LA County, California. We will have more to say soon on Debeauvoir’s latest update presented at NIST and Logan’s effort. For now here is our coverage of DeBeauvoir’s effort as of two years ago <read>

Note: Deputy Secretary of the State James Spallone participated in the panel, replacing Cheri Quickmire from Common Cause, who unfortunately could not attend.

Online voting bill moves while Cyber Security Command outlines risks

Here in the land of steady habits, we are ready to move forward with blinders at the ready, apparently confident that our registrars, town clerks, and state IT department will never discover any attacks on on our voting systems, email systems, or fax machines.

On Friday the Government Administration and Elections Committee voted to draft H.B. 6111, for “online voting” putting it one step behind the bill from the Veterans Affairs committee bill for “email and fax voting”.

Meanwhile from the New York Times: Security Leader Says U.S. Would Retaliate Against Cyberattacks <read>

General Alexander’s testimony came on the same day the nation’s top intelligence official, James R. Clapper Jr., warned Congress that a major cyberattack on the United States could cripple the country’s infrastructure and economy, and suggested that such attacks now pose the most dangerous immediate threat to the United States, even more pressing than an attack by global terrorist networks…

General Alexander has been a major architect of the American strategy on this issue, but until Tuesday he almost always talked about it in defensive terms. He has usually deflected questions about America’s offensive capability, and turned them into discussions of how to defend against mounting computer espionage from China and Russia, and the possibility of crippling attacks on utilities, cellphone networks and other infrastructure…

“In some cases,” Mr. Clapper said in his testimony, “the world is applying digital technologies faster than our ability to understand the security implications and mitigate potential risks.” He said it was unlikely that Russia and China would launch “devastating” cyberattacks against the United States in the near future, but he said foreign spy services had already hacked the computer networks of government agencies, businesses and private companies.

Two specific attacks Mr. Clapper listed, an August 2012 attack against the Saudi oil company Aramco and attacks on American banks and stock exchanges last year, are believed by American intelligence officials to have been the work of Iran.

Testimony against six bills and for one

All of these bills are well intended. In fact, I would support most of the concepts, yet in only a single case could I support one of these bills , based on huge gaps between the good intent and the actual details present and missing in those bills.

Let me echo again, Paul Krugmann:

Three decades ago, when I went off for my year in the United States government, an old hand explained to me the nature of the job: it was mostly about fighting bad ideas. And these bad ideas, he went on to explain, were like cockroaches: no matter how many times you flush them down the toilet, they keep coming back.
– Paul Krugman

Oppose:

S.B. 901 – all but eliminate our post-election audits
H.B. 6428 – Town by town electronic check-in
S.B. 775 and S.B. 777 – Town by town, pollworker by pollworker check-in and polling-place lookup
S.B. 779 and H.B. 6429 – Make cross-endorsed voting easier on officials, more work for voters

Favor:

S.B. 1058 – Minor change to destruction of blank absentee ballots – lots more we should address beyond this minor change

Each of the .PDFs has a link to the associated bill(s)

Groundhog Deja Vue for Fax, Email Voting

Now we have it, a redrafted S.B. 647. We do not know who was involved around the table rewriting it, yet what we have is almost an exact copy of the bill Governor Malloy vetoed last year as risky and unconstitutional.

Three decades ago, when I went off for my year in the United States government, an old hand explained to me the nature of the job: it was mostly about fighting bad ideas. And these bad ideas, he went on to explain, were like cockroaches: no matter how many times you flush them down the toilet, they keep coming back.
– Paul Krugman

The Veterans Affairs Committee held hearings on Feb 19th on S.B. 647, An Act Concerning Voting By Members Of the Military Serving Overseas. We testified against the bill which would allow fax and email return of ballots for presumably military serving overseas. The concept is risky, unconstitutional, ineffective, and unnecessary – there are better, more economical alternatives available, proven effective in other states. The Committee talked of working with others to rewrite the bill. Two days later they voted to draft S.B. 647 as a committee bill.

Do not let the bill’s title mislead you. It is not just for the military, it includes all overseas voters(*). It is not just for overseas military and their dependents, it is for any military anywhere, presumably even a national guard member living and working in Connecticut:

any elector who is living, or expects to be living or traveling before and on election day, outside the territorial limits of the several states of the United States and the District of Columbia and any member of the armed forces who is an elector or an applicant for admission as an elector, or the ember’s spouse or dependent if living where such member is stationed…

*Although we are opposed to online, email, and fax voting, we are in favor of treating all overseas voters equally, including military contractors, State Department staff, CIA staff, Peace Corps volunteers, and NGO staff and volunteers.

The problem with Internet voting, in video and in text

Timely for us in Connecticut as our Legislature contemplates online, email, or fax voting for military voters, while they also contemplate mandating towns to provide Internet access to all registrars.

All we can say is “If election officials cannot afford to be on the Internet, how can they provide online, email, or fax voting? If they do not use email, how can they understand Internet Security?”

Barbara Simons has a Ted Talk on Internet voting along with an extensive paper, co-authored with Doug Jones.

As they say: “We frequently are asked, ‘If I can bank online, why can’t I vote online?’ The question assumes that online banking is safe and secure. However, banks routinely and quietly replenish funds lost to online fraud in order to maintain public confidence.”

Nov 2012 Post-Election Audit Report – Flawed From The Start

Coalition Finds Continuing Problems with Election Audit and A New Flaw

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Highly Inaccurate List
of Election Districts

The report concluded, the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the:

Lack of integrity in the random district selection.
Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities and the lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies.
Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “We found significant, unexplained errors, for municipalities across the state, in the list of districts in the random drawing. This random audit was highly flawed from the start because the drawing was highly flawed.”

Cheryl Dunson, President, League of Women Voters of Connecticut, stated,, “Two years ago, the Legislature passed a law, at the Secretary of the State’s request, which was intended to fix inaccuracies in the drawing. For whatever reason, errors in the drawing have dramatically increased.

Weeks added, “Some officials follow the audit procedures and do effective work. This year one town investigated discrepancies and found errors to correct in their election procedures – that is one value of performing the audits as intended.”

Without adherence to procedures, accurate random drawings, a reliable chain-of-custody, and transparent public follow-up, when discrepancies are reported, if there was ever a significant fraud or error it would not be recognized and corrected.
<More Details>

Coalition Finds Continuing Problems with Election Audit and A New Flaw

Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Highly Inaccurate List
of Election Districts

The report concluded, the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the:

Lack of integrity in the random district selection.
Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities and the lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies.
Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.

Testimony: Three bills, including the National Popular Vote

Monday I testified on three bills, primarily the National Popular Vote Compact. Although I oppose the bill, and have since 2007, I actually favor the popular election of the President. Yet, we have a mismatch between our current state-by-state election system which not a match for the demands of a national popular vote that is fair and one we can trust. Like Europe before the Euro, we have a lot of work to do and details to attend to before we could make the change.

S.B. 432 National Popular Vote
S.J. 18 Applauding the Electoral College
H.J. 36 Early Voting
(links are to testimony, which have links to the bills)

I also prepared written oral remarks <read>. I adjusted my actual remarks to address critical issues raised or overlooked earlier in the hearing.

In 2007 and 2009 I was the loan dissenter in testimony opposing the Compact for technical reasons. Since 2011, I have been joined by a growing number of others. This year, most prominently, by former State University System Chancellor, William Cibes. I am sure, all things considered, Daniel Patrick Moynihan would have liked to join us in person.

Testimony: Online voting and three other bills

The hearing was close to six and one-half hours, 11:00am – 5:30pm. I was next to the last speaker. I applaud the committee members and public staying until the end, especially the two Co-Chairs and the Senate Ranking Member – they really listened to me and the last speaker, they asked excellent questions and provided the time for complete answers. Five Registrars of Voters also stayed as well.

On Friday we submitted testimony on four bills, limiting our oral testimony to the bill for online voting:

S.B. 283 Online Voting for Military Voters
S.B. 668 Training Election Officials
H.B. 6100 Voluntary Rationalization of Election Functions
H.B. 6111 Uniform Military and Overseas Voting
(links are to testimony, which have links to the bills)

The hearing was close to six and one-half hours, 11:00am – 5:30pm. I was next to the last speaker. I applaud the committee members staying and public until the end, especially the two Co-Chairs and the Senate Ranking Member – they really listened to me and the last speaker, they asked excellent questions and provided the time for complete answers. Five Registrars of Voters also stayed as well.

I also prepared written oral remarks <read>. I adjusted my actual remarks to address critical issues raised or overlooked in this hearing and the on three days before on email and fax voting.

That nobody in either hearing or the Tuesday press conference mentioned the free express mail service available from the USPS and FVAP (Federal Voting Assistance Program). Those unaware included election officials, military who told of snail mail being too slow, and Voting Assistance Officers (VAOs)charged by Congress with providing information to assist military voters. Here is the flyer that should have been posted around the globe <flyer>
Statistics show that ballots mailed through the USPS/FVAP program were almost all returned within 5-7 days.
I pointed out that the very same VAOs that are charged with making military members aware of the express mail program, are also charged with making computers, printers, scanners, and fax machines available for voting.

In Tuesday’s hearing, Representative Alexander, a recent VAO told of the process for faxing votes and his associated fears: Votes to be faxed are passed up the line through several levels from the soldier before they are faxed. Representative Alexander was concerned that some along the way might change votes, not recognizing the seriousness of the matter.
My concerns hearing that were: What happens to the paper ballot after it is faxed? No matter how honest and secure the process, the average soldier might suspect that his/her ballot would be seen by someone in the chain-of-command and might decide to vote in the way they thought their leaders might what.

No video of the hearings available yet. Another hearing tomorrow, Monday. I will be testifying on three more bills.

Fax and email voting: Hearing Highlights

With the same success as Rhode Island, perhaps this bill would decrease Connecticut’s failed return rate from 40% to 36.8%.

CT-N has posted the video from the Veterans’ Affairs hearing. About a half-hour to three-quarters of an hour of the four and one-half hour hearing pertained to fax and email voting. Watching the Windows Media Player version, you can see the times and select testimony you would like to watch <video> (click on lower left where it says ‘open in media player’)

Earlier coverage <read>

Overall:

Sadly, CT has a 40% failure return rate according to the Secretary of the State (SOTS)

Here are some highlights:

0:34 Town Clerk of Waterbury for the Town Clerks Assn.

0:41 She discusses risks of fraud

0:44 Sen Slossberg the sponsor

0:51 Rep Alexander, a former Adjutant and Voting Assistance Officer

Describes the risks of Fax on the submission end
(Much worse than I had imagined, also where does
the ballot go after faxing? Would a soldier vote
the way he/she thinks higher ups would want,
assuming they might look?)

1:00 Deputy SOTS James Spallone

Good review of OVF data and security concern

1:10 Senator Slossberg
Has info from all 29 states that do email and fax return that there have never been any problems

1:54 Vet that had return problem

Sen Slossberg asks if he is smart enough to waive rights

1:59 Rhode Island SOS Office

No fraud allegations in all these years

Less risk in RI as they do centrally

53/1700 were sent in email/fax

Note: At 53/1700 sent in for RI, even if all those would not otherwise have been counted, then the return rate would only have been increased by 3.2%, after the system has been available since 1999. With the same success as Rhode Island, perhaps this bill would decrease Connecticut’s failed return rate from 40% to 36.8%.