LWVCT: Voters Guide to Secretary of the State Candidates

Would you support legislation and funding to require post-election audits to be conducted by others than the same local officials who conducted the local election?

The League of Women Voters have published a guide to the Secretary of the State Candidates, listing their qualifications and their responses to two questions <read>

Jerry Farrell, Jr.
The Secretary of the State and local registrars of voters are responsible for both running our elections and conducting post-election audits of our voting machines. Would you support legislation and funding to require post-election audits to be conducted by others than the same local officials who conducted the local election? Please explain.

I do believe that there are improvements that can be made in the post-election audits that would enhance the credibility of the election process. It will be my responsibility to ensure that our elections are open and fair. I support having “outside auditors” as part of the post-election audit, as it would add to the transparency and legitimacy of both the audit and the election itself. I do believe that we need to approach the idea in a way that does not add to the financial burdens and mandates that municipal and state governments are facing.

Denise Wright Merrill
The Secretary of the State and local registrars of voters are responsible for both running our elections and conducting post-election audits of our voting machines. Would you support legislation and funding to require post-election audits to be conducted by others than the same local officials who conducted the local election? Please explain.

There is no greater mandate than to ensure elections are fair, open and accountable. The Secretary of the State randomly selects precincts to be audited and audits are open to the public. This provides accountability.

I believe that post-election audits should include third party review. I would work with the coalition that proposed these solutions to determine whether this could be achieved in a cost-effective manner. I would also review other recommendations made by the coalition such as requiring best practices and consistent procedures for post-election audits and propose legislation to conform our laws to those practices.

No responses were received from other candidates on the ballot.

Common Sense: The Indispensable Role Of Voter Verified Paper Ballots

Paper ballots filled out by voters are inherently “Voter Verified”. They provide the ultimate record of voters’ intent. They alone provide the opportunity for determining the exact result in close elections and the opportunity to verify the correct result in all elections. They alone provide the opportunity for public transparency necessary for real trust and confidence. Voter Verified Paper Ballots alone provide the opportunity for voting integrity, a necessary prerequisite for democracy.

Note: This is the second post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <previous> <next>

Among the heroes of our Democracy, George Washington has been called The Indispensable Man. When it comes to voting integrity, voter verified paper ballots play The Indispensable Role.

Perhaps there is an alternative. I’ll grant that paper might not be the only possible media. Voter verified stone tablets/ballots might work but are hardly realistic. Beyond a different permanent media, so far, no safe alternative has been proposed which has withstood scrutiny.

The alternatives that fail to pass scrutiny, so far:

  • Basic Touch Screen Electronic Voting (DREs)
  • DREs with “Voter Verified” Paper Trails
  • Internet Voting (including: Websites, Email, or Kiosk based)

Any form of voting that relies solely on computers for integrity is subject to fraud and error:

A hardware error could occur changing a program, or causing a touch screen or scanner to function improperly and unexpected, undetectably, to dramatically change a result – either on an individual voting machine or in transmitting or accumulating results.

An unscrupulous insider could change a program or function of a computer in a variety of ways that could be difficult or impossible to detect.

A voting machine could be programmed incorrectly to begin with, running correctly for years and then suddenly produce the wrong result on a particular set of ballots or based on the placement or spelling of a particular candidate’s name.

(It is not common sense that the spelling of a candidate’s name could change the result. It is common sense for experienced computer programmers. Programmers all have stories of mysterious problems. Believe it or not! I cannot send emails with my cell number including imbeded dashes ‘-‘, I can use periods ‘.” and other marks, I can use other phone numbers but not my particular cell number with dashes – the sent emails just plain disappear. I was using the cell number on my email signature.  It took months of lost emails, lost communications, interpersonal misunderstandings, changing software and email providers to no avail. until I stumbled onto this hard to believe fact. I still find it hard to believe, but it was repeatedly, rigorously tested to my amazed/dismayed satisfaction. As far as I can tell it is either a Microsoft or Apache bug which I have not pursued.)

No amount of testing or security can be sufficient to prevent such errors and fraud:

Based on Alan Turing’s Halting Problem it is impossible to determine, in general, that a computer program will do what it is expected to do in all possible circumstances. We could test many sequences of ballots and prove they are counted correctly, but in different circumstances the computer might function differently: A different set of ballots, a different sequence of their submission, submission at a different time, or with different time delays between ballots etc. could yield different results. In reality, it would be almost impossible to test each voting machine with a reasonable number of typical sets of ballots to provide reasonable levels of confidence, let alone test each machine before each election.

Beyond these basic, insurmountable obstacles, voting has unique challenges:

  • Resources are limited. Election officials, in general have limited computer and security expertise. Jurisdictions cannot afford the expertise to plan reasonably effective testing and security measures. They cannot perform extensive testing of single voting machines, let alone each machine before each election.
  • Election computers are programmed anew for each election. Past results do not imply that current programming is reliable or that new errors or fraud have not been induced.
  • Scanners or touch screens can go out of alignment or develop blind/weak spots and errors.
  • Security measures to prevent insider tampering with programming and computer chips would be prohibitively extensive, costly, and sophisticated.

Each of the current alternatives have their own limitations:

Touch screen (DRE) voting machines without paper trails do not have transparent records which can be verified by the voter or election officials after elections. There is no way for anyone to determine if a vote cast by a voter increased the vote for the correct candidates; no way for the public or officials to determine if the counters or electronic records of votes accurately reflect the voters’ actual choices.

Internet voting methods are subject to all the risks of the public and “private secure” Internets.  Sophisticated Government agencies and corporations are regularly subject to hacking (e.g. Google and the U.S. Defense Department). It is wildly optimistic and delusional  to expect voting jurisdictions or voting vendors to do as well, let alone better. Kiosks mitigate a few, but hardly all of these risks. Banks lose billions in ATM electronic fraud each year – once again, they are more sophisticated and can afford more to avoid costly fraud. And bankers have an advantage with double entry bookkeeping and customer receipts which provide means to detect fraud – means by definition unavailable to electronic voting. The recent extensive Wikileaks disclosure of government documents is an example of what a lone or very limited number of insiders can do in compromising the security of a system.

Paper trail DREs provide an inadequate substitute for voter verified paper ballots. The current paper trails are difficult to read for voters and officials and are frequently lost to jams oeundetected “out of paper” conditions.  A small percentage of voters actually verify their vote – fraud or error can misclassify a significant percentage of votes, with the smaller percentage verified chalked up to “I/you must have pushed the wrong button”.  Beyond this DREs are much more costly to purchase, operate, and audit than optical scanners.

The Bottom Line

It is theoretically impossible to develop a computer only voting solution that is not subject error and fraud. Beyond theory, common sense shows that proposed electronic voting systems are subject to error and insider fraud, with all but impossible testing and security requirements, well beyond the capabilities and resources available to election officials.

Paper ballots filled out by voters are inherently “Voter Verified”. They provide the ultimate record of voters’ intent. They alone provide the opportunity for determining the exact result in close elections and the opportunity to verify the correct result in all elections. They alone provide the opportunity for public transparency necessary for real trust and confidence. Voter Verified Paper Ballots alone provide the opportunity for voting integrity, a necessary prerequisite for democracy.

We will have much more to say.  “Opportunity” is insufficient.

Hartford Courant joins in fighting last [election] war

Clearly we got one thing right last month, when we said June primaries are a “Sure media winner”. If the primaries are moved to June we will reference this post when complaints are made that the campaign season is too long or to have the Legislature pay more attention to business in the 1st quarter of an election year.

In an editorial today, the Hartford Courant joins Secretary of the State, Susan Bysiewicz, in moving primary elections to June, unlimited absentee voting, and election day registration: How To Turn Up Voter Turnout – An Earlier Primary . . . . . . And two other reforms should boost interest in elections <read>

Ms. Bysiewicz is right. The Aug. 10 turnout — even with some competitive contests between strong candidates — was sickly. Fewer than one in four Democrats reported to the polls, and fewer than one in three Republicans voted.

She suggests the election calendar be changed to make the primary in June, “while children are still in school and parents are more tuned in to news and public affairs before we all go into summer vacation mode.” A June primary makes sense as long as the party conventions — whose main business is to endorse candidates — are moved back in the calendar as well — to, say, March. Keeping the conventions in late May and moving the primary elections to the first half of June would give party-endorsed candidates an even greater advantage than they now have.

The secretary of the state’s other two ideas are so-called “no-excuse” absentee balloting and Election Day registration. Both of those have resulted in increased voter turnout in states that have adopted them.

No-excuse absentee balloting is a form of early voting. It should work in Connecticut so long as political operatives are prohibited from distributing absentee ballot applications and strong-arming vulnerable residents — the elderly or incapacitated, for example — into voting for the operatives’ choices.

As CTVotersCount readers know we conditionally support Election Day Registration (EDR) – conditioned on an implementation that supports voting integrity along with voter convenience – providing election day registration in each polling place followed by the same voting methods used by other voters, as is the case in all but one of the apparently successful EDR states.

We are opposed to the expansion of all forms of mail-in voting, including no-excuse absentee voting. Abuses of absentee voting have occurred in Connecticut and occur on a larger scale in other states with significant levels of absentee voting – it is not worth the risk.  Even the Courant Editorial recognizes the risks adds conditions to its endorsement. We remain opposed given the track record here and elsewhere <ref> <ref>.  According to the Courant:

Absentee balloting has been used by unscrupulous politicians as an illegal vote-grabbing racket for years, especially in Hartford. Safeguards would have to be built into the system if it is expanded.

As we said last month when Secretary Bysiewicz proposed a June Primary:

This is not a voting integrity issue, yet we place it in the category of “Fighting the last [election] war” (i.e. Changes/reforms that look good when attempting to correct a recent, assumed election problem, without looking at all the consequences. ) We say “Be careful what you ask for”:

Starting in June would move the whole campaign season forward by two months:  Earlier primary, earlier state conventions, earlier pre-convention announcements, gaining support, election committees etc.

  • Many voters complain already that campaigns are too long
  • Many officials complain they are always campaigning
  • Would the Legislature’s “Short Session” be two months shorter, or would they pay less attention to state business?
  • Would candidates want/need more money for longer campaigns (A sure media winner)
  • Would challenging primary candidates find it harder to start earlier.

Finally, its unlikely that lower turnout is due to more travel in 2010 than in 2006 – more likely, its less interest in the differences between candidates and more turnoff by campaign tactics.

Clearly we got one thing right last month, when we said June primaries are a “Sure media winner”.  If the primaries are moved to June we will reference this post when complaints are made that the campaign season is too long or to have the Legislature pay more attention to business in the 1st quarter of an election year.

Do You Know A Military or Overseas Voter? Act Now!!!

Tell them they can express their voted ballots back to the U.S. from 94 countries, at a huge discount.

We recommend that all Military and Overseas voters review the information on voting at the Overseas Vote Foundation.  If you know an Overseas or Military voter (or a citizen overseas or in the military that may want to vote) please extend this recommendation to them.

Also the Overseas Vote Foundation has set up a steep discount for expressing back voted ballots:

We know you’ve been waiting for it. So we’re thrilled to announce that we have teamed up again this year with FedEx Express to offer Express Your Vote in 94 countries. (Fourteen more than in 2008!)

The one-of-its-kind Express Your Vote program provides highly discounted rates for express delivery of voted ballots back to local election offices in the United States.

See their site for <Countries, Deadlines and Rates>

Common Sense Election Integrity

One of the benefits of using optical scanners for voting is the requirement for voter marked paper ballots. They are much more reliable and useful than the paper records produced by some DRE (touch screen) voting machines. However, obtaining these benefits depends on the details surrounding the use of optical scanners and paper ballots. To provide true election integrity, Connecticut, like most states, needs to do much better in every dimension.

Note: This is the first post in an occasional series on Common Sense Election Integrity, summarizing, updating, and expanding on many previous posts covering election integrity, focused on Connecticut. <next>

One of the benefits of using optical scanners for voting is the requirement for voter marked paper ballots. They are much more reliable and useful than the paper records produced by some DRE (touch screen) voting machines:

  • Marked by voters, paper ballots, should accurately reflect the voters’ intent. Voter verifiable paper records (produced by DREs) are actually reviewed in detail by very few voters, providing an opportunity for fraud and for significant errors to go undetected.
  • Compared with curly, poorly printed, closely spaced DRE records (usually similar to store receipts), paper ballots are relatively easily preserved, organized, and recounted. They can be carefully reviewed for voters’ intent in the case of very close elections.
  • Properly tuned and programmed optical scanners can quickly and accurately count large numbers of ballots with many contests.

However, obtaining these benefits depends on the details surrounding the use of optical scanners and paper ballots. At a high level the requirements are:

  • The integrity of the paper ballots must be guaranteed by a trusted, reliable chain-of-custody.
  • There must be a trusted, reliable reporting process for accumulating results from multiple polling places and jurisdictions.
  • There must be a trusted, reliable post-election audit process that will detect and correct errors or fraud in ballot accounting, optical scanning, manual counting, and reporting process
  • In very close elections there must be a thorough, transparent, and adversarial recount.
  • The entire process must be effective, followed uniformly, enforceable, and enforced, along with a maximum opportunity for public transparency and meaningful observation.
  • The risks of error and opportunity for fraud should be minimized by: non-partisan and opposing party election management/oversight; security, testing, and controls over optical scanner programming and chain-of-custody; and extensive training and certification of election officials.

To provide true election integrity, Connecticut, like most states, needs to do much better in every one of these dimensions.

Warning: New link to check your CT Voter Registration – Not Always Accurate

It has come to our attention that the voter information provided by the Secretary of the State’s new web tool is inaccurate in some cases.

We learned this in the course of discovering a loophole in the integrity of the post-election audit random drawing process.

It has come to our attention that the voter information provided by the Secretary of the State’s new web tool is inaccurate in some cases.

We learned this in the course of discovering a loophole in the integrity of the post-election audit random drawing process:

This spring we realized that there was no way for us to verify the  accuracy of the  list of polling districts subject to se4lection in the 10% random drawing for post-election audits. Each time we had attended the drawing we checked a list of districts supplied by the Secretary of the State’s office against the slips placed in the barrel and occasionally founds some differences to correct. This spring, it occurred to us that we did not have a way to verify the list of districts we were given. In subsequent discussions with the Secretary of the State’s Office, we learned that municipalities are not obligated to send lists of polling places to the Secretary of the State. Municipalities are requested to do that, most do, but are not required to. The Secretary of the State’s Office has proposed legislation to mandate that information be sent, but like many bills it was never passed by the Legislature.

Subsequently we proposed that the list of districts be determined by extracting them from the Secretary of the State’s web feature for voter polling place look up.  Unfortunately, we learned that was also an unreliable source of a list of polling places, and must therefor be supplying incorrect information to some voters. The point was brought home to us when we called on of the towns selected for audit in the most recent random drawing: The district chosen in the town for audit did not currently exist.  The non-existent district was replaced by an alternate in another town, yet without a good lists of districts required an audit loophole is created since existing districts not included in the drawing could be known in advance and therefor guaranteed not to be audited.

Reviewing the Secretary of the State’s press release sent on August 5th, we see that another potential cause of inaccuracy was initially disclosed:  <read>

The website will also provide the location of the individual’s polling place. Users must be aware that occasional special conditions can force changes in
polling places. For the most up to date location, voters should check with their town offices and local registrar of voters.

However, we caution that we can find no similar caution of disclaimer on the website itself associated with the lookup feature. The only mention is in the posted press release.

Update: 9/4/2010

I observed a post-election audit yesterday.  Both districts selected in the random drawing were incorrectly identified by district numbers. Fortunately, the locations were correct and each polling place had only one district. Perhaps the problem is pervasive.

************Original Post 8/5/2010

Link to the Secretary of the State’s website to check that you are registered to vote:<click>  More voting information: <click>

While we applaud the Secretary and her staff for making this available, we have one suggestion: Include the party affiliation in the results. We find that many voters do not recall their affiliation, if any. Having that available would reduce much confusion and unnecessary work for voters and registrars.

CTMirror Op-Ed: State recanvass law inadequate for close elections

The recent Hartford close vote, recanvass and election challenge provides an example to highlight the limitations of the Connecticut recanvass law. Read our op-ed published today in the CTMirror.

The recent Hartford close vote, recanvass and election challenge provides an example to highlight the limitations of the Connecticut recanvass law.  Read our op-ed published today in the CTMirror: <read>

State recanvass law inadequate for close elections

You may have heard or read about post-election recounts after the recent primary. The reports were incorrect. There were no recounts. Connecticut law calls for something else, a recanvass.

The current recanvass law and procedures are inadequate to assure that the every vote is counted accurately and the correct winner certified. Experience shows that the current law is not well understood by election officials, candidates, and the media. The recanvass is often referred to as a recount, yet it is a far cry from the thorough, transparent, and adversarial recount process in other states. A positive example was the highly publicized Minnesota recount of the U.S. Senate race in 2008.

Connecticut’s current recanvass procedures are designed to parallel, for optical scanners, a law which was written for lever machines. In the age of lever machines recanvassing meant rereading counters of lever machines and recounting absentee ballots by hand. The current parallel optical scan procedure calls for rescanning most ballots and hand counting those that election officials deem to have a potential for being misinterpreted by the scanner.

The procedures to select ballots for hand counting are inadequate and do not spell out how ballots should be examined and the standards for manually evaluating them that would conform to law and precedent. Bubbles can be incompletely filled so that they might not be read by the scanner; the voter may have missed the bubble completely; the voter may have crossed out one candidate bubble and filled in another, which the machine would not have counted as a vote; and there may be voter identifying marks on either side of the ballot, which would disqualify the ballot altogether. Observing two optical scan recanvasses, I have seen that, in general, neither candidates nor election officials understand these important details.

The recanvass process is not transparent. The public may only observe from a distance. Even if candidates understand the details, they are only allowed two observers each to watch the entire process. Observers may not object during the process unless election officials consent and act on the objections. Two observers may be insufficient if more than two critical operations are being performed simultaneously, such as multiple teams counting ballots while others assess the scanability of ballots. Some municipalities have separate teams simultaneously counting several districts. Once again, my experience shows that officials and candidates do not generally understand how closely the process should be observed.

Compare that to the way Minnesota handles recounts: All votes are reviewed and counted by hand by teams of two officials, each team closely observed by a representative of each candidate. Both sides of each ballot are shown and examined for disqualifying voter identifying marks. The officials determine if and how each ballot counts. Any of the candidate representatives can disagree, in which case the ballot will later be adjudicated by agreement of the campaigns or, when necessary, by a state canvassing board.

The need for change in Connecticut is evident from the recent primary and recanvass of the race for state representative between incumbent Kenneth Green and Matthew Ritter in Hartford and Bloomfield. Preliminary results had Green ahead by two votes and the recanvass has Ritter ahead by two votes. Just one vote assigned to the wrong candidate or just two votes disqualified could mean a tie.

Green is contesting the count, pointing to some irregularities in the process. Candidates and voters should go beyond that and insist on a thorough, transparent, and adversarial recount on the general principle that the current process, even if accomplished flawlessly by the procedures, is inadequate in very close elections.

Luther Weeks is executive director of CTVotersCount and the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of other Coalition member organizations.

Candidate pledges to “ensure open, fair and secure elections.”

“The Office of Secretary of the State is charged with safeguarding everyone’s right to vote and I will do everything in my power to ensure open, fair and secure elections. Everyone’s vote must count. “

Denise Merrill released a letter on the occasion of the anniversary of the 19th amendment. We are pleased to note the strong statement included in support of election integrity. We trust that all candidates for Secretary of the State are in favor of election integrity, but note that it is regularly overlooked or underemphasized in campaign talks, web sites, and mailers. <the full statement>

The Office of Secretary of the State is charged with safeguarding everyone’s right to vote and I will do everything in my power to ensure open, fair and secure elections. Everyone’s vote must count.  Voting should be easy and I will work hard to explore ways to increase registration and voter turnout.

But more importantly, I believe we need to inspire people to vote. These are difficult times and people are worried about the economy.  We need to give people a reason to vote and get involved

Candidate files complaint in close election recanvass. Update: Another candidate complaint

In our opinion, in a race a close as this one, the only satisfactory solution is a complete, manual, adversarial recount. While some of Mr. Green’s allegations are cause for concern, even if the recanvass was performed competently, thoroughly, and legally there may be ballots that were not properly classified due to insufficient scrutiny for voter intent and voter identification. Such differences could easily change the winner is this close a race, disqualifying two votes or reversing just one vote could make a tie.

8/25/2010: Via CTNewsJunkie, Ken Green has filed a complaint in the Hartford election, where election night results had him winning by two votes and a close vote racanvass has him losing by two votes. His complaint alleges several questionable machine counts . irregularities, and potential chain of custody issues. The race was for a state house seat which crosses Bloomfield and Hartford requiring a recanvass of the race in both towns. <The Complaint>

Update: Hartford Courant Artilce with more details from the candidates <read>

Just how close do elections need to be to cause an actual, thorough, complete and adversarial recount?

Our Opinion:

The Connecticut Recanvass law is a useful method of reviewing results in close elections. It is based on the former practice of recounting absentee ballots, rereading totals from the backs of all lever machines and retotalling. Now most votes are recounted by scanner with some held back for hand counting. It is not the careful, adversarial, recount performed in other states such as Minnesota. When there is a moderate spread between candidates it would be of value to detect totalling errors, transcription errors, and scanner errors.

But the ultimate value of the recanvass is limited because each ballot is not thoroughly reviewed for voter’s intent and disqualifying marks which could identify the voter. Identifying marks could occur on either side of a ballot and would require that both sides be evaluated by election officials under the watchful eyes of representatives of both candidates. In fact, every ballot in a very close race should be evaluated by election officials and representatives for each candidate. There are usually a small number of ballots that can be difficult to classify which require study, discussion, and even adjudication by a court (e.g. as we saw in the Minnesota recount for Senate in 2008). A recanvass does not provide for such thorough scrutiny by election officials. It does not provide for close scrutiny or objections by candidate representatives. The law only allows two observers for each candidate. Two observers may not be enough to observe every activity going on simultaneously in a recanvass.

In our opinion, in a race a close as this one, the only satisfactory solution is a complete, manual, adversarial recount. While some of Mr. Green’s allegations are cause for concern, even if the recanvass was performed competently, thoroughly, and legally there may be ballots that were not properly classified due to insufficient scrutiny for voter intent and voter identification.  Such differences could easily change the winner is this close a race, disqualifying two votes or reversing just one vote could make a tie.

We have observed some aspects of three recanvasses in three municipalities.  All were performed using different methods and understandings of the same law. None were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of accuracy in this close a race. Here are two examples of my experiences:<Cromwell> <Hartford>

Update, also via CTNewsJunkie:  Second Lawsuit Filed Over Hartford Recount <the 2nd Complaint>

This complaint is by the losing candidate in the other election recanvassed (not recounted) in Hartford.  This complaint alleges election management and chain of custody irregularities that question the fairness of the election and the credibility of the paper ballots.

Update: Green’s day in court <read>

Update: Green Says Registrar Lied On Stand <read>